

SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY

**An Extension of Steve Bruce's
Secularization Paradigm and Its Application
to Alevi Communities in Turkey**

Volkan ERTİT

Copyright © Volkan Ertit 2017
All Rights Reserved
ISBN: 978-975-6124-50-5

Interior layout and design, by Yeter BAYSAL
Cover, by Meltem YILMAZ
Manufactured by ORIENT Publishing House
Printed by Bizim Dijital Matbaacılık, in Ankara, Turkey

The Radboud University Nijmegen has kindly provided financial support for the printing of this thesis.

SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY

An Extension of Steve Bruce's Secularization Paradigm and Its Application to Alevi Communities in Turkey

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 10 maart 2017
om 11.30 uur precies

door

Volkan ERTİT

geboren op 22 oktober 1983 te Adana, Turkije

Promotoren:

Prof. dr. E. van der Zweerde

Prof. dr. C. van Nieuwkerk

Manuscriptcommissie:

Prof. dr. J.B.A.M. Schilderman

Prof. dr. T. Sunier (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Prof. dr. J.P. Wils

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	1
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING.....	5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	9

INTRODUCTION.....	13
The Research Problems / Organization of the Study.....	17
Research Methods.....	31
Relevance of the Thesis.....	33
Limitations.....	34
Structure of the Thesis.....	36

PART A: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER I

SECULARIZATION AS A CONCEPT.....	39
What does Secularization Mean?.....	39
What does Secularization not Mean?.....	49

CHAPTER II

THE SECULARIZATION PARADIGM OF STEVE BRUCE.....	69
A Paradigm That Belongs to Protestantism.....	70
Why not Other Theories, But Bruce's Paradigm.....	86

CHAPTER III

THE EXTENDED SECULARIZATION PARADIGM.....	99
The Role of Natural Sciences in the Secularization Process.....	103
The Role of Capitalism in the Secularization Process.....	127
The Role of Urbanization in the Secularization Process.....	146
What does the Extended Secularization Paradigm not Assert.....	166

PART B: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL STUDY.....	191
Alevi.....	198
Revival of Alevism.....	203
Generation Gap With Regard to Modernization Level.....	222
Generation Gap With Regard to Marital Issues.....	253

PART C: DISCUSSION

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION.....	285
Towards Modernization Almost in Every Way.....	285
Secularization of Alevi or Revival of Alevism.....	289

CONCLUSION.....	301
REFERENCES.....	320

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Social Transformation of Turkey.....	345
APPENDIX B: The Semi-Structured Interview Sample With a Parent.....	351
APPENDIX C: The Semi-Structured Interview Sample With a Child.....	369
APPENDIX D: Interview Form.....	389
APPENDIX E: Map of Research Fields.....	393

List of Tables

Table A1. A café (previously frequented only by those who had a secular lifestyle) and secular way of action.....	51
Table A2. Frequency of Usage of the Concepts “Laic-Laicism-Laicization” and “Secular-Secularism-Secularization” by Four Mass Newspapers.....	61
Table A3. Increase and decrease of belief in God, Western and Eastern Germany, 1991 and 1998 (%).....	72
Table A4. Regular church attendance among Catholics and Protestants in Western Germany, 1952-1999 (%).....	73
Table A5: Levels in the under-five mortality rate, 1990-2010 (deaths per 1000 live births).....	120
Table A6. The Perceived Functions of Religious Authorities.....	129
Table A7. Social Characteristics of Religious Participation.....	130
Table A8. Religiosity by Type of Society.....	131
Table A9. Frequency of church attendance in West Europe 1999/2000 (some examples) %.....	179
Table A10. Extent of religious belief in West Europe 1999/2000 (some examples) %.....	180
Table B1. Educational Background of Respondents.....	223
Table B2. The Enrolment Rate in Turkey (%).....	224
Table B3. Line of Work before Marriage.....	224
Table B4. Ratio of Labour Sector in Turkey.....	225
Table B5. Fertility Rate of Respondents.....	225
Table B6. Births in a Medical Institution.....	228
Table B7. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-Five Mortality Rate in Turkey.....	232
Table B8. Changing Heating Methods and Their Fuels in Alevi Communities.....	238
Table B9. The Figure of Case and Deaths Related to Polio, Pertussis and Diphtheria, 1970-2003, Turkey.....	244

Table B10. The number of people who lived apart from family before marriage.....	248
Table B11. Average Age of First Marriage.....	249
Table B12. Average Age on First Marriage in Turkey.....	250
Table B13. Types of Marriage.....	251
Table B14. Premarital Datings.....	253
Table B15. The Number of People Married to a Non-Alevi.....	261
Table B16. The Figure of Divorced People.....	268
Table B17. Being in Spiritual Brotherhood.....	279
Table C1. Demographic Indicators by Type of Society.....	286

List of Figures

Figure A1. Bruce's Secularization Paradigm.....	76
Figure A2. The Extended Secularization Paradigm.....	101

List of Pictures

Picture A1. Halley's comet was depicted as a portent of doom in the Bayeux Tapestry (BBC, 2013, March 15).....	113
Picture A2. Unexplained Earth Phenomenon: The Moving Rocks in Death Valley National Park (Strange Sounds, 2012, December 4).....	115
Picture A3. Satellite Images of Atatürk Dam and Harran District (Google Earth).....	123
Picture A4: Atatürk on a mountain.....	186
Picture A5: Allah in a tomato.....	186

ABSTRACT

The meaning of secularization and the question whether a society has secularized or not are still very controversial subjects in the academic world. A profound lack of agreement regarding the definition and measurement of secularization is characteristic of contemporary intellectual life. With this in mind, this thesis claims that Steve Bruce's secularization paradigm (that the modernization process increases secularization and that the Protestant Reformation is the fountainhead of this transformation observed in Western Europe) is valid not only for West European countries and their offshoots, but may also provide valuable insights into the secularization processes in other modern or modernizing parts of the world. But to render Bruce's paradigm valid for non-Protestant societies, his paradigm had to be slightly extended. In this regard, aspects of his paradigm that relate to the history of Europe have to be downplayed (dynamics related to the Protestant Reformation), while those with more universal relevance, such as scientific advancements, industrial capitalism and urbanization, have to be highlighted.

The contribution of scientific advances to the secularization process seems to have taken place not directly, but indirectly. Developments in science increase the level of human rational consciousness,

and reduce the number of cases where religion touches upon the lives of people. Capitalism is a very powerful dynamic that can turn societies characterized by collective consciousness, hierarchy, simple division of labour, homogeneous-small-isolated communities, powerful customs and traditions that are mingled with religion, into societies characterized by specialization, individualization, rationalization, advanced transportation, split-second communication, and mass production. Urbanization tends to undermine functions of the supranatural forces in three ways: by increasing mobility, offering more alternatives in almost every aspect of life, and lastly by creating and protecting supranatural-free private spaces. The key hypothesis is the following: Three factors, viz. scientific advancements, industrial capitalism, and urbanization can lead to secularization in societies irrespective of the prevailing metaphysical realm.

To illustrate the hypothesis developed in this thesis empirically, the proposed extended secularization paradigm based on scientific advancements, capitalism and urbanization has been applied to the Alevi communities in Turkey. There are two fundamental reasons behind this choice: 1) Turkey is not part of Europe or one of its offshoots, and has not experienced the Protestant Reformation in its history. 2) There are many publications which seem to suggest an Alevi revival in Turkey after 1980s. Therefore, this study chose the Alevis in the Adana, Çorum and Tunceli regions as its focus, with premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, the institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people's court in these communities as the topics to be explored, since these are all directly influenced by the religious culture. The institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people's court are dealt with in this study as far as they are concerned with marital issues. During the fieldwork, 28 core questions with regard to marriage were posed to a total of 30 pairs of persons in three cities (with each city having ten pairs) from two generations (parents and children) in semi-structured in-

interviews to acquire insights into the generation gap with regard to faith and its impact on marital issues.

To analyze these large data, a qualitative data analysis software called MAXQDA which is very beneficial, particularly for a large number of files, has been used. In light of those interviews, it can be said that the transformation among Alevi communities in Turkey may also be explained by the extended secularization paradigm as elaborated here. Interestingly enough, the topic of Alevi revival has been the object of academic studies in Turkey since the 1980s. These studies suggest that, among others, Alevis have established associations to promote their identity in public areas; Alevi beliefs and rituals have begun to reach a wider audience through their television and radio channels. The new generation of Alevis, unlike the previous generations, does not hide its identity. The Alevis have become more recognized at the state level compared to the past. However, despite the Alevi revival, the Alevis seem to have distanced themselves from their traditional Alevi beliefs and rituals due to scientific developments, capitalism, and urbanization. Specific to this thesis, it has to be stated that, Alevis in Turkey have become much more modern compared to bygone days, and at the same time a rather pervasive secularization process touches upon all marital issues due to the very structure of modern life.

NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING

De betekenis van secularisering en de vraag of een samenleving gesecculariseerd is of niet, zijn nog steeds zeer controversiële onderwerpen in de academische wereld. Een groot gebrek aan overeenstemming aangaande de definitie en de bepaling van de mate van secularisering is kernmerkend voor het hedendaagse intellectuele debat. Met dit in gedachten claimt dit proefschrift dat het seculariseringsparadigma van Steve Bruce (dat stelt dat het proces van modernisering de secularisering versterkt en dat de Protestantse Reformatie de oorsprong is van deze transformatie die in West-Europa waar te nemen valt) niet alleen voor West Europese landen en hun voormalige koloniën en andere door het Westen beïnvloede landen geldt, maar ook waardevol inzicht kan bieden in seculariseringsprocessen in andere moderne of moderniserende delen van de wereld. Om echter het paradigma van Bruce te laten gelden voor samenlevingen die niet overwegend Protestants zijn, moet het enigszins uitgebreid worden. Om deze reden moeten sommige aspecten van dat paradigma, namelijk die welke te maken hebben met de geschiedenis van Europa, gerelativeerd worden (die dynamiek die direct met de Protestantse Reformatie in verband te brengen is), terwijl die aspecten die universeel relevant zijn, zoals wetenschappelijke vooruitgang, industrieel kapitalisme en verstedelijking, benadrukt moeten worden.

De bijdrage van wetenschappelijke vooruitgang aan het proces van secularisering lijkt niet direct, maar indirect te hebben plaatsgevonden. Ontwikkelingen in de wetenschap vergroten het menselijk rationeel bewustzijn en verkleinen het aantal gevallen waarin religie de levens van mensen beïnvloedt. Kapitalisme is een erg krachtige factor die samenlevingen, welke gekarakteriseerd worden door collectief bewustzijn, eenvoudige arbeidsverdeling, homogene kleine geïsoleerde gemeenschappen, alsook sterke gewoonten en tradities die gemengd zijn met religie, kan veranderen in samenlevingen die gekarakteriseerd worden door specialisatie, individualisering, rationalisatie, transport over grote afstanden, snelle communicatie en massaproductie. Verstedelijking ondermijnt de functies van bovennatuurlijke krachten doorgaans op drie manieren: door verhoogde mobiliteit, door het bieden van alternatieven binnen bijna elke sfeer van het leven, en door het creëren en beschermen van private gebieden die vrij zijn van het bovennatuurlijke. De centrale hypothese is de volgende: drie factoren, te weten wetenschappelijke vooruitgang, industrieel kapitalisme en verstedelijking kunnen leiden tot secularisering in een samenleving ongeacht de heersende metafysische of religieuze overtuigingen.

Om de hypothese die in deze dissertatie ontwikkeld wordt empirisch te illustreren, is het voorgestelde uitgebreide seculariseringssparadigma, gebaseerd op wetenschappelijke vooruitgang, kapitalisme en verstedelijking, toegepast op de Alevi-gemeenschappen in Turkije. Er zijn twee fundamentele redenen voor deze keuze. 1) Turkije is geen onderdeel van Europa of een voormalige kolonie en heeft in haar geschiedenis de Protestantse Reformatie niet doorgeemaakt. 2) Er zijn vele publicaties die een ervaring van Alevi-gemeenschappen in Turkije na 1980 lijken te suggereren. Daarom maakt dit onderzoek de keuze zich te richten op de Alevi's in de regio's Adana, Corum en Tunceli, met afspraken [dating] voor het huwelijk, partnerkeuze, huwelijksrituelen, echtscheiding, de instituties van de spirituele broederschap en de volksrechtbank in deze ge-

meenschappen als objecten van onderzoek, aangezien deze allemaal direct beïnvloed worden door de religieuze cultuur. De instituties van de spirituele broederschap en de volksrechtbank komen in dit onderzoek in bod in zoverre als ze betrekking hebben op huwelijkskwesties. Gedurende het veldwerk zijn achttwentig kernvragen aangaande het huwelijk gesteld aan in totaal dertig paar mensen in drie steden (in iedere stad tien koppels) van twee generaties (ouders en kinderen) in semigestructureerde interviews, om inzichten te verkrijgen in de generatiekloof betreffende religie en haar effect op huwelijkskwesties.

Om deze data te analyseren is gebruik gemaakt van kwalitatieve data analyse software genaamd MAXQDA, die erg bruikbaar is met name voor een groot aantal bestanden. Op basis van deze interviews kan gezegd worden dat de transformatie onder de Alevi gemeenschappen in Turkije verklaard kan worden vanuit het uitgebreide seculariseringsparadigma, zoals het hier uiteengezet is. Opvallend is dat de opleving van Alevi-gemeenschappen sinds 1980 onderwerp is van academische onderzoeken in Turkije. Deze onderzoeken suggereren onder andere dat de Alevi's associaties hebben opgericht om hun identiteit in het publieke domein te promoten; Alevi overtuigingen en rituelen hebben een groter publiek weten aan te trekken door televisie- en radio-uitzendingen. De nieuwe generatie Alevi's verstopt haar identiteit niet, dit in tegenstelling tot eerdere generaties. De Alevi's worden tegenwoordig meer erkend door de overheid in vergelijking met het verleden. Maar ondanks deze opleving van hun religie lijken de huidige Alevi's zich te hebben verwijderd van hun traditionele Alevi overtuigingen en rituelen als gevolg van wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling, kapitalisme en verstedelijking. Specifiek voor dit proefschrift moet gezegd worden dat Alevi's in Turkije veel moderner zijn geworden in vergelijking met het verleden, terwijl tegelijkertijd een zeer indringend proces van secularisering aan alle huwelijkskwesties raakt als gevolg van de structuur van de moderne leefwijze.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have never thought that my doctorate will be accomplished. I was replying to people who asked when the doctorate will finish: “Why? Is the doctorate an extinguishable thing? Does it have an end?”

First and foremost I want to thank my supervisors Evert van der Zweerde and Karin van Nieuwkerk. Dear Evert, you did trust in my ideas and my enthusiasm, take patiently care of me and correct my mistakes. Many times I was shocked because of your very quick replies to all my e-mails and your comments on my manuscripts which were –many times– longer than the actual page ☺ Your criticisms, suggestions but most of all your trust helped me in finishing this thesis. You were very generous with your time and advice. You have been a tremendous academic personality for me.

It is also not an easy job to “thank” you, dear Karin. One of the claims of my thesis was “Alevis are more secular compared to their own past in Turkey.” However, I have learned from you that there is a claim as Alevi revivalism and rather very large literature about this issue. This thesis would have been incomplete without that discussion. By introducing me Alevi revivalism, you gave me chance to improve the quality of my thesis.

In addition, non-tiresome writing style of the thesis is actually indebted to both of you. Thank you so much for all your suggestions and corrections.

“Why not Other Theories, But Bruce’s Paradigm” section of Chapter II was accomplished with insightful criticisms of Professor Hans Schilderman after he read theoretical part and shared his criticisms with me in 2015 March.

And I would like to thank distinguished members of dissertation committee, Professor Hans Schilderman, Professor Jean-Pierre Wils and Professor Thijl Sunier for their inspirational and encouraging comments and criticisms. By nature, it is obvious that my thesis requires to be developed and at this point, your criticisms will be guiding light for me. Particularly your criticisms about the status of the empirical part and the “self-assured tone” of the main claims of the thesis urged me to go through many parts.

Dear Mrs. Godelief de Jong, thank you so much for your help to ease my journeys to the Netherlands, to make quick solutions for all bureaucratic procedures and not let me feel to be burden on you.

Dear Merih (de Heij-Cibiş), thank you for your care about me and your interest in my study throughout the years as one of the best scholar on secularization studies although you are a Biomedical Engineering ☺

Dear Yasemin (Abayhan), thank you so much for your full support that you showed when I feel down. And without your instructions, it would not be that much easy to learn how to use MAXQ-DA.

I also need to thank Hasan Yücel Başdemir since I was introduced by him to the reference persons in Çorum who were known and respected in the city.

I would like to thank other distinguished PhD students of Professor van der Zweerde, i.e. Evi Zacharia, Александра Комарицкая, Sona Hovhannisyán, Arthur Zijlstra, Rashad Shirinov, and Jose-

phien Kessel for their helpful feedbacks on my thesis draft in productive workshops which were organized by Evert for us to exchange our ideas and to improve our manuscripts.

I also would like to thank my current rector Professor Yusuf Şahin and my former rector Professor Mustafa Acar for their support and consideration throughout dissertation stage.

And special thanks go to the people of ORIENT PUBLISHING HOUSE, Buhari Baytekin, Yeter Baysal and Meltem Yılmaz for their incredible support in printing process of the thesis.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

At the very beginning of my graduate programme in European Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven, I decided to write my master thesis on the secularization process in Western Europe. The question that my thesis tried to answer was simple: “Why is Europe considered the most secular region in the world?” In this study, the word “Europe” will refer to particularly to Western Europe, unless otherwise is stated. However, while writing my thesis, I noticed that before anything else, i.e. before dealing with the European secularization process, the concept of secularization needed to be discussed in detail, since there was no agreement on the meaning of the term among scholars. Particularly after the first half of the 20th century, dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been devoted to the seemingly endless debate on what the concept of secularization means (Martin, 1965; Shiner, 1967; Wilson, 1979; Luckmann, 1979; Lechner, 1991; Casanova, 1994; Yamane, 1997; Stark, 1999; Bruce, 2002).

The first thing that strikes the eye in this discussion is the deep disagreement among scholars with respect to the definition of the concept and the proper methodology to measure it. In the early 21st century, two scholars have been at the heart of these discussions: Steve Bruce and Rodney Stark. The claims of these two scholars

have been reviewed in numerous academic works. Some of these works attempt to find a middle way between Bruce and Stark or else side with one of them (Pollack & Pickel, 2007; Norris & Inglehart, 2008; Warner, 2010; Roberts & Yamane, 2012).

To explain the reasons behind the secularization process as seen in societies, Bruce and Stark use different models, i.e. the Classical Secularization Theory and the Religious Market Model, respectively. The Classical Secularization Theory claims that the process of secularization is intrinsically connected to the process of modernization, namely that the decline in religious practices and beliefs in Western Europe is an inevitable result of historical progress due to modernization, i.e. “industrialization of work; the shift from villages to towns and cities; the replacement of the small community by the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; and the rationalization both of thought and social organization” (Bruce, 1999a: 266). The Religious Market Model, by contrast, argues that the decrease in religious activity can be explained by the lack of a free market in religious goods as well as by the lack of significant competition between the providers of such goods. Competition is seen as a stimulus for religious growth. Well-respected publishing houses and journals have published the works of Stark and Bruce in an effort to pit one against the other. The article by Stark (1999), “Secularization R.I.P.”, and the book by Bruce (2002), *God is Dead*, became peak-points of these discussions. It would seem that for Stark, almost everything asserted by Bruce had been interpreted wrongly by historians. While Bruce claims that modernization is the cause of the secularization process, Stark adamantly rejected this idea on the basis of statistics from another modern country, the USA, and further asserted that beyond the USA there is a worldwide religious revival which should be accepted as a very strong sign for the rebuttal of Bruce’s renowned argument, viz. that modernization and secularization go hand in hand. The abstract of Stark’s sensational article states it as follows:

From the beginning, social scientists have celebrated the secularization thesis despite the fact that it never was consistent with empirical reality. More than 150 years ago Tocqueville pointed out that “the facts by no means accord with [the secularization] theory,” and this lack of accord has grown far worse since then. Indeed, the only shred of credibility for the notion that secularization has been taking place has depended on contrasts between now and a bygone Age of Faith. In this essay I assemble the work of many recent historians who are unanimous that the Age of Faith is pure nostalgia –that lack of religious participation was, if anything, even more widespread in medieval times than now. Next, I demonstrate that there have been no recent religious changes in Christendom that are consistent with the secularization thesis – not even among scientists. I also expand assessment of the secularization doctrine to non-Christian societies showing that not even the highly magical “folk religions” in Asia have shown the slightest declines in response to quite rapid modernization. Final words are offered as secularization is laid to rest (1999: 249).

The following excerpt from Stark asserts that Bruce himself accepted his mistake and does not believe anymore that there was a Golden Age of Faith during Medieval times:

Steve Bruce of the University of Aberdeen has long been one of the most die-hard proponents of the secularization thesis. Recently, even he admitted that, in terms of organized participation, the Golden Age of Faith never existed. Indeed, Bruce (1997: 674) proposes that the medieval church was not even especially concerned to bring the people to mass as “was clear from the very architecture of churches and forms of service” (1999: 263).

However, in *God is Dead*, Bruce accused Stark of distorting his views:

It is an unfortunate feature of Stark’s style that he often misinterprets those with whom he disagrees. On this point he says of me: “Recently, even he [Steve Bruce] admitted that, in terms of organised participation, the Golden Age of Faith never existed.” (2002: 243).

Since the focus of the theoretical part of this thesis is based on the ongoing discussions among these two scholars, an extensive discussion regarding their views is provided in the theoretical part of

the thesis. Why? Because, after all the criticisms raised by Stark and his followers, Bruce restricted himself to a certain place and time. He admitted that he does not make his claims for all societies in the world; whatever he claims is related geographically to Western Europe and its offshoots¹, and historically is based on the beginning of the Protestant Reformation:

Instead, I take the secularization story, like Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis, to be an attempt to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes. It is an explanation of what has happened to religion in Western Europe (and its North American and Australian offshoots) since the Reformation (Bruce, 1999a: 265).

The secularization paradigm combines two things: an assertion about changes in the presence and nature of religion, and a collection of related explanations of those changes. It is not a universally applicable scientific law, but a description and explanation of the past of European societies and their settler offsprings (Bruce, 2006: 35).

However, the present dissertation claims that Bruce's secularization paradigm is not only valid for West European countries and their offshoots, but also may provide valuable insights into the secularization processes in the other parts of the world. But to render his paradigm valid for other modern or modernizing societies that have not experienced the Protestant Reformation in their own history, Bruce's paradigm needs to be extended. In this regard, aspects of his paradigm that related to the Protestant Reformation need to be downplayed, while those with more universal relevance need to be highlighted. For illustrating it, the extended secularization paradigm is then applied to the Alevi community in Turkey, which is not part of Western Europe or one of its offshoots, and has not experienced the Protestant Reformation in its history. The sole reason for the selection of a community from Turkey is not the need for a non-Protestant group. The outcome of this study may also provide

1 By using the word "offshoots", Steve Bruce refers to Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand.

some impressions concerning an issue that had preoccupied Turkish public opinion for years. Many academics, journalists and opinion leaders in Turkey claim that Turkey has been getting more religious especially ever since the AK Party came into power in 2002 (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül & Şener, 2010). For example, during rallies in cities such as İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir in 2007, criticism of a Turkish society that was becoming more Islamized has been openly voiced. Millions of people at these demonstrations (called Republic Rallies) have screamed out slogans saying that they would not allow Turkey to become another Iran and openly invited the Turkish Armed Forces to intervene in Turkish politics (Sivil Media, 2009, December 2). Consequently, another reason for selecting a community in Turkey as part of this study is the domestic and international perception of a country that keeps getting more and more religious such as Turkey *vis-à-vis* Bruce's claim that a society that gets modernized will inevitably become secular. Does the "Islamization" of Turkey mean that Turkish society is going through a process of "desecularization" or can Turkish society become more religious while at the same time becoming more secular?

This study chose the Alevis in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli regions as its focus, with premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, and the institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people's court -as far as they are concerned with marital issues- as the topics to be explored.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS / ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Present dissertation investigates whether or not the extension of Steve Bruce's secularization paradigm could give plausible explanation for the social transformations in other modern or modernizing countries apart from West European countries. Therefore we will analyze the modernization process among Alevi communities in Turkey as well as the changes they encounter on marital issues in or-

der to ascertain the answer to the above question. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to find plausible answers to the following ten questions:

1) What does the concept of secularization mean?

For a discussion of whether the claims of the secularization paradigm can be extended and whether it can provide a reasonable explanation for the Alevi communities' situation in Turkey, first of all it is crucial to clarify secularization as a concept. For that reason, at the outset of the thesis, the concept of secularization will be discussed and defined. Then, in order to indicate the inadequacy of the general perception of "secularization = disappearance of religion" which has been put forward by many prominent scholars (Hadden, 1987; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994; Cox & Swyngedouw, 2000) and which also finds support in Turkey (Küçükcan, 2005; Köse, 2006; Yapıcı, 2012), and also in an effort to differentiate the concept of secularization from laicization (the two terms are often confused in Turkey due to Turkey's own peculiar history), it is necessary to discuss how the concept of secularization differs from being irreligious and why it is mistaken wrong to use the two terms (secularization and laicization) interchangeably. Although they should not be used as substitute terms for historical and etymological reasons, Turkish intellectuals, scholars, editors of dailies and interpreters have continued to use the two terms alternatively (Duran, 1995; Akşit, 2005).

2) Is it possible to explain the secularization process among modern or modernizing societies in light of an extended paradigm?

According to Bruce's secularization paradigm, modernization is accepted as the main reason behind the vigorous secularization process in Western Europe. In this case, a vital question of this thesis is "whether it would be possible to come up with a Secularization Paradigm in order to understand not only the secularization process

experienced by modern West European societies but also the secularization processes that take place in other modern or modernizing societies which have not experienced the Protestant Reformation in their own histories?" The answer of this study to this question is affirmative. But there is no need for a new paradigm that is totally independent of Bruce's. This study is convinced that if his paradigm is revised and extended, we can come up with a key paradigm that may provide a coherent explanation for the secularization process of other modern or modernizing societies apart from West European societies. Therefore, in the theoretical part, after exploring secularization as a concept, I will shed some light on what Bruce's secularization paradigm asserts. Then, in a clear departure from Bruce, I will argue that his paradigm is not only valid for West European societies, but also for Alevi communities in Turkey. However, to extend the scope of his paradigm in its relevance, aspects of the paradigm that belong to the history of Western Europe and its offshoots will be somewhat downplayed while those with more universal relevance will be upgraded.

3) Why is the Protestant Reformation vital for Bruce's paradigm?

By presenting more details on the extended paradigm's pillars, my aim is to show that Bruce's paradigm may provide us with insights into the secularization process in other societies besides Western Europe and its offshoots. However, I still think it crucial to explore the vital place of the Protestant Reformation (which is not part of the extended version) in Bruce's paradigm. Bruce used his paradigm "to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes" (Bruce, 1999a: 265) in Western Europe which started with the Protestant Reformation. Therefore, Chapter II will shed some light on why the Protestant Reformation is vital to Bruce's paradigm.

4) Why not use other models as a starting point (i.e. Religious Market Model, Secure Secularization Theory and Religious Individualization Theory) rather than Bruce's paradigm?

Apart from Bruce's secularization paradigm, there are other theories that bring to light cause-effect relations on the subject of the secularization process of societies. Although these theories have dominated contemporary thinking on the question of secularization as much as Bruce's paradigm, I have not chosen them as my starting point because of their premises which will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. Therefore, before discussing the details of the extended secularization paradigm, I will explore the main assumptions and inefficacies of three alternative theories: the aforementioned Religious Market Model advanced by Stark *et al.*, the Secure Secularization Theory of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, and lastly the Religious Individualization Theory proposed by Thomas Luckmann and later advanced by Grace Davie.

5) What are the pillars of such an extended secularization paradigm?

The historical dynamics behind the West European secularization process consists of the following seven dynamics: the Renaissance (15th century), the Protestant Reformation (16th century), the emergence of absolute monarchs (16th and 17th centuries), the Scientific Revolution (17th century), the Age of Enlightenment (18th century), industrial capitalism (from the middle of the 18th century to the middle of 19th century), and urbanization (19th century). The major and vital social, economic, political, and cultural changes that came about with these historical dynamics are regarded as the segments of modernization. This modernization process has also led to a decline in religion's prestige and power in Western Europe. However, although these historical factors did play a vital role in Western Europe's secularization process, it does not necessarily mean that all these seven factors are indispensable for secularization in other

parts of the world. For even though the seven historical dynamics do not seem to occur in other countries as they did in Western Europe, still, some of them could be sufficient to trigger the process of secularization regardless of the peculiar histories of those non-Protestant societies. This dissertation suggests that these three factors of Bruce's secularization paradigm, 1) scientific advancements 2) industrial capitalism 3) urbanization, might be sufficient to trigger an increase in the secularization level of societies regardless of the dominant religious culture.

6) Why does the secularization process accelerate with the diffusion of scientific knowledge and advancements in daily life?

To answer this question, I will first emphasize that it is not abnormal for religious people to trust science or that a scientist can be religious since there is no zero-sum relationship between science and religion according to the secularization paradigm asserted in this study. Secondly, I aim to explain how scientific advances accelerate the secularization process in the absence of a zero-sum relationship. The section concludes that the impact of scientific developments on the secularization process is twofold: (i) the increase in rational consciousness by which human beings start to explain the natural phenomena in a rational cause-and-effect relationship, and (ii) the spread of technology which has reduced the number of areas and issues previously occupied by religion.

7) Why does the secularization process seem to be accelerating in capitalist countries?

As an economic system, in capitalism, the means of production are supposed to be tied to private ownership. The government does not intervene in the economy wherein goods and services are freely ex-

changed² (Barry, 2002; Hazlitt, 2012; Machan, 1993). Capitalism is one of the main dynamics that led to Western Europe becoming the world's most secularised region (Casanova, 1994). Moreover, if we look at the world map, it can be seen that religion recedes into the background where capitalism becomes the dominant economic model (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 77, 104). Therefore, my aim is to build a theoretical framework for the regression of a dominant religious culture at the social level in different regions of the world on account of capitalism.

Because of the peculiarities of capitalism, rational and organic³ societies come into the picture, while the power and social prestige of religion, folk-religions, religion-like mechanisms and superstitious beliefs are restricted. Notwithstanding the absence of a zero-sum game between capitalism and religion, at least on paper, statistically it can be shown that countries with a free market economy are more secular than countries with a command economy (Norris & Inglehart, 2008). In this section, it will be examined in detail how the capitalist mode of production reduces the social power of religion under four subheadings:

1. Rules of Economy and Secularization (Weber, 1930/2005; Mises, 1981)
2. Disintegration of Traditional Family Structure and Secularization (Finer, 2007; Chartsbin, 2009).

2 How and why a country is called capitalist has been detailed in Chapter III. But, briefly, it might be said that capitalist countries have an economic system where there is private or corporate ownership of the means of production. It should be noted that in this study we are not talking of "pure capitalism" which is an idea that private markets are most efficient and functional if government does not interfere in the economy. Today, although there are many countries that call themselves capitalist, there is no "pure capitalist" country in which the government does not play any role in the economy.

3 The term "organic" is here used in a Durkheimian sense, meaning that interdependence of the component parts of society emerged with the industrial revolution (Durkheim, 1893/2014).

3. Increase in Welfare and Secularization (Hartwell, 1965; Skousen, 1994; Kasper, 2002)

4. Downsizing of the State and Secularization (Dal Lago, 1999; Berlin, 2004)

8) Why does urbanization lead to an increase in the level of secularization?

Religion turns into something “alien” in urban life every passing day (Bruce, 2014). Young people who have had some kind of religious life in their rural communities just before tertiary studies start to have less religious life after enrolling at university (Kirman, 2005a; Amman, 2010). Alevi and Sunni religious leaders, who are regarded as the representatives of God in rural areas, lose their prestige and social clout in the face of urban life mechanisms (Balkanlıoğlu, 2012). With urbanization, estrangement towards anything beyond the material world increases, while the impact of religious identity on daily life decreases. Sexual minority groups (e.g. homosexuals, transsexuals), which do not have the opportunity to exist or express themselves freely in rural areas, are becoming part of everyday life due to the structure of urban life (Harry, 1974; Yılmaz, 2012, October). The number of inter-denominational marriages, dates and pre-marital sexual intercourse, all of which are mostly forbidden in traditional communities intertwined with Abrahamic religions, also increases in urban life (Yılmaz, 2005; Dinçer 2007). In short, religion loses its power and prestige for providing guidance in urban society. But why? The basic argument for such a link is that urbanization accelerates secularization by creating problems for religion, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms and superstitious beliefs. That is, as urbanization increases, secular and rational solutions begin to replace religious regulations, values, and teachings which normally handle the problems of daily life in rural society. Therefore, the following three dimensions will be elaborated in this section, in an effort to build a theoretical framework for the decline of dominant

religious culture at the social level where urbanization increases: 1) mobility (Cox, 1965), 2) access to Different Alternatives (Dobbe-laere, 1985), and 3) privatization of personal life (Wirth, 1938).

9) What does the extended secularization paradigm *not* assert?

To avoid possible confusion, it is essential to concisely mention what the extended secularization paradigm does *not* assert. This will be examined in the Chapter III under six subdivisions:

1. The extended secularization paradigm is not limited to particular parts of the world.
2. The extended secularization paradigm is not a secularist or a progressivist ideology.
3. The extended secularization paradigm does not claim that the end point is atheism.
4. The extended secularization paradigm is not “synchronized swimming”.⁴
5. The extended secularization paradigm is not based on the frequency of worship -or lack thereof- only.
6. The extended secularization paradigm is not relevant for monotheistic religions only.

10) Can the extended secularization paradigm provide a plausible explanation for Alevi communities in Turkey even if there has been a revival of Alevism?

According to the secularization paradigm proposed in this thesis, the level of secularization of societies may increase if the effects of scientific developments can be seen in people’s daily lives, the capitalist economic system becomes prevalent, and urbanization rate

4 In synchronized swimming, athletes try to accomplish a synchronized routine of intricate moves in split-second accuracy in the water. Based on this, the secularization paradigm does not claim that secularization comes into being under modernization in the same way or within the same time frame for all parts of society.

increases. Turkey has experienced these three processes since the 1960s as will be illustrated in Appendix A. Since Alevi communities are part of Turkey, they are supposed to be affected by these structural changes as well. However, according to the hypothesis of this study, while secularization of the Alevis was expected as a result of the modernization process experienced in Turkey, many academic works published in Turkey and also abroad (Çamuroğlu, 2003; Çaha, 2004; Shah, 2013) have pointed to an Alevi revival in Turkey especially since the 1980s. Alevis, who previously were assumed to be nil at the state level and also at the social arena, have become one of Turkey's most important agenda items. Alevis' struggles for their rights when they arrived in cities, establishment of Alevi associations, the opening of Cem houses for worship in the center of large metropolitan areas, broadcasting their rites and rituals in Cem houses to millions via state televisions, and the new generation of Alevis expressing their Alevi identities without hiding in contrast to previous generations – are some examples presented as part of the Alevi revival.

So, the field research of this study has been designed for Alevi communities in an attempt to find answers to the following questions: If Alevi revival is a fact, then how have Alevi communities been affected by the rise of scientific developments, capitalism and urbanization? And, how has this influenced their secularization level? Is it possible for Alevi communities to experience secularization and revival at the same time?

Why are Alevis chosen as the subject of this study?

Although the findings part of the thesis provides detailed information about the history and the position of Alevis in Turkey, it should be briefly discussed here why Alevis have been preferred for present dissertation. As an illustration case for the extended secularization paradigm, initially, my aim was to study the secularization process of Turkish society instead of the Alevi communities. However, since

the scope of such a study would be far bigger than a PhD thesis can cover, it would create insurmountable problems in terms of budget and incompatibility in terms of scope and sampling. For that reason, choosing one single community in Turkey as a focus seems much more convenient for the objective of the thesis. This community would have to be a religious one, because the aim of the thesis (application of a secularization paradigm in Turkey) necessitates this. Sunnism and Alevism are the two prominent denominations in Turkey. The Sunni denomination was not chosen because it is the most common religious community and the official faith of the Turkish state. These features would have also pushed the boundaries of the thesis. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA, *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) is an institution serving only Sunni Muslims since, for the state, being a Muslim is automatically interpreted as being a Sunni Muslim. Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi Dersi*), which is lectured as compulsory subject in the public schools, is based on the Sunnite belief. Since the sub-religious groups are not officially recorded, data on the precise number of the Sunnite population are not available. Nonetheless it would not be an exaggeration to say that their population amounts to tens of millions. For this reason, selecting a religious group with fewer adherents was more convenient in terms of the limited character of the dissertation.

However, even though there are fewer Alevis than Sunnis in Turkey, they still constitute the second largest religious sub-group. They live in cluster-like structures in different parts of the country. As I will explain in more detail in chapter IV, from past to present, they have always been a minority and identified themselves with their belief. Alevi identity is not only a religious belief, but also an identity. Several massacres were carried out against Alevis in Anatolia in the last quarter of the 20th century (the massacres in the cities of Çorum, Maraş and Sivas). All these massacres, as well as the resulting state of introversion, living out their beliefs behind

closed doors, the obligation imposed by the state to take part in classes where the compulsory subject of religion based on Sunni belief is taught, non-recognition by the state, being humiliated in society, and the difficulties they experience within the bureaucratic apparatus to reach administrative positions, have rendered them all the more sensitive in comparison to Sunni people in terms of their identity. In other words, because of both late urbanization and the above mentioned social problems, Alevis are supposed to secularize rather slowly and they are likely more connected to their religious sense of belonging. Alevis have been known to be self-enclosed and sensitive about their faith-based identity as Alevis (Erdemir, 2004; Erdem, 2010).

Another reason why Alevis have been chosen as the focus group despite being part of a modernizing country is the sheer number of academic works concerning an Alevi revival in Turkey especially since the 1980s. Better organization by Alevis, their efforts to increase societal awareness regarding their rights, owning their own television and radio channels and lobbying efforts at the state level for recognition have made Alevis part of Turkey's agenda as never before. Such an Alevi revival, hand in hand with the secularization of Alevis, seems contradictory on paper, making Alevi communities a more interesting subject, at least for research.

Finally, although it is not easy to define what Alevis is, at least it will not be difficult to denote what Alevis is not.⁵ For all these reasons the Alevi communities of Turkey has been considered a proper example for the application of the extended secularization paradigm to a religious group.

Why does the present dissertation focus on the generation gap with regard to the subjects of premarital datings, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, the institution of spiritual

5 The detailed discussion on Alevis is made in the PART B.

brotherhood (*musahiplik*) and the institution of the people's court (*düşkünlük meydam*)?

Due to its position in the center of Alevi belief and rituals, the marriage institution has become the subject of this thesis. The marriage institution is for Alevis of utmost importance as it concerns posterity and continuation of their community. The direct relationship between some vital Alevi institutions (the institution of spiritual brotherhood and that of the people's court) and marriage is not coincidental. For an Alevi individual, being married and sustaining it in accordance with Alevi belief and traditions means being a complete Alevi. Consequently, individuals who are thought to have harmed the marriage institution face enforcements that may at times include death and being an outcast. Due to the vital position of marriage in Alevi faith, it has thus been chosen as the issue to be illustrated in this thesis' field research.

Premarital datings or non-matrimonial relationships are conducts that are not at all approved in traditional Alevi communities and perceived as one of the most severe religious sins ever to be committed. What's more, not only the lovers, but also the engaged pairs are not allowed to stay by themselves in a room or they cannot go out together without being accompanied by a relative. Conducts that can harm a matrimony may result in social exclusion and people pay, in certain places, for such conducts with their lives (Bayatlı, 1957). The information we got during the field survey in the present study has also confirmed the strict structure of Alevi traditions with respect to dating in the premarital phase. Elderly participants stated that the bride and the groom especially did not see each other until the wedding night. An elderly participant from Tunceli, 64 years of age, said that conditions were so conservative in his youth that girls and boys were not allowed to communicate with each other; it was even prohibited to see the face of their fiancées/fiancés. Another participant from the city of Çorum said that they always got cold feet in front of elderly family members and they always did

whatever they were told. He further said that he did not see his wife before the matrimony, and that it was his mother who chose her as his spouse.

Divorce is another sensitive issue relating to matrimony in traditional Alevi communities. Divorce is always a frightening event for Alevi families. Divorced people are regarded as incompetent and incomplete in Alevi communities. It is seen as damnation when married women return to the house they lived in as maiden. It used to be expected that Alevi girls would obey their husbands and never return to their maiden home, even if the result would be their death. Young people in an Alevi community, be it girls or boys, had no other option to choose (Yaman, 2007). Divorce was an event that resulted in social exclusion.

Whether there has been an increase or decrease in the social prestige and power of the institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people's court will also be investigated in this thesis. These two institutions are directly associated with the matrimony in an Alevi community, and it was these two institutions that enabled Alevis to re-create themselves and maintain their traditions for centuries. For this reason, the changes in the social effects of these two institutions will provide significant information in terms of the secularization process of Alevi communities.

Spiritual brotherhood is a concept which could be referred to as the development of a relation between two Alevi men by means of a contract after they get married. The two men become closer than real brothers after going through certain social processes and rituals. Thus, it is not a blood relation, but they become even closer than that. Spiritual brotherhood could also be known as "holding brotherhood," "fellowship of the road," and "hereafter fraternity" (Yaman, 2007). The traditional Alevi faith requires that every man should have a spiritual brother after he gets married. Otherwise, it would not be suitable for him to be part of any religious ceremonies. It is mandatory for spiritual brothers to help each other throughout

their entire lives. This includes addressing even private matters of each other's family, and paying the other's debt if required (Melikoff, 2012). The concept of spiritual brotherhood goes back to the times of the Prophet Muhammed. The information present in the sources and the statements of the respondents both are well aligned with regard to the origin of the concept of spiritual brotherhood. The prophet Muhammed developed the concept of social solidarity when he announced brotherly association between a Muslim who had migrated from Mecca to Medina and another Muslim who was from Medina (Tiryaki, 2013). It is stated by the Alevis that each person had found a spiritual brother except for 'Alī, and so the Prophet Muhammad had announced that he would be 'Alī's spiritual brother. Since that time, the Alevis have been using this concept to revive their own customs.

Finally, in Alevi communities, the *institution of the people's court* is one of the main social institutions related to marriage. When traditional Alevi communities are considered, their institution of the people's court was similar to that of current courts. This indicates that the court ensures correct law and order. The places in which the institutions of people's court functions are known as the *Houses of Cem* (sacred place of Alevis for gathering, religious rituals and other social issues). The issues which are dealt with and resolved include parental discord, rural planning, inheritance issues, and other community related problems. If a person is found to be guilty by the religious guides and judges (the *dedes*), then, depending on the degree of the crime, the social sanction applied on the person could include "excommunication". People who have been excommunicated are not allowed in the House of Cem as they become known as *decayed* (*düşkün*).

In case a person is announced to be *decayed*, s/he would not be allowed to live in the community at all. This means when someone is declared as *decayed*, s/he has to face the disastrous consequence of social hatred and exclusion. The overall community ends all ties

with the *decayed* person and they cannot be invited to the House of Cem either. Nobody visits the *decayed* person and they are not even helped if required. Sacrificing animal to God is not permitted to them and nobody eats their *lokma* (highly symbolic dessert offered in religious ceremonies). There is no communication with the *decayed* person, meaning s/he is completely excluded. The boycott is to such an extent that even family members cannot stake a claim on him/her. Moreover, in case a spiritual brother is announced to be *decayed*, his other spiritual brother and immediate relatives are directly affected. Their lives become morally troubled (Üzüm, 2009: 170-71; Tiryaki, 2013: 144-45). As David Zeidan (1999: 76) explains, the Alevis tried to ensure strict endogamy so they could avoid penetration by hostile outsiders, which ultimately made them a quasi-ethnic group. The Alevi taboos restricted any communication with the leading Sunni political-religious centre. Those who married outsiders, ate with outsiders, or had economic cooperation with outsiders, were threatened with the ultimate punishment of excommunication. Use of the state (Sunni) courts was also not permitted.

Considering this given information, it should be evident that in Alevism, marriage, as a social institution, has an extremely important position. Marriage is used as a tool to keep the community growing. In their entire history, Alevis have gone through strict sanctions and social elimination any time they caused damage to this institution. For this reason, this study focuses on understanding the institution of marriage and issues related to it with respect to the process of secularization.

RESEARCH METHODS

This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a theoretical discussion of the concept of secularization and the secularization paradigm on the basis of the relevant literature. The second part (Part B), includes a fieldwork study conducted to illustrate the theory put forth in the first part.

For the conceptual framework of the theoretical part, Steve Bruce's works and the works of Bryan Wilson by whom Bruce is influenced mostly, have been used as the main sources. Furthermore, the theories opposing Bruce and interpreting the secularization process from the perspective of different dynamics have also been discussed.

The aim of the second part is to investigate possible transitions in terms of three elements of modernization, i.e. scientific advances, industrial capitalism, and urbanization, among Alevi generations and their effects on the institution of marriage and related subjects such as dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, spiritual brotherhood, and the people's court. I conducted in-depth interviews with 60 Alevis in total (30 parents and 30 children) during field studies in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli. While identifying the persons to be interviewed, I preferred the snowball sampling method as those persons are not easily accessed due to socio-political reasons. In this method, respondents were chosen by the previous ones.

As the purpose of this study is to examine the transforming effect of belief on marriage issues, I opted to do interviews with one parent and one of his/her children. I also applied a special coding for them in order to protect their privacy.

In semi-structured interviews, I posed 28 core questions to the parents and to their children.⁶ Inherent to semi-structured interviews, sometimes it was not possible to ask the same questions in the same order. At times, I needed to add questions or did not need to ask questions that I had planned. I grouped the questions in two: I posed the first group of questions to learn about the generation gap in terms of the modernization level; I then asked the second group of questions, in order to understand the transformations and impacts of belief on marriage. After decoding the interviews, I used a qualitative data analysis software called MAXQDA to organize,

6 These questions can be seen in Appendix D.

encode, take notes, and analyze hundreds of pages of Word documents.

RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS

This study, which aims to understand whether the extended secularization paradigm can provide a reasonable explanation for the Alevi communities in Turkey, is important for a couple of reasons. As previously mentioned, Bruce restricted his paradigm to Western Europe and its offshoots, while admitting that his paradigm is based on the Protestant Reformation and covered geographically some particular parts of the world. By contrast, the present dissertation claims that Bruce's paradigm could be applicable to non-Protestant societies. Therefore, his paradigm is here applied to a non-Protestant community in a non-European country. As such, this study sets out with a fairly new approach.

This study further intends to investigate the secularization process among the Alevi communities without either a religious or secularist agenda; it also avoids a Eurocentric or Islamic bias. In addition, it has an integrated interdisciplinary thematic profile: it does not treat its subject from an exclusively philosophical, sociological, theological, political, or historical standpoint. Moreover, this study can encourage new academic studies that could contribute to the discussion on the subject of secularization in Turkey or in other non-Protestant communities.

Besides, this research sheds light on an important social debate in Turkey. According to many scholars and public opinion leaders Turkey has become more conservative and has been losing its secular roots over the years (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül & Şener, 2010). Although this study claims that Alevi communities have been secularized due to scientific advances, industrial capitalism, and the urbanization process that Turkish society has experienced for decades, the general impression in both domestic and international public opinion is quite the opposite. For example, in 2007, to raise

public opinion against the gradual promotion of Islamists and Islamism by AKP government, several mass rallies were organized in the big cities of Turkey. Millions of demonstrators gathered in city centres in support of the secular society of Turkey. “We don’t want to become another Iran, another Afghanistan” was one of the most verbalized slogans. Those millions of demonstrators, several popular dailies, many scholars, and secularist opinion leaders all regard the Turkish Armed Forces as the protector of Turkey’s secular identity. The impression of a more religious Turkey is very tangible, particularly among secular people, and even they do not find it necessary to discuss the opposite claims since it is pretty obvious for them (Firat, 2003, June 23; Medya Radar, 2009, December 2). The army has been both implicitly and explicitly asked to stage a coup against the pro-Islamic government.

If my dissertation would succeed in showing that at least one part of Turkish society is in fact more secular than it has been in the past, and that there are no signs of a reversal in this transformation, then the general public may be encouraged to let go of the idea that a militarily controlled Turkey is a necessary part of the process of secularization. What is more, this study might reveal that it is not an easy job for a conservative or an Islamist government to transform society by just passing some pro-religious laws since scientific advancements, industrial capitalism, and urbanization are strong triggers of the process of secularization regardless of the laws and/or intentions of conservative politicians.

LIMITATIONS

This study investigates the generation gap in terms of premarital dating, premarital sex, marriage rituals, divorce, spiritual brotherhood, as well as the subject of the people’s court in relation to marriage and divorce issues among Turkey’s Alevi communities. It tries to find answers to the question which generation is more in touch with religion regarding the aforementioned subjects in light of the

secularization paradigm. However, it should be stressed that this paradigm is neither new nor original. On the contrary, it is based for the most part on Bruce's secularization paradigm.

Besides, it should be stressed that this study also has limitations in terms of its scope. I conducted in-depth interviews with 60 people divided into 30 pairs from the three regions of Adana, Çorum, and Tunceli. Therefore, we should be careful about generalizing the result of the research to all Alevi communities living in other parts of Turkey. The Alevi denomination is perhaps not the largest denomination in Turkey, but it is still the second largest denomination, consisting of millions of people. The total Alevi population is not exactly known since sub-religious identity is not officially required at the governmental level. As a result, the number of Alevis varies according to different authors. Sunni authors' numbers are generally lower than those of their Alevi counterparts. But despite these diverse figures, it is generally accepted that their number amounts to several millions and Alevis are the second largest denomination in Turkey. Therefore, it should be emphasized once again that the result of this study has to be supported by other studies before generalization on this subject can duly be made.

In addition, since Alevis are being studied in their own lands, the impact of internal or external migration to big cities on the secularization process among Alevi communities in Turkey and Europe is omitted in this study. Due to the chain referral sampling method, there is a risk of involving only a certain kind of people and being overly directed by previous respondents. My control over the sampling was very limited due to the nature of the chain referral sampling method. As Chaim Noy neatly summarizes:

The fact that all of the information about informants available in snowball sampling is supplied solely by the informants themselves has a crucial consequence. Unlike the bulk of sampling procedures and designs, in snowball sampling the researcher relinquishes a considerable amount of control over the sampling phase to the informants (2008: 332).

This method could lead researchers towards a sampling bias. Since respondents are chosen by previous respondents, they might recruit only people who are very well-known to them. Therefore, it is quite possible that the interviews are conducted with people who would be classified in a rather similar way. In addition, although face-to-face in-depth interviews help researchers acquire insight into their field subject, respondents will be likely to give more politically correct, rather than truthful answers to the questions, and they might behave differently than normally due to the face-to-face nature of the interviews.

Also, since I am unable to communicate in the Kurdish language, it is possible that this may have created some very minor problems for respondents in the Tunceli region. Despite the fact that I only managed to contact them via my reference, due to the thirty-year-long conflicts in the Eastern Turkey between Kurdistan Workers' Party and Turkish Armed Forces, some respondents could have been a bit skeptical. Therefore, it is not abnormal that my two respondents already gave up and cancelled our meetings in the last minute. However, when my respondents from Tunceli realize that the questions were not related to any political issues, they become more relaxed while answering the questions. Therefore, this study should be evaluated with these limitations in mind. Also, it must be supported by other related studies.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The following parts of the thesis consist of three main units: Part A, Part B, and Part C. There are three chapters in Part A which contains the theoretical skeleton of the thesis. The first chapter includes a debate as to what secularization is, and what it is not, as a concept. The second chapter includes a detailed review of Bruce's secularization paradigm which is a source of inspiration for the extended secularization paradigm. This chapter will put forward why Bruce's paradigm is Christianity-based, and later discussion shall clarify

why Bruce's paradigm has been taken as the basis (and not others') for the extended secularization paradigm. The third chapter, the last chapter of PART A, will include arguments concerning what the extended secularization paradigm is and what it is not. Part B contains field research done to illustrate the theoretical framework created in Part A. In this part, after providing historical information concerning Alevis, and discussing the Alevi revival since the 1980s, data obtained from the field research will be presented. Part C consists of the Discussion and Conclusion sections where data from both theory and area are merged and discussed.

PART A

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER I

SECULARIZATION AS A CONCEPT

If we want to find out whether the extended secularization paradigm can provide a plausible explanation for the transformation of Alevi communities regarding their belief system and its effect on the marital issues, first of all, it is crucial to elaborate what secularization as a concept means. For that reason, at the beginning of this chapter, the concept of secularization will be fleshed out. Two fallacies, i.e. the general perception of “secularization = disappearance of religion” (which has been put forward by well-known sociologists of religion like Peter Berger, Grace Davie, Rodney Stark *et al.* and which also finds support in Turkey) and the identification “secularization = laicization” (the two terms are often confused in Turkey by scholars and media) are fairly widespread. Therefore, in this chapter, after discussing secularization as a concept, I will argue how the concept of secularization differs from being irreligious, and also why it would be a mistake to use the concepts of secularization and laicization interchangeably.

WHAT DOES SECULARIZATION MEAN?

According to Evert Van der Zweerde (2014: 132), there are two basic senses of any -ization: *process* and *policy*. Secularization could thus be “an objective process that can be observed, analysed, *etc.*”

or “an active policy”. In this dissertation, I will explore the term as a process rather than as a policy, since the aim of this study is to examine whether changes in the three elements of modernization have any kind of effect on the secularization process in Alevi communities. However, it should be noted in the beginning of this chapter that, “the concepts of ‘secular’ (...) are hard to pin down, and far from neutral. Notions in the conceptual field of ‘secular’ may seem neutral or objective, but they never are: they are always also *polemical* notions” (Van der Zweerde, 2014: 137). Therefore, the concept of secularization in this thesis is not exempt from polemics.

Etymologically, the word secularization goes back to *saeculum* of Ancient Rome, and the word has been used in different senses since then. First of all, in Ancient Rome and early Christendom, it refers to a long period of time as in a century or age (Bremmer, 2008). The word secular was still used in the first half of the 17th century as an adjective to define “long-lasting”. John Donne, a poet from Oxford, used the term in one of his sermons in this way: “If I had a secular glass, a glass that would run an age” (Burnett, 1807; Donne, 1840). This usage corresponds to *secolo* (Italian), *siglo* (Spanish), *segle* (Catalan), *século* (Portuguese) and *siècle* (French) in the Romance languages of today. Jan Bremmer (2008) argues that the term, which had been used to define a period of time equal to an age, underwent important changes in the early Middle Ages. He says that the notion of *saeculum* was defined by Christian theologians “as the world in which we live, a world that is characterized by sin and the rejection of God” (Bremmer, 2008: 432). The contribution of Christian theologians to the concept of *saeculum* in Ancient Rome is rendered by Yehoshua Arieli as follows:

It is a new era [*nova aetas*] structured on the rejection of the belief in the determining force of transcendence as an actor in history as the idea was formulated in the Bible and in the Augustinian scheme of the two cities. It is a new era that denies the claim of the Church to be the lawgiver and foundation of all values, truth and meaning for man, living in the world, the *saeculum*, or city of man (1994: 205).

Another usage in the history of the word secular is within canon law for ecclesiastics who abandon monasticism in favour of the “world.” However, these “secular” ecclesiastics did not cut off their ties with the Church. Different from the radical ecclesiastics, who shut themselves up in their monastery and lived in seclusion, these men continued to maintain their relations with the world out there. Hence, they attempt to find solutions to the everyday problems of society from a religious perspective and through dialogue with the people (Casanova, 1994: 12-13). Yet another usage, as a noun (*secularisation*) and as a verb (*seculariser*), is found in French in the second half of the 16th century, and refers to “transfers of goods from the possession of the Church into that of the world of the lay people” (Bremmer, 2008: 433), i.e. “the massive expropriation and appropriation, usually by the state, of monasteries, landholdings, and mortmain wealth of the Church after the Protestant Reformation” (Casanova, 1994: 13).

Today there seems to be no agreement among scholars over what secularization is and what it is not. José Casanova argues the following for the concept on the basis of contemporary usage:

(...) the concept itself is so multidimensional, so ironically reversible in its contradictory connotations, and so loaded with the wide range of meanings it has accumulated through its history. The concept’s very range of meanings and contradictions makes it practically non-operational for the dominant modes of empirical scientific analysis (1994: 12).

According to Larry Shiner (1967: 207), one of the characteristics of the contemporary academic world is a profound disagreement in terms of defining and measuring secularization. While the disagreement referred to by Shiner used to be found between sociologists like Bryan Wilson and David Martin in the middle of the 1960s, the debates seem to continue unabated today between scholars such as Steve Bruce and Rodney Stark. In these debates, to which other sociologists of religion also contribute significantly,⁷ what secular-

7 Grace Davie (1994; 2002), Peter L. Berger (1997; 2008), José Casanova (1994;

ization is and whether it defines the relationship between society and religion (especially in West European countries, but also in the USA and other developed countries) are discussed in detail.

In an environment in which scholars tend to consolidate their positions on issues on the basis of their own and sometimes contrasting definitions, the concept of secularization is in a position akin to that of a servant who has more than one master (Shiner, 1967: 207). Therefore, it would seem fairly clear that whenever the word secularization is used, it is important to know first of all what the author means by using the concept.

Martin (1965) has argued that the concept of secularization was used as an ideology in the 1960s, and that for this reason it should not be used in sociological literature to explain the relationship between religion and society. By contrast, Wilson (1966: 11) argued that secularization did not have an ideological aspect, but was used to express the decline in the impact of religion in Europe and the USA as a mode of thought guiding daily practices. The term itself did not support this transformation in religion-society relation. Peter Berger (1967a: 107), in his early writings, uses the term for “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. (...) the decline of religious contents in the arts, in philosophy, in literature (...).” Richard K. Fenn (1969: 112) summarizes what had been said of secularization until 1969 as follows: “expropriation of ecclesiastical property; renunciation of powers; declericalisation of structures; deconfessionalising of social services; desacralization of cultures; the de-ideologising of traditions; the demythologizing of sources (...).” Wilson (1979: 277) also stated that religion, having gradually lost its authority, has been reduced to the same status as any other item to be consumed in a consumer society as well as being marginalized in day-to-day activities. In addition, Thomas Luckmann views as hallmarks of secularization people’s endeavour to find solutions

2003; 2007), Mark Chaves (1994), Karel Dobbelaere (1985; 1999), Jeffrey K. Hadden (1987; 1995) among others.

for the problems they come across in their daily lives without consulting religion or religious figures, the restriction on the control of religion in non-religious areas, the estrangement of any religious belief from being the dominant culture and means of expression within society and the ensuing confinement of religion to the private sphere (Luckmann, 1979: 12; Tschannen, 1991: 398). Frank J. Lechner (1991: 1104) emphasizes the concept of cultural pluralism that emerges with rationalization, the formation of different social strata, and the assumption of social tasks by different groups which previously belonged to religious institutions. Mark Chaves (1994: 750) argues that secularization should not be understood as the decline of religion, but as the declining power of religious authority. Casanova (1994: 19) highlights functionalist differentiation and, just like Lechner, sees social modernization as liberation of the secular sphere (state, economy, art, science) from the religious sphere. Karel Dobbelaere (1999) explains secularization on a social level as the replacement of traditional society with complex, pragmatist and modern society, the loss of the power of religious knowledge in favour of rational knowledge, and the replacement of the religion-moulded traditional jurisdiction by the secular legal order. Bruce (2002: 3), finally, sees secularization as a decline of behaviours and thoughts whose reference point is religion, not to mention breakdown in the previously prevalent power of religion, just as many have already pointed out above, in non-religious spheres – economy, health, education.

These scholars define the term secularization either as a decrease in religion and religious authority or restriction of religion into the private sphere. However, unlike them, there are other prominent scholars who perceive secularization as the complete disappearance of religion, total disengagement of the modern person from religion, or as the equivalent of laicization – a view that is especially prevalent in Turkey. For example, Berger, one of the world's most reputable sociologists of religion, argues the following with respect to the concept of secularization:

I think what I and most other sociologists of religion wrote in the 1960s about secularization was a mistake. Our underlying argument was that secularization and modernity go hand in hand. With more modernization comes more secularization. It wasn't a crazy theory. There was some evidence for it. But I think it's basically wrong. Most of the World today is certainly not secular. It's very religious. So is the U.S. The one exception to this is Western Europe. One of the most interesting questions in the sociology of religion today is not, How do you explain fundamentalism in Iran? But, Why is Western Europe different? (1997: 974)

Harvey Cox, who is recognized as one of the key theorists of secularization in the 1960s with his book *The Secular City*, later claimed that the theory of secularization had collapsed,⁸ because there were religious revivals all around the world (Cox & Swyngedouw, 2000). Stark and Iannaccone, by contrast, accept the following sentences by F. C. Wallace as the anticipated impact of secularization:

The evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in supernatural beings and supernatural forces that affect nature without obeying nature's laws will erode and become only an interesting historical memory. Belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the World, as the result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge (1994: 230).

Jeffrey K. Hadden (1987; 1995) states that the concept of secularization ostracizes the sacred, and that various intellectuals since the Enlightenment have wished for the disappearance of religion. Moreover, many have tried to prove that religion belonged to primitive people and would therefore perish completely with modernization. Hadden argues that these hostile sentiments against religion and wishes for non-religious societies have been sacralized as secularization theory. Therefore, Hadden sees secularization as becoming irreligious, and claims that there are totally opposite developments (due to the presence of religious people in modern societies), and the theory of secularization should be seen as an outdated theory.

8 Cox criticizes the idea that modernization creates problem for religion by looking at modern countries.

Seeing secularization as the total disappearance of religion has been taken up by reputable scholars in Turkey such as Ali Köse and Talip Küçükcan. Köse (2006) defines secularization as the erasion of religion from the earth due to modernization, while Küçükcan (2005) defines it, following the founding fathers of sociology like Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857), as the gradual disappearance of religion in industrialized societies. But then he goes on to claim that there is indeed religious revival all around the world, and that there has not been secularization in most parts of the world at the beginning of the 21st century. While a more detailed critique of this understanding (i.e. perceiving secularization as the disappearance of religion) merits being the subject of another dissertation, we will consider this approach critically below when discussing what secularization does not mean.

I stand closer to scholars who define secularization as a process through which the influence of religion on society declines, partly because its final end is not specified in the process of secularization itself. That religion's decline in power and prestige coincides with the modernization process does not mean that they have or would become totally extinct. In this sense, we can say that sociologists of religion such as Stark, Hayden, Davie, and Berger, who define secularization as the extinction of religion due to the modernization process, present a rather crude definition of the term.

At this point, I tend to agree with those who define secularization as a process whereby the power and prestige of religion declines, rather than those who advocate for the disappearance of religion. However, I am also of the opinion that the definitions put forward above are rather religion-centric (with a focus on Christianity) and for that matter also church-centric. We need a concept with a more comprehensive framework rather than reducing a concept with a universal character to a specific religion or to an established institution within that religion. Nonetheless, a decline in the power of religion is certainly associated with secularization, but earthly structures that have been sacralised and gained religion-like characteris-

tics are also within secularization's field of interest. In addition, not only the social power and influence of religions and religion-like structures, but also folk and superstitious beliefs constitute part of the discussions on secularization.

That being said, I define secularization in general terms as follows: *Secularization is the relative decrease in the social prestige and social influence of dominant metaphysical realm, i.e. religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms and superstitious beliefs, within a defined period of time and in a particular place.*

In this study, the concept *metaphysical realm* is used as an embracing concept and covers the field of reasoning and thinking on the concepts and events based on belief and intuition rather than experiment and observation. For example having attitudes, commitments, believes and approaches with regard to nature without an observable connection to experiences are considered part of the metaphysics (Steup, 2011: 21-22). Since metaphysical realms vary across societies, the word "dominant" is used to point out there is no one way or unique experience of metaphysics.

Here, the phenomenon called *religion* has been used, in the first place, as a paradigm in its entirety based on metaphysical references and having an influence on daily practices, ethical values, aesthetical perceptions, ontological (existential) problems, the perceptions about social norms of the communities in which they are practised as in monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, etc.). I think Durkheim's definition will be helpful at this point. "A religion" says Durkheim (1912/2008: 46), "is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions - beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community." Such an entity, being an ethical system presenting proper and correct conduct modes, can also function as a social control mechanism, and contributes to the maintenance of the social order, thereby encouraging those attitudes and conducts that are socially acceptable (Atay, 2012: 25).

The concept of *folk religion* is used to mean “the totality of all those views and practices of religion that exist among the people apart from and alongside the strictly theological and liturgical forms of the official religion” (Yoder, 1974: 14).

The notion of *religion-like mechanisms*, on the other hand, has exclusively been used in this thesis to indicate the structures emerging as a result of the sacralisation, deification and sublimation of the secular domain. The religion-like structures are those that emerge as a consequence of the belief that a political leader, a singer, a fashion icon, a nation, a community, a football player, even a particular location possesses supranatural characteristics or powers and the consequential glorification, deification and sacralisation of such entities. For example, some world leaders may be deified, sublimed, ascribing to them a superhuman character. People have sometimes seen such leaders even as more dignified than prophets, ascribing to them the character of a semi-prophet. Everything they say is passed from one generation to another over decades or centuries, like the verses of a holy book. Their influence is not limited to the period in which they live, but their ideas offer solutions to problems in a timeless manner. Furthermore, laws are enacted to protect them from criticisms; and quite often, it becomes impossible to criticise them because of social sanctions. A divine characteristic is attributed to their arguments and they gain a transcendental characteristic.

A *superstitious belief* is “defined as a strong conviction based on the erroneous perception of a cause-effect association between two independent events” (Joukhador, J., Blaszczyński, A. & Maccallum, F., 2004: 171) and inconsistent with the known laws of nature (Kramer & Block, 2008). The term superstitious has a pejorative meaning in daily usage and presupposes that there is a true belief (generally the dominant religious belief) and other beliefs apart from this true belief are considered false, irrational, and incompatible with truth. However, it should be stressed that in this thesis the term is not used in this pejorative meaning but just to describe a belief or practice that is not in harmony with orthodox religious

understanding as it arises from holy scriptures and that is not explained with the laws of nature. Therefore, for lack of a better term, despite its weaknesses, the term superstitious is used in this study without its pejorative meaning.

The phrases *relative* and *a defined period of time and particular place* in the definition are used in order to prevent an absolute understanding. In other words, they are used to indicate the weaker social power of religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms and superstitious beliefs “in comparison to the past” in a “particular place” rather than indicating an absolute value or level. We can say, for this reason, that even a rather faithful community may undergo a “secularization” process or may become more secular compared to the olden days. In the same way, it can also be said that a quite religious individual may also be secularised in comparison to former times or may become part of a more secular life. To sum up, to decide whether any person or community becomes more secular or not, a reference point (time and place) is needed.

The crucial point of this definition is that it will help us explain the relationship between different forms of the “sacred” and human beings in various parts of the world. For, as the above definition states, secularization denotes the decrease in the social impact not only of religion, but also of secular “things” that are religion-like, sacralized, deified or exalted into a supranatural realm.

In short, if religion is able to penetrate social life and to influence daily activities more than it did in the past, then it is argued that this society has become less secular. By the same token, if a society distances itself from religion compared to what was the case in the past due to some new dynamics, and if religion, folk religions or religion-like things are mentioned less often and have less influence in daily life, then it can be stated that this society is becoming more secular.

WHAT DOES SECULARIZATION NOT MEAN?

Up until now, we have examined some definitions which for the most part express what secularization is. However, in order to better express the concept of secularization and to demonstrate the fallacy of the mainstream perception, I find it necessary to explain what the concept of secularization is not.

Secularization does not Equal Becoming Irreligious

It has been stated that certain scholars writing on secularization in English as well as Turkish academia see secularization as “becoming irreligious,” and interpret the presence of various religious people in today’s modern world as an absence of secularization. However, secularization does not mean becoming irreligious or faithless. In a secularized society, as defined in this study, individuals can still have religious faith and can still perform religious rituals. Sociologists of religion who perceive secularization as becoming irreligious have often put forward a very crude interpretation of secularization and a highly simplistic perception of religion.

It could be claimed that changing one’s belief system in favour of another religion is not a sign of secularization, since the individual is still said to be under the influence of another religion. However, secularization should not be confused with atheism or deism. What is important as far as secularization is concerned is the softening up of a religion up to a point where it becomes an entity that can be preferred or rejected. If a religion, which is supposed to be carried from birth to death, turns into something that is selectable, this is called secularization (Bruce, 1998: 229).

The process of secularization may result in many people distancing themselves from religion or losing their faith altogether. Bruce (2002; 2011a) remarks that these two processes are interrelated in that the decline in the social importance of religion may also lead to a drop in the number of people interested in religion. Nevertheless, the two processes are not identical, and this standpoint does not

necessarily suggest that the final point of secularization is becoming irreligious or that religion will vanish. It is not easy, or even possible, to make such a direct correlation in the light of the current presence of religion in secular societies.

The absence or presence of religious belief for that matter is not the primary parameter for measuring secularization's pervasive impact. The real issue here is the estrangement of religion from being a positive (as exemplified by an authentic religious life) or negative (as exemplified by certain militant atheists) reference point in society. Max Weber's concept of being *religiously unmusical* (Weber, 2009: 324) will help us in this context: "It is true that I am absolutely unmusical religiously and have no need or ability to erect any psychic edifices of a religious character within me. But a thorough self-examination has told me that I am neither antireligious nor irreligious." In terms of secularization, even if the decline in the social impact of religion may result in an increase in the number of atheists or agnostics, what needs to be emphasized is not being irreligious, but becoming indifferent to religion. Because, secularization questions the ways in which religion penetrates society's fabric, sometimes certain religious people can even act in a more secular way than certain atheists. Some atheists, even if they do not believe in a higher power or creator, can act in a less secular manner because of their connection to religion. We can collate these theoretical arguments in Table A1 in the context of the cafés at *Nişantaşı*, a very popular district for *white Turks* (elite Turks) in İstanbul.⁹

9 The reaction against the conservative AKP government, especially between 2007-2009, focused on headscarfed women in the streets. At the beginning of 2008, the political discussions which emerged because of the law that allowed the wearing of a headscarf at universities started to position themselves over the issue. The most caricaturized forms of these discussions were the reactions to the visibility of the headscarf in places where they were not previously visible. The journalist Ayşe Arman, from the *Hürriyet* daily, spent time in the famous *Nişantaşı* cafés such as House Café and Beymen Brasserie while wearing a headscarf and wrote her impressions in order to examine the claims about the laic-neighbourhood's pressures against the headscarfed women in the cafés of *Nişantaşı* (Arman, 2009, July 12). In addition to this, these discussions have continued until recently. At the beginning of 2013, the wellknown theatre actress Gülriz Sururi

Table A1. A café (previously frequented only by those who had a secular lifestyle) and secular way of action.

Person	Faith & ideology	The act of going to a Nişantaşı café which is “now” frequented also by those wearing a headscarf	Is this action secular?
First Woman (No headscarf)	Militant Kemalist ¹⁰ or Militant Atheist ¹¹	She does not go to this café anymore, because she does not feel comfortable going to a café where there are people wearing a headscarf.	No
Second Woman (Headscarfed)	Moderate Muslim ¹²	She goes to this café because she loves very much the caramel macchiato that is served there.	Yes
Third Woman (Headscarfed)	Radical Muslim ¹³	She goes to this café even though it is not to her taste. She thinks that by going there she is taking revenge upon those who had despised her for years.	No

said the following in an interview: “Look, people can veil themselves according to their free will. I accept that. But where were they ten/twelve years ago? They have come out systematically. They were commanded to sit in the cafés of Nişantaşı, so they did. They spread everywhere, to the most unexpected restaurants, the most unexpected cafés, cinemas, theatres” (Sururi, 2013, February 19).

- 10 In this study, a militant Kemalist has been defined as an individual claiming to be a Kemalist who expects that everyone she/he coexists, or must coexist, in the public sphere should conduct in compliance with her/his own ideology.
- 11 The notion of militant atheism has been used in this study for situations where the reaction given against seemingly religious people in particular has an influence on the daily life of an individual.
- 12 In this study, the term of moderate Muslim has been used to refer to the individuals the religions of whom play no crucial role in their daily life activities.
- 13 The notion of radical Muslim has been used in this study to characterise the individuals whose religious beliefs have a radical and constant influence on their daily life activities.

From this table, we can see that sometimes a religious person can act more “secularly” than an atheist person. This is because secularization is not about becoming irreligious, but is rather about the social contexts where religion is less and less taken as a positive or negative reference point. In this example, the daily behaviour of the First Woman (to go or not to go to a café she used to frequent) is influenced by her relationship with religion. Although she does not have any religious faith or does not have much connection with religion in her daily life, her reaction towards religion, religious people or religious symbols provides direction for her daily life. At times, her negative relationship to religion or religious people restrains her from doing the things she likes (such as going to her favourite café). The Third Woman, who is a radical Muslim, wants to go to that café from where she had been excluded for years because of her outfit, this time only because of the rejection she had to endure in the past, even though she does not care much about the menu of the café. Just like the First Woman, the Third Woman also decides to go to that café due to her relationship with religion. Even if one of them goes to the café and the other does not, both of them act on the basis of their relationship with religion as a reference point. Whether the action is positive or negative does not change the fact that the action arises from their relationship with religion. However, the Second Woman, who also wears a headscarf just like the Third Woman, goes to that café mainly to have *caramel macchiato*. She has this coffee not on the basis of her relationship with religion, but according to her taste, irrespective of religion or religious discussion, and she prefers a place where she can, but must not wear a headscarf. When we juxtapose these three people – in the context of one and the same café – we can state that the Second Woman, who is a moderate Muslim, acts more secularly than both the First Woman, who is an atheist, and the Third Woman, who is a radical Muslim.

Therefore, it should be stressed once more that secularization is not to be equated with becoming irreligious. On the contrary, peo-

ple do not have to lose their faith when they become secular. They can still regularly go to churches, mosques, synagogues or other sacred places of their faith, baptize their children, sacrifice animals, go on *Hajj*, celebrate Thanksgiving Day in crowded and appropriate places, perform prayers, fast, and carry out all their religious duties and rituals. When it comes to secularization, how the individual cares about religion positively or negatively in matters such as premarital relations, abortion, sexual orientation, birth control, education, health, divorce, euthanasia, having premarital or extramarital children, choice of work and friends, marriage between people of different religions or denominations, choice of city or neighbourhood to live in, understanding of vacation, *etc.* seems more important than how often s/he prays or the faith s/he adheres to. Certainly, changes in the frequency of religious rituals or changes in the number of people who have a faith are also important in discussions on secularization. However, the concept of secularization in this thesis focuses on how religion, religious-like structures, folk beliefs and superstitious practices are reflected in societal life. Therefore, it is crucial to emphasize the difference between a faith, which has lost its power to influence people's daily practices after having been reduced to certain rituals during specific times of the year, and other forms of faith which still hold the power to regulate societal life in terms of discussions on secularization. For that reason, the secularization concept in this thesis is not related to the number of believers, but to the functions of faith in daily practices.

Secularization does not Equal Laicization

The concept of secularization is discussed frequently in academic studies and even in daily life, especially in countries where Germanic languages (English, German, Dutch, *etc.*) are spoken. However, when it comes to Turkey, the concept has not received the attention that it deserves due to historical and etymological reasons. Turkish scholars and media have preferred to use the terms derived from the

Greek word *laïkós* meaning “from the people” and the Latin word *laicus* meaning “not related to religious affairs” (Küçük, 2011: 46), namely, terms such as laic, laicism or laicization to describe what secular, secularism and secularization mean, respectively. It would be very common in Turkey for two people to vehemently argue on certain topics related to religion and society without using – even once – the terms derived from *saeculum*. And that is because the terms derived from *laïkós* have already been used to express all those ideas related to the issues of religion-society-state. Therefore, for the sake of this dissertation, the ambiguity and confusion regarding these terms should first be clarified by highlighting the key differences between them. In doing so, the following thus contributes to the discussions on these issues by liberating them from the “laicization – Islamisation” dichotomy prevalent in Turkey.

In contrast to the concept of secularization that aims to define an objective process between religion and all other entities, laicization is an active policy, implemented in France and Turkey, which projects the relation between the state and religion. In its broadest sense, laicization denotes the separation of the state from religion, the state being equidistant to all religious groups, and religious groups not being allowed to have a voice in education, health, security, law, or economy, all of which are under state supervision. It also signifies the state not looking after the interests of certain religious groups when taking decisions on internal and external affairs, people not being suspended from state institutions or promoted on the basis of their religious beliefs; in short, the state is irreligious.

Even if this can be considered a definition of laicization, it is not enough to merely provide a definition when it comes to laicization since the practices of it differ throughout history. Because of the 1789 French Revolution and the 1923 Kemalist Revolution, laicization has been held to mean not only the separation of state from religion as defined above, but also the struggle of the state to establish hegemony over religious institutions. The Turkish word

laiklik comes from the French word *laïcité*. After the French Revolution, one key purpose of the revolutionaries was to make people worship not the Church, but the State. The primary objective was to eliminate the Church or at least hinder its progress so as to always remain under the hegemony of the State. Soon after the revolution, many priests and nuns were shot, hung, or mutilated with axes if they were believed to have been collaborators of the previous regime (Souvay, 1923: 489). The ecclesiastics who refused to pledge loyalty to the new regime were threatened with death and the revolution's laws replaced the laws of the Church (Brunner, 1991: 76). In brief, the French revolutionaries separated religious affairs from those of the state and aimed their revolution at eliminating the Church by replacing it with the state.

Inspired by the French system of thought and state structure, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the politically active intellectuals of the young Turkish Republic adopted the French style for their new state. Like the French Jacobins, they wanted to redesign society through a highly centralized structure. Just as the Jacobins had managed to eliminate the Church from the state affairs under the concept of *laïcité*, Atatürk also wished, in the name of *laiklik*, to remove all religious symbols from social life and render everything religious under state control. Until he died in 1938, Atatürk continued to either change the Islamic symbols or eliminate/nationalize them so as to liken Turkish society to contemporary (Western) secular societies. He wanted to found not only a laic state, but also to create a secular society. He passed radical laws both to laicize the state and to prevent religion from penetrating Turkish life (the policy of secularizing).

In 1922, the Ankara Government¹⁴ abolished the sultanate, which was probably the first step by the young Republic on its way

¹⁴ In 1922, there were two governments in the territory then known as Turkey. The Ankara Government was established by Atatürk and his friends. The *Is-tanbul Government*, on the other hand, was set up by the supporters of the old

towards laicization. In 1924, the caliphate and the old ministry of religious affairs (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) were abolished. A laic system of education was introduced with the removal of any distinction between *madrasah* (Islamic religious school) and school. The contents of the courses were cleansed of anything that smacked of religion. In 1925, monasteries, *zawiyahs* (Islamic religious schools), and shrines were closed down. A year later, the Swiss Civil Code and German Commercial Law formed the backbone of the new Republic's laws which were free of religion. The French revolutionaries had lengthened the days in a week from 7 to 10, so that people could not pray on Sundays and even banned the word "Sunday". Maybe not in that level and extent, but Atatürk also changed the weekend holiday from Friday to Sunday.

In 1928, the provision "Religion of the State is Islam" was deleted from the Constitution. Arguably, the most far-reaching move towards laicization of the state occurred in November of the same year. Atatürk changed the alphabet from Arabic to Latin and almost the whole nation had to learn the new written language from scratch overnight. In 1932, Arabic and Persian words were removed from the glossary under the name of purifying the Turkish language (Stirling, 1958: 399-403). According to Nilüfer Göle (1997: 50), all these efforts were aimed at estranging Turkish society from the Qur'an and other religious sources in Arabic. In 1933, all religious educational institutions were closed down and religious education in primary schools was forbidden (Stirling, 1958: 396). Women, who previously had been given the right only to vote in local elections, received in 1934 the right to vote and be elected in the general elections.

And finally, in 1937 *laiklik* was formally added to the Constitution. Thus, the process which started with the abolition of sultanate and caliphate¹⁵ was officially completed with the formal adoption

regime.

15 The modernization process of Turkey cannot be thought of independently

of *laiklik* into the Constitution after ground-breaking decisions had been made in the fields of education, law, commerce and politics. Just as the French revolutionaries had founded a new republic by eradicating all traces of the old regime and by implementing *laïcité*, the Turkish revolutionaries removed religion from public domains and restricted it to private homes, degrading it to a point at which they could easily control it. Unlike the way the term is defined in the dictionaries, in both cases the exact situation is not like separation of two entities, but that one of them goes under the control of the other.

Another problem concerning the definition of the concept is etymological in nature. The Germanic languages (English, German, Dutch, Danish, *etc.*) do not use laicism to express the separation between state and religion. In these languages, the term that expresses this division is *secularism* rather than laicism. But in the dictionaries, the word *laïcité* is translated into English as secularism, German as *Säkularismus*, Danish and Norwegian as *sekularisme* and Dutch as *secularisme* although these two terms (laicism and secularism) refers to different things. If a person who speaks one of the Germanic languages uses the word laicism, s/he is primarily referring to the relation between state and religion in France or Turkey in particular. Because, as opposed to secularism which merely implies the separation of state and religion, religious institutions or religion itself has been controlled in the public sphere under the name of laicism.¹⁶

from the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire, that is, from the reforms which took place in the 18th and 19th centuries. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the roots of the new country, which Atatürk tried to build by modelling it on the West, were based on the military reforms of the 18th and 19th centuries, in the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839, in the Royal Edict of Reform in 1856, and in the other regulatory laws on education, jurisdiction and the economy (Berkes, 2006).

- 16 Those Germanic languages do have the words derived from “*laïkos*”: lay in English, Laie in German, leek in Dutch. However, instead of using it for a specific political move like in France and Turkey, they are used with the general meaning of non-ordained or, more generally, non-initiated.

While the state is not supposed to favour or disfavour religious positions in the so-called laic countries, the case is strikingly different when it comes to Turkish laicism. For example, Sunni Islam is taught in the public schools of Turkey as a requirement. Students, be they Alevi or atheist, have to take that course and learn how to pray like Sunni people. Besides, all mosques belong to the Turkish state and all the costs of mosques are paid for by the state. The sermons given each Friday in mosques are sent to all mosques from one centre, The Directorate of Religious Affairs, located in the capital city, Ankara. Therefore, it is not abnormal to learn that the contents of the sermons are directly linked to the government's interests (Gürpınar & Kenar, 2016).

In light of these different structures, it would not seem appropriate to use laicism and secularism or secularization and laicization interchangeably. For example, the regime of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden (until 2000) and Norway, where the head of state is also the head of an established state church or religion, is not one of laicism, but of secularism. These are not laic, because the state does have a religion, even if it is only a figurative one. However, secularism is the political principle that the state is relatively equidistant to all groups of faith, which means that religion has no word in the state of affairs. The fact that these countries have secular judicial systems does not mean that they are therefore laic.

To overcome this etymological difference and confusion, Manoranjan Mohanty (1989) uses the concepts of "hegemonic secularism" and "democratic secularism". Ahmet Kuru (2007), on the other hand, uses the concepts "assertive secularism" and "passive secularism" to explain the different structures. In this case, we can say that according to Kuru and Mohanty, assertive/hegemonic secularism has been experienced in Turkey and France whereas other non-laic West European countries have been experiencing passive/democratic secularism. In the same vein, Van der Zweerde (personal communication, May 23, 2014) uses *Catholaïcité*, *New Englaïcité*

and Muslaicité to stress that what is being experienced in France, the USA and Turkey with regard to state-religion affairs is not one and the same thing and depends on the religious tradition in place.

In this case, if we can summarize the difference between secularization and laicization (as it has been implemented in Turkey and France), it will be the following:

Secularization is the process of gaining independence from religion (...) without having an aggressive and antagonistic attitude against religion, on the other hand, laicization is the process where a direct hostile attitude is assumed against religion in an effort to eliminate all the rituals, realms, individuals and public conducts having religious character and substitute them with pure earthly and non-religious factors. As a stern attitude is taken against religion and religious institutions in the laicization process, this process will necessarily be accompanied by oppression, totalitarian inclinations, assimilation and projects of social liquidation (Duran, 1997: 13).

In other words, while the defenders of laicization in Turkey try to alienate religion from various aspects of social life, theorists of secularization do not seem to have such an objective. While laicization has pillars such as transforming and changing society, forbidding and enforcing things, theorists of secularization do not expect anything from either society or state. Laicization expresses the transformation desired at the state level, whereas secularization refers to the overall transformation mostly as an objective process. While laicization is the active policy of a politico-judicial principle, Wilson (1966), by contrast, stated that secularization is not an ideology and does not have as objective either to applaud or condemn the transformation of the relationship between religion and society. I think that the following summary by Hasan Yücel Başdemir of Turkish laicization is instructive:

The implementation of Turkish-type laicism as a project of enlightenment and modernization has revealed another problem in terms of the freedom of religion. Laicism has been implemented as a lifestyle which has encompassed all the domains of life and which is alternative to the religious life. Laicism, which is fundamentally a *legal* and *political* thought and value (...) (2011: 148).

In brief, secularization is not something that can be imposed upon society, as is the case with laicization in Turkey and France. On the contrary, it is a process that has its own internal dynamics and emerges by itself. Now, it is necessary to look at examples of how these two concepts, which do have different meanings, are used in the Turkish media and academic world to mean the same thing.

Two Concepts Used Interchangeably

It should normally be taken for granted that the concepts derived from the word *laikos* may be used far more frequently than the concepts derived from the word *saeculum* in a country where the principle of laicity has been used to build a new system and then adopted in its constitution. However, the main problem in Turkey is not which concept is used more or used less, but that one of the concepts may be used to encompass the other. There are two pillars of such misuse: media and – parallel to it – academia. Turkish columnists, newspaper editors and some scholars have used the words laic, laicism, laicization instead of secular, secularism, and secularization for quite some time now, either because they think that the vast masses will not understand it, or because they are not themselves familiar with the concept. I think that it is no coincidence that there are still people asking, “Do you mean laicization?” whenever I try to explain what secularization is.

For example, journalist Mustafa Armağan (1997, September 26) opts for the title, “The Legend of Secularization (Laicization)” for his article in which he criticizes the secularization thesis. Armağan considers it more appropriate to use “laicization” in parentheses, probably so as not to scare off people from using an unknown word, secularization. Nuray Mert (2009, March 29) uses the title, “Do They Get Laicized as They Prosper?” for her column in *Hürriyet* with a discussion on the estrangement of prospering conservatives from religion. The content of the article exhibits a certain conceptual confusion because of the writer’s bias against the word secularization. Özdemir İnce (2012, March 4), in his column in *Hürriyet*, uses

expressions such as “the social culture is laicized” or “the laicization of the individual.” However, social culture can be secularized, but not laicized. Moreover, contrary to what İnce implies, individuals cannot be laicized. They can defend a laic state system, but by that fact cannot be considered laic. If we want to express the notion that individuals are living a life away from religion, it would seem more appropriate to say that they have been secularized, but not laicized.

In addition to the columnists, the editorial preferences of newspapers do not favour the word “secularization” either. If one searches how often big daily newspapers use the terms, the outcomes are very interesting. Table A2 demonstrates how often these terms have been used in a period of more than ten years by four top newspapers in Turkey. There are two main reasons why I have chosen these four newspapers. First, these four newspapers address quite large audiences, i.e. millions of people from different segments of society. The second is that due to the technical infrastructure they possess, research into the past is possible for *Zaman*, *Hürriyet* and *Sabah* until 1997, and *Milliyet* until 2001. This finding is related to concepts that render the claims above more concrete.

Table A2. Frequency of Usage of the Concepts “Laic-Laicism-La-icization” and “Secular-Secularism-Secularization” by Four Mass Newspapers

Newspaper	Time Scale	Laic-Laicism-Laicization	Secular-Secularism-Secularization
Zaman	October 1997 – September 2015	26.166 times	1.844 times
Hürriyet	July 1997 – September 2015	19.336 times	507 times
Milliyet	January 2001 – September 2015	12.180 times	325 times
Sabah	January 1997 – September 2015	2.950 times	444 times

Even if it can be agreed that the concepts derived from the word *laikós* have dominated the Turkish agenda (due to historical processes) more than the concepts derived from the word *saeculum*, where the frequency is 26.166 to 1.844 (*Zaman*) or 19.336 to 507 (*Hürriyet*), we need a different dynamic from that of Turkish political history or the mere existence of a word in the constitution in order to explain these figures. The reason for the apparent lack of enthusiasm in Turkish society for the word secularization is really not the indifference of Turkish public opinion concerning this issue. On the contrary, discussions on matters such as “becoming conservative,” “Malaysianization,” or “Iranianization,” which have ranked among the most important issues of the Turkish agenda for so many years, do in fact address the realm of secularization. Even in these discussions, words such as *laic*, *laicism*, and *laicization* have been wrongly used instead of *secular*, *secularism* or *secularization*. For example, *laicization* of the social order is talked about in *Hürriyet* (2003, December 20) in this way: “(...) it has been understood that the social order will not *laicize* before schools are *laicized*.” *Laicization* is also mentioned in *Milliyet* (2004, February 17): “Especially in Islamic societies which are in the midst of *laicization* process (...)” However, neither the *laicization* of social order nor the *laicization* of society is a meaningful expression. *Laicization* is not related to society but a concept related to the state.

Even if the academic world uses the concepts *secularization* - *laicization* interchangeably less often than the media, it is quite possible to still come across many wrong examples in Turkish academia. For example, although Anthony Giddens uses the word “*secularization*” as the subtitle in his famous book *Sociology*, the word was translated into Turkish as “*laicization*” and currently many universities still use that book for all freshmen. In the book Şerif Mardin’e Armağan (Companion to Şerif Mardin), Bahattin Akşit, who is one of the more notable sociologists in Turkey, writes:

Casanova (1994) who questions and reformulates the laicization thesis in terms of the historical process (...). (...) to research the relationship between Islam and laicization. According to Casanova (1994) our evaluation rests on three separate moments when we say that a country or a society is laicized: differentiation, retreatment to the private sphere and the decrease in religiosity (...) (2005: 68).

[*Laikleşme kuramını Protestanlığın dışındaki Katolikliğin geçirdiği tarihsel süreçler açısından sorgulayan ve yeniden formüle eden Casanova (1994) İslamiyet'in laikleşme ile olan ilişkisini araştırmamızı (...). Casanova'ya göre (1994), bir ülkenin veya toplumun laikleşmiş olduğunu söylediğimiz zaman üç farklı boyutta değerlendirme yapıyoruz: farklılaşma, özel alana çekilme ve dinselliğin azalması (...).*]

However, the statements made by Casanova in the book *Public Religions in Modern World* (1994) differ from those cited by Akşit. Casanova talks about secularization, not laicization, and discusses in his book the fundamental argument of the secularization theory. While Casanova (1994: 19) uses the subheading *Three Separate Moments of the Theory of Secularization*,¹⁷ Akşit (2005: 68) translates this as “the three separate moments of laicization [*laikleşmenin üç farklı boyutu*].” While it is “the theory of secularization” which is prevalent throughout Casanova’s book, Akşit adapts it to his article in terms of laicization. Yet another professor, Bünyamin Duran, uses laicization and secularization interchangeably in his early writings, and sees secularization as part of a project such as saving, purifying, liberating someone from something:

Laicization (secularization) can be defined as the process of liberation of the human mind and thought – in general – from the control of religion and metaphysics. It is the purification and liberation of all the branches of social life, of politics, culture and science from religion-based values (1995: 29-30).

[*Laikleşme (sekülerleşme); insan aklı ve düşüncesinin-genel olarak-dini ve metafizik denetimden kurtarılması süreci olarak tanımlanabilir.*

17 In his book, José Casanova, after a statement on “the core and central thesis of the theory of secularization,” explains the three dimensions that Akşit talks about.

Toplumsal hayatın tüm branşlarının; siyasetin, kültürün, bilimin dine dayanan değerlerden arındırılması ve bağımsızlaştırılması olayıdır.]

In addition, “secularism”, as an ideology, is also confused with secularization in Turkey. The book entitled *Secularism on Trial* (*Sekülerizm Sorgulanıyor*), edited by Prof. Ali Köse and published in 2002, contained articles criticizing the theory of secularization, such that the title should indeed have been *Secularization on Trial*. This book, which focused on West-oriented literature, includes important articles by well-known scholars who have criticized the theory of secularization over the past 30 years, such as Peter Berger, Rodney Stark, Grace Davie and Harvey Cox. Unlike secularization, secularism, however, denotes an ideology which affirms a structure distant from religion at the level of both the state and the individual.

As can be understood from these examples, the scholars and journalists in Turkey have used laicization and secularization to mean the same thing many times for some understandable reasons. However, I think that these two concepts should not be used interchangeably, because they do have very different meanings. As will be seen below, states which are not laic may have societies which follow secular lifestyles, just as there are laic states which have highly religious societies.

Laic States with Religious Societies or vice versa

Laicization, in its broadest sense, only refers to the relation between religion and state, whereas secularization is also used to define the relation between religion and society. Therefore, a laic state may have non-secular societies, while non-laic states may have societies with a secular lifestyle. The founding fathers of the United States, such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin, all of them faithfully religious, separated religion from state affairs when the newly formed nation was being set up, grounding it upon the principle of “freedom of religion” (İmga, 2010). However, even though in the USA the state does not adopt a positive or negative

position towards any particular faith, the level of religious sensibility in American society is very high because of the peculiar dynamics within American society.¹⁸ The ratio of church-going is much higher in the USA than in European countries even if all have a similar level of modernity.¹⁹

In addition, although the Islamic Republic of Iran has been governed by *shari'a* law since 1979, a considerable proportion of Iranian society has a secular lifestyle. The research carried out by Abdolmohammad Kazemipur and Ali Rezaei (2003: 357) shows that Iranian society has not become as religious as its state. Iranian women cannot take off headscarves in public places and Iranians cannot drink alcohol outside because of state law. However, in realms where the state does not interfere – especially inside the homes – they follow a secular lifestyle. The Iranian house parties (since they do not have the opportunity to have parties anywhere else) are places where women wear clothes with cleavages, where all kinds of alcohol are consumed, and where women and men are free from the religious laws imposed upon them by the state (Farid, 2013; Maxfux, 2013). The present religious regime seems to have a society which adheres to a more secular lifestyle day by day (Lotfi, Kabiri & Ghasemlou, 2013). The fact that the state is not laic and that it is governed

18 There are important works written about the USA and Europe which have pursued different processes of secularization despite having the similar degrees of modernity. I think that it is not a coincidence that, while different from Europe, the USA did not go through the Protestant reform and did not experience the absolute monarchy, and as a country of emigration is therefore more religious. For related sources, see: Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008; Casanova, 2003; 2007).

19 “American church membership rates have risen throughout the past two centuries—from 17% at the time of the Revolution to more than 60% in the 1990s.” (Frejka & Westoff, 2008: 12). On the contrary, church membership rates in United Kingdom decreased from 27% at the beginning of the 20th century to 10% in the 2000s (Bruce, 2002: 67). In addition to this, while 12 % of American women between 18-44 years old go to church more than a week this ratio decreases to 3 % for European women. While 21 % of American women go to church once in a week, again, this percentage also decreased to 12 % for European women (Frejka & Westoff, 2008: 27).

by *shari'a* law does not make many Iranians more religious; it only makes them look more religious in the public domain.

Turkey is an interesting case in this respect as well. Although Turkish society experienced an exclusionary/hegemonic laicism throughout the 20th century, it has not been able to isolate itself from religion as much as the state wished. Atatürk and the governing elite thought that they could secularize Turkish society by abolishing the sultanate and dynasty, by changing the hats and clothings of the people, by closing down the monasteries, the *zawiyahs* and the shrines, and by changing the alphabet. But while it is possible to make the state laic with a law that is made part of the constitution, diminishing the presence of religion within society is not as easy as laicizing the state. If societies could be secularized by means of changes to the law, it should also be possible to divest oneself of this secularity with a single law. The secularization of society is not something that can be realized simply through the law or with a certain project. For this reason, we should state that although Turkey has tried to establish itself as a laic state and the laws enacted by the governing elites in the 1930s have caused people to practice their religion for a long time in places where the state cannot see it, this is just the opposite of what happened and is happening in Iran.

I do not for a moment wish to claim that there is not any interaction between laicism and secularization or between laicization and secularism. Certainly, Iran becoming a religious state has caused a group within Iranian society to become more religious, while the exclusionary laicism in Turkey has led to a group there becoming secularized. However, neither Iran was able to make its people more religious by using force, nor was Turkey able to estrange its people from religion, as the Kemalist elites had wanted, with top-down laws. The reason why these states have failed in their projects is that for secularization to take place, much more is needed than the power of the law.

Conclusion

There is no consensus within the social sciences with regard to the definition of secularization. For that reason, the academics who work on the concept of secularization need to clarify their understanding of secularization with their readers at the beginning of their studies. In addition, there is no consensus in the academic world on how secularization would be measured. Therefore, specifying the social dynamics that would be assigned priority in measuring secularization would prevent many misunderstandings. Since the following sections of the thesis are based on the secularization concept, what secularization is and what it is not had to be explained to the reader in detail.

Secularization, as far as it is defined in this study, is not only a concept used to explain the relationship between religion and society. Secularization means the decrease in social prestige, power and visibility of the metaphysical realm within a specific society at a certain period of time. The concept of metaphysics used here is not just religious but also encompasses (together with religion) folk beliefs, religion-like mechanisms and superstitions. Additionally, secularization should not be used as being synonymous with separation of state and religion or becoming irreligious. If secularization is defined as such, the frequency of prayers, the rates of going to church or changes in the number of believers will not be primal in measuring secularization because how metaphysics reflect itself on daily practices might be different in different societies or belief systems. From this point of view, the thing expressed here is not that change in religious rituals or in the number of believers is not important in measuring secularization. However, it should be emphasized one more time that the common feature of secularized societies is that the metaphysical realm now touches daily life practices less than in the past.

CHAPTER II

THE SECULARIZATION PARADIGM OF STEVE BRUCE

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the concept of secularization and argued how this concept is different from being irreligious, and why laicization should not be used as a substitute for the term. In this chapter, I will explore the secularization paradigm of Steve Bruce, which is based on classical secularization theory and remains one of the most controversial paradigms in social science.

According to Bruce's paradigm, modernization is the main reason behind the aggressive secularization process now pervading Western Europe and its offshoots. There are two main issues of discussion among sociologists and theologians in this regard. First, there is an ongoing debate on the meaning or scope of classical secularization theory, in which scholars have yet to reach consensus regarding the answers to the questions "What does the theory assert?" and "What does it not assert?" The second discussion, which cannot be considered separate from the first, is whether the theory is able to put forward a clear explanation for the bumpy relationship between religion and society in the European context and in other parts of the world. Therefore, in this chapter, I will attempt to provide some answers to the questions mentioned above. Firstly, I will try to shed some light on what Bruce's secularization paradigm does

assert. Then, I will explain why Bruce's paradigm, rather than other secularization theories was chosen as the starting point.

A PARADIGM THAT BELONGS TO PROTESTANTISM

It is true that to understand the underlying causes of the secularization process in a certain region, the internal dynamics of that region should be studied. Although the central claim of the secularization paradigm of Bruce – a direct correlation between modernization and secularization – is related to West European countries and their offshoots at least as a general statement, the fact that modern societies in and outside Europe have very different levels of secularization suggests that there is more at stake.

For example, is it really possible for anyone to examine the history of secularization regarding French society without taking into account the French Revolution? For any discussion on the secularization of French society, the elimination and removal of religious symbols from the public sphere by the revolutionary leaders as well as the closely connected relations between high clergy and the former regime (the monarchy before the revolution), should be on the table. In parallel, when it comes to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact,²⁰ a different dynamics beyond the modernization process is needed to explain the very harsh and rigorous secularization.

Likewise, it would not be wise to suggest that the lack of secularization of Irish society compared to other West European societies is directly linked to the modernization process alone. The war of independence waged by Irish Catholics against English Protestants in the years 1919-1921 rendered Catholicism more than just a matter of faith for the Irish. Similarly, the armed struggle carried out by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) between 1969 and 2005 for a reunite-

20 People's Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Hungarian People's Republic, Romanian People's Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of Albania, Polish People's Republic, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

ed Ireland rendered mainly Protestant Northern Ireland more sensitive to its religious identity and symbols. If the secularization histories of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are studied, it is obvious that such histories cannot be regarded independently from those bloody struggles.

To give another example, “Czechs are some of the least religious people in Eastern Europe, (...) [but] their close neighbours and one-time compatriots, the Slovaks, are vastly more religious. (...) the religious differences between Czechs and Slovaks are rooted in the historical relationship between religion and nationalism in both regions” (Froese, 2005: 269), but not in their different modernization levels. A third example can be found in the Polish religious involvement. It is not a coincidence that Polish society, which has struggled for independence from Soviet Russia for years and received support from the Roman Catholic Church and its clergy, is more religious than most other European societies (Arnold, 2012: 228).

The feelings among the Polish people towards religious rituals, symbols and clergy who placed themselves at the forefront of the battle against Soviet Russia for 40 years after World War II, or the feelings within French society towards religion and the French religious class who had supported the old regime until 1789, cannot be dissociated from their own histories. Although years have passed since both cases, it is likely that social consciousness was deeply influenced by each nation’s unique course of history.

In fact, it should be stated that not only do different modern or modernizing countries tend to have various degrees of secularization; different regions within the same country may also have different degrees of secularization due to various distinctive factors. For example, the Eastern and Western parts of Turkey show different secularization levels. In particular, a form of feudal culture is still being experienced as part of social life in some regions of Central, East and Southeast Anatolia. Religion still has the capacity and power to

penetrate society in these regions with its rules, bans and sanctions. On the other hand, a secular lifestyle, akin to that in West European countries, can be easily observed in some cities of the Western regions of Turkey. Another solid example at this point would be Germany. The secularization level in East Germany, as shown in Table A3 (Pollack & Pickel, 2007: 613), is much higher than that in West Germany, and to understand this striking difference, we need a more detailed explanation than the dynamics of a universal theory.

Table A3. Increase and decrease of belief in God, Western and Eastern Germany, 1991 and 1998 (%)

Belief in God	West Germany		East Germany	
	1991	1998	1991	1998
Have never believed in God	10	13	50	58
Have previously believed in God but do not do so now	23	25	25	17
Have not believed in God previously but do so now	9	11	5	7
Always believed in God	58	51	20	18

Source: ISSP 1991 (West n = 1346; East n = 1486) and 1998 (West n = 1000; East n = 1006); statements are summing up to 100 per cent.

At the same time there are differences in terms of religious life even between the Catholics and Protestants living in the same region. As seen in the Table A4 (Pollack & Pickel, 2007: 615), there are significant differences in terms of frequenting church services between the Catholics and Protestants in Western Germany.

Table A4. Regular church attendance among Catholics and Protestants in Western Germany, 1952-1999 (%)

Regular Church Attendance	1952	1963	1967/ 69	1973	1982	1991	1999
Catholics as a whole	51	55	48	35	32	33	26
Catholics in the age of:							
16-29	52	52	40	24	19	17	10
30-44	44	51	42	28	26	21	15
45-59	50	56	53	46	29	34	24
60 and older	63	64	62	57	54	54	50
Protestants as a whole	13	15	10	7	6	8	7
Protestants in the age of							
16-29	12	11	6	3	4	4	4
30-44	7	10	6	3	4	4	3
45-59	13	16	11	7	6	7	6
60 and older	23	24	22	12	12	17	15

Sources: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 1978ff., in general n:1000

In addition, native Germans across the country have by and large adopted a more secular lifestyle, while religion has become very important for those who migrated to Germany – particularly first and second generation of migrants from Muslim countries. Hence, immigration itself might well be a reason for being more attached to religion, during especially the first years of settlement in a new country. Being broken off from their ancestral roots and having to live in a culture of uncertainty and unfamiliarity may partly explain the very central role these immigrants attribute to religion (Casanova, 2007: 66). ²¹A similar social difference with respect to immigration is also observable in France. Michèle Tribalat (cited in


21 For example, one in every ten people living in the United States was born outside the United States, and most of this immigration came from non-modern countries. I think this reality may offer us some insight in respect to the very different secularization levels now seen in European countries and the USA.

Fetzer and Soper, 2005: 77) argues that “French Muslims as a whole appear more likely to practice their religion than are French Catholics, the nominal religious majority.” Besides, it would not be wrong to claim that one of the main reasons that the Southern *Länder* are less secular today than the Northern ones is because Germans have experienced two different forms of Christianity since Martin Luther: Protestantism and Catholicism. The Catholic majority in the Southern states is, by the very nature of their religion, more sensitive to religious rituals and symbols and resists secularization in comparison to its counterpart (Greenberg, 2014).

Against this background, it seems to become more and more difficult to defend secularization theory, when almost all districts or regions of the world have different levels of secularization. As we have seen above, each country, and even different regions within a country, due to its peculiar history and circumstances, deserves a separate study. However, notwithstanding this, I think we are still able to make some generalizations even if some particular social changes come into focus due to reasons already outlined. When it comes to secularization, certain time-frames as well as geography should be considered, while keeping in mind that various factors at different times can change the relationship between religion and society. In 2002, Bruce outlined his secularization paradigm in *God is Dead*. Nine years later, he published a book entitled *Secularization* (2011a: VI), partly to clarify some misinformation relating to his secularization paradigm among young scholars “who have read no further back than the work of their supervisors, who caricature the secularization paradigm as predicting the rapid eradication of all religious sentiment, who present a small case study as rebuttal of a story about large-scale social change”. In this book, Bruce used the same figure which he had used nine years ago to explain the secularization paradigm as “an attempt to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes” (Bruce, 1999a: 265). This historical period begins with the Protestant Reformation and encompasses the history of modern Europe. Geographically, the paradigm also mentions Western Europe and its offshoots:

Instead, I take the secularization story, like Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis, to be an attempt to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes. It is an explanation of what has happened to religion in Western Europe (and its North American and Australian offshoots) since the Reformation (Bruce, 1999a: 265).

But why is the Protestant Reformation so pivotal in Bruce's paradigm? According to Bruce, the secularization of Europe is the result of the European modernization process, and historically he sees the Protestant Reformation as the starting point of this drastic transformation. Referring to Weber, Bruce (2011a) claims that the Reformation drastically and unintentionally changed the work ethic, and brought about the accumulation of capital. Before the Reformation, "other-worldly" asceticism and being cut off from "this world" had been seen as the very attitudes that could gain the mercy of God. Martin Luther focused his attack precisely on this form of piety and eradicated the division between religious and ordinary people by claiming that to be blessed there is no need to withdraw from "this" world. God would already be glorified if all – legitimate – work is done in a diligent manner. According to Luther, human beings had already been divided into the saved and unsaved, and worldly success was accepted as the sign of being chosen: a good person does good works (McKim, 2001: 113-14; Allen, 2010: 75-77). Weber (1930/2005: 19) uses Benjamin Franklin's autobiography to bolster this idea: "Benjamin Franklin (...) answers in his autobiography with a quotation from the Bible, which his strict Calvinistic father drummed into him again and again in his youth: 'Seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings.'" Anthony Giddens (Weber, 1930/2005: XV) summarizes Weber by saying that "the Calvinist ethic introduced an activism into the believer's approach to worldly affairs, a drive to mastery in a quest for virtue in the eyes of God (...)." With all the other reforms, i.e. arguing against the Catholic way of confession, devotion, atonement, absolution, and affirming work in a religious manner, the Reformers created a new ethics and transformed other-worldly asceticism into one of this-world.

Figure A1. Bruce's Secularization Paradigm

In addition, according to Bruce (2002: 10), the Protestant Reformation was one of the main reasons behind the rise of individualism, a crucial element in the secularization process. Unlike Catholicism, the religious culture that came with the Protestant Reformation was extremely open to fragmentation since the Church was no longer seen as the primary authority between the celestial and terrestrial world. Since Christ's authority was institutionalized in the office of the Pope for Catholics, the papacy could thus claim that it had full control of the means of salvation, and it could decide all controversies in the name of God's will. However, after the Reformation, many different perceptions and religious organizations, claiming different ways of attaining salvation, came onto the scene. Unlike Catholic countries, the social differentiation in Protestant ones did not take the shape of a drastic split between religious and non-religious elements, but of many different sects from the main tradition. Maybe reformers could not be called democrats, or men who were sensitive towards freedom of religion or freedom of conscience, but individuals who were relatively free to choose their own church, unlike in Catholic countries. Having rejected the privileged status of the clergy, they then claimed that they (individuals) were all equal in the eyes of God. Equality in the eyes of God then laid the foundation for equality in the eyes of fellow humans and before the law. Equal obligations eventually became equal rights.

Bruce claims that another dynamic that indirectly emerged out of the Protestant Reformation is the cultural diversity which presents itself in three phenomena. First of all, people carried along their languages, faiths and social characteristics to the places they moved to. Secondly, parallel to the emergence and spread of nation-states, new groups of people began to live under the roof of these states. Thirdly, the modernization in the economic field that came into the picture especially in the Protestant dwelling units led to the emergence of groups that entered into competition with each other. He believes that some Protestant sects removed the social support for

any particular culture or religion. "Especially in Protestant societies" says Bruce (1999b: 19), "nation states were having to come to terms with increasing religious diversity. A society that was becoming increasingly egalitarian and democratic and more culturally diverse had to place social harmony before the endorsement of religious orthodoxy."

For Bruce, religious diversity has serious social-psychological consequences for the secularization process. In a particular society where there is only one religion in which the overwhelming majority believes, and the rituals of which are adhered to by almost every member of society, it would not be wrong to assume that the position of such a religion would be seen as most vital. In religiously authoritarian and hierarchical societies, religious minorities would be disregarded, kept under control or, at best, tolerated. Nonconformist minorities are not allowed to exist, and are most likely to be expelled or oppressed. However, if that society becomes more egalitarian, and starts to enjoy religious diversity, then it is likely to see social harmony instead of religious orthodoxy. In addition, diversity challenges the truthfulness of religion to which believers commit themselves. As Bruce (1999b: 20) asserts, ideas are most persuasive if they are unanimously shared. Universal or social acceptance of a belief system makes it "an accurate account of how things are." Therefore, any alternative to this universally acknowledged truth could be seen as a startling objection.

This does not mean that adherents to the dominant religion will fall on hard times simply because alternatives have come into being. But clashes over diverse views on beliefs bring about very serious secularizing effects. People who had been absolutely sure of the truth of their faith now start wondering whether it might not be different after all, precisely, hence Augsburg, 1555.²² One authority

22 With the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, different belief doctrines become official in various princedoms. The establishment of principle *cuius regio eius religio* gave to ruling people, be it king, prince, bishop or whoever, the right to create

with force is always seen as more prestigious, convincing and powerful than two authorities claiming the same thing(s), but without force.

In addition, different sects and churches did more than merely break the hold and power of the dominant belief system; they were also left with no choice but to moderate themselves, thereby losing their radical character in the course of time:

(...) that diversity weakens religious commitments by removing the social support for any one religion and by encouraging people to confine their religious beliefs to specific compartments (...) and to remove the specific and contested elements from their beliefs. The sect, by proliferating competing alternatives (...), is thus its own grave-digger (Bruce, 2002: 22).

For example, although the Quaker movement in England was first set up as a marginal sect whose founders were punished for infraction of the traditions of the established Church of England, not long after, the movement moderated its own condemnations due to requests from its own members (Bruce, 2002). This kind of transformation was observed among Methodists as well. Bruce, using Reinhold Niebuhr's argument, has astutely depicted the dynamics behind this transformation:

Commitment is inevitably reduced because increasingly large parts of generations subsequent to that of the founders inherited rather than chose their faith. The first generation (and subsequent adult joiners) elected to be sectarians and did so in the full knowledge of the penalties that their dissent would incur. Hence they began with very high levels of commitment and, to the extent that they were victimized, their subsequent experiences of suffering for their God strengthened that commitment. Those who were born into the

uniformity of faith within their own territories. That is to say, differently from the practices until then, secular leaders in Europe were given the right to determine the religious doctrine his/her people would believe in. The Peace of Augsburg, says Willaim Monter (2002: 10), created the legal recognition of confessionalism, and made the confessional states dominant theme in European culture.

movement might be strenuously socialized into the tenets of the sect but they had not chosen it (2002: 23).

In addition to this, Bruce sets forth that industrial capitalism and economic development, which are both phenomena caused by the Protestant Reformation²³, paved the way for a functional differentiation as well as a differentiation in the social domain. The duties that were previously assumed by solely one institution began to be taken over, parallel to the structural differentiation, by individual persons or institutions specialized in their respective activity fields. Secular experts began to fulfil the social functions that were previously only under the monopoly of the Church (Bruce, 2002: 8). Structural differentiation in Europe may be summarized, as Philip Gorski (2003: 111) did, as follows: "(...) the establishment and expansion of secular institutions in the fields of social provision, education, moral counseling and other fields of activity once dominated by the Church, a development which would be characterized as a loss of social functions."

Bruce (2003) thinks that social differentiation came into the picture when the new social classes accelerated the dissolving of traditional religious community. Industrial revolution moved home-based economic activities out of the household. Such a separation

23 At this point, Bruce provides an interpretation by taking Weber's well known work *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* as the basis. Weber (1930/2005: 39-50) claimed that the emergence of the Industrial Revolution and modern capitalism primarily in Protestant countries in Western Europe was not a coincidence. According to him, the legal arrangements, technological development, and organizational development did exist in other civilizations but these were not enough for the emergence of modern capitalism. He thinks that the Protestant ethic such as working with care and patience, being in a better position financially and making prudent investments became accelerators of modern capitalism. The reason for work and accumulating capital in Protestantism is not just to meet material needs or enjoy worldly pleasures even more, but on the contrary because it is a moral duty and has intrinsic value. According to Weber, working very hard with care and self-discipline, entrepreneurship, pursuing economic profit to acknowledge being one of the chosen, individual initiative, accumulating capital according to Protestantism has provided opportunities for market economy and private enterprise.

also made it necessary to establish more rational, instrumental and pragmatic perspectives. He argues that the economic growth caused by industrialization gave rise to new classes and class conflict. In feudal societies, where individuals were aware of their place (status or class), they were also expected to know that there was only one single moral universe. Having stated that social differentiation follows structural differentiation, Bruce says that:

(...) as the functions of society become increasingly differentiated, so the people also become divided and separated from each other. (...) With the proliferation of new social roles and increasing social mobility, traditional integrated organic or communal conceptions of the moral and supernatural order began to fragment. When the community broke into competing social groups, the religiously sanctified vision of that community, united under its God, also broke up. As classes and social fragments became more distinctive, so they generated metaphysical and salvational systems along lines more suited to their interests (2002: 9)

In his scheme, Bruce theorized that the Protestant Reformation indirectly paved the way for mass literacy and the consequent emergence of voluntary associations which, in turn, accelerated the secularization process. Bruce is of the opinion that Reformation prepared the ground for a new way of thinking: answering to God individually. For this reason, people not belonging to the clergy needed new resources to fulfil this new responsibility. The Holy Bible was translated into vernacular languages so that people could answer to God individually. Thus new developments were set in motion in the art of printing in an accelerated manner, the literacy rate rose and non-formal education was introduced. As Bruce put it, the rivalry and the competition between the sects to win more and more people for their belief enabled the acceleration of these developments.

Bruce further argues that the Protestant sects also contributed to the development of secular liberal democracy through the new model of social organization:

Reformed religion was individualistic but it was not lonely. It encouraged individuals to band together for encouragement, edification, evangelism, and social control. As an alternative to the organic community in which position was inherited and ascribed, the sectarians established the voluntary association of like-minded individuals coming together to pursue common goals. (2011a: 35)

My case that the Reformation played a major part in laying the foundations for liberal democracy rest on the mechanism of unintended consequences. What were initially religious arguments inadvertently encouraged individualism, egalitarianism, and diversity, which in turn combined with growing social and structural differentiation to shift governments in the direction of secular liberal democracy.

(2011a: 39)

Bruce argues that the structural and social differentiations, socialization and pluralism that emerged as a result of the Protestant Reformation caused religion to become isolated in a specific area. While different world views continued to exist in their own area with their own values and logic, this process “removes much of the social support that is vital to reinforcing beliefs, makes the maintenance of distinct lifestyles very difficult, weakens the impetus to evangelize and encourages *de facto* relativism that is fatal to shared beliefs” (2002: 20).

This is Bruce’s secularization paradigm based on the Protestant Reformation. I think that it works very well for West European secularization process (it took place much later in the South) and ample quantitative data indeed support his views. However, although Bruce historically starts with the Protestant Reformation, I think we should not underestimate the role played by the Renaissance in European secularization. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that modernity began in Florence and other city-states in 14th century Italy. After Italy, it spread to other European countries such as England, Germany, Spain and France during the 15th and 16th centuries. It was “the period when man rediscovered the world and his own creative capacities for what they really were and fashioned a new civilization with nature as its basis and humanity as its source,

centre, and end” (Coates, White & Schapiro, 1966: 3). The new outlook that came with the Renaissance meant a transitional period for Europeans and laid the foundation for modern times. Particular components of the medieval times attracted less and less attention, while classic cultural forms were being revived.

The Renaissance was the period in which an intellectual revolution, known as the Revival of Learning (i.e. new thoughts about religion, new methods for science, new outlook on the nature of human beings, and a new architectural style) came into being. It was a phase of exploration and a period of political and social transition. Ancient Greece and Rome came to prominence as the main sources of inspiration, and their classic works became part of the educational and cultural curriculum. Gradually, Antiquity became a reference point for a lively and productive life at the expense of religious doctrines (Schevill, 1930; Mann, 1996). For example, the Platonists of the Renaissance period read Plato from a Christian perspective and they held that finding truths concerning God-created nature is equivalent to searching information on God. Universities in Italy advocated using mathematics and music as tools to reach the invisible world of ideas and forms put forward by Plato as the subjects of reality. Reducing nature to mathematics caused an excitement in how to measure and experience it. The gravitation of the Renaissance art toward nature and specifically to the human anatomy, especially as the ideal form, is a product of this perspective (Perry, Chase, Jacob, Jacob & Von Lauhe, 1989: 374).

Another point I would like to stress is that, although what Bruce claims about Western Europe and its secularization process does make sense -rendering it somewhat tricky to refute his assertions- this does not mean that these same dynamics will lead to similar outcomes in other modern or modernizing parts of the world. For example, very intolerant religious cultures have emerged in many Muslim countries due to the struggles between different denominations. Each year, thousands of people lose their lives due to some

very bloody sectarian clashes in societies with different religions. Even in Turkey, relatively a very modern country with a huge Sunni Muslim majority, just at the end of the 20th century, 33 Alevis were burned to death in Anatolia because of their religious identity (The New York Times, 1993, July 3).

In contrast with Bruce's claims, the existence of different sects has not led to a more moderate religious outcome in all countries. On the contrary, such sectarian groups are often the main reason behind religious persecutions and intolerance. These kinds of struggles render religious belief systems or identities more powerful, while religion places itself more at the centre of society with each passing day. What is surprising at this point is that, the features common to these societies, wherein religious conflicts, identities, rituals, and struggles play vital roles in public life, include the fact that they are yet to be confronted with industrial capitalism, scientific advances or urban life. Among others, Syria, Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Kashmir, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Uganda, *etc.* are countries where religion-based conflicts are the part of daily life. That does not mean that countries with more modern systems are not beset by problems arising from religion. However, it seems nowadays, not to be possible to consider it a coincidence that civil unrests allegedly arising from religion come about more infrequently in modern societies.

Therefore, it should again be emphasized that although Bruce's paradigm has been very well-established for the secularization process in Europe and its offshoots, this approach inevitably excludes other societies from the secularization process that have not had the Protestant Reformation as part of their history. Bruce's paradigm works well and seems valid for modern European countries, Canada, the USA, and Australia (Bruce, 1999a; 2002). But I suggest that, if slightly revised, the scope of his paradigm might be extended and be made applicable to other societies that do not have the Protestant Reformation in their history or that are not predominantly Chris-

tian. In order to make the paradigm more general I propose to tone down some parts that are strictly related only to Christianity, and enhance other parts which can be observable in almost all societies.

The key difference between Bruce's paradigm and my own extended version, which will be explored in more detailed in Chapter III, lies herein: In the extended version, Christian history or culture does not play a role in the secularization process. From the perspective of this extended paradigm, Western Europe is one case among many. However, Bruce starts with a historical event that is unique to Christianity, and he puts it above all else as the basis of every other dynamic. He focuses extensively on the impact of the Protestant Reformation on the expansion of capitalism, the urbanization process, and scientific developments in the history of Europe. Contrary to this, I think there is no clear-cut connection between these three historical dynamics and the Protestant Reformation for other regions of the world. A social innovation may have an attractive quality in its own right. Therefore, even non-Protestant societies could introduce or apply the same system without the original social events experienced by those pioneering societies.

Such an extended secularization paradigm is not something new. On the contrary, it is largely based on what Bruce and Wilson have explained about secularization until now. The claims and explanations of Bruce's paradigm regarding the secularization history of modern European countries and their offshoots are fairly consistent and also supported by empirical data. For that reason, it is necessary to repeat that the extended secularization paradigm here proposed is almost entirely based on Bruce's own paradigm and not in contradiction with it.

Why, the reader may ask, has this extended secularization paradigm been elaborated on the basis of Bruce's paradigm, rather than on the basis of other outstanding theories? Before explaining the details of the extended secularization paradigm and its application to Alevi communities in Turkey, it is necessary to articulate why not

other theories, i.e. the Religious Market Model (RMM) advanced by Stark *et al.*, the Secure Secularization Theory (SST) of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart and the Religious Individualization Theory (RIT) first proposed by Thomas Luckmann and later advanced by Grace Davie, but Bruce's paradigm was chosen as the starting point.

WHY NOT OTHER THEORIES, BUT BRUCE'S PARADIGM

Even though the theories below constitute the cornerstones of the secularization discussion, it has to be said that there are some differences between the definitions of secularization and measurement methods of these theories on the one hand, and this thesis' definition and measurement methods on the other. Church attendance rates and changes in the number of individual faithful have been used as the most important indicator, and at times the only criteria of secularization in the theories below. Of course, all parameters thought to provide information concerning secularization should be taken into consideration. However, reducing secularization to only the frequency of worship or being a believer or not may not provide sufficient information on the bigger picture in some societies. For example, societal expectations of Islam as experienced in 21st century Turkey and societal expectations of Christianity as experienced in 21st century Netherlands may be different. While the rate of church attendance may be accepted as a sufficient criteria for piousness in West European countries, not merely performing the Friday prayer but what someone has done throughout the whole week will provide important clues on piousness in Turkey.

What is to be expressed subsequently is not that church attendance rate should not be taken into consideration or that it is of lesser importance. Rather, in societies where religion's societal visibility is reduced to frequency of church attendance, it cannot be denied that it would be one of the fundamental parameters in the secularization discussion. However, both religious culture and so-

ciety's own distinct dynamics should be taken into consideration when measuring secularization. In particular, unlike West European societies, it may not be an accurate method to understand the secularization process happening in non-Christian societies only by measuring the frequency with which people pray. For example, taking into account only the change in frequency of praying or increase/decrease in the number of non-believers in Turkey where the majority is Muslim may not be a sufficient basis for secularization debates. 21st century Islam, unlike Christianity, aims to touch every aspect of human life, from clothing, catering, wedding, friendship, sexuality to family relations, etc. Therefore, although changes in frequency of praying and number of believers are important issues and deserve to be analyzed, the issue that should be particularly examined is the degree in which the metaphysical realm is reflected in daily social life. However, as the theories below are evaluated, it has to be emphasized that this discussion is done using their own secularization measurement methods.

Religious Market Model (RMM)

The Religious Market Model is based on two fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that a fruitful religious life is suppressed by a religious monopoly (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). Advocates of RMM explain the secularization process via the lack of a free market in religious goods as well as a lack of competition among religious suppliers (Iannaccone, 1991). Finke and Stark (1988) consider competition between religious providers a motivation for religious growth, as various religions and religious sects/denominations are seen as the main players in religious economies. They claim that competition between suppliers in an open religious economy rejuvenates religious mobilization and this “forces each religious body to appeal successfully to some segment of the religious market, or to slide into oblivion” (Finke & Stark, 1988: 47). Therefore, secular-

ization of societies seems to be a consequence of religious market regulation by the state.

The second assumption of this theory is that the demand for religious products is constant, i.e. religious need is innate to human nature. Therefore, if there are enough suppliers (to satisfy different consumers) in religious goods, then it is highly likely that there will be a high degree of religious activity. Individuals are assumed, for sure, to choose convenient religious goods for themselves as long as reasonable religious suppliers are not hindered by the state. These two assumptions taken together can be rendered as follows: "(...) religious activity will be likely to increase where there is abundant supply of religious choices, offered by a wide range of 'firms' (religious organizations of various kinds.); it will be likely to diminish where such supplies are limited" (Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008: 35).

In comparison to church attendance in other modern countries, the high church attendance rate in the USA is used by advocates to substantiate RMM. They argue that Americans are less secular than other modern nations, not because of a low level of modernization, but because churches in the USA are subjected to the unpredictable nature of market forces and have to compete to sell their goods to the consumer, i.e. they have to become attractive. By contrast, European churches, they believe, are not subjected to market forces. It means that those churches do not have to attract "consumers" since they are already subsidized by the state though this subsidy differs very much from one country to another. For Stark and Finke, a socialized religious economy dominated most of Europe, and that is the reason for the aggressive secularization process in those societies:

European religion suffers from the weaknesses now well-known to plague socialism, because, whatever the character of their commercial economies, most European nations sustain a socialized religious economy, while in all the others one (or several) religious groups enjoy special status and privileges (2000: 228).

The RMM advocates the belief that having a secure income and certain privileges play a decisive role in the tendency towards laziness and slack among the clergy. Therefore, if it is necessary to accuse someone/something of the low level of religious activity in Europe, while assuming human beings are born *de facto* with religious need, then the men of religion have to blame themselves for not being able to attract people to their churches (Stark & Finke, 2000).

Although at first glance RMM seems to supply a plausible answer for the different secularization levels of societies with similar levels of modernization, I still have some doubts about the validity of the theory. Of course, a diverse range of churches and a free market religious economy might lead to an increase in the tendency among consumers to embrace a relatively more fruitful religious life in some parts of the world. However, this theory, as indicated, has two basic important assumptions even though there have not been sufficient attempts to prove whether those assumptions are indeed true. The first assumption is that a religious monopoly decreases religious activity, while the second is that the demand for religious products is innate to human nature and therefore constant.

For the first assumption, it might be asserted that examples within Europe (Bruce, 1995; 2000; 2001) and the rest of the world do not confirm RMM's main doctrines. As Gorski (2000) rightly argues, the lack of religious market has not played a role in the decline of traditional religious beliefs and involvement in institutionalized religion throughout European history. If the basic tenets of RMM would be true, then we would be entitled to expect that religious monopoly in European countries would have been the main reason behind the aggressive secularization process that started back in the late nineteenth century and which accelerated after the 1950s. However, as Gorski (2000) stresses, it was not religious monopolization, but religious deregulation that increased during that period. Besides, modern day European societies do not support the basic tenets of RMM either. For example, although Poland and Ireland

do have a religious monopoly, they, contrary to what Stark and Finke claim, have been enjoying a high level of religiosity compared to other European societies. It seems that the examples of Poland and Ireland, where church attendance is high in comparison to other more pluralist countries like Netherlands or the UK, and where there is a solid religious monopoly, create problems for the RMM.

In addition, church attendance is higher in monopolistic Catholic countries than in the Lutheran countries (Davie, 2002). Not only Europe, but many other countries across the world do not conform to the RMM. The interesting thing is that, although the USA at first glance seems to fit RMM, and proponents of the theory put the USA forward all the time to prove their theory, there is no hard evidence to support that increasing liberalization and state deregulation work against persistent rates of religious decline even in the USA. By contrast, academic studies indicate that a steady secularization process has already been experienced in the USA as well (Bruce, 1993; Norris & Inglehart, 2007).

I think that we can make some critical evaluations of the secularization process in the USA at this point. First of all, contrary to popular myth, the rate of church attendance has steadily been dropping in the USA for decades (Barna, 2001, December 17), and the percentage of people who do not believe has increased from 2% in the 1950s to 14% at the beginning of the 21st century (Bruce, 2002). If this rate is much higher in other modern countries, this does not mean that the USA has become less secular. Secondly, it should be noted that even deeply religious people in the USA prefer to use very secular language (discourse which is not based on religion) to impress public opinion on the subjects of many controversial topics like abortion, gay marriage, *etc.* Instead of reading passages from the Bible, they choose to emphasize the right to life or wholesome society (Bruce, 2002).

In line with this, trends in first premarital sexual intercourse and changing patterns of nonmarital childbearing do not support the

claim of a less secular society for Americans. Should the dominant religion be Christianity, so it is expected that the changes in these two dynamics evolve in the manner as desired within the traditional values of Christianity. However, data from the National Survey of Family Growth 2002 (7,643 women and 4,928 men were surveyed) indicate that by age 20, 75% had had premarital sex (Finer, 2007). Further, “births to unmarried women totaled 1,714,643 in 2007, 26% more than in 2002. Nearly four in ten U.S. births were to unmarried women in 2007” (Ventura, 2009 May). In addition, almost 50 % of Christians in the USA is noted as tolerating couples living together without official marriage, and public support for same-sex marriage has also grown (Giddens, 2006: 432-447). All those transformations do not picture a less secular American society.

Furthermore, this theory does not work either in other English-speaking countries, which are relatively pluralistic. For example, religious pluralism has a negative effect on religiousness in Canada. As Alastair Hay (2014: 19) says “(...) religious pluralism was observed to have a negative effect on all three dependents (religiosity, frequency of religious attendance, belief in parental religion), suggesting that those forms of religious pluralism operating in Canada were more corrosive to belief than supportive of it.” When it comes to New Zealand, the claims of RRM are also not supported by the empirical evidence. According to Statistics New Zealand (2014, April 15), since 2001 the number of irreligious people has increased. The number of people reporting ‘no religion’ was 1,028,049 in 2001, a figure that increased to 1,635,345 in 2013 (more than two in five people or 41.9 percent). And as obsolete and unserviceable churches in Britain have been turned into carpet stores (Bruce, 2002), in Australia there is a marked decrease in church attendance from 30 percent to 13 percent within a 40-year period (1960-1998). At the same time, the number of Australians with no religion has increased from 4% in 1961 to 15.5% in 2001, while the total num-

ber of Christians in the country has also declined from 88% of the population in 1961 to 68% in 2001 (Mason, 2012).

Like the first assumption, the second assumption of RMM, viz. that the demand for religious products is relatively constant because of human nature, remains to be proven. If there would be such a reality in human nature, then RMM theorists should explain the lack of desire for different or alternative ways to salvation after Europeans have become more secular. Against the second assumption, Casanova (2003: 26) argues that “the culprit is not so much the monopolistic laziness of the churches protected by state regulation, but the lack of demand for alternative salvation religions among the unchurched, even in the face of new, enterprising generally unsuccessful, religious suppliers.”

To sum up, when it comes to the validity of RMM, it is not so easy to find hard evidence in support of its basic tenets across the world. As Norris and Inglehart (2008) put it, after studying a large scale of data pertaining to more than 80 countries throughout the world, there is no consequential connection between high religious activity or church attendance and state deregulation.

Secure Secularization Theory (SST)

Norris and Inglehart (2008: 4) think that the classical version of the secularization thesis claims that religion will cease to exist due to the modernization process. Therefore, since there are still people who believe in religion in today’s modern societies, they attempt to explain the secularization process by proposing what they call the “Secure Secularization Theory” which grounds itself on the conditions of existential security. They argue that social vulnerability, anxiety and risk lead people to have more recourse to religion. Uncertainties and continuous substantial risks push people towards religion or make them keenly participate in mystical-supernatural activities. If a society cannot escape the threat of natural disasters, poverty, or disease, then it would not be abnormal to expect to come

across people who are deeply religious, as in earlier centuries (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 216).

Based on this, they expect that religion plays a crucial role in the daily activities of poor agrarian societies (which live under non-welfare states), while the rate of worship and prayer is supposed to be higher than those of industrial/post-industrial societies. On the other hand, they assert that a relatively egalitarian distribution of household incomes, relatively high living standards, an income that guards against the risk of absolute poverty and sense of security in a society would diminish the importance of religion or others with absolute power. That is to say, wealthy and secure nations can be expected to become more secular, i.e. if people experience higher levels of physical and social security, then religion or other absolute powers will be given a lower priority by the public (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 28).

If the feeling of vulnerability is the basic driver for being religious, then it is possible to run into elevated religious activity due to economic inequality even in rich nations (Norris & Inglehart, 2007: 45). With this premise, Norris and Inglehart argue that the high levels of religious belief and engagement in the USA would be explained through the reality of the distress from losing jobs, inadequate medical insurance, high possibility of being subjected to violence, *etc.*. In line with this, the inhabitants of the wealthy and secure post-industrial nations of Europe, who have less anxiety about almost each aspect of life, are statistically the most secular nations across the world (Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008): "The secular Scandinavian and West European states remain some of the most egalitarian societies, with an expansive array of welfare services, including comprehensive health care, social services, and pensions" (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 108). To sum up, SST asserts that since Europeans, unlike Americans, are living in egalitarian, secure and wealthy societies, they are much more secular than all other parts of the world.

Although, at first sight, SST seems to give a very coherent explanation for both Europe and the rest of the world, it is not easy to understand at which point the theory differs from what the classical version of secularization theory asserts. Of course, the levels of social security and wealth do play a crucial role in the secularization process. But, the mere fact that SST emphasizes one particular aspect of the modernization process does not make it another theory. Whatever they mention as the causes that lead to an increase in the secularization level, these are actually outcomes of the modernization process. SST and CST only differ from each other on the subject of secularization in the USA. Contrary to what Norris and Inglehart say about the USA, the American people are more secular now than in the past. Being less secular than other modern societies does not render Americans *de facto* less secular compared to their own past. When it comes to the secularization level of a society, that society has to be compared to its own past, not with other societies. Therefore, it seems that, apart from the USA, whatever SST claims seems right and is supported by hard evidence. The only problem is that SST, as such, seems to be extracted from the classical version of secularization theory.

Religious Individualization Theory (RIT)

The Religious Individualization Theory, which was developed mainly by Thomas Luckmann (*Invisible Religion*) and later by Grace Davie (*Believing without Belonging*), has attracted much attention particularly at the end of the 20th century. RIT assumes that the process of modernization has changed the social form of religion, but this does not mean that there is a decrease in the prestige and power of religion. It is true that, according to the advocates of RIT, there is a negative correlation between modernization and church attendance; however, the demise of traditional churches should not be confused with loss of religiosity of the individual. Actually, on the

contrary, the undisputable decline of traditional churches and the increase in individual religiosity correlate:

According to the individualization theory, traditional and institutionalized forms of religiosity will be increasingly replaced by more subjective ones detached from church, individually chosen, and syncretistic in character. (...) The individualization thesis utilizes a distinction between church and religion in order to distance itself from the secularization theory. In this view, individuals are increasingly freeing themselves from institutional guidelines in their religious ideas and behaviours, and thus increasingly making their own decisions about their religion. In consequence, ever more subjective forms of religion are purportedly replacing institutionalized ones (Pollack & Pickel, 2007: 603-604).

Luckmann (1967: 68) says that due to functional differentiation established religious institutions are not able to represent the entire holy universe anymore. But a decline in the power of traditional institutions does not have a positive correlation with the decline in individual faith. Maybe the metanarratives of traditional religious institutions cannot offer a personally meaningful system for individuals anymore, but individuals, in their private spheres, still believe “in a relatively autonomous fashion.”

The renowned phrase of “believing without belonging” has become a motto of this theory at the end of the 20th century. Not believing in the disappearance of the sacred, Davie (1990) argues that individual religious faith has been distanced from traditional religious belonging and Europeans do not want to put their belief into practice even though they still want to believe:

Why is it, for example, that the majority of British People - in common with many other Europeans - persist in believing (if only in an ordinary God), but see no need to participate with even minimal regularity in their religious institutions? Indeed most people in this country - whatever their denominational allegiance - express their religious sentiments by staying away from, rather than going to, their places of worship (Davie, 1994: 2).

In short, many Europeans have ceased to connect with their religious institutions in any active sense, but they have not abandoned,

so far, either their deep-seated religious aspirations or (in many cases) a latent sense of belonging (Davie, 2002: 8).

Like Luckmann and Davie, Danièle Hervieu-Leger (cited in Pollack and Pickel, 2007: 604) also emphasizes “an increasing loss of control of the established religious institutions over the belief systems and religious practices of individuals.” But she does not think that individualization in belief leads to an increase in secularization or that individual religiosity is damaged.

Although RIT is widely supported by many respected scholars, it is not easy to find hard evidence in support of this theory either. An empirical assessment of RIT by David Voas and Alasdair Crockett (2005) and by Pollack and Pickel (2007) indicates that neither the UK nor Germany support the claims of the advocates of RIT. After a statistical analysis of the data from both the British Household Panel Survey (conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex) and the British Social Attitudes Survey (conducted by the National Centre for Social Research), Voas and Alasdair arrived at the following conclusion:

(...) belief has in fact eroded in Britain at the same rate as two key aspects of belonging: religious affiliation and attendance. Levels of belief are lower than those of nominal belonging. The roles of period, cohort and age effects on religious change are considered; the conclusion is that decline is generational. In relation to the rates at which religion is transmitted from parents to children, the results suggest that only about half of parental religiosity is successfully transmitted, while absence of religion is almost always passed on. Transmission is just as weak for believing as for belonging (2005: 11).

Pollack and Pickel (2007: 603) also studied the empirical validity of RIT “on the basis of how religiosity and church affiliation have evolved in Germany over the past 50 years.” Here is their conclusion: “(...) the rise of individually determined non-church religiosity cannot compensate for the losses of institutionalized religiosity, since non-church religiosity remains rather marginal and is interwoven with traditional Christian religiosity.” In addition, some

scholars have come up with a new term in opposition to believing without belonging: *belonging without believing*. Brian Mountford, author of *Christian Atheist*, defines those in the category of “belonging without believing” in this way:

[these are] people, who value the cultural heritage of Christianity
 - its language, art, music, moral compass, sense of transcendence
 - without actually believing in God; or, at least without believing in God in a way that would satisfy Christian orthodoxy, particularly in the metaphysics department (2011: 1).

Like Mountford, Esther McIntosh (2015) considers the popularity of “virtual” religious revival as a significant move towards belonging without believing.

By the end of the day, it should be noted that, although RRM and RIT are advanced and adhered to by some very respected scholars, neither of them are supported by hard evidence, nor do they, in comparison with classical theory, provide a better insight into secularization process of societies. SST is supported by hard evidence, but it is not easy to get at which point the SST differs from the classical version of secularization theory.

In the following chapter, in a clear departure from Bruce, I will argue that his paradigm is not only valid for European societies, but for every society at large. However, to extend the scope of the paradigm in its relevance, Bruce’s secularization paradigm needs to be revised. In attempting this, aspects of his paradigm that belong to the specific history of Europe and its offshoots will be downplayed while those with more universal relevance, i.e. science, capitalism and urbanization, will be highlighted.

CHAPTER III

THE EXTENDED SECULARIZATION PARADIGM

It has been stated that there might be various causes behind the rise or fall in the level of secularization. When it comes to the European secularization process, it is necessary to mention seven different factors which are not independent from each other and have appeared at different times in the history of Europe: Renaissance (15th century) (Coates, White & Schapiro, 1966: 3), Protestant Reformation (16th century) (Casanova, 1994: 21), emergence of absolute monarchies (16th and 17th centuries) (Maland, 1986: 18-20), Scientific Revolution (17th century) (Perry *et al.*, 1989: 251), Enlightenment (18th century) (Eze, 2002), industrial capitalism (from the middle of the 18th century to the middle of 19th century), and urbanization (19th century) (Wilson, 1976). The major and vital social, economic, political, and cultural changes that came about with these historical dynamics are regarded as the segments of modernization.


Therefore, it could be claimed that the classical secularization theory, which has been handled quite systematically in the works of Bruce and Wilson, offers the most accurate approach to the secularization of Europe. However, notwithstanding these historical factors which played a crucial role in Europe's rising level of secularization, this does not necessarily mean that all these seven factors are

indispensable for secularization to take place under the roof of various religious cultures in other parts of the world. For even though the seven aforementioned historical factors do not seem to occur in other countries as they did in Europe, still, some of them may be enough to trigger the process of secularization. Therefore, I venture the hypothesis that for such an extended secularization paradigm, we should especially emphasize three factors derived from the old paradigm, viz.: Scientific Advancements, Industrial Capitalism, and Urbanization. This dissertation argues that these three factors from the old paradigm might be sufficient to trigger secularization in societies regardless of the dominant religious culture, be it Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, *etc.*

There are two important reasons behind my choice of these three factors. First, these three are already the results of other factors and they can all be seen in every country regardless of its religious, historical, political or economic history. For example, capitalism, which had been triggered off by the Reformation of the 16th century in Christian Europe and led to a rise in the level of secularization, is also seen in non-Protestant countries today where the Protestant Reformation did not take place. Likewise, while the Scientific Revolution came on the scene in 17th century Europe, its offsprings such as advances in technology and the expansion of technological consciousness have now become a reality in various non-Protestant countries across the world. Although modern cities²⁴ first appeared in Europe and the USA, modern city life does not belong only to Europe or Christian countries at present. It is seen in many areas where the Protestant Reformation has not been experienced. For

24 The concept of modern city, specific to this thesis, is used as a place where economic activity is not agriculture-based but industry- or urban-based, where population density has increased while rates of death and birth have decreased, where a central bureaucratic management has assumed responsibility for administrative work, where education has been widespread and technological developments get implemented quickly (Landes, 2003: 6), where commerce plays a vital role, and where there is not a homogenous structure but a widely differentiated population exists.

Figure A2. The Extended Secularization Paradigm



instance, while Turkey did not undergo the Protestant Reformation in its history, modern Turkish society is quite sensitive to technological advancements; at the same time as capitalism has become the dominant economic model for decades and widespread urbanization has been steadily increasing due to the accelerated industrial mode of production since the 1960s. Similarly, the Japanese, who hardly have anything in common with Christianity, can boast of a country where the effects of capitalism, urbanization and scientific advances are seen in every corner of life.

The second reason why I chose these factors is because they in themselves also contain the dynamics which were mentioned in Bruce's paradigm: Social Differentiation, Structural Differentiation, Social and Cultural Diversity, Economic Growth, Egalitarianism, Religious Diversity, Relativism, Technology, and Technological Consciousness seem to be mostly derived from these three main accelerators of secularization.

In brief, the hypothesis of this thesis argues that secularization is observable if the scientific advances have begun to spread incrementally, if the dominant economic model in any society has turned towards industrial capitalism, and if the urbanization rate has increased compared to the past. This dissertation argues that with these three pillars, the importance of religion, religion-like mechanisms, folk beliefs in any society will be reduced, indifference to things relating to the spiritual will increase, and religious identities in society as a whole will play a less decisive role. Although these factors had first been experienced in Europe, rendering Europe the world's most secularized continent, they have become to varying degrees widespread in the 21st century in terms of their impact on societies in different parts of the world.

However, before moving on to how the three legs of the secularization paradigm have expedited secularization, it has to be stated that the writing below are based on a sharp duality. That is, a manner of telling has been selected as if there is no intermediate form

between the rural and urban, agricultural production and industrial production, scientific developments and periods when science does not touch people's lives. However, it is necessary to mention that daily practices are not open to dichotomy as such, that there are intermediate or transition forms and there could be elements of the city within the rural and elements of the rural within the city. For example, the ghettoization of some communities from a certain section in the city provides the opportunity for continuation of customs and traditions decorated with religion from the rural. Or, there may be many opportunities available in the rural area similar to the city as a result of developed networks and technology.

What needs to be emphasized here is the main story that reveals the direction of change even though there are no such sharp dichotomies in daily practices. Therefore, these are the questions that need to be asked: Do scientific developments impact life more or less in comparison to the past? Or, is industrial capitalism which operates with market dynamics more dominant now than in the past? For which generations have cities become the center of life? Of course, urbanization does not mean that all the components of the city are or will be part of the same culture or lifestyle, as argued later in this thesis. During social changes, while a section of society moves in one direction, the other part may be moving elsewhere. The thing we call transformation is a new form (Yılmaz, 2012) provided to society by the total change formed during these movements. Consequently, even though sharp dichotomies exist below, it needs to be emphasized that life practices are not separated from each other in such clear lines.

THE ROLE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES IN THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS

Partly as a result of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century and its successor, the Enlightenment of the 18th century, the fields of natural sciences and theology (ideology of the Church in those

times) have since largely been treated as mutually exclusive, particularly in Western literature. The new ideas that came to light with the Scientific Revolution provided philosophers of the Enlightenment with ammunition in their wars against the Church and its ideology, theology. Since then, numerous works have asserted that theology, the Church, the clergy, and religion generally have lost their powers in the light of new scientific discoveries (Bernard, 1938; Goldmann, 1968; Crocker, 1969; Easlea, 1980; Eze, 2002; Jones, 2009).

In the first place it must be stated that the Catholic Church (The Church) and religion are not the same thing and as concepts they should not be used interchangeably. The Church belongs to the world of Christianity and there are religious systems without a church-like organization. However, in the European context, especially in the Middle Ages, the Church did not only serve as a religious space where people worshipped. It was a powerful institution both in the political and intellectual sense. The Church was an institution that directly participated in wars, granted titles to monarchs, established universities, stepping, in a way, in all the spheres of life. For this reason, the Church was not only a worship place for Europeans, but it was an active representative of that religion (i.e. of Christianity) and it wanted to concern itself with each and every sphere of life. The clergy did not only consist of religious leaders who solely had a mediator role between the Creator and its servants, but at the same time they were mighty and divine characters in the regions they served. Theology, on the other hand, was not only an academic discipline, but also the ideology of the Church.

For this reason, taking a closer look at the European history we would see that religion (Christianity), the Church, the religious leaders (the clergy) and theology were intertwined, especially in the Middle Ages. In such an environment, an advantage or loss of one of these actors was automatically also attributed to the others. For instance, when a claim of the theology as the ideological column of the Church was disproved by natural sciences, it was not only a blow

to the prestige of the Church naturally. In this case the religion, of which the Church was the representative, and the clergy, that served to spread the theological arguments, were also substantially hit in terms of prestige. It was in the modern time that the religion, the Church and theology entered into a path where they got separated from each other. For this reason, below I will advocate the argument that the changes inspired by the natural sciences have dealt a blow to the prestige and power of the Church, theology and indirectly to the religion due to the close association of them in pre-modern Europe.

Although it is an undeniable fact that the Scientific Revolution became a vital pillar of the European secularization process, taking a closer look at this historical phenomenon, as Bruce neatly explains, it is not possible to claim a zero-sum relationship between scientific advances and the belief in religion:

(...) many seventeenth-century Protestant scientists were inspired to natural science by a desire to demonstrate the glory of God's creation, by the rationalizing attitude of the Protestant ethic and by an interest in controlling the corrupt world. The end result was the same irony that followed from the general rationalization of ethics. Because the Puritan scientists were able to demonstrate the fundamental rule-governed nature of the material world, they made it possible for subsequent generations to do science without topping and tailing their work with the assertion that "This shows God's glory". At any stage in the growth of knowledge, God could be summoned to fill a gap. Newton, for example, believed God periodically took a hand in the movement of the planets to rectify a slight irregularity (2002: 27).

Indeed, as history has shown, a religious man can be a scientist and a scientist can be religious. Stark & Finke (2000) and many other sociologists of religion claim that such cases expose the failure of secularization theory. For them, secularization theory should be sent to the graveyard of failed theories since there are many scientists who believe in God, just as there are many religious people in the modern world who occupy themselves with scientific research.

However, according to Bruce (2002: 26-28), the contribution of scientific developments to secularization cannot be reduced to the notion of mutual exclusion of two spheres, namely, that religion cannot survive if there is development in natural sciences or that natural science cannot be advanced if religion remains dominant. No doubt, to the extent that scientific developments penetrate into daily life, the secularization process will continue to accelerate. But it should be stressed that the effect of scientific advances on the secularization process is not a direct effect, but rather an indirect one. If a pious man is busy with scientific research or a scientist believes in religion, this does not create any problem in terms of validity of the theory (Bruce, 2002: 106-117).

In light of the above discussion, this section has two main objectives. First, to explain the historical origins of the dominant, yet inaccurate notion of a zero-sum relationship between natural science and religion in light of Bruce's works. Second, to indicate that the role of natural sciences in the secularization process does not depend on the history or geography of any particular region, which means that the vital role of scientific advances in the secularization process is not unique to the history of Europe and its offshoots across the world.

Origins of the Inaccurate Notion of a Zero-Sum Relationship

By the 16th century, Catholic theology had been one of the reliable ways of accessing knowledge. Unlike today, the Catholic Church and other religious institutions had the authority and power to touch upon every corner of life: education, health, politics, diplomacy, marriage, birth and death. In like manner, scientific methods and studies were not exempt from the interference of self-reliant theology and all-powerful religious authorities. Many questions, which might be clustered under the title of natural science, were answered by theology without demur. For example, very clear and incontestable answers were searched in sacred texts and/or given by

clergy to questions such as: “How was the Earth created? When was it created? What is the substance of planets rotating in outer space? Are there other creatures somewhere out there in space? Do the sun and the moon move? What is the hierarchical order of animals?” Especially after the translation of Aristotle’s works from Arabic and Greek into Latin, Aristotle’s physics, cosmology, mathematics and logic were accepted by the Catholic Church as unquestionable sacred knowledge (Harman, 1983: 4-5).

For example, according to the Aristotle-based Church teaching, the Earth was at the centre of the universe and its shape was circular as a symbol of perfection. All other heavenly bodies, including the Moon and the Sun, were moving around the Earth in circular motion. All things found between the Earth and the Moon were open to transformation. However, the things above the Moon were seen as perfect and immune from any alteration. In Aristotle’s philosophy, unchangeability denotes faultlessness. While the *aether* was seen as the substance of perfect region (supralunar), the main substances of the imperfect terrestrial sphere (sublunar) were air, water, fire, and earth (Koestler, 1990; Shapin, 1996: 22-23).

The ongoing quasi-hostility between natural science and theology began with the scientific refutation of Aristotle-based Church claims about the universe. For instance, Copernicus (1473-1543) objected to the idea that the Earth is at the centre of the universe. His hypothesis was that the Sun, not the Earth, is at the centre; the Earth revolves in a yearly period around the Sun while it rotates daily on its axis; not only the Earth but other planets as well revolve around the Sun. In this way, claims held to be unquestionable by the Church for centuries were directly challenged by Copernicus. Then, Kepler (1571-1630) argued that the laws governing planetary motions were different from what they had been thought to be. After studying the orbit of Mars, Kepler claimed that the Earth and other planets do not move in a circular motion around the Sun, but in an ellipse. But the fatal blow came from an Italian astronomer by the

name of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). He observed that the Sun's black spots were constantly changing in terms of their number and shape. That observation by Galilei spelled the end of an era, for it profoundly violated the Church's claims based on Aristotle's physics (Harman, 1983; Shapin, 1996).

Up until the 17th century, theology had been respected and rarely questioned as one of the reliable methods for accessing knowledge. Claims of the natural sciences were supported not to contradict the Church's doctrines. However, the accuracy of the Copernican system was not revealed by looking at sacred texts, but through observation made by Galilei. Newton's laws of motion reinforced the superiority of scientific knowledge over the authority of the Church at the end of the 17th century. Thenceforth, the authority of the Church, which had already been shaken by the Protestant Reformation in matters of theology, was shattered.

The Scientific Revolution that began with Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton did not only change the human perspective on nature, but also the method of obtaining data. Along with Francis Bacon and René Descartes, collecting materials, making observations, carrying out experiments, and reaching conclusions based on evidence became the main scientific method at the expense of relying on sacred religious texts (Tierney, Kagan and Williams, 1992). While man had been placed at the centre according to the Christian Genesis, the new planets discovered by Galileo's telescope revealed the possibility of other worlds and creatures.

For one thing, these discoveries cast serious doubts on the anthropocentric world view of the Church.²⁵ In time, some of the most well-known religious claims about the universe and history completely lost their validity. Scientists proved beyond doubt that the Earth was much older than had been claimed by the Church. Biblical assertions such as "the world also shall be stable, that it be

25 "Any view magnifying the importance of human beings in the cosmos, e.g. by seeing it as created for our benefit" (Blackburn, 2005: 18).

not moved" (King James Version, 1 Chronicles 16:30) was soundly refuted. The understanding of a limited universe preached by the clergy was replaced by the perception of a universe that is infinite. In addition, not only did the ideology of the Church, i.e. theology, lose power and prestige due to advances in natural sciences, other spiritual thoughts, superstitious beliefs in miracles, and alchemy (miracle drugs, magic potions) also lost their prestige. Supranatural claims about the universe were replaced by knowledge obtained via secular methods. As a result, fewer people continued to pay attention to astrology, treatment with magic, or witchcraft and the visibility of these supranatural phenomena in society dwindled in time (Perry *et al.*, 1989).

After all these developments in natural sciences that successfully refuted the main claims of theology, 17th and 18th centuries Enlightenment philosophers and scientists added to the fire by producing many works that were outrightly hostile to those aspects of theology, if not religion itself, that were not coherent with reason.²⁶ For example, Comte de Buffon, an accomplished mathematician and biologists, argued that the Earth must be older than it said in the Bible. Like Buffon, the Scottish geologist James Hutton suggested that the Earth was older than 6000 years by commenting on the perpetual erosion of mountains (Tobin & Dusheck, 2005: 303).

The ongoing debates between Enlightenment thinkers and the clergy throughout the 18th century (Hayes, 1919: 413-14) and the exciting quarrels between 19th century religious leaders and ardent defenders of Darwinism (Turner, 1978: 356-57; Bruce, 2002) helped to disseminate the perception of a zero-sum relationship in which the gain or loss of the Church/theology/clergy is balanced

26 Spinoza in his *the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670), John Toland in his *Christianity Not Mysterious* (1696), Montesquieu in his *Persian Letters* (1721), Voltaire in his *English Letters* (1734), and *Philosophical Dictionary* (1764), Edward Gibbon in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-89), David Hume in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779), Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (1793), etc..

in an appropriate manner by the losses or gains of secular domains. Indeed, Enlightenment thinkers believed that the more natural science would become pervasive, the less Catholic theology, Catholicism and the clergy would find a habitat for themselves; by the end of the day, religion would vanish due to scientific progress. In 1710, Thomas Woolston argued that Christianity would vanish by the beginning of the 20th century. Likewise, the French philosopher, Voltaire, heralded the annihilation of religion within 50 years in a letter to Friedrich II of Prussia (Stark, 1999: 249). Hostility towards religion, theology and the clergy had almost become the prerequisite of being an intellectual during the Enlightenment. Prophets of the monotheistic religions were called charlatans, while religious beliefs, following classic atheist discourse, were seen as the expression of fear (Redwood, 1976: 34; Norris & Inglehart, 2008).

The founding fathers of sociology joined the Enlightenment philosophers who believed that rational thought and scientific knowledge are capable of occupying almost every field that was previously under the hegemony of theology. The alleged zero-sum relationship between natural sciences and theology of the 18th century was maintained by Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Comte (1798-1857) in the 19th century. Saint-Simon believed that there would be no need for religious men at the final stage of humanity, and that all supranatural beliefs and superstitions would be completely disregarded in the not-too-distant future. For him, religion or men of religion would inevitably lose out to scientists, artists, intellectuals and industrialists (Simon, 1956: 320-21). Like Saint-Simon, Comte (1998: 41) thought that religion would totally disappear in the new world as a result of scientific progress. Some scientific developments at the time, like analysing water and air, the discovery of oxygen, new information related to blood circulation, significant improvements in light, the universal law of gravity, *etc.* convinced him that in the near future people would rely only on scientists and industrialists.

If we go back to the founders of sociology, it is fairly common to come across thinkers who argued that scientific developments would render religious discourses invalid, and that neither god nor religion would have any chance of survival in the foreseeable future. However, such an idea or claim has not been defended or recognized by the classic theory of secularization. That theory has been fervently discussed after the 1960s, and encountering classical secularization theorists who defend that religion will vanish with the advancements of natural science have become the exception rather than the norm. Berger (1967b), who defended a classical version of the theory in the 1960s, built his theory on pluralism, not on natural science. Likewise, when Wilson (1966) tried to explain the theory, he asserted that the coexistence of religion and natural science does not pose a problem at all for the theory. As one of the best-known proponents of the secularization theory, Bruce (1996: 48-49; 2002) explains quite clearly and comprehensively, that the so-called zero-sum relationship has no place in the theory. Working parallel to these authors, other scholars such as Chaves (1994), Dobbelaere (1985), Davie (1994), Luckmann (1967), Martin (1965; 1978) and Fenn (1969) have not supported the notion that scientific advances have a direct impact on the secularization process.

Sociological explanation, by its very nature, is not interested in or concerned with conflicts between two different ideas or concepts. What is important for sociology is the social impact of those ideas. The battle between the claims of natural sciences and the claims of theology could be zero-sum on a theoretical level. The claims, findings or doctrines of one may be rejected or refuted by the other. But if there is no social response to this battle, in other words, if there are those who define themselves as religious while engaging with science, the zero-sum relationship on the theoretical level does not make much empirical sense for the discipline of sociology. Today, while many modern communities are experiencing a process of change from an industrial society to a knowledge-based society,

many religious people are still engaged in scientific experiments in their laboratories. Regardless of the fact that science has permeated every area of life, there are countless people who still believe in theology and are still practicing the rituals of their religion in modern countries. Therefore, to posit that religion and natural science have a zero-sum relationship in daily life just because of the quarrel between theology and natural science is not consistent with the facts of life.

So, if scientific developments do not undermine religiosity, and if natural science and religion continue to co-exist, how then is the secularization process accelerated by scientific advances?

The Role of Scientific Developments in the Secularization Process

The contribution of scientific advances to the secularization process seems to have taken place not directly, but indirectly. Scientific developments lead to secularization in two indirect ways. Firstly, they increase the level of human rational consciousness. Secondly, the proliferation of technology reduces the number of cases where religion touches upon the lives of people. I will discuss these two points in greater detail below.

Rational Consciousness and Secularization

The concept of rational consciousness refers to conceiving natural phenomena in the worldly cause-effect relationship, and not having tendency to use supranaturalism to explain them (Morrison, 1995: 42). Weber calls this “the disenchantment of the world”. To him, humans began to conceive worldly events in light of observable facts due to the scientific progress. Science accelerated the collapse of enigmatic structures in the universe filled with magic, mystery and unknowable “facts” (Hughes, Martin and Sharrock, 1995: 120-21). As for the origins of natural phenomena, human technical knowledge, the ability to calculate and observe, and the natural human de-

sire to take more control of nature have resulted in fewer references to “metaphysics”.

Throughout the ages, when scientific advances had yet to penetrate radically into society, natural events such as solar eclipse, lunar eclipse, comets, incurable infectious diseases, and quite a number of deaths from devastating calamities like floods, earthquakes, and droughts had all been conceived as messages from the gods. While the sun was the symbol of justice and righteousness among the Sumerians, it was worshipped as a god in ancient Egypt. In the olden days, people tried to create various noises using pots and pans to ward off evil spirits during solar eclipses. The Halys War in 585 BC between the Lydians and the Medans was ended thanks to a solar eclipse which was seen by the warring parties as a message from the gods to end the fighting (Worthen, 1997, May). Abundant harvest and rain, victory in battle and a safe return of the marines were ensured by the gods of Romans (Bagnall, 2002: 16). Trying to understand whether the gods supported the army by looking at the amount of chicken’s grain (Dillon & Garland, 2005: 189), attributing the loss of battle to lunar and solar eclipses (Leick, 2010: 28), ending wars, cancelling a planned invasion, or postponing retreat from war because of a solar or lunar eclipse, and deciding or not deciding to attack because of comets (Scheckel, 2013: 132), are historical examples that indicate how “metaphysics” could easily interfere even in very important and influential historical events.



Picture A1. Halley’s comet was depicted as a portent of doom in the Bayeux Tapestry (BBC, 2013, March 15)

However, with the advent of scientific tools and observations, the solar eclipse, which had been conceived of as a message from supranatural powers, is currently taught in all educational institutions as a natural phenomenon that occurs when the Moon passes between the Earth and the Sun. In this day and age, it is possible to know with great precision when, in terms of hour and seconds, and where, in terms of visibility from the surface of the Earth, the next solar eclipse(s) will take place. Moreover, comets are now known to be a combination of water, frozen gases and cosmic dust. There are too many of them to be counted and while the trajectories of some can be calculated, it is not possible to make such a calculation for the vast majority of them which move beyond the limits of our solar system (NASA, n.d.).

A similar mental transformation has also taken place with regard to the origin of diseases. Before the discovery of bacteria and the subsequent invention of antibiotics, the causes of many diseases were unknown. All those enigmatic natural phenomena - solar eclipse, comets, diseases with unknown causes - were freed from being considered a mystery and turned into subjects of scientific inquiry. Therefore, the more scientific advances penetrated into daily life (invention) and natural phenomena became subject of natural science (discovery), the more the mechanical worldview of the 18th century Enlightenment philosophers was taken seriously.²⁷ Like a clock, the earth was considered to be self-powered without need of any external influence for it to work. Likewise, the creator turned into a watchmaker who created the Earth and then stopped in-

27 Although the mechanical worldview became prevalent with industrialization, Francis Bacon, René Descartes and Isaac Newton had already introduced it in Europe in the 17th century. Bacon praised the scientific method based on observation and experiment. Descartes founded analytic geometry and argued that all phenomenon could be explained by mechanical philosophy. And lastly, Newton's famous laws of motion laid the foundation for the mechanical worldview. It should be added that, natural science moved away from mechanism with the theories of evolution and relativity. But still these theories do not support a world designed according to divine laws.

terfering with its mechanism: “The universe was now viewed as a giant machine functioning according to universal laws that could be expressed mathematically; nature could be mastered” (Perry *et al.*, 1989: 385). This idea, which suggested that the creator had created the universe and then retreated, is a result of the mechanization and cause-effect explanations for the origin of natural phenomena. Thus, all those natural phenomena, for which physics and mathematics had not been able to offer any compelling explanation, would remain unknown until scientists were able to solve the mystery. On the other hand, explanations based on metaphysics are not taken into consideration anymore.

As a contemporary example, we can take the self-propelled large rocks of Death Valley, located on the border between California and Nevada:

One of the most interesting mysteries of Death Valley National Park is the sliding stones at Racetrack Playa (a playa is a dry lake bed). These stones can be found on the floor of the playa with long trails behind them. Somehow the stones slide across the playa, cutting a furrow in the sediment as they move. Remarkably, multiple stones commonly show parallel tracks, including apparently synchronous high angle turns and sometimes reversals in travel direction. Some of the stones weigh more than 300 kg. That makes the question: “what powerful force could be moving them?” (Sci-News.com, September 14, 2014)



Picture A2. Unexplained Earth Phenomenon: The Moving Rocks in Death Valley National Park (Strange Sounds, 2012, December 4)

The mystery behind their movement had not been solved until recently. With hundreds of pounds in weight, and although starting at the same place, they each drag through different directions without any visible force. Many metaphysical explanations such as the devil, who is responsible for the grains of sand, or aliens who are responsible for the movements of these rocks, had already been offered for this quite interesting and exciting natural phenomenon. However, NASA scientists, Ralph Lorenz *et al.*, put forth a very plausible answer to this unsolved mystery while they were making a comparative study of Death Valley's meteorology and a hydrocarbon lake on Saturn's moon, Titan. Lorenz *et al.* (2011: 2374) argued that heavy rocks were moving in different directions since the mass under the earth turns into ice in extreme cold and this ice mass influences the Earth's surface. However, the explanation by Lorenz *et al.* has already been falsified in 2014 by further research. A weather station adjacent to Death Valley was set up and a number of time lapse camera systems were used to overlook the southeast corner of the *playa* in the Valley, and fifteen GPS-instrumented rocks on the *playa* surface (Norris, Norris, Lorenz, Ray & Jackson, 2014). Norris *et al.* visited the dry lake several times in a year to exchange battery packs and download weather data. Conditions were recorded hourly from November to March each year via the time lapse cameras in which exposures are taken at fewer intervals than usual. This allowed researchers to view a naturally slow process at an accelerated pace on playback. By the end of the day, they succeeded to solve the mystery of Death Valley's moving stones. Here is the mystery behind the moving rocks:

First, the *playa* fills with water, which must be deep enough to form floating ice during cold winter nights but shallow enough to expose the stones. As night-time temperatures plummet, the pond freezes to form thin sheets of 'windowpane' ice, which must be thin enough to move freely but thick enough to maintain strength. On sunny days, the ice begins to melt and break up into large floating panels, which light winds drive across the *playa*, pushing rocks in front of

them and leaving trails in the soft mud below the surface (Sci-News.com, 2014, September 14).

At present time, each new disclosure about the movements of rock or other mysteries about nature would have to be far-removed from metaphysics to be taken seriously. If this natural phenomenon had been discovered in the 16th century, when the level of rational consciousness was completely different from today's, women in the nearest settlement to the area might have been called witches who were responsible for the rocks' movement, and no one would have felt the need at the time to question such explanation based on metaphysics.

Experts who are consulted in the visual or written media on the effects of natural disasters or any unexpected development related to space or irremediable illnesses do not say that those unexpected developments or disasters are messages from any supreme powers beyond physics. On the contrary, they discuss these subjects without taking supranatural explanations as a reference point, and they would not show any interest if someone tries to imply the involvement of any supranatural power. Thus, as a result of rational thinking, theology is destined to lose its power and prestige in many areas that it had previously claimed.

Proliferation of Technology and Secularization

Compared to many centuries ago, the power of developed or developing societies with respect to nature has increased considerably because of technological possibilities. These developments have led to a decrease in the number of social fields where religion is influential. In this section, I will discuss how technology creates problems for religion. There are two subdivisions to this section:

1. Developments in Medical Science
2. Controlling Nature

Developments in Medical Science and Secularization

Here is an excerpt from a speech by John F. Kennedy at Rice University on September 12, 1962:

No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if you will, the 50,000 years of man's recorded history in a time span of but a half-century. Stated in these terms, we know very little about the first 40 years, except at the end of them advanced man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover them. Then about ten years ago, under this standard, man emerged from his caves to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man learned to write and use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less than two years ago. The printing press came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50-year span of human history, the steam engine provided a new source of power. Newton explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and telephones and automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last week did we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, and now if America's new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight.²⁸

It was not a coincidence that the 35th President of the USA mentioned *penicillin* while he was giving a speech on the USA space program. Again, it is not surprising that he commemorates penicillin together with gravity, the invention of writing and the power of steam as factors which significantly changed the direction of human history. What makes penicillin historically so important is that it emerged as a remedy for what were until then considered incurable diseases. Because of penicillin, many incurable diseases became curable ones.

But why is the invention of penicillin so crucial in terms of secularization? To answer this question, it is important to recall what people tend to do when they cannot find any solution to their health problems. Fervent believers go to sacred places (Vatican, Kaaba, Wailing Wall, Lourdes, shrines, temples, *etc.*) for their incurable dis-

28 Kennedy, J. F. (1962, September 12). Speech in The University of Rice. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Retrieved from <http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/MkATdOcdU06X5uNHbmqm1Q.aspx> in May, 2014.

eases while preferring to go to hospitals for curable ones. I think this shows a direct correlation between secularization and developments in the medical field. Having the ability to cure incurable diseases, coupled with an increasing number of medical centres, renders treatment faster and cheaper than ever before. This leads people to use modern ways of treatment rather than seeking alternatives such as supranaturalism, alternative medicines, visiting sacred places or invoking the clergy.

For example, in the past, those who could not give birth would go to holy places such as mosques, mausoleums, shrines, as a last resort. Or, people would perform several spiritual rituals to reverse what was thought to be a spell, often related to infertility. Therefore, it would not be implausible to claim that with the development of IVF methods and other newly improved techniques, there might be a considerable decrease in the number of such religious visits and rituals. For instance, to have a baby, Turks would go to the Zile district of Tokat to visit the Huseyin Gazi Tomb. According to legend, if seven small stones are picked from the field near the Tomb and if those stones are then hidden under the pillow, Allah will help the couple to have a baby. However, nowadays, although people are still paying visits to such shrines when they want to have a baby, they tend to try other possibilities as well that were not available years ago like new medicines, IVF method, improving the quality and number of sperm cells, surrogacy, *etc.*.

Diseases like mumps, measles, chicken pox, and polio have nearly been eradicated in the modern developed world. In the past, almost every 10-year old child knew what mumps are since either they had had mumps themselves or had seen them already on other children's faces. However, today's children, although they may know mumps is a child disease, do not see mumps anymore, neither on their own faces nor on other children's. Knowing that Turkish children were still being taken to men of religion to have verses from the Qur'ân written on their faces up to the beginning of the 1990s would help

us understand why there is a direct link between secularization and preventing mumps through vaccination.

In addition, as a result of developments in medical science, child mortality rates have been drastically reduced in all regions of the world. Table A5 shows the child mortality rate between 1990-2010 for children under five years old.

Table A5: Levels in the under-five mortality rate, 1990-2010 (deaths per 1000 live births)

Regions	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009	2010	Decline (percent)
Developed Regions	15	11	10	8	7	7	53 %
Developing Regions	97	90	80	71	64	63	35 %
North Africa	82	62	47	35	28	27	67 %
Sub-Sahara Countries	174	168	154	138	124	121	30 %
Latin America and Caribbean	54	44	35	27	22	23	57 %
Caucasus and Middle Asia	77	71	62	53	47	45	42 %
East Asia	48	42	33	25	19	18	63 %
South Asia	117	102	87	75	67	66	44 %
Oceania	75	68	63	57	53	52	31 %

Source: United Nations Report on Child Mortality, 2011

Having changed the daily practices of societies, developments in medical science inevitably affect the human connection with religion. While it was quite normal to seek help from a man of religion for mumps just 20-25 years ago, children of today simply do not have mumps anymore due to vaccination in modern countries: “An effective national health service and global networks of information about alternative medical remedies have undermined local folkloric medical traditions” (Bruce, 2011b: 559). Thus, men of religion, holy places and religion-like mechanisms have lost their power and prestige due to new developments in health care.

However, these advances in medical science do not necessarily reduce belief in religion or supranatural forces. People who seize the opportunity to have a baby through modern science do not lose their faith or their trust in religion or religion-like places. The decrease in the need for religion, temples or clergy does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the level of trust in them. On the contrary, if there happens to be an increase in the number of incurable diseases in the foreseeable future, or if the population growth rate becomes higher than the growth rate in the number of hospitals due to possible structural changes, then it would not be surprising to find that holy places and the men of religion will be popular once again as the last resort for those who cannot find proper treatment. But until then, religion and everything associated with it seems destined to lose its visibility, at least at the social level.

Controlling Nature and Secularization

The unpredictability of nature may become destructive and devastating in natural calamities. If human capacities are not enough to overcome the catastrophic results that come with such unpredictability, then it would be normal to expect humans to seek out help from religion or supranatural powers. But technological advances have rendered human beings more powerful than ever, even to control nature or to handle such disasters. By the end of the day, this ever-increasing power of humans over nature reduces the need for religion-related solutions.


In the past, if nature did not supply the right conditions for agriculture, this might cause heavy losses. If it did not rain enough, so that droughts threatened communities, this was considered a message from the gods or God. The opposite cases were conceived as a blessing from God or for example a rain god. In those times, to reduce such losses or to relieve their pain, people needed spiritual support. At this point, the increase in technological possibilities would reduce how often religion is asked to intervene in everyday life.

For example, people from 24 different villages of Malkara, which is a borough in one of the most modern cities of Turkey, Tekirdağ, collectively prayed for rain in May, 2013 (Malkara Latest News, 2013, May 26). The crowd, which gathered to pray due to the severe drought, included the district governor, mayor, county council members, city council members, political party representatives, the county Mufti, the president of the chamber of agriculture, the presidents of non-governmental organizations, village leaders, and the local people. "We opened our hands to God. We are waiting for the rain. Unknown diseases have just emerged recently and damaged severely our wheat fields. We pray to God for rain and to bestow fertility on our fields," one village headman told *The Malkara Latest News*. Those living in the villages of Malkara district wanted to seek refuge in Allah in such times of drought. During hard times, they sought help from Allah, reciting verses from the Qur'ān, sacrificing sheep to Allah, and performing public religious rituals. Since they have not overcome the problem of drought using worldly means, people in the 24 villages of Tekirdağ took refuge in religion to combat nature's cruelty. Taking refuge in Allah or praying for his help is not a mere coincidence in this case. For Malkara residents, Allah is considered the creator of natural phenomena. Due to the fact that they are deprived of technological tools to overcome such natural disasters, they need Allah to stop what he has caused.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the reason why there are enough water sources for the millions of people in big cities (but not in these villages of just several hundreds of people) is not because Allah/God has more sympathy for the millions in the city than for the villagers. Often with the help of technology, urban people tend to take the necessary precautions to ensure there is enough water. In that way, they do not need to pray to a creator or any supranatural power in times of drought. Because of the use of large dams or artificial ponds, droughts are prevented even in situations where it does not rain for a certain period, or even for years. So, I think it would not be wrong to say that religious rituals, which often

crop up after natural disasters, are generally seen in places where technological advances are still lacking.

This kind of transformation has been experienced by the Harranian people after the world's fifth largest dam - Atatürk Dam - was built between 1983 and 1990. Harran, located in the south-eastern region of Turkey, is one of the country's most conservative districts where even feudal traditions can still be observed. However, unlike the more modern Malkara residents, the more religious Harran people stopped praying to God for rain after they were supplied water by the Atatürk Dam. If we look at satellite images of the Harran district, many water-deprived wastelands just outside of Harran could be seen in a yellow colour. On the other hand, as seen in Picture A3, the Harran district is clad entirely in green after water from Ataturk Dam that was built in 1992 had reached it through channels and pipes. Secularization comes into being at this point. With such technological advances, the Harranian people do not need to plea to Allah for rain anymore, even if it does not rain for years. It indicates that the Harranian people have become secularized, at least in this respect. Despite being very religious, they stopped asking God for rain, and they do not organize any religious rituals even in years without rain.



Picture A3. Satellite Images of Atatürk Dam and Harran District (Google Earth)

However, this does not mean that the Harranian people are less religious than the people of Malkara. Proliferation of technological advances does not have to lead to an increase in the number of irreligious people. Rather, it reduces the number of cases in which humans seek help from beyond the physical world. In the end, the new and next generations of Harranians will not even know the verses that had been recited during rainless times. There is no doubt that the Harrianian people will continue to beg Allah and seek help - but for other reasons. However, the ever-increasing use of technological facilities such as dams, hospitals, paved roads, faster and safer cars, clean drinking water, *etc.*, has clearly brought about a decrease in the number of cases in which these people would still see the need for Allah.

I think that, a comparison between Bangladesh and the Netherlands in terms of the levels of scientific developments and secularization will supply another crucial insight in this regard. Julian Morris (2006, September 7) rightly asks, "Why is Bangladesh so much more at risk of losing human life and experiencing economic losses from flooding than Holland?" In this, he raises the question of why China and India as well as Bangladesh struggle with floods, although they are way above sea level, while the Netherlands, with half of its land below sea level, does not experience similar kinds of flooding. Although the effects of global warming, such as very high temperatures, heavy rains or disproportionate colds, can bring about the deaths of hundreds or even thousands of people in some countries, these do not necessarily result in the loss of life in some other countries. As an expert on environmental issues, Morris' response to this reality recalls the very famous letter of an *optimistic* Rousseau (1756, August 18) to Voltaire who had made very *pessimistic* comments regarding the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake:

Without departing from your subject of Lisbon, admit, for example, that nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of six to seven stories there, and that if the inhabitants of this great city had been more equally spread out and more lightly lodged, the damage would have been much less and perhaps of no account (Masters and Kelly, cited in Dynes, 1999: 10).

In parallel to Rousseau, Morris says that it is no coincidence that climate change negatively affects poor people most of the time. To Morris, because of technological developments, people in the Netherlands are not confronted with floods even though heavy rains can be seen throughout the year and half of the country is below sea level. Contrary to the Netherlands, Bangladesh is grappling with floods due to poverty and lack of technological tools. Surely, this situation could be interpreted differently, but when it comes to the secularization level in Bangladesh, it would not be wrong to assume that there is a parallelism between the low level of secularization and the living conditions under which its people are continuously exposed to danger. Dutch people do not rely on God but on their infrastructure during the same heavy rains that can cause flooding in other underdeveloped countries. But it should be stressed that having a better infrastructure does not have to make the Dutch people more atheistic or irreligious than the Bangladeshi people. What should be highlighted at this point is that although the new technology that accompanied scientific developments does not necessarily render human beings more irreligious, people will inevitably need, recall or seek out orthodox religion or folk religions less and less in their daily lives. I think this is one of the main reasons behind the very different secularization levels in Bangladesh and the Netherlands (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 169, 224, 226, 235, 239).

With the help of technology, humans are now capable of developing early warning systems and building very impregnable defences to minimize the loss of life and reduce the impact of natural disasters. With the advent of new construction technology in Japan, even multi-storey buildings do not collapse during an eight Richter scale magnitude earthquake. During extremely cold weather, the number of deaths in Europe is limited to a few homeless people in the least modernized parts of the continent. The remaining millions of Europeans get over this kind of freezing disasters in their warm houses. In the same way, people in hot countries, where the temperature can get up to more than 50 °C during the day, overcome this potential disaster by means of air conditioning. Today,

life-saving advances in the treatment of stroke, needleless injection, three-dimensional mammography for the early detection of cancer, survival of premature babies, and the gastric bypass method against diabetes are part of normal healthcare in modern societies. Spectacular engineering structures and innovations, as well as an increasing variety of products with falling prices are other opportunities that scientific advances offer. Therefore, it could be said that the rising living standard that comes with scientific developments is clearly reducing the number of cases in which humans would still feel the need for supranatural powers.

Conclusion

The main argument of secularization theory is that the modernization process is for the most part responsible for the loss of social power and visibility of religion at any one time. As part of the modernization process, scientific developments are considered the accelerator of this social transformation. However, contrary to common belief, scientific developments do not contribute to this transformation by falsifying religious teachings or beliefs. Needless to say, beliefs do not require scientific evidence. As it might be seen in the effects of a small village dam that supplies water during times of drought, the contribution of scientific advances to the secularization process seems to have happened not directly but indirectly, namely through science-based technology

To sum up, scientific developments tend to increase the secularization level in two ways: by advancing the level of rational consciousness which allows people to describe or understand natural phenomena in a worldly cause-effect relationship, and by making technology cheaper and pervasive for their daily use. However, it should be emphasized once more that I do not claim that scientific developments increase the number of atheists or irreligious people even though that is also a possibility. Of course, there was some inconsistency between the Medieval Catholic Church's teachings and

some scientific findings. But these inconsistencies do not demonstrate a zero-sum relationship between faith and science. This is because there is no universal rule whereby other belief systems have to conform or support the claims of the Medieval Catholic Church, and the Church was already able to adapt itself to a new era in which scientific findings are taken into consideration more than they had been. However, although it is not possible to claim that there is a zero-sum relationship between faith and science, it can be argued that scientific advances can be held responsible for rendering religion and theology less visible and/or influential in modern-day society in different fields such as explaining sickness and natural disasters.

THE ROLE OF CAPITALISM IN THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS

It is a truth, (almost) universally acknowledged, that industrial capitalism is one of the key dynamics that led to Europe becoming the world's most secular continent. The aim of this section is to build a theoretical framework whereby it can be shown that there is a positive correlation between industrial capitalism and secularization. Hence, in this section, I will briefly touch first on the meaning and structural characteristics of capitalism. Then, I will indicate how capitalism is a key accelerator of secularization at the theoretical level by focusing on four major corollaries of capitalism:

1. Rules of Economy and Secularization
2. Disintegration of Traditional Family Structure and Secularization
3. Increase in Welfare and Secularization
4. Downsizing of the State and Secularization

Capitalism

Capitalism is an economic system in which labour and capital are separated and wherein the means of production are privately owned. In such a system, the state is expected not to decide how, where and how much to be produced; goods and services are voluntarily

exchanged; people are free to sell their products and labour force at a price determined by a largely impersonal market; and competition among producers is considered one of its main pillars (Machan, 1993; Barry, 2002; Hazlitt, 2012). As Nigel Ashford (2003: 28) neatly summarizes it, capitalism is an economic system “based on the voluntary exchange of goods and services, in which the people determine their own economic affairs, by deciding where they work, or invest, how to spend or save the fruits of their labour, and with whom they trade.” In such an economic system, the rules for a functioning economy do not stem from any historical-dogmatic teachings or dictation by political leaders.

Production for the masses and not just for a certain class in society is another feature of industrial capitalism. The well-known Austrian economist Ludwig Von Mises mentions continuous improvement of the average standard of living and increase in wealth as some of the benefits of this system:

It is this ascension of the multitude in which the radical social change brought about by the Industrial Revolution consists. Those underlings who in all the preceding ages of history had formed the herds of slaves and serfs, of paupers and beggars, became the buying public, for whose favor the businessmen canvass (1972: 1).

Since state ownership of production is restrained as much as possible in favour of the private sector, it means that first the economic power of the state and then, parallel to it, its political power are bound to decrease. Ashford indicates a very limited role for government in a free market economy:

The role of government is to provide the rules or framework that enables everyone to be free, to protect them from infringements on their freedom by others. The free market is associated with economic freedom or freedom of choice: the freedom of the consumer to buy, the freedom of the trader to fix the price of his goods and services (and of the consumer to accept or refuse to pay it), the freedom of the worker to choose his job or profession, and the freedom of the producer to produce what he wishes and to employ whom he chooses (2003: 36).

These freedoms provided by capitalism reduced the capacity of any one person or group to seize the state and to dictate their own values on society.

The aforesaid characteristic features of capitalism allow a more rational and organic society to emerge, reducing in the process the social prestige and influence of religion, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms and all forms of superstitious beliefs. Although there is no zero-sum relationship between capitalism and faith, it can be statistically shown that countries with a free economic system are more secular than those with a command economy (Norris & Inglehart, 2008; Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2013). The data supplied by World Value Survey and European Value Survey (pooled in 1981-2001) support what has been asserted above. Table A6 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 105), Table A7 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 70) and Table A8 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 57) indicate the direct correlation between capitalism and secularization.

Table A6. The Perceived Functions of Religious Authorities

Type of Society	Moral Role (% Agree)	Spiritual Role (% Agree)	Family Role (% Agree)	Social Role (% Agree)	Total Function Scale
Postindustrial	39	34	39	58	1.6
Industrial	59	53	59	76	2.4
Agrarian	75	72	75	80	3.0

NOTE: "Generally speaking, do you think that the religious authorities in your country are giving adequate answers to ...

- The moral problems and needs of the individual,
- The problems of family life.
- People's spiritual needs.
- The social problems facing our country today."

(Yes/No) Percentage who agree.

Source: WVS data, pooled 1981-2001

As shown by Table A6, the influence of religious authorities declines alongside the transition from an agricultural to industrial society. While individuals in an agricultural community still have confidence in the religious authority at a rate of up to 80% when it comes to moral problems, individual needs, family problems, spiritual desires, and social problems facing their country, the rate decreases as the community distances itself from structures with an agricultural character.

Table A7. Social Characteristics of Religious Participation

	Agrarian	Industrial	Postindustrial	All
All	49	25	22	28
Sex				
Women	49	26	26	30
Men	49	22	18	26
Age Group				
Younger (Under 30 years old)	49	22	15	26
Middle (30-59 years old)	47	23	21	26
Older (60+ years old)	47	29	35	34
Education				
Low education	55	34	21	36
Medium Education	47	23	16	28
High Education	48	22	24	28
Employment Status				
In paid work	49	29	26	27
Income				
Lowest income deciles	56	30	22	34
Highest income deciles	45	17	22	26
Social Class				
Manager/professional	52	22	23	28
Lower middle	46	22	17	22
Skilled working	42	21	17	23
Unskilled working	52	30	19	31
Marital and family status				
Married	49	24	23	28
With children	48	25	23	29

NOTE: Religious Participation: *“Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never.”* The percentage attending religious services *“more than once a week”* or *“once a week.”*

Source: World Values Survey, pooled 1981-2001.

Table A7 shows that the level of religious participation decreases in so far as a society distances itself from any social structure with an agricultural stamp. We observe and examine religious participation under headings such as gender, age, education, employment status, income, social class and family status. Religious participation is much greater within agricultural societies than within societies with an industrialized structure.

Table A8. Religiosity by Type of Society

	Agrarian	Industrial	Postindustrial	Eta	Sig.
RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION					
Attend church at least weekly	44	25	20	.171	**
Pray “every day”	52	34	26	.255	***
RELIGIOUS VALUES					
Religion “very important”	64	34	20	.386	***
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS					
Believe in life after death	55	44	49	.229	*
Believe that people have a soul	68	43	32	.169	***
Believe in heaven	63	45	44	.094	*
Believe in hell	59	36	26	.228	***
Believe in God	78	72	69	.016	N/s

NOTE: Significance (Sig.): ***P = .001; **P = .01; *P = .05. N/s 0 not significant.

than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never." The percentage attending religious services "more than once a week" or "once a week." Frequency of prayer: Q199: "How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? Would say ... Everyday (7), more than once a week (6), once a week (5), at least once a month (4), several times a year (3), less often (2), never (1)." The percentage "every day." Religious values: Q10: "How important is religion in your life? Very important, rather important, not very important, not at all important?" The percentage "very important." Religious beliefs: "Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Yes/No." The percentage "yes".

Source: World Values Survey / European Values Survey, pooled 1981-2001.

Table A8 also shows that religious beliefs are more dominant in agricultural communities. Communities with an agricultural character show higher rates in the criteria of belief in life after death, belief in heaven, belief in hell, and belief in God. The number of people who say that religion is "very important" tends to shrink in industrial and postindustrial societies compared to agricultural ones. As is shown in Table A8, the rates of weekly church attendance and daily prayer are also higher in agricultural societies.

I will now examine one by one how the aforementioned characteristics of capitalism render religion less influential at least at the social level.

Rules of Economy and Secularization

The ethos of capitalism is incompatible with the traditional social structure adorned with religion. Most religions, by definition, are based on an *other world* and see *this world* as only temporal. Weber (1930/2005) saw no possibility of a compromise between bourgeois morality and traditional religious teachings. The success of a capitalist in trade is based on a number of rational decisions involving many religion-free factors. The reason of all decisions, choices, measures, precautions and judgments of a capitalist is only concerned with this world. Capitalism, largely viewed by traditional societies as the origin of greed, leaves no room for the supranatural or divine in running this world. Like Weber, Von Mises (1981) also claims

that traditional social structure is a barrier to a free economy, since the ethos of capitalism cannot compromise with old traditions, laws, rules and morals that are mingled with religion.

Economic success in a free market economy does not depend on the relationship with spiritual powers or with the ideologies of leaders. To be successful, what people need is to be able to make the right, rational, religion-free decisions regarding trade at the right time and place. While free market entrepreneurs have to take into consideration various independent dynamics to ensure success in trade, they have to compete not only with other entrepreneurs in their own city, but also with tradesmen from other cities and countries, often with other religious beliefs. When they seek to produce goods of good quality in a more economical way than their competitors, religious teachings, doctrines, practices, rituals and methods play no part whatsoever in that effort. Things which were previously considered sinful or improper in the light of religion become an indispensable part of life by reason of capitalism.

The institutionalization and proliferation of “loan with interest” in a particular society wherein usuriousness used to be prohibited or conceived as a misdeed because of religion, is one clear example of the penetrative power of capitalism. In traditional society, the system of making money from money was actualized in the form of lending money to the poor by the rich. This process follows a different path in the capitalist system. It is obvious that in an agricultural society, in which industrialization and capitalism are not dominant at all, people tend to need money from a “usurer” relatively less frequently than people living in a capitalist society. In traditional home-based societies, loan with interest was not used to invest, but to relieve one’s grief or get over the devastation caused by natural disasters or diseases. Loan with interest, which often happened in very difficult times, could result in the confiscation of all property by the end of the day. Since those loans with interest were not used to finance a particular production or produce any added value, after

a period of time borrowers might find themselves in a more difficult situation. For that reason, humiliation, degradation or vilification of those usurers were not unusual in traditional societies. Like moneylender Shylock in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, it comes as no surprise that moneylenders are characterized as the villains in many literary works. Regarding the notorious moneylenders of times past, the articles by Celeste Turner Wright, "Some Conventions Regarding the Usurer in Elizabethan Literature" (1934) and "The Usurer's Sin in Elizabethan Literature" (1938) may supply some important insights. As can be seen in these articles, moneylenders were considered "a fix type monster" in pre-capitalist societies. Besides, expressions like "(...) usury offends Goodness divine, and disengage the knot" were also frequently used in Dante's (1555/2005) widely known work, *The Divine Comedy*. Like Dante, Balzac (1830/2013) characterized his moneylender in *Gobseck* as a cheapskate, pirate and petty, and those who had to take loan with interest from moneylenders as "victims".

Although it is understandable that interest on loan was considered diabolical and dirty money in religion-dominated societies in which traditional forms of production pervaded, that same interest has become one of the most fundamental features of the modern world economic system. With the increase in capital accumulation, moneylenders (banks) have taken up the central role in modern economies (Hayes, 1919: 68; Rowen, 1960: 580). Wright (1938: 178) depicts the beginning of this transformation in English society as follows: "About the middle of the 16th century, English law and business began to ignore the medieval injunctions against usury. Despite the continued opposition of the Church, economics was being gradually divorced from religion."

With the development of capitalism, two structural differences arise with regard to loan with interest. First, since the middle and upper classes also need money for various reasons, like investing, increasing their living standard, producing more goods, *etc.*, wealthy

people as much as poor ones start to take out loans with interest. And taking out loans with interest has led to the revival of economies as well as bringing about a rise in the living standards of people. With the help of such loans, people are able to buy houses, cars, properties, make investments, and establish businesses without having to save money for years on end in order to reach the required amount. The second structural difference is that although only rich people were able to make money from money in pre-modern economies (namely, whoever lent money was rich, and whoever took out loans was poor), in present times ordinary citizens can realize additional income by depositing their money with interest in banks. So, unlike traditional society, in capitalist economies, lending money with interest might happen between ordinary citizens and banks except that the roles have now been reversed.

In addition, religious preferences are now forced to retreat while usury imposes itself due to the nature of free market economies themselves. As the free market economy does not allow for religious intolerance, it leads to indifference towards different beliefs. Voltaire, who is one of the most influential and prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment, penned some letters on English religious life and politics during the period he had to live in London when he was not allowed to enter Paris. At the very beginning of the fifth letter, *On the Church of England*, Voltaire (1980: 37) depicts England with this sentence: "This is the land of sects. An Englishman, as a free man, goes to Heaven by whatever route he likes." Voltaire was talking about something quite new for his native France, where Catholicism had been upheld as the only belief system for ages. For Voltaire, the reason why there was religious tolerance among Londoners from different religious backgrounds, and why religious bigotry was less prevalent in England than it was in France, had to do with the fact that there was no traditional economic system in England, but free trade. In fact, religious differences or prejudices tend to lose their power to guide social behaviours if humans are

able to come together and benefit from each other. The economic interests of societies belonging to different faiths exert greater weight than religious preferences. Since trade has to be impersonal and free from all human or religious biases, it paves the way for very different groups to come together to collaborate on a shared interest while the very impersonal character of it naturally restrains religious preferences from interfering with the economy. As Wendy McElroy (1998, June 1) states, a Jew who wishes to do business with a Muslim, or a Christian who wishes to trade with a Jew, has to ignore cultural and religious differences, and avoid the biases and prejudices of his own religious affiliation for such a trade to happen.

Disintegration of Traditional Family Structure and Secularization

Rural people in pre-industrial societies were able to produce their own clothes, foods, tools and other necessities. Agricultural production was at the centre of life, and there was little diversity or specialization in the production process (Treasure, 1993: 62). By contrast, the capitalist mode of production renders the division of labour, private property rights, working for a salary and private factories part and parcel of modern-day life. This new structure that came onto the scene with the advent of capitalism turns most of the population into a part of economically active population in factories and service sector and accelerates the disintegration of the traditional family structure:

The societal range of role performances of husbands and wives is structurally determined. The range of role performances and, consequently, of statuses of husbands, is much broader than the range of role performance or statuses of wives. An important indicator of the husband's performance status is his income, one of the wife's performance status the "quality" of her housework (Heintz, Held & Levy, 1975: 862-863).

However, a cultural shift comes into play in the perception of women whenever there is a transition from an agricultural society,

where religious values, norms and bans dominate, to a capitalist society, in which secular-rational thinking, values and evaluations pervade. In traditional family structure, women had very limited options in terms of jobs due to the lack of available jobs and social expectations. The existence of women without economic freedom is one of the important dynamics for the continuation of the traditional family structure. Women with little education and without their own income tend to experience issues even in choosing their own spouses. In addition, these women are also expected to comply with the social moral principles legitimized by religion.

However, in societies dominated by the free market system, women tend to make the continuation of traditional family ties difficult when they start to earn their own income due to more job opportunities and better education. They can make friends with people from other cultures, which may not be easy in agricultural communities; and since they have become stronger economically, they are also now entitled to have the last word on marriage. Unlike the situation in traditional societies, in which the number of children per family was often determined by religion-sanctioned traditions, in modern capitalist societies it is no longer tradition or religion but “worldly” concerns such as health and education that decide how many children a woman will have. Such a transformation in daily practices and mind-set also leads to a decrease in birth rate. Needless to say, women are more or less forced into having fewer children to maintain their working life in capitalist societies. Therefore, it is no coincidence that one of the most serious problems facing present-day capitalist societies is a rapid decline in population rate. In fact, the rapid decline in childbirth (Yew, 2012, October 6; East-West Center, 2013) has forced governments to take serious measurements in this regard.

More than ever, women who become “individuals” by gaining economic freedom tend to get rid of the suppressions meted out by traditional social structures mingled with religion. Besides, the age

for the first sexual experience outside marriage has also gone down (Finer, 2007; ChartsBin Statistics Collector Team, 2009), while at the same time the relative number of children born out of wedlock has increased significantly in capitalist societies (Swinford, 2013; Eurostat, 2015).

Increase in Welfare and Secularization

Norris and Inglehart (2008: 109-10) showed statistically in their masterpiece, *Sacred and Secular*, that as the level of human development increases, religious values, practices and beliefs erode. The transition from agricultural production to industrial production, the growth of the service sector, the rise in the ratio of literate people, more comfortable housing conditions, more leisure time, the increase in average life expectancy, the decrease in infant mortality rate, reduction in health care costs, proliferation of communication tools, and a democratic form of government can all be counted as parameters of human development. Negative changes in these parameters, on the other hand, render societies more vulnerable with respect to life's challenges. It is highly likely that societies which are exposed to the destructive power of nature, severe poverty, or state oppression, are more religious or more inclined towards the sacred than those societies which live under secure, peaceful and affluent conditions. As people tend to go to shrines, temples or other holy places for their incurable diseases while preferring hospitals for curable ones, in the same way, the more societies are faced with devastating physical and social risks or ills, the more they use non-secular ways to cope with them.

By reference to Adam Smith's well-known metaphor of the 'invisible hand', in a system where private property and freedom of contract are recognized and trade is free from state intervention, individuals unintentionally increase the welfare of the community as they try to maximize their own gains on a free market. As Mark

Skousen (1994) points out, the idea that capitalism makes the rich richer and the poor poorer cannot be proved by simply looking at the daily life of capitalist societies. Capitalism prevents even protected groups from controlling all the resources, offers a chance to poor people to be able to support their families, and creates opportunities for disadvantaged people to become wealthy. Having changed the historical structure of the discipline of economy, capitalism has brought about a dramatic increase in the national income per capita of countries which adopt it (Kasper, 2002). In addition, it helps new technologies to be developed and become widespread while increasing the level of education (Hartwell, 1965: 165).

As the OECD report about international migration tendencies around the globe indicates, the flow of migration is from closed economies to capitalist ones (OECD Reports on Trends in International Migration, 2001; Griswold, 2002, May 1). In other words, people tend to go where the money is, where labour is free and where they would have a chance to be wealthy. As Marc Swanepoel (1992) argues, increase in wealth occurs where the means of production are less controlled by the state. The Annual Report of the 2013 Economic Freedom of the World showed, once again, that countries governed by capitalism yield more wealth than those of command economies. For example, while the per capita income for capitalist countries is around 36,000 USD, this amount drops sharply to 4,382 USD for command economies such as Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Central African Republic, Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and Venezuela (Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2013).

The infant mortality rate was over 40% in pre-industrial Europe. Due to extreme poverty, the population of Europe had not increased up until the 19th century. However, as Mustafa Erdoğan (2002) states, a significant increase in living standards of Europeans could be seen in the period between 1760 and 1850 because of

a - relatively - *laissez faire*²⁹ economy. While capitalism has led to a fall in death rate, it has increased purchasing power. Eating and drinking habits have changed dramatically; per capita consumption of meat, sugar, tea, beer and eggs, which had once been considered luxury food items, has increased drastically and they have now become ordinary consumer goods. What Erdoğan argues for the history of Europe regarding capitalism is perhaps not unique. Interestingly, Milton Friedman (1982), recipient of the 1976 Nobel Prize in economic sciences, points to something similar for the history of the USA in terms of capitalism:

The United States has continued to progress; its citizen have become better fed, better clothed, better housed, and better transported; class and social distinctions have narrowed; minority groups have become less disadvantaged; popular culture has advanced by leaps and bounds. All this has been the product of the initiative and drive of individuals co-operating through the free market (1982: 164).

With the rise of capitalism, living standards of societies have skyrocketed; and the gap between the poor and the rich has narrowed with regard to basic needs. For all these reasons, the need of society for absolute powers (religious or non-religious) is being (or will be) reduced in the course of time. As Mehmet Ali Kirman (2005b) observes, the tougher the living conditions in societies, the more they wish to live under absolute powers. Therefore, on the basis of history, it would be fair to say that the secularization process is likely to be found in capitalist societies like those of European countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, *etc.*, since with the proliferation of capitalism humans are bound to enjoy a higher level of prosperity that renders them less vulnerable to the unpredictability of nature (Norris & Inglehart, 2008). On the other hand, this is not (yet) the case in undeveloped countries or in countries with rich natural resources where the production of wealth is not based on the

29 The original expression of *laissez faire* is “laissez faire, [laissez aller], laissez passer”. In English, it means “Let them act, let them go”. It is considered a motto for those who glorify the economic freedom of individuals.

capitalist economic system. Religion, religion-affiliated institutions, and sacred figures/deities are more likely to be visible if not effective in those countries.

Downsizing of the State and Secularization

Capitalism further prevents states from imposing any particular religious beliefs, doctrines or values on societies by limiting their power of penetration. Since the means of production are owned by the private sector and not the state, people are hired according to merit, and there is a direct proportion between their being continually hired and their merit within the production process. However, if the employer is the state instead of a private entrepreneur, employees will need to have the mind-set that is required for a job, or at least they have to pretend that they support the state or its institution. Since no one is responsible for the loss of state enterprises, people do not need to improve themselves; rather, they may tend to think, defend or act in accordance with government policies.

Since the most important thing for a capitalist is to make more profit, religious identity loses its significance when it comes to recruitment. Human beings from different faiths start to work in the same workplace and start to live in the same neighbourhoods. John Hood (1998, August 1) points out that capitalist enterprises play a very crucial role against religious discrimination, since it would be against the principles of productivity or efficiency for company executives to exclude potential employees or customers on the basis of religious affiliation. Since capitalism is based on competition among companies, and surviving in a free market depends on profit, companies cannot run the risk of hiring or not hiring someone on the basis of their faith or ethnic origin instead of their competence. As Richard M. Salsman clearly explains:

To compete in a free economy means to create and offer better values to customers than rival firms. Successful competitors focus on reality, inventions, innovations, materials and methods—not on ri-

vals per se. They're independent, unconventional, often rebellious toward accepted norms and opinions. They're first-handed. They don't copy—they originate. They don't travel well-worn paths—they blaze new commercial trails. They are forward-looking—not mired in the past or in the status quo or burdened by conventional habits. They're not passive order-takers or servants of demanding consumers. They invent products and processes that consumers never heard of nor could dream of (2000, January 2).

Linda Gorman (1993) rightly argues that religion (or political affiliation) can be one of the hiring criteria if state-owned enterprises instead of private sectors run the economy. According to her, while such a system can cause waste of resources and depletion, at the same time it aggravates the friction between religious groups nurtured by the state and other, discriminated ones. Since the loss of state-owned enterprises is compensated with taxes, it is not merit but loyalty to the government that is important in such economies. By contrast, capitalists, who want to maximize their profits, do not recruit staff in accordance with their religion or their loyalty to the boss's ideology or faith. Capitalists are more keen on finding the most productive staff without taking their religious affiliation into account. The religious identities of workers in an automobile factory are of no concern to the factory owners unless, of course, friction among workforce reduces profit. Therefore, compared to a statist economy, a capitalist society is highly likely to generate less religious discrimination. For example, at present, it is not Muslim Turks who are working in privately owned mines in the city of Zonguldak (North Anatolia), but Taoists, Buddhists or people with folk beliefs from China.

As Friedman (1982) rightly argues, the more a state interferes in the economy, the more it becomes autocratic and totalitarian in a political sense. States of command economies have more desires, tools and possibilities to disseminate their ideologies (religious or non-religious) and to make them more visible even by using force where necessary. Owning all schools, factories and other educational, political and economic institutions helps states to dictate doc-

trines, ideologies or faiths that they want to sanctify or perpetrate. Sometimes, this is seen via dictation of a religious identity by the state under the name of compulsory or elective-compulsory courses in state run-schools, or via deification of a leader. Thus, having owned the means of production, the state, through educational and communicative channels, can interfere and control the lives of those who are at the mercy of the state in terms of job opportunities, for example. In particular, throughout the 20th century it has been observed that states with command economies dictated certain commonly unquestionable values, doctrines, and teachings, or they sanctified a particular ideology or person for the sake of creating a homogenous society. To those undemocratic countries, shared sanctified values were necessary to hold together the entire community and to keep any kind of heresies from infiltrating society. Sanctification was used and considered a guarantee of social harmony. As McElroy summarizes:

(...) society would collapse into open violence without the cohesion provided by common values. Thus, those in authority needed to centrally plan and rigorously enforce the values that should be taught to and should be practiced by the masses. After all, if people were allowed to choose their own religious values, if values became a commodity open to competition, then civil chaos and conflict would inevitably ensue (1998, June 1).

By contrast, capitalism relatively prevents the accumulation of economic power in the hands of a few, and protects individuals from economic or political oppression by the political powers that be (Von Hayek, 1944: 46-48). In capitalism, human beings are supposed to be treated as independent individuals who are responsible for their own thoughts, personalities, works and products (Rand, 1986). If a state loses its control of the means of production, meaning losing its status of “boss”, it also loses the power of dictating any belief to people, intervening in their lives, or deciding what is good for them. Earning a living without needing the state’s mercy liberates individuals from state oppression. As the state gets smaller and

becomes less needed, it loses its power of imposing on people what to believe in, what to wear, or what to eat/drink.

For example, art is one of the areas in which capitalism has liberated individuals from the hegemony of the state, and has made state-supported common values less visible, if not irrelevant. According to Tyler Cowen (2008), artists have managed to stop living off the state (or the Church, for that matter) with the opportunities they get from capitalism. The increase in the number of potential buyers other than state or religious institutions, and the decrease in the price of tools that are necessary to make art have given artists the chance to be engaged with artistic production as and when they wish. The wealth and financial security supplied by capitalism has allowed artists to reject the imposed values of the state. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that bohemians, nihilists, and avant-gardists are products of capitalism itself. Likewise, when we look at the history of art and literature, it can be observed that artists, poets, authors, composers, and journalists have all to praise the state-supported doctrines, beliefs, and ideologies when the state controls the means of production or is powerful enough to impose certain values on society. In parallel, the 20th century has borne witness to some very deplorable tragedies, the deaths of a great number of intellectuals who criticized the state-supported or state-sanctified policies or institutions (Dal Lago, 1999; Berlin, 2000; Raw, 2011).

Conclusion

Capitalism is a fundamental pillar of the modernization process. In particular, economic development (one of the most important effects of capitalism) has played a vital role in the transition from a traditional society to a more modern one, most clearly illustrated in the history of Europe. Capitalism is a very powerful dynamic that can turn societies, characterized by collective consciousness, hierarchy, simple division of labour, homogeneous-small-isolated communities, and powerful customs and traditions, into societies

characterized by specialization, individualization, rationalization, advanced transportation, split-second communication, and mass production. With the proliferation of the capitalist relations of production, feudal systems and values slowly disappear. This process inevitably leads to a decline in the power and prestige of belief systems and traditional value judgments of pre-capitalist societies; in other words, all those feudal features lose their ability to influence society. Norman Barry (2002) explains that a traditional, conservative society, and all those institutions which thrive on keeping it alive, is in direct conflict with the spirit of openness and continuous mobility of the capitalist system.

However, it should be emphasized that the reason why capitalism seems to go hand-in-hand with secularization is not because there is a zero-sum relationship between capitalism and religion. Indeed, the withdrawal of religion from the social to the individual level in capitalist societies is not because people start to question their own beliefs and then decide to collectively move away from their faith. Far from it. In fact, people of whatever religious persuasion in capitalist societies might still spend all their money on building new temples, share their profit as alms, or in some other way be dictated in their behaviour by their own religious belief. But, when it comes to making money in a capitalist free market economy, they have no choice but to enter into a system in which secular rules dominate. They have to “act secularly” as it were in order to survive in that kind of economic system. The rules of capitalism do not allow for any spiritual teachings to take hold in the market. Indeed, by keeping its “this-worldly” focus alive, capitalism directs human attention, desires, wishes, and plans from a so-called “other world” towards “this world”. In capitalism, employer and employee are supposed to be neutral with respect to religion, and their religious attitudes are not expected to influence their economic activity.

As old religious habits begin to change, the frequency in which humans continue to involve themselves with religion becomes less

and less while education, shopping, music, travel, clothing and other areas of life become more secular. Still, this life transition should not be interpreted as irreligiosity. Being unable to keep up with the old religion-dominated, traditional patterns in the new life conditions that emerged in capitalism's aftermath does not necessarily mean moving away from religion in a conscious way. It is obvious that the reason why people have started to take out loans with interest to buy a house or a car, or for other practical reasons, is not because they have questioned their religious doctrines or some verses from their holy books, but for clearly practical reasons.

And thus, to sum up what has been discussed thus far, it can be argued that capitalism, whereby the means of production are tied to private property, indirectly restrains the social power of religion. Since most of the population becomes part of an economically active population in capitalism, religious influence will be overcome and it will lose its place in factories. The wealth and welfare that stem from capitalism will reduce dependence on absolute authorities, religious or other. As government loses its power to run or even influence the economy, its political dominance likewise will dwindle, so that its capacity to impose any value on society will become smaller. When all these are examined together, the underlying theme is that the capitalist economic system seems to have the capacity to restrain the power and prestige of religion, religion-like mechanisms, folk beliefs and superstitious beliefs at the social level.

THE ROLE OF URBANIZATION IN THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS

Although there is no subtitle "urbanization" in Bruce's secularization paradigm, almost all subtopics such as Social Differentiation, Structural Differentiation, Social and Cultural Diversity, Egalitarianism, Compartmentalization, and Privatization incorporate what I am about to discuss in this section.³⁰ My claim is that even though

30 These subtitles were discussed in Chapter II.

Bruce holds that his paradigm is only valid within a certain time frame (from the Protestant Reformation until the present day) and territory (West European countries and their offshoots), the correlation between urbanization and secularization, not unlike those between scientific developments and secularization or between capitalism and secularization, suggests that the paradigm's validity may encompass a wider geography.

The basic argument for such a link is very obvious: urbanization accelerates the secularization process by creating problems for religion, religion-like mechanisms and folk religions. That is, as urbanization increases, religion-based behaviour among people declines, while secular and rational solutions begin to replace religious regulations, values, and teachings. With urbanization, disenchantment with respect to anything beyond the physical increases, while the impact of religious identity on daily life decreases. In this section, I will discuss the theoretical framework for this correlation between urbanization and secularization. Therefore, firstly I will indicate how I use the concept of urbanization. Secondly, I will elaborate the discussion under three subdivisions as follows:

1. Mobility and Secularization;
2. Access to Different Alternatives and Secularization;
3. Privatization of Personal Life and Secularization.

Urbanization

Although there is no agreement (yet) among sociologists on how to define, let alone measure urbanization, I think that a general framework of urbanization could be set up using the following dynamics:

(...) the concentration of the population (...), a sharp reduction in both death rates and birth rates from traditional [previous] levels
 (...) the establishment of an effective, fairly centralized bureaucratic government, the creation of an educational system capable of training and socializing the children of the society to a level compatible with their capacities and best contemporary knowledge; and

of course the acquisition of the ability and means to use an up-to-date technology (Landes, 2003: 6).

To wit, change from illiterate agriculturalism to literate industrialism, increase in trade intensity, improved education, decline in infant mortality rate, rise in average life expectancy (Davis & Cassis, 1946: 186), swift application and utilization of newly developed technologies and mass communication tools (Wirth, 1938: 4-5), political and social order in which structural and social differentiations dominate, and the appropriate geographical conditions for all these dynamics to flourish might be counted as the core features of urbanization.

Unlike urban people, rural people often continue the family business like a profession. Their assets tend not to vary that much over the years. And so, their social status or class remains unchanged, such that they are more likely to remain within the social status or class of their ancestors. As custodians of the customs and traditions of the neighbourhood, elderly people determine the values and identities that individuals should possess by offering very detailed prescriptions that are often mingled with religion. Religion, traditions, and customs hold a very important place in the daily social life of rural people, especially those who have never travelled or moved elsewhere. In rural areas, how individuals should live and even die, what they should believe in, whom they should (or should not) marry, what they should eat, drink or wear, are issues which are generally dictated by religion, tradition and customs (Cox, 1965: 22). Religion, religious mechanisms, and supranatural or conventional beliefs are at the centre of rural life. However, when people begin to live in a more unconfined way, with more alternatives in almost every aspect of life compared to what they used to have in rural areas, and in private spheres that are free from traditions and customs and the dominance of religion, their lifestyle can become radically altered, thereby accelerating the secularization process.

Mobility and Secularization

Mobility can be understood as perpetual motion for the purpose of finding a better life. When it comes to urbanization, there are two forms of mobility. The first is migration from rural to urban areas. Due to rapid developments in technology, old modes of production are replaced by mechanization and factories. New agricultural machineries, like combine harvesters and cotton-picking machines, have led to a serious drop in the number of agricultural labourers needed in the fields. A combine harvester can reap the crops, separate kernels, and make straw bales by itself in a field of hectares. Likewise, a cotton-picking machine can collect by itself the same amount of cotton within a matter of hours that was used to be collected by a large number of people for days. Thus, technology-based machines can fairly quickly accomplish tasks that used to be done by many people.

By reason of increased mechanization coupled with the job opportunities that city life offers, the rural population has migrated to urban areas over the years. In addition, other factors have also pushed them towards the cities, such as being miles away from the nearest hospital, being more vulnerable to nature's devastating calamities, using very basic technology, continuously being oppressed by powerful traditions, having limited opportunities for socializing, not having free partner choice, scarcity or absence of educational institutions, and having little opportunities for self-actualization activities.

The second form of mobility occurs when urban people continually move within and between cities. Humans tend to change their place of living within or between cities in order to find a more convenient neighbourhood with respect to their financial situation or to be closer to businesses, or to educational institutions where they may want to enroll their children. Additionally, to get to their workplaces, millions of people have to make daily travels for long distances, especially in metropolitan areas. While in cities like İs-

tanbul, New York City or Tokyo, such daily travel may sometimes take more than two hours, people may have to drive for more than an hour in the mornings and evenings even in cities where transportation is easily available. Although this mobility phenomenon is nothing out of the ordinary for urban dwellers, this is not the case for those who are deprived of the most usual means of transportation, living far away from industrialization in places where they were born, always working and living in the same place and going to work on foot.

Furthermore, humans tend to be more mobile in urban areas for reasons of socializing, having fun, shopping, *etc.* Cities have become “outdoor malls” because of the new generations with very different lifestyles compared to their ancestors. On an average day, millions of people in different cities and countries go to shopping malls to shop or wander. On the other hand, people in rural areas buy their foods - if they do not grow them by themselves - from the nearest grocery; their clothes are sewn by some tailor in the neighbourhood, and their shoes are bought from the nearest shoemaker in the area. Or they have to visit city centres by making long trips several times in a year for those family needs.

In addition, structural changes in the business world also contribute to mobility. In the past, modern criteria such as “being in a condition to travel” or “having a driver’s licence” were usually not required. New technological developments necessitate ongoing training for people with jobs. For example, a very experienced plane technician, who has been working for more than twenty years, is required to get further training in another country due to new advances in the aeroplane sector. Firstly, such a person may have to travel to the city of Exeter in the UK to receive training in the electronics of the most recently produced Brazilian-made Embraer 170 and Embraer 190, and then from there to other world cities to undergo further training on the other parts of the plane. Conference halls of hotels, normally used for academic meetings, are

now taken up with the training programs of business firms. The new technologies and the increasing diversification of markets through competition, *etc.*, have rendered mobility and self-improvement a necessity even for those who already have a profession. Being promoted or finding a better job may bring along further mobility. On the other hand, mobility itself may in turn lead to promotion or a new and better job. And that is because moving to another district, city or country is one of the common consequences of joining a different company. In Turkey, for example, it is not uncommon for a bank supervisor in a big, vibrant city to move to a relatively small and dull town in order to secure promotion as a manager. Or, a second-degree audit commissioner in an insurance company in a big city may be assigned as a regional manager to a rather smaller city. It does not happen only in relatively small countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, but even in bigger countries like Turkey, that people have begun working in neighbouring cities on a daily basis. Between cities like Mersin-Adana, İzmit-İstanbul, Bursa-İstanbul, Ankara-Kırıkkale, İzmir-Manisa, Trabzon-Rize, Aksaray-Nevşehir, thousands of people make daily trips to work during weekdays as they do in Dutch cities.

Structural changes in the educational system have also led to people becoming more mobile. Millions of students now have to leave behind the place where they were born and raised to continue their education or otherwise improve themselves (e.g. internships). For the most part, they continue to live in another city within the same country or move to a different country for better opportunities. In addition, because of exchange programmes like Erasmus, Mevlana, Socrates, Farabi, or because of master's and PhD programmes either at home or abroad, even the short-term displacements of thousands of students in high education bring about an increased level of mobility.

It should be stressed that cities by their very nature render people more mobile through their airports, railway/bus stations, universi-

ties, economic centres, educational and training institutions, health and sports centres, subways, roads and all other facilities and infrastructures. So, how is the secularization process affected by mobility from rural to urban areas, or within/between urban centres as discussed above?

Three social changes that emerged with mobility further accelerate the secularization process:

1. Becoming more tolerant towards different ways of life;
2. Relative decline in the prestige of power groups or knowledge resources;
3. Increase in distances from holy places.

Becoming more tolerant towards different ways of life

A rural person (who has mainly communicated with people from the same village throughout his entire life) and an urban person (who has had the chance to meet people from different backgrounds) can be expected to have different degrees of tolerance towards different ideas and lifestyles (Harry, 1974). Encountering different cultures on a regular basis leads to people becoming less judgmental towards other cultures. Although a single culture may be generally dominant in rural areas, urban dwellers ought to learn that their cultures or standpoints need not be the same as those of their neighbours, colleagues and school friends. While almost everyone has the same belief system and performs the same religious rituals in rural areas, the city brings together people of different faiths and backgrounds. It should be stressed that although encountering people with different belief systems does not necessarily lead individuals to question their faith or doubt their religion, what is usually a single and unquestionable faith in a particular rural area is now only one out of a dozen in the city. Of course, the disinterestedness of others who do not believe in what we believe, who do not perform what we perform, or even have a different set of rituals, doctrines and teachings,

do not necessarily dissociate individuals from their own belief system or traditions. However, these kinds of encounters could make people realize that their unquestioned holy faiths, dogmas, rituals, and customs might not be “the one and only” universal truth.

This kind of mental change can be illustrated by means of a colour-metaphor. For example, if an individual is born into and raised up in a society where the colour blue is associated with goodness, honesty, incorruptness, love, and morality, then everybody (friends, family members, neighbours, *etc.*) will like the colour blue. It is often implicitly expressed that the reason why people in other lands are ignorant, depraved, immoral, corrupt and wicked is simply because they like colours other than blue. Therefore, disliking blue might lead to material and moral damages in such a community. In such an area, where the colour blue has indisputable prevalence, people of other colours will most likely be prevented from entering social settings. For example, they would not be allowed to get married with blue people or else they would be the subject of harsh gossip; and worse, they might even be forced to leave due to pressure from the blue people. Interestingly enough, blue people may well experience the same exclusion in other rural areas. For example, not being attracted to the colour blue may be a reason for exclusion from a rural community, while in other rural areas people may be excluded and exposed to ridicule or even subjected to physical violence if they are in favour of the colour blue. In this metaphor, colour is no longer just a colour in rural areas, for it represents an identity that is related to faith, traditions, customs, doctrines, teachings, *etc.*

Unlike the rural setting, the urban one may be depicted as a combination of different colours. Even if there is predominance of one particular colour due to the high number of people favouring it, this does not mean that differently coloured people cannot live there. As multiple colours can be found in the same city buildings, different shades of the same colour can be seen easily in the urban fabric, too. As love for a different colour (commitment to a differ-

ent belief system) cannot be the reason for being thrown out from one's apartment, the question of "which colour do you like most?" is not commonly heard when doing shopping in supermarkets, buying clothes, a house or car, making vacation plans or registering children at school. Commitment to a particular colour is not as decisive for one's daily functioning and activities in urban areas as it is in rural areas. While marriages in rural areas tend to be between people of the same colour, the urban one blends with different colours. Because of this, the number of marriages between different denominations is higher in urban areas compared to rural areas (Erdemir, 2004; Firat, 2005; Erdem, 2010; Balkanlıoğlu, 2012). The very dynamics of urbanization melts the strict rules of religion into thin air. There are thousands of people living in urban areas without knowledge of the rituals and/or old strict rules of their forefathers' religion or of their neighbours'. Interestingly, a similar transition can be observed for different ethnicities as well (Mitchell, Fu, Heaton & Jacobson, 2010; Schram, 2013: 141; Mutisya & Mutisya, 2015). The reason for the higher number of urban marriages between different ethnicities compared to rural areas is because different colours have been able to find a living space for themselves in the urban setting.

Relative Decline in the Prestige of Power Groups or Knowledge Resources

The second way in which mobility accelerates the secularization process is the relative decline in the prestige of power groups, institutions or knowledge resources compared to earlier times (Berger, 1967b: 9). Being mobile necessarily puts individuals through very intensive intellectual, economic and psychological transformations. As the process of mobility leads to the estrangement of individuals from their beliefs, communities or thought patterns (Salisbury, 1958: 198) which have sustained them for ages, their sense of belonging and esteem are naturally threatened by the mobility process. Thus, it is no coincidence that those who are against mobility are

likely to be conservative in outlook, faith, thought, and belief. The word conservative is not used only to depict religiously conservative people, but also to denote any individual or community that is opposed to change. Cox explains how conservatives tend to be against change throughout history:

The conservatives in the polis of Athens were right in their fierce opposition to constructing a port at Piraeus. They knew that mixed with the exotic products of foreign shores there would come strange people with exotic ideas which would shake their security. Virulent opposition to the building of railroads was voiced by the lords of the English establishment in the early nineteenth century, not just because railroads were loud or dirty, but because even lowly villagers would now travel to other towns. There they could not be kept from coming under strange influences since they would wander about without the normal social controls. Worst of all, it was argued, they would meet people who had never heard of their local squires. They would see their own towns in perspective and might lose all respect for traditional authority (1965: 65).

In other words, as long as small settlements are connected to each other in the countryside, worldlinization of landowners would occur. The story behind a Turkish movie directed by Atıf Yılmaz, *Kibar Feyzo* (1978), is based on such a transformation that took place in a Turkish village. Every time the main protagonist of the movie goes to other settlements, particularly in big cities, he returns to the village with new ideas. At the end of the movie, all villagers rise up against the landowners spurred by the ideas that were brought home by the main protagonist, Kibar Feyzo.

The years-long struggle of black Americans for equality can be considered another striking example of the impact of mobility on the dissolution and disintegration of the old order:

(...) the movement of large numbers of Negroes out of rural areas in the South and into urban industrial centers, plus the experience of thousands of young Negroes in the military service, supplied the indispensable social exposure which has resulted in the civil rights revolution. Negroes discovered that things did not have to be the way they were. Those who acted against oppression were young, and they were geographically and occupationally mobile. Their battles,

unlike those of the Civil War which took place at heretofore unknown villages (...) now took place in urban centers (...) Mobility had unlocked the cage (Cox, 1965: 66).

Therefore, it would not be wrong to claim that the struggle of urban black people, who were more mobilized compared to their families back home, is one of the main reasons behind the decomposition and disintegration of the old racist conservative structure in the USA, wherein blacks were seen as second class citizens, e.g. separate seats were reserved for whites and blacks, blacks could not use the same toilets as whites, *etc.*.

Increase in Distances to Holy Places

The third way in which mobility paves the way for secularization is the tendency among people to “grow away” from holy places where religion regenerates itself. In rural areas, holy places are not only very close to people in terms of distance, they are also used for different social events apart from worship. Holy places in rural areas, usually within walking distance, tend to be located relatively far away from people in urban areas. When it comes to countries like Turkey with its majority Sunni population, it might be asserted that there are mosques in every corner of every city with no big distances. However, my intention here is not only to denote “space” when I use the word “distance”: as S. S. Aquaviva (1960: 212) rightly states, the new lines of business and socializing opportunities that came with urbanization lead to people being able to spare less time for religious duties. The “daily” organization of urban life brings with it a certain limitation on the possibilities for an active religious life. For example, the long working hours due to very severe competitive working conditions, more (secular) opportunities to socialize after work, or being too tired to do anything apart from staying at home on the sofa, more non-religious courses for self-improvement (sports, music, art, yoga, tai chi, *etc.*) outside of work, spending more time with children even though having just one or two, change in

vacation perception, and so forth, have somehow forced the daily life of modern individuals to focus more on this world rather than on religion's other world.

Although the conditions in rural areas help individuals to maintain a religious lifestyle, mobility and other (secular) dynamics have reversed this situation in urban areas. What is more, going abroad (which has become a regular situation even for the middle class in developed or developing countries) often means that individuals can end up far from their holy places of worship. We should, however, point out that technological opportunities can, in some places, enable people to perform their religious duties more frequently. More comfortable and cheaper transportation, for example, enables more people to perform their duty of *Hajj*. Developments in transportation enable more Christians, in a similar way, to visit holy lands.

The fact that belief tourism is more attractive and popular than before is certainly associated with the developments in the transportation sector. However, an important question that should be answered appears at this point: Did the Muslims, who could not manage to fulfil their duty of *Hajj* in previous times due to the lack of technological means, consider this religious duty to be unimportant or not-worthy just because they had not enough money or the conditions did not allow them to perform it? Do people begin, specifically in terms of *Hajj*, to do something that they previously found unworthy to do, that they attributed no meaning before or even something that they were contrary to? Do, in other words, people who had an atheistic world-view before decide to perform the *Hajj* due to cheaper flight tickets or are these people who had already attributed importance to the duty of *Hajj*?

It is true that making pilgrimages with the help of technology by those who could not realize this visit to the *Hajj* may be considered one of the indicators of moving away from secularization. However, it has to be emphasized that the rise of flirtation rate due to technological advancements among children of families who were

against flirtation has a different weight with regard to the secularization discussion compared to the rise of *Hajj* visits due to ease of transportation among children of families who did not oppose such pilgrimages in the past. Because in the first case, premarital dating, which once was a disapproved form of behavior has become part of daily life with the changing technology. On the other hand, unlike premarital dating, performing *Hajj* was not forbidden or condemned in the past in Turkish society. In other words, the first case (hajj) is a continuation of religious beliefs in a different form, whereas the other example (dating) is a diminishing of religious influence in this specific field. In addition, when an answer was being sought as to what the secularization paradigm is, it was stated that it is not like synchronized swimming. As social changes take place, all components of societies do not have to move in the same direction and at the same rate. On the contrary, there might be social components which would evolve in a different direction during social changes. What we call social transformation is a new form provided by the social components which evolve in different directions.

Here, I do not mean an absolute disengagement or break, nor do I claim here that no one goes to mosques during the day to pray in urban areas. But the thing I would like to stress is that holy places are visited relatively less frequently in urban areas, which seems to run parallel to clerics losing their power to intervene in the daily lives of urban dwellers. However, this does not mean that urban dwellers necessarily lose their faith on account of the level of mobility they have to adopt. What should be emphasized here is that even for very religious people, the number of moments reserved for worship in urban settings tends to go down. The results of a survey under the theme, "What would you do with an extra hour every day?", carried out by the YouGov research company, which asked a number of questions to 1000 adults on behalf of *The Huffington Post* (Belkin, 2013, August 2) seem to support the point being made here. The number of people who say "I use my extra hour for religious issues"

is less than that of those who would use that extra hour to relax, sleep, cook, spend time with family or friends, do housework, make home repairs, do office work, watch television, play music, have sex, engage in athletic activity, study, *etc.* Actually “religious issues” do not even appear on the chart.

Thus far, I have examined how social changes that come with mobility can accelerate the secularization process under three headings. In sum, as Bruce (2011b: 560) puts it “increased social and geographical mobility, separation of work and home, decline of isolated local societies, increasing cultural diversity and the globalisation of knowledge make difficult the maintenance of any distinctive shared belief system.”

Having looked at mobility, I am now going to examine how having more alternatives with respect to just about every issue may cause a rise in secularization.

Access to Different Alternatives and Secularization

When an urbanite wants to watch a movie or go to the theatre, s/he will most likely have many options. The number of movie houses, plays and appropriate places will be far greater in an urban setting than in a rural one. Rural people must either go to the nearest urban centre or go to a cinema hall in their town in order to watch a movie. Similar cases can be observed with regard to educational institutions, markets, museums, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, sport centres, cafés, *etc.* Since the city offers a variety of facilities in almost every aspect of daily life compared to the rural area, the places where life regenerates itself are not confined to a limited number of options as it is in a rural area. It is no coincidence that the number of consanguineous marriages in rural areas is much higher than in urban areas, since individuals have fewer opportunities to socialize in rural areas, whereas in urban areas people have more chances to make friends or find their life partners among a variety of people.

Correspondingly, urban people get acquainted with different belief systems, faiths, religious groups and denominations (or non-religious ones) in cities. Urbanites have the chance to choose their faith from among a number of different alternatives, a choice that is more often than not unavailable to rural people. The freedom of choice that city life offers plays a crucial role in creating a new kind of consciousness. The faith that everyone has to accept unquestioningly in a rural setting becomes one of many alternatives in an urban setting (Dobbelaere, 1985: 382). For those who could not go to church in Muslim villages because there is no church or for fear of religious persecution, there are no such obstacles standing in their way when going to churches in an urban setting. If it is necessary to hide their belief, cities provide convenient conditions for that, too. Also, it is quite possible for a person who has never heard of the Jehovah's Witnesses before s/he migrates to an urban setting to become Witness of Jehovah within a few months in such a setting due to the rapid and widespread communication facilities that are available.

It could be claimed that changing one's belief system in favour of another religion is not a sign of secularization, since the individual is still said to be under the influence of another religion. However, secularization should not be confused with atheism or deism. What is important as far as secularization theory is concerned, is the softening up of religious identity which is supposed to be carried from birth to death, as is the case in a rural setting (Bruce, 1998: 229) up to a point where it becomes an entity that can be preferred or rejected. For instance, while apostasy might result in deaths from time to time in rural areas, it does not create problems in an urban setting unless the social role of people is jeopardized in such a way that they can no longer properly and effectively maintain their social roles. Contrary to the traditional social structure where family was the most fundamental unit of production, in modern societies there is a need for institutions and experts for the continuity of the huge

size of economic activity, formed together with industrialization, and modern city life. For that reason, more institutions and experts are available in modern cities for specific tasks and functions than there are in rural areas. And the faiths of these experts, e.g. doctors, lawyers, mechanics, teachers, barbers, restaurant managers, bank officers, etc., do not bear any importance for the continuation of social life if the experts are fulfilling their obligations. It is not which faith a doctor belongs to, but rather his/her competency that needs to be looked at, not which religion a lawyer belongs to but his/her success at cases in court, not which sect a baker belongs to but the quality of his/her bread is the yardstick.

Privatization of Personal Life and Secularization

In this dissertation, the phrase “private space” refers to the times and spaces outside working hours and work places where individuals can be on their own or become anonymous. Urbanization creates such private spaces that are relatively free from religious duties, sanctions, traditions, customs, pressure from neighbour, *etc.*. An urbanite has to continuously be in communication with other people in order to survive for most of her/his life. Until the end of working hours, everybody, irrespective of faith, background or culture, functions like the proper organ of a healthy living organism³¹ for the continuation and wellbeing of a wholesome urban life. However, after work, they have the opportunity to enjoy some private time for themselves.

In urban areas, individuals do not necessarily come together again in the evenings with someone they had met for professional reasons during the day. For a person who wants to get divorced, for example, what her/his divorce lawyer does after working hours is of no concern. That lawyer might be a gambler, a member of a very marginal sex group, a Satanist, a believer in the Flying Spaghetti

31 In a healthy living organism each organ fulfils its works no matter what they are doing. Likewise, in a proper urban life, each individual has to fulfil his/her works no matter what they believe in.

Monster, or a homosexual; neither it is possible to know for sure whether these are true nor do these identities of that lawyer make any sense if s/he is good at her/his job.

For urban life, if individuals fulfil their duties properly during the day, it is of no consequence what they believe in or what their religion is. For instance, a deeply religious restaurant owner may have an atheist customer. A company with a Christian owner may organize a deeply religious wedding ceremony for a devout Muslim couple. Individuals in a company may never know whether they will be part of a team led by a homosexual. A religious worker may receive orders from a deistic supervisor, or a religious client may consult someone whom s/he never shares anything with in daily life. Banks' lending rates, house-car prices, the prices of electronic goods, or the task that must be done within a certain time period do not depend on religious affiliation in a city. Religious belief relatively becomes irrelevant in the daily activities of urbanites.

On the other hand, people in rural areas are addressed in daily life by their names. Cheese is bought from Mr. Ahmet, watermelon is bought from Mr. Mehmet. In contrast, the number of sellers who are addressed by their name in an urban setting is considerably fewer. At the supermarkets, urbanites quickly pay and get their change back without needing to learn the details of the cashier's life; individuals even do not bother to say "good morning", "good evening", or "hi" when they go into places or take their leave.

Having a family connection other than by chance with the grocer or being the neighbour of the glassworker, electrician, mechanic, and serviceman who are called in for everyday problems is endemic to the rural setting. Getting into dialogue with the same people during both working hours and after-hours is not common for urbanites. As Louis Wirth (1938) points out, the level of relationship among people in urban settings is very impersonal, superficial, fragmented and temporary.

The question “Which family are you from?” is heard more often in a rural setting. Forasmuch, if it is known “from whom” a person hails, then this vital knowledge will provide an idea on whether that individual is reliable or belongs to the same community or whether s/he might be a good candidate for marriage, *etc.*, at the end of which the social borders will be determined. Since millions of people or at least hundreds of thousands live in cities where they ought to be always on the move or mobile, it is not meaningful to ask a person “which family do you belong to?” In an urban setting, information about professions, companies, education levels, neighbourhoods, football teams, girl/boyfriends and so forth is much more important than the question of family origin.

While an urban setting may convert social venues into private areas, even shops in rural areas are used as venues for socializing. Rural sellers and buyers become part and parcel of highly mechanical³² relationships even getting into the subject of family or personal issues. Highly private family issues, e.g. something shameful or dishonourable, are quickly heard in a rural setting. In addition, when an unknown car is parked in front of a coffee-house in a rural area, people in such an area would be keen to learn the identity of their visitor(s). Since any place is accepted as part of the public sphere, whoever gets into the village must be known immediately. On the other hand, it would seem meaningless to try to learn who passes by in the street outside when the next-door neighbour already is and remains unknown for urbanites.

Another way in which urbanization creates private spaces for people is that it is free choices, common interests and common pleasures that bring people together, rather than traditional or forced associations. Urbanites decide according to their own free will, while in rural areas the questions “with whom”, “how”, “where”,

32 The term “mechanical” is here used in a Durkheimian sense, meaning that clan-based strong sense of community in which there are the same or very similar beliefs, ethnic origin and social norms (Durkheim, 1893 / 2014).

“how long” to socialize are answered by traditions, customs, duties or family demands and requirements. People living in urban areas have less difficulty when they do not want to establish a dialogue with their neighbours. Indeed, they have less need for neighbours due to rising living standards in cities. People may not need much neighbourliness in settlements where many services (from basic foods to emergency services) are quickly accessed twenty-four hours a day on account of advanced technology; besides, because of cities’ extensive transportation network, close friends can be visited within a relatively short time in spite of being far away.

As such, this process inevitably leads to a decline in the number of cases in which neighbours would intervene in the daily lives of others. Therefore, by its very nature, the urban setting has rendered customs, beliefs, friends, and guests free from neighbours’ intervention. Since everybody is able to delve into the details of others’ lives in a rural setting, the amount and velocity of propagation, and the impact of “grapevines” are much bigger than in an urban setting. For example, while it would be very difficult for a person to invite his/her unmarried partner to spend the night together in a rural settlement (since such a case could even result in death, injuries or being isolated from the community), even next-door neighbours are not interested in visitors and prefer to have nothing to do with them in urban context. Private letters, court decisions, enforcement notices, *etc.*, might be talked about (or rather gossiped about) in rural living rooms shortly after or even before the real owners get them, while intrinsically such a case is not at all possible in the city.

Urbanites are very protective of their privacy vis-à-vis any incursions from traditions, religions, neighbours, customs, *etc.* –with the help of protection and opportunities that city life offers. Thus, it would be fair to say that while private and public spheres are intertwined in a rural setting, this is not the case in an urban setting where people are more protective of their own privacy. It should be added that religion-free laws also allow individuals to protect their

private spaces and to keep traditions, customs, religion or religious mechanisms out of their daily life if they want (Cox, 1965: 50-59).

Conclusion

I think Wilson's impressive article, "Aspects of Secularization in the West," could help us to summarize what has been discussed thus far about the function and power of religion in rural areas:

Religion is an agency of social control, a system of taboos and prescriptions, legitimated by reference to a supranatural order. (...) Control in social system depends on supranatural concepts (...). Religion subserves social cohesion, providing supranatural legitimation for the values men held in common, values they saw as characterizing their societal life. Religion helps to "objectify" those values, giving them the appearance of some supra-social authority. (...) Religion legitimates group ends and activities (...). And religion facilitates the expression of emotion, prescribing the circumstances and styles (...) (1976: 267-68).³³

Urbanization tends to undermine these functions and power of religion in three ways: by increasing mobility, by offering more alternatives in almost every aspect of life, and by creating and protecting religion-free private spaces. However, this dissertation in no way claims that there is a direct link between the level of urbanization and the number of atheists or irreligious people even if that is also a possibility. Rather, it should be noted that urbanization is responsible for rendering religion less visible and/or influential.

Therefore, the impact of urbanization on the level of secularization can be summarized as such: Urban life reduces the number of "moments" reserved for religion, and forces individuals to channel their energy from "the other world" to "this world" (Weigert & Thomas, 1970). A secular lifestyle can be made normal and familiar even for very radically religious people on account of the mass media and the widespread use of modern communication facilities. It becomes more and more difficult for any belief system

33 The expression in this passage is past tense in the original document.

to be powerful enough to represent every component of the urban setting. For social cohesion, not common values, but pluralism and tolerance have become the structural elements of systems, while the visibility of marginal groups has increased considerably (Harry, 1974). Urbanites make themselves available for secular spare-time activities rather than religious ones. Production and consumption patterns, coordination of everyday life, knowledge resources, methods of knowledge dissemination, *etc.* have become more rationally based and independent from religion in urban settings. It is not only religion but also social prestige, social influence and visibility of religious mechanisms, supranatural or conventional beliefs, mysticism, magic and astrology which have declined in importance in urban life. Religious authorities do not command the same respect in urban settings as they do in rural areas. Technology and scientific advances are more common and used more frequently in urban areas than in rural ones.

WHAT DOES THE EXTENDED SECULARIZATION PARADIGM NOT ASSERT?

What the extended secularization paradigm asserts has been examined in detail above. However, to avoid possible misunderstandings, it is necessary to briefly mention what the extended secularization paradigm does *not* assert. And that is what the present section, which has the following six subdivisions, is about.

1. The extended secularization paradigm is not limited to particular parts of the world.
2. The extended secularization paradigm is not a secularist or a progressivist ideology.
3. The extended secularization paradigm does not claim that the end point is atheism.
4. The extended secularization paradigm is not “synchronized swimming”.

5. The extended secularization paradigm is not based on the frequency of worship -or lack thereof- only.
6. The extended secularization paradigm is not relevant for only monotheistic religions.

I should note that the first and the fifth of these subdivisions are the only ones that are different from Bruce's paradigm. The others are extracted from his works.

1. The extended secularization paradigm is not limited to particular parts of the world

Bruce's paradigm is an attempt to clarify specific clusters of changes that occurred within certain time frames and geography. Historically speaking, the Protestant Reformation is invoked by Bruce to be the starting point, while geographically speaking his paradigm aims to explain what has happened to religion in Western Europe, and by extension, its North American and Australasian offshoots. Not unlike Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis, Bruce's attempt is confined to a particular geography and history, so that the secularization of other geographical regions and historical time periods as well as the reasons behind them are not dealt with. For Bruce, the validity of his secularization paradigm for European countries does not mean that the same process will necessarily accompany the modernization of other regions of the world.

When it comes to the secularization process of socially differentiated and industrial societies, Martin (1978) speaks of "particular historical circumstances" behind this transformation in his respected and well-known work, *A General Theory of Secularization*. More precisely Martin (1991: 467) argues that history does not hold a common fate for all societies, by saying that "under conditions A, B and C the phenomenon N is associated with Z, but under other conditions the association may disappear or be crucially modified". Likewise, Bruce's paradigm, which has been used to analyse the social transformation in Western Europe and its offshoots, cannot

be universalized to explain all the different experiences around the world, due in part to its starting point, the Protestant Reformation. His paradigm is neither a future projection, nor an all-encompassing explanation that covers every secularization process that takes place in any part of the world. In addition, there are scholars who claim that “secularization is a product of the conflict between the Church and the state in Western Europe and emphasize that an analogous situation has not developed in the Muslim world.” (Ceylan, 2004: 178).

By contrast, the extended secularization paradigm proposed in this study is an attempt to support the theoretical framework of Steve Bruce’s paradigm without the pretense that such a framework is one of natural laws. This extended theoretical framework claims that scientific advancements, industrial capitalism and urbanization may trigger secularization in any society regardless of the dominant religious culture, history or geography. However, the issue expressed here is not meant to suggest that all secularization processes around the world are the consequence of modernization. Of course, societies which have relatively become more secular deserve a separate study. The centerline of this study’s hypothesis does not stipulate that the only reason behind a secularized society is modernization; rather, it only suggests that the secularization of modernized societies is not a mere coincidence.

Alevi groups in Turkey are selected as the field of study. However, it should be noted that all societies, groups or countries experiencing the modernization process but did not have the Protestant Reformation in their history should also be included in the paradigm’s field of study. For example, Catholic Southern European Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and particularly their offshoots in South America like Brazil, Chile, Argentina etc. or Catholic countries in Central Europe like Austria, Poland and the Czech Republic or South-Eastern European Countries and countries in

Eastern Europe like Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Greece, Croatia, and Bulgaria all have the potential to be the field of this paradigm.

According to the paradigm, the dependency on absolute power, be it religious or not, is expected to be reduced if a country passes on to a free market economy from an economic structure where the state was completely dominant and as much as the current technologies can be applicable in modern urban life. For example, many countries in Latin America, which experience a relatively more modern life compared to the past, have also passed through a similar secularization process. According to the report issued by Pew Research Center (2014, November 13), it is suggested that there is decrease in religious practices, beliefs and memberships that extends all along the continent. The dominant religious belief in the continent, Catholicism, is in a rapid decline since the 1950s. According to this report, while at least 90% of the population of Latin American countries were Catholic five decades ago, this rate has decreased to 69%. In addition, the approval rates of abortion, divorce and gay marriage, which were once impossible within Catholic tradition, are rising. The rate of acceptance for gay marriage has increased to over 45% in major Latin American countries like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay. That means almost one in two of people on the streets defends the legality of gay marriage in societies where 90% of the population were Catholic. Sections related to birth control and divorces in this report are also important for demonstrating the ongoing secularization process:

Regardless of their assessments of whether change is occurring, many Catholics think some of their church's teachings should be revised. For instance, across Latin America, a median of 66% of Catholics say the church should allow Catholics to use artificial means of birth control, and in Chile, Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay, roughly eight-in-ten Catholics favor a change in church teaching on contraceptives. In the U.S., 72% of Hispanic Catholics think the Catholic Church should permit the use of contraceptives. There also is substantial support among Latin American Catholics (a regional median of 60%) for ending the church's prohibition on divorce.

Again, Catholics in Chile (82%), Uruguay (78%) and Argentina (77%) are among the most likely to voice support for change (2014, November 13: 23-24).

Mentioning the Pentecostal movement in Latin America, particularly after the 1950s, might be used to make objection to Latin secularization process. The Pentecostal movement is named as the most dynamic social movement in this region by researchers due to its rapid expansion (Gaskill, 1997; Gill, 1999). However, a contrary argument to this objection can be submitted based on three points. The first is that since the 1950s, the Catholic Church has decreased from 94% to 69%, while the rate of Protestants increased from 3% to 19%. That means increase in Protestants is not sufficient to compensate for the group that leaves Catholicism. The second contrary argument relates to the secularization definition given in this study. The definition of secularization in this study deals with the increase and decrease in the social impact of the metaphysical realm in people's daily lives, as well as with the change in the number of believers. Social force and beliefs are decreasing in daily life as seen in rising rates of divorce, abortion, gay marriage, pre-marriage intercourse. The third contrary argument is that the emergence of the Pentecostal Movement can also be construed as secularization due to the transformation in the nature of belief. Preferring another belief system at the expense of the parental belief that is supposed to survive from birth to death indicates very dramatic changes in the nature of belief. When it comes to belief, opting for preferable or selectable fact in place of the unquestionable and unchangeable situation is also one of the indications of secularization.

The question of whether the extended version of secularization paradigm can also provide an explanation for the transformations experienced in former Soviet Socialist republics and East-Central European countries emerges as an important field of study. However, it should be expressed that it does not seem possible to present a meta-narrative that provides a plausible explanation with regard to the secularization process for each country. Interestingly, some

countries experienced a religious revival after the collapse of communist regimes, while the speed of secularization increased in some others. Besides, although a sharp fall was seen in religious affiliation since some states encouraged secularization during the communist period, this process has not been experienced in the same way in all countries due to their own peculiar history. Alar Kilp states the following using data from the work of Steve Bruce (*Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory*) and data from the World Value Survey:

Between 1937 and 1980, the number of places of worship and the number of full-time clergy were doubled in Poland and earlier rounds of the WVS [World Value Survey] testifies to some increase of religiosity in Hungary during the 1980s. In other societies (e.g. Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovenia), the levels of religiosity were decreasing during Communist period and the same trend also continued after the collapse of Communist regime (2009: 206-207).

Religion is a body of paradigm that influences daily practices, moral values, and ontological problems of a society, as well as their perception of social norms through metaphysical references in traditional societies. Answers for such issues are sought also in modernizing societies, and this time it is not only religion or the traditional world view but secular-rational values are also used to give plausible answers to those issues. The usual indicators of this value change are related to the increasing levels of justification for abortion, divorce, homosexuality, euthanasia, and suicide among the general population. While abortion and homosexuality were not accepted traditionally in Christian societies, and were even considered a crime until very recently, religious authorities also asserted that people who had abortion and/or who are homosexual are sinners. In the 19th century, there was no divergence between the societies of Europe on these issues. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the proportion of the population that never approve divorce, euthanasia and casual sexual relationships is higher in East-Central Europe (ECE) compared to the modernized Western Christian so-

cieties of Europe (WEST) (Kilp, 2009: 217). Similarly, the average disapproval rate for homosexuality is 54.4% in ECE and 26.4% in WEST.

Contrary to contemporary liberal societies where the freedom and happiness of individuals are a priority, totalitarian communist states gave priority to surrounding and inclusionary ideological doctrines rather than the freedom of individuals. And after some time, this doctrine transformed into a structure similar to religion, that is, it became unquestionable, touched every aspect of life, and became sacralized in these countries. The existence of scientific atheism in Soviet Russia can be an example of this. Paul Froese here explains how scientific atheism is consecrated by the state:

Atheists waged a 70-year war on religious belief in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party destroyed churches, mosques, and temples; it executed religious leaders; it flooded the schools and media with anti-religious propaganda; and it introduced a belief system called "scientific atheism" complete with atheist rituals, proselytizers, and a promise of worldly salvation. (...) Scientific atheism, the official term for the Communist Party's philosophical worldview, posited the ultimate purpose of human existence, a moral code of conduct, and created a collection of atheistic rituals and ceremonies that mimicked religious ones. In addition to developing this ersatz religion, Soviet officials heavily promoted scientific atheism. The doctrine was taught in schools, advocated in the media, and emphatically propagandized in books, posters, the arts, holidays and celebrations. Convinced atheists could join atheist organizations and meet on a regular basis in lieu of church participation; the primary atheist organization was the League of Militant Atheist which was active prior to World War II and later replaced by the Knowledge Society. All in all, scientific atheism was omnipresent in the daily lives of communist citizens. Atheist propaganda and rituals in combination with the brutal repression of Russian religious groups produced an atheistic "church" similar to a state-supported religious monopoly (2004: 36).

Russia constitutes an interesting example with respect to secularization discussions. After 70 years of state-imposed atheism, in the last 25 years there has been an increase both in the number

of Orthodox Churches and people who consider themselves as believers (Evans & Northmore-Ball, 2012: 795). According to public opinion polls conducted in 1991, 63% of Russians defined themselves as atheist, and 28% defined themselves as Orthodox Christian. Since then, that is to say from the beginning of the 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of people who are bound to a religion group except atheists. When we come to 2010, the number of atheists has decreased by 8%, while 75% of the population began to define themselves as Orthodox Christian (Kulkova, 2014: 3).

In order to discuss whether (or not) the extended secularization paradigm can explain any transformation experienced by a society with respect to its sacred values, first of all the tripods (science, industrial capitalism, urbanization) of the paradigm need to be analyzed with respect to their realization in that country. It is not a coincidence that by consecrating its own doctrine as was the case in the former Soviet Union, there was no free market economy and the state held such absolute power.

Specific to post-communist countries, the changes and transformations experienced recently will supply important data with respect to secularization discussions. With increase in the level of modernization and elimination of the underlying structure that allowed the state to consecrate any social values, it might pave the way for a new lifestyle with respect to the metaphysical realm. It will be the subject of highly charged discussions in the future, where a culture, which emerged because of the collectivist communist regime and lower degree of modernization, tends to evolve after structural transformation.

For example, the status of Slovenia, which had the most developed economy amongst post-communist countries at the end of the 20th century, can make a contribution to the paradigm. During census studies conducted in 1991 and 2002 in Slovenia, the number of Catholics in Slovenia was observed to have decreased from 71.36% to 57.80%. At the same time, the number of atheists increased from

4.35% to 10.10% (Sturm, 2004: 608). Besides, on social mores in Slovenia, Kilp has this to say:

The value orientations of Slovenians are closer to the post-industrial societies of WEST [Western Christian societies of Europe] than the usual orientations of post –communist realm. Among Slovenes, the level of those who find abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, divorce, having casual sex, and adultery “never justifiable” is always lower than the average of the ten post-communist societies (2009: 221).

Additionally, Norris and Inglehart (2008: 127) also point out that people who have higher living standards and better educational qualifications in post-communist countries give less importance to religion in their lives. In particular, they examined the various levels of secularization experienced in the Czech Republic/Estonia and Romania/Albania. Norris and Inglehart claim that the higher level of secularization in the Czech Republic and Estonia compared to Romania/Albania, seem to depend on human and economic development levels.

However, it should be reiterated that such an extended secularization paradigm is not supposed to give a plausible explanation for all secularization cases around the world. It is only used to explain the transformation in modernizing societies, i.e. societies that are being confronted with industrial capitalism, scientific advances, and urbanization. Therefore, the secularization or desecularization processes of societies that are far beyond the modernization process do not belong to the field of this study.

2. The extended secularization paradigm is not a secularist or a progressivist ideology

Scholars like Cox, Hayden and Stark see the secularization paradigm as an Enlightenment project. To ground their claims, they refer to the founding fathers of sociology like Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx, Weber and Durkheim, or to the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud. However, the interesting part in this story is that since the 1960s,

secularization theorists have not referred to those founding fathers of sociology or psychoanalysis in order to ground their claims. At the very least, well-known scholars like Bruce and Wilson have not taken Saint-Simon, Comte or others as a reference point to support their claims. Neither Wilson nor Bruce talks about heathenized societies when they explain what the secularization paradigm is. Neither of them claims that a good endpoint for society ought to be atheism, as Saint-Simon and Comte did. On the contrary, we do not find a single sentence by these scholars in support of the idea that a secularized society is more peaceful and happier than a less secular one. The secularization paradigm does not assert that the secularization process will lead society to attain a higher level *qua* society. To claim that societies, wherein the social prestige and social influence of religion have relatively waned, become *de facto* better than less secular ones, or to defend the idea that the more a society becomes secular, the more it is happy and enjoys the peaceful conditions of life, are not the assertions made by the secularization paradigm. On the contrary, Wilson, being one of the more well-known proponents of classical secularization theory, argues in no uncertain terms that the paradigm itself is not progressive and that even secularization might lead to people feeling restless or agitated:

(...) Because such developments [the breakdown of local community and the rise of civic arena in which an individual may escape the social control of being a known person, and in which moral-virtue turns into a private preference] facilitate a variety of criminal or antisocial behavior, such breakdown of moral control leads inevitably to the threat of more oppressive measures for the maintenance of public order. Modern governments, even in the most liberal states (perhaps especially in the most liberal states), contemplate or institute such devices as data retrieval systems, video monitoring of public space, the electronic tagging of offenders, "three-strikes" convictions, reimpositions of visa requirements for migrants, curfews, boot camps, zero tolerance, and the like (2000: 46).

The secularization process does not inevitably lead to a happier, safer, or better world. On the contrary, the social support derived

from religion might still be very critical for individuals. The belief and faith in the existence of a god, and feeling the need for it, may bring a sense of relief, inner peace and happiness, at least to some. In addition, religion may contribute to social integration with the perception that it enables people to understand social and even natural phenomena, and could thus play a crucial role in the regulation of social relations (Akyüz & Çapcıoğlu, 2005).

To sum up, the aim of the secularization theorists is just to pin down the spectacular transformation related to society and religion. Whether they personally support or oppose secularization as such, does not make their paradigm an ideology. For example, if there is an increase in the number of cars in a given society, the duty of a sociologist is to reveal why and how this transformation has come about. However, an endeavour as such does not render that sociologist a proponent of a society with lots of cars. In fact, due to environmental problems or other reasons, s/he, as an individual, is more likely to go against such a transformation. But as a sociologist, s/he would not hesitate to put a name on this transformation regardless of whether s/he likes it or not. In other words, scholars who defend the secularization paradigm are not necessarily secularists, nor do they claim that secular societies are preferable. Whether secularization is morally good or not is a subject for other fields than sociology.

3. The extended secularization paradigm does not claim that the end point is atheism

The extended secularization paradigm does not anticipate atheism as the end point of modern societies, nor does it assume that everybody will have a secular disposition by the end of the day. It does not predict that individuals will abandon or cease to hold on to their religion. What the extended secularization paradigm asserts is that religion loses its power and prestige that enables it to interfere in social life as capitalism, urbanization and science permeates and influences daily life. We are not talking here of the death of religion

due to the secularization process. Of course, as Bruce (2002: 43) claims, the decline in the social significance of any ideology, belief system or cult may, in turn, reduce the number of individuals who are attached to it. Bruce believes that “ideologies that lose relevance will also lose plausibility,” and because of the secularization process, he expects “the proportion of people who are largely indifferent to religious ideas to increase and the seriously religious to become a small minority” (2002:43). But the defenders of such a paradigm neither expect, nor claim that religion will vanish. The secularization paradigm neither hypothesizes, nor envisages an end point. It merely aims to provide a plausible explanation for the questions of why religion has lost its power and prestige in this modern world, and why religious men and women cannot persuade societies anymore about public-related issues as they once did.

4. The extended secularization paradigm is not “synchronized swimming” (Bruce, 2002)

Synchronized swimming (water ballet) athletes perform a synchronized routine of intricate moves in the water. They try to produce the same movements in split-second accuracy with the same artistic values. However, the secularization paradigm does not claim that societies under modernization secularize within the same time frame, in the same way, at the same speed, or in every minor detail, like synchronized swimmers. Besides, the paradigm does not assert that individuals in modernizing countries become secularized in the same manner, within the same time period, or to the same degree. For instance, immigrants’ relatively charged religious lifestyles in any modern country should not be seen as a rejection of the secularization paradigm. Likewise, if a radical religious sect emerges or if several thousand people become member of a radical religious group in a modern or modernizing society, this does not falsify the secularization paradigm either. People do not become secularized simply because they now live in a modern society. Immigration, civil

war, severe economic crises, natural calamities and the like should also be taken into consideration, since they have the potential to greatly influence an individual's connection to religion. Therefore, it would not be fair to claim that the secularization process occurs in a synchronized way, or that immigrants must lead a fruitful secular life as far as migration is concerned. What seems crucial at this point is that the parameter to be analysed at first glance is the difference(s) between generations within the same community. For as far as the different communities within the same society are concerned, "who affects whom" should be the question to ask when trying to understand the secularization tendency. Bruce neatly explains this:

It is in the nature of sociology to seek the general social changes that explain whatever interests us. We should never forget that such perceived changes are abstractions created by colour-washing the jagged edges of events in the real world. That, on close acquaintance, the history shows that things could have been very different is not a refutation of the secularization paradigm; it is merely the normal relationship between history and sociology. The jagged bits are a problem only if it can be plausibly argued that a different abstraction can be better drawn from the same material. If there are too many exceptions, then we should consider painting "growth" or even just "random fluctuations". But some small reversals need not trouble the paradigm (2002: 40).

5. The extended secularization paradigm is not based on the frequency of worship –or lack thereof- only

The rate of frequenting a church and the increase in the number of believers or disbelievers are considered significant, sometimes unique, parameters to measure secularization in the literature related to secularization in the Christian world. For instance, Grace Davie (2002: 6-7) presents Table A9 and Table A10 in her arguments about secularization in Europe in her book *Europe: The Exceptional Case*.

Table A9. Frequency of church attendance in West Europe
1999/2000 (some examples) %

	Once a week	Once a month	Special occasions	Never
European Average	20,5	10,8	38,8	29,5
Catholic Countries				
Belgium	19,0	9,0	25,3	46,6
France	7,6	4,3	27,8	60,4
Ireland	56,9	10,5	22,8	9,7
Italy	40,5	13,1	32,5	13,9
Portugal	36,4	14,9	33,5	15,2
Spain	25,5	10,5	32,5	31,5
Mixed Countries				
England	14,4	4,5	25,3	55,8
Germany	13,6	16,5	41,2	28,8
Netherlands	14,5	11,2	28,1	46,1
Northern Ireland	48,5	14,9	16,9	19,8
Lutheran Countries				
Denmark	2,7	9,2	45,4	42,7
Finland	5,3	8,8	59,8	26,2
Iceland	3,2	8,8	55,6	32,3
Sweden	3,8	5,5	90,5	0,2
Orthodox Countries				
Greece	22,3	20,9	53,9	2,8
Data supplied by European Values Study, University of Tilburg				

Table A10. Extent of religious belief in West Europe 1999/2000
(some examples) %

Belief in:	God	Life after death	Heaven	Hell	Sin
European Average	77,4	53,3	46,3	33,9	62,1
Catholic Countries					
Belgium	71,4	45,6	33,5	19,3	44,1
France	61,5	44,7	31,2	19,6	39,8
Ireland	95,5	79,2	85,3	53,4	85,7
Italy	93,5	72,8	58,7	49,0	73,2
Portugal	96,4	47,3	60,0	37,8	71,2
Spain	86,7	49,9	50,8	32,9	51,2
Mixed countries					
England	71,6	58,3	55,8	35,3	66,9
Germany	67,8	38,8	30,9	20,1	41,3
Netherlands	61,1	50,1	37,4	13,8	39,7
Northern Ireland	93,2	75,1	86,6	73,9	90,4
Lutheran Countries					
Denmark	68,9	38,3	18,4	9,5	20,6
Finland	82,5	56,7	61,4	31,4	67,1
Iceland	84,4	78,2	58,7	17,5	64,3
Sweden	53,4	46,0	31,2	9,4	25,7
Orthodox Countries					
Greece	93,8	59,2	59,1	52,6	83,3
Data supplied by European Values Study, University of Tilburg					

Davie, like many other sociologists and theologians in the Western world who have written extensively on the secularization of the Christian world, considers that the rate of frequenting churches, the number who believe in God, in the existence of Hell and Heaven, and life after death are significant criteria to measure the degree of secularization. To criticise Stark, almost all the statistical information that Bruce (2001) included in an article was about church membership or church attendance. Even though the argument that “the rates

of church attendance should never be taken into consideration” is not actually and specifically advocated in this dissertation, it is argued here that taking primarily into account the rates of church, or mosque, or synagogue, or temple attendance (worship) may not supply adequate data to be able to properly appraise the issue of secularization.

All parameters that are likely to provide an impression of the social transformations should absolutely be taken into account in any discussion about secularization. However, that an emphasis is given to the frequency of worshipping or the carrying out of other religious rituals in order to measure the rate of secularization in countries where the majority of the population identify themselves as Christians, brings into focus the problem of using the same method for other religious groups.

In the case of Turkey, for instance, increases-decreases in the worshipping rates of Muslims or changes based on the numbers of atheist-deist people should not be given priority in discussions about secularization. While church attendance and the belief in God can be comprehensible for Christians in this sense to a certain extent, we need parameters for Muslims that are different from the one measuring the frequency of attendance at places of worship. The existing differences between Christianity and Islam in terms of exercising an influence on daily life practices come to mind as the first reason. While Islam tries to influence daily life in all its facets by means of the authority of the Qur’ān, the sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*), and *fatwas* issued by Islamic scholars, contemporary Christianity exercises less influence on the social life of its adherents.

What should be put under the microscope is the extent to which Muslims attending the Friday prayer complies with the rulings of Islam during the remaining six days 23 hours; whether they take reference to their religious belief in their choice of friends, spouse, profession or a town as place of residence; whether, and to what extent, they conduct themselves in compliance with the regulations of Islam in terms of dressing, food and beverages, sexuality or whether

they arrange their conduct in line with Islamic rules to a greater or lesser degree compared to the past (the past of the individuals and their family). Because individuals who never perform the ritual prayer of Islam can come under the influence of religion in different spheres of their life; religion can play a role in marriage, school choice, or relations within the family. Conversely, individuals who perform the ritual prayer every day and fasts for one month during Ramadan, can still be part of a relatively secular lifestyle.

It cannot, of course, be argued that the worshipping rate is thus a parameter of less importance, not suitable to be used in this sense. On the contrary, it is clear that the frequency of worship can give some clues in certain matters. However, it may hinder us from obtaining sound results if we take frequency of worship or changes in attendance in sacred places as the primary indicator of secularization, in the way sociologists who strive to give a picture of the secularization process in the Christian world have tried to do.

6. The extended secularization paradigm is not relevant for only monotheistic religions

Some sociologists of religion, who claim that the paradigm of secularization has lost its validity, assert that the influence of religion has increased rather than decreased when it comes to Europe. They say that Europe in the Middle Ages was not so religious as is commonly presumed. Europeans were in the dark about religion in the Middle Ages and people attended churches not primarily out of motivation (Stark, 1999). However, the position of the Church in the Middle Ages was powerful enough even to initiate war; people were judged and tortured by Inquisition courts; powerful popes could crown kings; thousands of people were killed by churches during the so-called witch hunting; people notified their neighbours to authorities on grounds that they did not live in accordance with the norms of Christianity; art was monopolised by the Church; philosophy regarded as a discipline put at the disposal of the Church to prove

the existence of the Christian God instead of being a discipline that took interest in every sphere of life in the Middle Ages; there was an environment where a religious institution represented the whole of society and there was no liberty of religion (McCabe, 1916; Sharkey, 1950; Perry *et al.*, 1989; Hamilton, 2003).

All these assertions give us a rather different picture than the one Stark and others used in their arguments. Nonetheless, let us assume that Stark is right in his claim, namely, that Europe is equally religious in the 21st century in comparison to the Middle Ages. In other words, let us accept that Christianity was not as powerful in the Middle Ages as often supposed, and that communities in Europe did not attach so much importance to religion, contrary to the picture we now paint of it. In fact, that does not refute the claim constructed around the paradigm of secularization. Because the argument of Stark *et al.*, that the paradigm of secularization is not related to “religion” but to Christianity, is an unfortunate one. In fact, secularization is not only about the decrease in the power of Christianity or other monotheistic religions at the communal level. At the same time, secularization also focuses, as a sphere of interest, on the pagan rituals touching on the polytheistic and multi-symbol daily life of the peoples in Europe stemming from Pre-Christian periods and continuing within Christianity. If, as Stark puts it, only Christianity springs to mind when it comes to religion, in this case, people who lived before Jesus Christ was born, should have been secular individuals. If we limit the notion of religion only to religions established by those descending from the Prophet Abraham, in this case, we would ignore hundreds of, small or large, spiritual belief systems and ways of life such as Hinduism, Paganism, Shamanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Shintoism, Sikhism and Bahaim that had gained a place in the world in the past or are still prevailing in some societies today. In order to negate the paradigm of secularization, those who claim that “The Middle Ages weren’t a Golden Age for Christianity” should examine the religious beliefs

(other than Christianity) that prevailed at the time in Europe in terms of their influences on societies.

Folk and superstitious beliefs have also considerably influenced life in human societies for hundreds if not thousands of years alongside belief systems. The belief in the existence of goddesses and gods, believing that witches can have an influence on daily life, deification of fire, water, land and air, organising festivals on days in which people believed that gods and goddesses got married, rituals where a new-born child bites a lamb's ear, crossing fingers, spending large amounts of one's income on fortune telling, avoiding whistling and cutting nails at night, carrying a charm to bring good luck, avoiding black cats by ascribing them bad luck, avoiding walking under ladders, avoiding passing a scissors or a knife from hand to hand, avoiding handshaking through an open door, attaching a piece of cloth to the tombs of saints or on the branches of a tree, throwing money into pools, pouring molten lead into water, wearing a talisman, writing wishes on a piece of paper or keeping money in a purse and not spending it so that it becomes more and more during Hıdırellez festival, placing garlic or black cumin under the bed of a woman bearing a child, riding on a swing at a certain time of the year in the belief that it makes one healthier, showing money towards a full moon to become rich, mixing water and salt to get purified from evil spirits, summoning spirits by means of a cup of coffee or another method, and hundreds of other rituals are miscellaneous forms of the supranatural. A decrease in the visibility and influence of such beliefs ranks among the focal points of the discussion about secularization. Instead of Islam, Christianity or other Abrahamic religions, a person can deify and worship fire and regulate his/her daily life in accordance with the relation s/he establishes with fire. Such a practice does not render that individual more secular than a faithful Muslim or Christian.

Sometimes, the paradigm of secularization can also include, apart from beliefs that people profess to have, the deification of an

earthly leader. Some world leaders have been or are being deified, sublimed, ascribing them a superhuman character. People they lead see such leaders as superhumans who never do evil, make no mistakes, and do not have any human fancies or pleasures. Such leaders can sometimes be given a status that is more sacred and important than the prophets of orthodox religions. Their words can also be passed from one generation to the other just like the verses of a holy book. People can believe, without time limitation, that the inspirations of these blessed leaders can provide remedies to all kinds of social problems. Additionally, legal sanctions can be imposed or social pressure can be exerted to prevent that the status of these leaders ever be brought into question.

There are more similarities than differences between a prophet and a holy book sent to him, on the one hand, and Mao Zedong and his Red Book, on the other. The power Mao and his Red Book exercised at the social level in the time of Mao was superior to that of an earthly leader. Being in a sort of trance, the Chinese wished that their leader should live “ten thousand years” more. It is the outcome of the same motive when Chinese taxi-drivers put up Mao’s picture in their cars to “bring them good luck” and “protect them”, while Muslims, on the other hand, put up the Qur’ān or an amulet in their vehicles. That Mao was a leader in this world and Qur’ān was sent from another world does not render the Chinese, who deified Mao, more secular. And that is because old gods can make place for new ones and religion can gain a place in our lives in different forms and systems (Crippen, 1988).

At this point, the position of Atatürk in Turkey should also be put under the microscope more carefully. The motivation of people who fancy seeing the Arabic script of the word Allah in a tomato, on the skin of a sheep or cow, on the shell of an egg, in a walnut, on the ear of a baby, or on the rind of a water-melon, and then think that it is a miracle, and the feelings of hundreds of thousands of people who go to the city of Ardahan every year between the 15th of June and 15th of


July in the hope of seeing the silhouette of Atatürk on the Mountains of Damal, standing to attention in the shade of the mount as if they were performing a duty of pilgrimage, and asserting that it is a miracle, a message from supranatural powers to their country – all these are also to be handled within the discussion of secularization.



Picture A4: Atatürk on a mountain

Source: Uludağ Sözlük

<http://www.uludagsozluk.com/r/atat%C3%BCrk-%C3%BCn-izinde-ve-g%C3%B6lgesinde-damal-%C5%9Fenlikleri-288758/>



Picture A5: Allah in a tomato

Source: Uludağ Sözlük

<http://www.uludagsozluk.com/k/%C3%BCzerinde-allah-yazan-domates/>

Some of the poetry written for Atatürk is also similar in this sense. The following quotation is a passage from the renowned poem by Kemalettin Kamu titled *Çankaya*:

Kaaba be for Arabs,

Çankaya³⁴ suffice for us!³⁵

Ka'aba (the centre of pilgrimage for İslam) and the place where Atatürk resides bear the same import for the general public. On the other hand, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, another poet, grants Atatürk the character of a creator in his poem *The Nation on Duty*:

Creator, Oh Creator!

Not four years, not a thousand years

³⁴ Where Atatürk lived.

³⁵ In Turkish: "Kabe Arab'ın olsun, Çankaya Bize Yeter".

can extirpate your flame in us
 your voice just like a gleam carrying us away!
 Oh eternal blue ocean!
 Lying there in a piece of marble,
 in a handful of soil.³⁶

Another example in this sense is a poem titled *To the New Parliamentarians*, also written by Çağlar:

Those not bowing in the [Atatürk's] Mausoleum
 will be shocked, plump down, fall flat, one day.³⁷

These are all expressions that are used for people with religious character. All these examples show that Atatürk represents a perfect, almighty, supreme, supranatural and divine personality for a certain social segment in Turkey. For this reason, if we speak about “a secularization process of Turkey ongoing in recent years”, we should also underline that it does not only concern the social power and prestige of the religion of Islam, but also of Kemalism. Discussing the divine character of Atatürk fancified in a religion-like structure, secularising him and starting to criticise him in terms of his human weak points, mistakes, ideas and reformations in a peaceful atmosphere are all part of the secularization process. The same argument applies to Mao Zedong in China. The decrease in power and prestige of a person, who is dressed up and divined like a prophet in a structure well resembling a religion, in terms of influencing and directing a society, can mean social secularization, at least as it is defined in this thesis.

36 In Turkish: Yaradan hey Yaradan!, Dört yıl değil bin yıl geçse aradan, Sensin ateş diye kanımızdaki, Sesin ışık diye önümüzdeki! Ey yanımızdaki, Beş on mermere, bir avuç toprağa sığan, Sınırsız mavi umman hey!

37 In Turkish: “Anıtkabre gidip de yürekten baş eğmeyen, Günü gelir çarpılır, düşer, yere serilir.”

Conclusion

The secularization paradigm is based, primarily, on the assumption that scientific developments, capitalism and urbanization cause a decrease not only in the influence of religion, but also in religion-like mechanisms, superstitious beliefs and beliefs based on folkloric traditions. All these should lose ground in such a process:

This is what is at the heart of the secularization thesis. What is required in the contrast between the past and the present is that there be an identifiable differences between then and now in the popularity and salience of beliefs, actions, or impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose" (Bruce, 1997: 679).

This is the core of the paradigm that, in my opinion, can be not only preserved, but also, if revised, expanded.

However, making clear what the paradigm is all about can sometimes not be sufficient to clearly define the desired stance. For this reason there was also the need to underline those points that the paradigm did not advocate. While Steve Bruce uses the secularization paradigm to specify the relationship between religion-society-modernization within a specific time interval and a specific region, the extended secularization paradigm is not limited to a specific time or region. Furthermore, neither it is a secularist nor a progressivist ideology. It does not consider atheism an end point for modern societies and does not assert that modernizing societies secularize within the same time frame, in the same way, at the same speed, or in every minor detail. For this paradigm, frequency of worship should not be the only parameter to measure the degree of secularization. Finally, besides other religions as well as monotheistic religions, deification or transcending of worldly "things" should also be taken into consideration.

In the following part of the study it will be illustrated whether the paradigm defined in the theoretical part can empirically provide an insight into the transformation that the Alevi communities in Turkey have experienced.

PART B

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL STUDY

The extended secularization paradigm is based on the idea that there is a non-accidental and direct correlation between modernization and the level of secularization in society. The paradigm claims that the diffusion of modernization, comprising three developments, viz. scientific development, capitalist economic structure and urbanization restrains the power of religion, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms, and superstitious beliefs at the social level. Alevi communities in Turkey were chosen as a case study for this extended secularization paradigm. Essentially, the purpose of this study is to examine secularization in the context of Turkish society. However, such a study could have caused serious problems with respect to the population, sample compliance and budget. Therefore, focusing on a non-Protestant religious subgroup in Turkey was much more convenient for the purposes of this thesis. It would have been also possible to prefer Sunnis over Alevis, but as Sunni-Islam is the official religion of the Turkish state, it is compulsorily taught in schools in Turkey and the number of followers is in the range of tens of millions, selecting Sunnis would also have challenged the limitations of the thesis in terms of budget, population and sample relationship. Although Alevis constitute a much smaller group than

Sunnis, they constitute the second largest religious subgroup within the country.

Alevism is not only a belief, but is expressed mostly as an identity based on its own history. The Alevi massacres that happened both in the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey in the 20th century have made them very sensitive about their identity. Alevis who have been forced to learn Sunni beliefs in compulsory religion classes at school, held on to their beliefs behind closed doors for years. They have been humiliated based on whispers in the social arena about having incestuous relationships and not having family bonds.³⁸ Their existence had not been acknowledged by the state until the beginning of the 21st century, and these social dynamics have made Alevis extremely sensitive about their identity. On the other hand, Alevis live in different regions of the country which provided a convenient environment to distinguish between generations in these structures and to understand social changes from the past to the present.

For the aforementioned reasons, I use a qualitative approach and conduct fieldwork research. Fieldwork, as part of ethnographic study, is one of the main methods used in the social sciences today, particularly for the discipline of anthropology and sociology. Although the concept of ethnography does not have a standard usage, it has extensive overlap with these labels: qualitative inquiry, fieldwork, interpretive method, and case study (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007). Examining “behavior that takes place within specific so-

38 The basis for the accusation voiced against Alevis is their Cem worship (Ayin-i Cem). Because in Cem worship, Alevis conduct worship together as women and men. Historically, Alevis who had supported the Safavid State against the Ottoman Empire were seen as dissidents in Ottoman Society following the defeat of the Safavid State at the Çaldıran War (1514 AD) and they were obliged to continue their existence as closed community in places far away from the centers. Living as a closed community, not including those who do not belong in their worship, and participating in these worship services together as women and men have led to enemies of the Alevis spreading rumors about them turning the lights off and committing sexual acts without any regard to relationship of affinity (Kaplan, 2014: 46-47).

cial situations, including behavior that is shaped and constrained by these situations” (Wilson & Chadda, 2010: 549), studying cultures through close observation, interviewing and interpretation help researchers learn and understand more deeply the components of any culture. Therefore, I have decided to carry out fieldwork research which might enable me to observe respondents in their natural habitat. Since the subject itself is quite sensitive and no such study has ever been conducted heretofore, face-to-face communication in the respondents’ own hometown should provide a better insight into the aforementioned issues. In that way, I would avail of more detailed data and profound insights into the subject, thereby helping me “to produce general patterns and ... provide(s) an understanding of group life” (Önen, 2011: 111).

Therefore, for this study, I conducted three fieldwork researches in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli. I carried out my first fieldwork in Adana between August 4 and August 14, 2014. My second fieldwork in Çorum was held between August 25 and September 4, 2014. The last fieldwork in Tunceli was carried out between March 9 and March 18, 2015.

Subsequently, during the fieldwork, two generations (parents and children) were asked the same questions with regard to marriage since the aim of the study is to acquire insights into the generation gap with regard to faith and its impact on marital issues. A total of 30 pairs in three cities (with each city having ten pairs) were interviewed. A special coding was applied for them so their privacy could be maintained. For example, I used code A8P for a respondent from Adana (A), is a parent (P), and of pair 8 (8), and code Ç4C for a respondent who is from Çorum (Ç), is a child (C) of pair 4 (4). Respondents were asked 28 core questions during semi-structured interviews.

In semi-structured interviews, 28 core questions were posed to the parents and to their married children. Although I had planned to ask the same questions in the same order, due to the nature of

semi-structured interviews, sometimes I needed additional questions or could not ask all the questions as planned. The questions were classified into two sets. The purpose of asking the first group of questions is to understand possible diversity between generations in terms of three elements of modernization (scientific advances, industrial capitalism, and urbanization). With the second group of questions, I wanted to depict different secularization levels according to generations with regard to marital issues.

After I decoded the interviews, I had hundreds of word documents. To analyse these large data, I used a qualitative data analysis software called MAXQDA which is very helpful, particularly for a large number of files. By means of MAXQDA, I was able to easily organize, codify, annotate and analyse my primary non-numerical, unstructured documents.

To identify the respondents, I used *the chain referral sampling method* (the snowball sampling method). This method is preferred particularly when it is not easy to identify potential respondents (hidden populations) due to various socio-political reasons (homosexuals in conservative societies, unemployments, prostitutes, AIDS carriers, ethnic or religious minorities in not-so-liberal countries, drug addicts, etc.). It is called “snowball sampling” because

(...) the researcher accesses informants through contact information that is provided by other informants. This process is, by necessity, repetitive: informants refer the researcher to other informants, who are contacted by the researcher and then refer her or him to yet other informants, and so on. Hence the evolving ‘snowball’ effect, captured in a metaphor that touches on the central quality of this sampling procedure: its accumulative (diachronic and dynamic) dimension (Noy, 2008: 330).

Due to the reality of the Alevi communities, which is a religio-ethnic minority group that has been suppressed and massacred throughout the history of Anatolia, it was inevitable for me to choose this sampling method. Otherwise, it would not have been easy to reach Alevi respondents or talk to them in a serious way

about their daily lives. Noy (2008: 331) uses the terms “safety net” and “fall-back alternative” to define the snowball sampling method, since it is used when other methods are not attainable. In comparison with other sampling methods, it was easier to reach potential subjects in a very affordable and quick way in this method. If a researcher thinks that enough data has been collected due to similarities in the stories, i.e. if stories start to repeat themselves, s/he can stop at that point.

In the research fields in Çorum and Tunceli, I was first of all introduced by my personal connections to the reference persons who were known and respected in their cities. After that, with their connections and the chain referral sampling method, I established contact with my respondents. For the fieldwork in Çorum, I was introduced to many locally known people by a professor who had worked for several years at the University of Çorum. In Tunceli, through my close friends, I met a lady who was the general manager of the Post Office and had many contacts there: from the governor of the province to local people. In Adana, due to the family connections, it was not difficult to find respondents there.

A voice recorder was used to record the interviews, and just before the interviews, the respondents' permission was sought for the process. Interviews were conducted at different locations such as cafés, respondents' houses, or workplaces. Since very respected and well-known people were my references and I used the chain referral sampling method, respondents did not treat me as a stranger and I did not observe any anxiety. Although they had the right to erase any statements they expressed during the interviews, none asked for this.

The in-depth interviews lasted between fifteen minutes (with very old people) and seventy-five minutes. For my study, I did not pay attention to differences in age, sex, education or jobs, but only to marital status. Because of the cross-generational nature of the study, I needed a parent and his/her married child. Very often, I had the

opportunity to hear life stories of respondents because of the scope of the questions. Through these life stories, I was able to better understand the transformation that has taken place within Alevi communities. What is more, although the main issue was related to the generation gap between two generations, I generally asked respondents to tell any stories about their neighbours, relatives, friends or acquaintances. For example, if a respondent expressed that s/he had had an affair before marriage, I asked them whether (or not) this kind of lifestyle was common among their friends. Or, if I learned that a respondent did not have access to hot water during his/her childhood, I also tried to learn whether this was the case for the whole community or just a specific case.

I also had the opportunity to observe respondents' daily life and general lifestyles during fieldwork. I stayed at least ten days in each city and was wandering about, pounding the pavements during my free time. In that way, I was able to get impression on the accuracy of the things I had heard in the interviews by checking them against the daily lives of other community members. Besides, since most of the interviews were conducted in the respondents' homes, I was able to get then an impression of their domestic living standards.

I also visited their religious or holy sites many times. In fact, some of the interviews I conducted in Adana and Çorum took place at such religious sites. I participated in some wedding ceremonies in Adana and Çorum as well, since the field research coincided with their wedding months. Moreover, since I myself am an Alevi from Adana, it was easier for me to review the transformation experienced there. Having lived among the Alevis in the Adana region until eighteen years of age and having visited Adana continuously during the next fourteen years, this has helped in terms of observing the social transformation in Alevi society.

Besides the people I interviewed, I also asked questions in a semi-formal way to many people that I came across during my stays. These people could be public transport drivers or café waiters.

Therefore, it should be noted that although 60 interviews will be reflected upon in detail in the empirical part, the number of people I interviewed for the thesis is much larger than 60.

In this empirical part, I will discuss who Alevis are and are not, from a historical perspective. Then, I will discuss why the questions were selected in as far as they allow for understanding the difference between generations in terms of modernity. Subsequently, I will discuss the topics wherein Alevism has had the biggest impact on marriage before presenting the respondents' answers to the questions. Instead of marriage in Alevism, frequency of worship, or even belief could have been the topic of this thesis. However, due to the secularization paradigm as defined here, how the metaphysical realm gets reflected in the social life is reviewed in this thesis. Naturally, frequency of worship or changes in the number of people with Alevi belief are also important in terms of secularization discussions and need to be taken into consideration. However, frequency of praying or statement of a person who says he/she is an Alevi is not sufficient as basis for secularization debates. The extended secularization paradigm analyses the role played by the metaphysical realm in the daily social lives of individuals. Therefore, a belief which has lost its power to regulate social life and which interferes less with an individual's daily life compared to past, may be conceived as strong evidence for secularization. For this reason, the marriage institution has been chosen as the subject of this thesis. I have chosen marital issues due to the central position of the marriage institution in Alevi life. The marriage institution is considered one of the most critical institutions for the continuation of Alevi culture. Important institutions such as those of the spiritual brotherhood and the people's court (which continue to regulate Alevis' social life) also happen to be institutions that are directly involved with marriage. If an Alevi adult individual is not married, they are not accepted as a full Alevi. In Alevi belief, those who stand to harm these institutions are faced with serious sanctions.

ALEVIS

Even in terms of a very limited literature review on the subject of Alevism or its meaning, there are indeed numerous and different sources (Bozkurt, 2000; Yaman & Erdemir, 2006; Bardakçı, 1940/2012; Köse, 2013). However, investigating Alevism is not an easy job for a researcher due to the absence or insufficient reliability of written documents about Alevis or Alevism (Demiray, 2004). However, it should be stressed that the question of what Alevism really is or what it is not is well beyond the scope of this study for several reasons. Consequently, any people who identify themselves as Alevi are included in the sample. This decision was inevitable since Alevis are not part of a homogeneous group and Alevism is not associated with only one way of faith. As Martin van Bruinessen (1996: 7) argues, the term Alevi is “a blanket term for a large number of heterodox communities.”

In terms of population, there are studies claiming that Alevis constitute 15 to 30 percent of the entire Turkish population (Erdemir & Göker, 2000: 99). It should be noted that this figure varies according to researchers and their own positions. The figures put forward by Sunni researchers are generally less than those asserted by their Alevi counterparts (Erdemir, 2004: 31; Üzümlü, 2000: 19-28). In addition, there are different ethnic Alevi communities such as Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish and they have different beliefs and rituals (Erdemir, 2004): “Basically, Alevism is a protean that shows great variation according to geography and ethno-linguistic factors” (Demiray, 2004: 63). Not only do the ethnically different Alevi communities living in different parts of the country have varied traditions, customs, rituals or belief systems, it is also very common to come face-to-face with different belief systems, customs and other characteristic features within one and the same Alevi community (Yaman, 2007). For example, according to a sociological survey conducted by Ali Aktaş (1999) among 1623 Alevis, Alevism is described in different ways: 43,43 % of participants call it a denom-

ination, 16,88 % see it as a way of life, 16,14 % define Alevism as a culture, 10,41 % see it as a religious order, and 10,35 % accept it as a religion. In addition, according to another sociological survey, conducted by Kamil Fırat (2005: 55) among 208 Alevis from two Ankara neighborhoods, the term Alevism is perceived differently: While 52.4 % of Alevis consider the Alevism “the proper Islam”, 1.9 % sees it as a separate religion out of Islam; 45.2 %, on the other hand, define it as a life style. In another survey, carried out by Nail Yılmaz (2005: 210) with 364 Alevis, while 89.8 % of the participants said that Alevism was intertwined with cultural/religious values, the rest defined Alevism as “ethnic” or “religious and ethnic.”

All the more interesting, during my field research I discovered that the Alevis of the Adana region are subdivided into two groups: *Haydri* and *Kalushs*. Alevis who live on the Eastern side of the river Seyhan (the districts of Yamaçlı and Haydaroğlu) are called Haydri, while the Western side of the river (the districts of Akkapı and Mıdık) is the home of the Kalush. And although these two Alevi communities belong to the same denomination (Arab Alevis) and their belief systems have a lot in common, in the 1970s-1980s it was not easy for a Haydri to marry a Kalush. A similar fractionation was also identified in the Çorum region during the field research. Slightly varied forms of Alevism are found in different villages of Çorum. Bayram Ali Soner and Şule Toktaş also emphasize different perceptions related to Alevism:

The traditionalist-religious sections of the community conceive of Alevism as the pure form of Islam in terms of theological roots and rituals. They are headed by the more state-friendly Alevi association of the Cem Foundation, and support a more religious definition of Alevism. (...) In contrast, modernist-secularist Alevis see Alevism as outside Islam and identify it more with non-Islamic elements. According to them, Alevism is a syncretistic belief system, a philosophy, a culture as well as a lifestyle constructed originally as the community interacted with various religions, including Shamanism, Manichaeism, Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, as well as

other polytheistic religions of Anatolia and the Middle East (2011: 423-24).

Therefore, this study could not define Alevism or provide a detailed answer to the question of what Alevism is, due to the lack of consensus in the literature and different lifestyles (traditions, customs, rituals) found even within the same region during field research. As Mehmet Demiray (2004: 63) states, that “ rituals and religious leaders show great disparities (and) such differentiations have so deep effects that the Alevi activists say that there are as many Alevisms as there are individual Alevis.” However, this reality does not hinder us from making some generalizations regarding Alevism. Although this study is not aimed at identifying Alevism, it is still possible to mention some basic characteristic features of Alevis which differentiate them from Sunnis. And so, basically, I would like to give a thumbnail sketch of the beliefs, rituals and structure of Alevi communities in as far as they are relevant to this study.

First of all, in Turkey, Alevism is generally considered one of the denominations of Islam. I use the word “generally” because, as stated above, some Alevis do not consider themselves Muslim, but just Alevi. To them, Alevism is a separate religion from Islam, not a sect of it (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2012). Historically, to talk about the roots of Alevism, it would not be wrong to trace it back to the death of Prophet Muhammed. After the death of the Prophet of Islam, Abu Bakr took over the office of caliphate which created a lot of discontentment among the supporters of ‘Alī who was the son-in-law of Muhammed and was considered the Prophet’s successor by his supporters. This conflict among Muslims and the dissatisfaction among ‘Alī’s supporters continued under the leadership of caliphs ‘Umar and ‘Uthmān.

The killing of ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī taking over his position caused a more profound discontent among Muslims. Because of the death of ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī’s new position, Aīsha, the daughter of Abu Bakr and wife of prophet Muhammed, took up arms against ‘Alī

with the support of some Muslim groups. That was the first time in history that Muslims went to war among themselves, namely, in the Battle of the Camel (656 AD) (Demircan, 2013). Hostility against the winner of the Battle of the Camel, i.e. 'Alī, was maintained by Mu'āwiyah who had been appointed governor of Syria during 'Uthmān's caliphate. The Battle of Siffin took place in 657 AD between 'Alī, who was supported by Arabian Arabs, and Muawiyah from the Umayyad clan, who was supported by Syrian Arabs (Demircan, 2013). After the Battle of Siffin, in which there was no winner, Muawiyah proclaimed his power over Syria, while 'Alī continued to govern Arabia and places nearby (Keser, 2013).

With the killing of 'Alī in 661 AD, Muawiyah became unrivalled and seized power as the sole authority over the whole Islamic world. In addition, he ended the former regime and founded the Umayyad dynasty in which the office of caliphate passes from father to son (Keser, 2013). Faced with such a situation, the supporters of 'Alī declared Ḥasan and Ḥusayn (sons of 'Alī) as the legitimate caliphs one after another. Ḥusayn seized full control after his brother Ḥasan was poisoned. However, Ḥusayn and all his family were killed by people from the Umayyad dynasty while on his way to Kufa in 680 AD (Demircan, 2013). The massacre of Ḥusayn and his family became the underlying reason behind the continuing conflict within Islam. The deaths in Kufa led to the emergence of new streams called Sunnism and Shiism (Shi'a Islam) which were not only opponents in terms of aspects of the Islamic faith but also in the political sense.

Throughout history, various denominations came into being under Sunnism and Shiism. Alevism in Anatolia is part of Shi'a Islam which has found new expressions in different regions of the world with different rituals, aspects of the Islamic faith, customs, and traditions (Keser, 2013). Therefore, the question of the Alevis' identity could be answered briefly by stating that they belong to the side of 'Alī and his family. It is no mere coincidence that dictionaries define

the word Alevi as ‘Alī’s supporter, ‘Alī’s lover or being attached to ‘Alī (Moosa, 2009).

Some scholars and researchers consider Alevism part of Islam and describe Alevis as those “who embrace Islam, believe in monotheism, accept Muhammed as the prophet, and admit Qur’ān as the holy book and Ahl al-Bayt lovers” (Tiryaki, 2013: 13-14). However, Alevis in Turkey do not fast during Ramadan as a matter of principle, do not perform *salāt* like Sunnis, do not go to mosques, *Hajj* is not something they do in the normal course of life and “do not make the saying of the *Kalema* (Creed of Islam) a condition to faith” (Shah, 2013: 265). In addition, they do not have a culture of *zakāt* as prescribed in the Qur’ān. Maybe not all of the Alevi communities in Anatolia, but especially Turkish and Kurdish Alevis fast during the first twelve days of the month of Muharram. The historical reason behind this ritual can be traced back to the beginning of Islam. 48 years after the death of the prophet Muhammad, Ḥusayn, his grandson and the son of ‘Alī, was killed by Yazid from the Umayyad dynasty in a rather cruel way. Since Ḥusayn was dehydrated and starved to death, Alevis fast in the first twelve days of the month of Muharram in memory of this incident. During these twelve days, they do not get married, do not go to wedding ceremonies, do not go to fun places, try to drink water as little as possible, do not eat particularly delicious foods and meat dishes, spouses abstain from sexual life in the first twelve days of Muharram. If it is possible, men do not shave (Tiryaki, 2013: 154-55).

Hatred towards the first three caliphs after Muhammed, namely Abu Bakir, ‘Umar and ‘Uthmān, is common among Alevis since these three figures of Islam and their supporters are considered traitors who persecuted ‘Alī and his family. The three caliphs are cursed violently all the time during the Alevis’ daily social life and worship. Parallel to this, these three names are never ever given to an Alevi child. In my field research in Çorum, one of the respondents expressed his expectations of his daughter with the following sen-

tence: "I told her that now you are going to be a university student in another city, please do not choose someone there as a spouse whose name is 'Umar or 'Uthmān." Therefore, a great number of Sunni people see the Alevis

(...) as heretics [*sapkın*] and pervers [s*apık*]. They believe that the Alevis practice orgies in congregational ceremonies [*mumsöndü*] and practice incest [*anabacı tanımazlar*]. Conservative Sunnis see the Alevis as being filthy and ritually unclean arguing that they fail to perform the bodily ablutions following sexual intercourse. Moreover, some argue that the Alevis are not circumcised and that they eat pork and human meat (Erdemir, 2004: 31).

It is important to repeat here that this study does not pay attention to the status of Alevism - whether it is a religion or not, whether it is a branch of Islam or not - because this is not of interest for this study. It is obvious that theologians and other researchers from other disciplines than sociology would make a claim on this very interesting issue. But this thesis sees Alevis as members of a faith group, and investigates whether their daily practices related to the faith have changed with the transformation of Turkey as a whole. According to the hypothesis of this thesis, while secularization of the Alevis was expected as a result of the modernization experienced throughout Turkey, many academics have published studies which claim a revival of Alevism in Turkey (Çamuroğlu, 2003; Çaha, 2004; Shah, 2013). Therefore, Alevi revival, which has become a phenomenon accepted in the academic world, has to be discussed prior to getting into the details of the field study.

REVIVAL OF ALEVISM

In order to understand such a revival of Alevism which is reported to have started in the 1980s, it would be better to review the way in which Alevis had lived up until that time. When Alevis sided with the Safavid dynasty under the presidency of Shah Ismail against the Ottomans during the disputes that led to the Çaldıran War (1514 AD), Alevis became an unwelcome community among the Otto-

mans. Therefore, Alevis ever since were forced to live mostly in rural areas, hidden from public view (Çaha, 2004: 327). One of the respondents from Çorum said that in the 1960s Alevis who wanted to travel to the city center of Çorum had to wear *chador* like radical Islamists so as not to be recognized as Alevis and only when they returned to their villages could they then take off the *chador* again.

When the New Republic was established in 1923, most Alevis supported Mustafa Kemal because of his secular principles and they thought they would get a better deal and be more free than during Ottoman rule. However, in the 20th century, due to the Kemalist modernization process, religion and religious identities within the public area were under state control and forced to be confined to a particular field. An identity policy was applied from top to bottom during the process of constructing a new nation: a policy of Turkishness. Being a Turk became the sole legal identity of the new Republic according to the state. However, the Sunni exposition of Islam continued to be powerful both in politics and in public opinion, while Alevism was ignored (Dressler, 2008: 287).

It would not be an exaggeration to say that Alevism and Alevis were ignored in Turkey up until the 1980s. Alevis think that they are forced to be melted into the pot of mainstream Sunni Islam, which is attempted through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). The DRA budget is rather high compared to many ministries' budgets, and the DRA "defines and organizes legitimate public Islamic practice and is responsible, among other things, for Islamic education, mosque construction and maintenance, issuing of legal opinions [*fatwas*], and the pilgrimage to Mecca" (Dressler, 2008: 289). Therefore, Alevis could never have an official status and their actions in the public arena were deemed illegal. During his speech in 1994, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of that time, stated that "Alevism is not a religion. Nor is it a sect of Islam. Alevism is a culture complete with its own folklore" (Şahin, 2005: 481).

Before 1980, not only the state, but also Alevis themselves were not so sensitive about the problems related to their own identity. Particularly during the conflicts between the right and left wings during the 1970s, Alevis fell within the left wing, such that labour rights were the most important rights they had to fight for. They were fighting for socialism, but not for the rights of Alevis. Most of the Alevis internalized socialism and rejected their Alevi beliefs as the symbols of obscurantism, as with all other religious faiths and symbols (Shah, 2013: 266).

Alevis, who were entrapped in rural areas for centuries during the Ottoman Empire and had to hide themselves, who could not display their identities in the public arena after the establishment of New Republic, and then ran after the socialist ideal, finally took the scene at the end of the 1980s. If there is any *Alevi Question* or *Alevi Initiative* that finds a response currently at the state level, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that the reason for this is the resurrection of Alevism at the end of the 1980s. The Alevi Question became one of the most discussed issues in the country since then. Voluntary Alevi associations have started to rise in every part of the country while Alevi NGOs started to promote Alevi identity for the new generations and to organize cultural and religious activities. Such associations played a great role in reinforcing solidarity amongst Alevis as well as raising awareness about Alevism (Soner & Toktaş, 2011: 422).

Alevis politicized historical figures such as Ali, Hasan, Husayn, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal, and Karacaoğlu who were important for them and their values by redefining them in festivals, symposiums, television or radio programs, and in printed publications. This process, which started with radio programs, allowed the broadcasting of Alevism to extend to local and national television channels, and more recently also by means of social media, in order to reach a larger audience. Although Alevis do not have their own daily newspaper, they have found place in dailies by means of

articles by Alevi and left-wing journalists (Çaha, 2004: 332-33). Cems, which had been prohibited since 1925, began to be organized in Cem Houses that are constructed in various parts of the cities. Books about the history, doctrines, and rituals of Alevism started to appear by Alevi intellectuals. All of these developments brought certain changes to the nature of Alevism. The belief system, which had been hidden for centuries and fully closed for the outside community, was inter-generationally transferred from mouth to mouth and then appeared on the stage of Turkish public opinion with its written precepts and rituals (Van Bruinessen, 1996: 8). Besides this, the DRA also internally changed its discourse with respect to Alevism. When in 1994 a president of the DRA stated that he sees Alevism as outside of Islam, ten years after that statement, in 2004, the new president of DRA, Ali Bardakoğlu, stated that Alevism is a part of Islam and should be honoured as much as any other sub Islamic groups. Alevism has become part of the culture of the Turkish part of the world and has made contribution to the religious life of the country (Dressler, 2008: 290).

The AKP, which has a Sunni Islamic core, organized seven workshops, in which Alevi leaders, Alevi intellectuals, researchers who are not Alevi but have studied Alevism, members of non-governmental organizations, academics, and political party representatives participated between 2009 and 2010. The aim of those workshops was to bring the problems of Alevis to the table and to find solutions to their demands. These workshops caused an affirmative effect on normalization and awareness of Alevi identity in the public arena.

Still, the question is how has Alevi revival been experienced since the 1980s. Jamal Shah (2013: 266) examines this change under six headings: urbanization, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the rise of radical Islam, the Kurdish problem, the European Union membership process, and the proliferation of the media sector.

Urbanization: Rural-urban migration commenced particularly at the end of the 1960s due to economic and political reasons, and is found to be the most important factor in the revival of Alevism. After having lived in rural areas of the country for centuries, Alevis started to reveal new forms of Alevism that are adapted to cities and that became public with their migration to cities. The migration process that came to pass very rapidly caused great changes in the social lives of Alevis. Increase in the number of educated Alevis and the rise of an Alevi middle class have caused a new social stratification (Çamuroğlu, 2003: 79). Alevis who have moved to cities have to coexist with the Sunni majority that has not been fully aware of their existence hitherto. By contrast, Alevis, who had to pray in secrecy in their Cem Houses before the 1980s, constructed new Cem Houses or dervish lodges for gathering in cities with a large Alevi population (Çaha, 2004: 333).

Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Political conflicts in Turkey in the 1970s arose under the headings of right and left wings. During a period when all aspects of the country were politicized and which led to coups, Alevi youths participated particularly in the movement towards socialism. However, this ideologic movement lost its importance with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the USSR, this void was filled with Alevi identity and Alevi rights (Çamuroğlu, 2003: 80). Ömer Çaha believes that the disintegration of the socialist block had great importance, particularly in making the Cem Houses the center of attraction:

(...) the collapse of the socialist regime made them [Alevi Youth] turn to their traditional identity, and when they did so, they faced cem houses. Cem houses, today, function not only for ayin-i cem [worship of Alevis], but also for a number of different cultural and charity activities. They became the prominent centres for the organisation of various protests in large cities like Istanbul and Ankara (2004: 333).

Rise of Radical Islam: The Alevi massacres in Çorum and Maras at the end of 1970s just before the Iranian revolution were experi-

enced under the name of left-right conflicts. In 1993, 33 Alevis in Sivas were burnt to death in a hotel by fundamentalists. The Welfare Party, the policies of which were oriented towards Islamic sensitivity, won the general election of 1995 and hold nearly one-third of the seats in parliament. These historical events made Alevis more sensitive with respect to their identities. Shah (2013: 266) thinks that the rapid rise of Alevi organizations was partly the result of the increase of radical Islam.

Kurdish Problem: The conflicts commenced after the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) murdered three Turkish soldiers in the Eruh district of Siirt in 1984. It led to Kurdish words being used with negative meanings more than ever before in Turkey. Expressions like separatist, collaborating with the enemies, baby killers, *etc.*, were used for PKK, whereas the Kurdish people also took their share. Therefore, particularly among Alevis with Kurdish ethnic origin, they started to put their religious identities in the forefront, rather than their ethnic origin:

Ordinary Alevi Kurds tend to feel threatened by the strong feelings against Kurds in society where Kurds are stigmatized by associating them with the ‘PKK terrorists’, and some tend to suppress their Kurdish identity and distance themselves from those Alevi Kurdish groups who stress their Kurdishness; they instead emphasize their integration into Turkish society (Erman & Göker, 2000: 107).

European Union Process: Having their identities recognized during the European Union membership process of Turkey allowed Alevis to assert themselves. Legal restrictions against associations that depend on ethnic, religious or regional varieties were lifted due to demands from the European Union on Turkey. In the Progress Reports of the European Commission in 1998 and 2000, Alevis and their demands were also mentioned within the context of human rights (Şahin, 2005: 478). Alevis who did not have any collective identity previously and who had been ignored, now were identified as a Muslim minority in the EU Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, released on 6 October 2004 (Göner, 2005:

108). Due to the reforms implemented in line with EU demands, Alevi-based NGOs, which have not been permitted to function after the 1980 *coup d'état* were opened and allowed to carry out their activities. These were the leading ones: Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Cem Foundation, Karacaahmet Association, and Hacı Bektaşî Veli Association. Lobbying activities by Alevis who migrated to Europe and their financial support to the Alevi associations in Turkey were some of the factors that accelerated this process:

In consequence, several Alevi associations were re-established that, prior to the legal amendment, had been closed down several times. It was in this legal and political context that the Federation of Alevi-Bektashi Associations was for the first time granted legal recognition in April 2003. This was followed by the recognition of a number of other associations, including the Cem Foundation and the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association. In addition, Turkish governments started to allocate resources from the state budget to the use of a few state-friendly Alevi organizations, and political authorities regularly attended the Alevi festival annually held in Hacı Bektaş. (...) The state broadcasting institution TRT (Turkish Radio-Television Corporation) began to show an interest in Alevi music and started broadcasting documentaries on Alevi cultural heritage. (...) A number of municipalities have already granted licenses for the construction and operation of cem houses (Soner & Toktaş, 2011: 422).

Privatization and Proliferation of the Media: In the 1980s, Turkey saw the emergence of new social and political groups such as Greens, feminists, and Alevis. Narrow-scoped rights demanded by small groups took the place of street policy that had been used to change the regime in the 1970s (Çaha, 2008: 328). One of the most important elements that allowed Alevis to come to the stage, defend their rights, create an agenda, and to commence the revival of Alevism was indeed the media. Privatization and proliferation of the media supplied new means to leaders of Alevi groups to have public visibility (Soner & Toktaş, 2011: 422). The article by Çaha under the title of “The role of the media in the revival of Alevi identity in Turkey” briefly summarizes this process as follows:

The relatively free environment of the 1980s provided for the proliferation as well as privatization of the media in Turkey. The visual as well as the sound media channels, i.e., TV channels and radio stations, were under the monopoly of the state until 1989. Moreover, there was very strong governmental control on the privately-owned newspapers and journals. Articles 141, 142, and 163 of Turkish Penal Law made it almost impossible to touch upon secret issues, i.e., any issues implying different identity or culture or way of life than the one drawn by official ideology. The elimination of these articles (...) in 1989 created a new environment for the expression of opinion. This gave media groups the opportunity to draw attention to Alevism — for instance the Alevi way of life, their rituals, their problems — (...) Media groups opened the closed wall of the public sphere. It can be claimed that uncovering officially hidden issues has raised the public consciousness about the government, politics and the state in general. (...) newly rising media groups have developed a ground table for intellectuals from different ethnical or even religious and political/ideological backgrounds (2004: 329-330).

As a result of these social, economic and political transformations, Alevis gained so much self-confidence that an Alevi family brought a case to European Human Rights Court (EHRC) about mandatory religion class in which their children had to participate in the early 2000s. EHRC resolved this case in 2007 by ruling that Turkey has discriminated against Alevis due to the mandatory religion class. In the end, Alevis' self-confidence has been reinforced, and has become more at peace with their identities, having become part of the country's agenda as they had never been before. It would seem obvious that Alevi revival that had commenced in the 1980s has led to Alevis being included in the agenda of Turkey as much as never before and the new Alevi generations are starting to express their identities more bravely than previous ones.

Starting from this point, can we draw a conclusion that Alevism touches the daily life much more than ever, and that the rituals and doctrines of Alevism are observed much more in the daily life of new generation? To answer this question, the next sections of the chapter will be about the social transformation that Alevi communities in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli regions have been experiencing

due to the modernization and its relation with the revival of Alevism.

Why are the regions of Adana, Çorum and Tunceli chosen for this study?

The aim of this study is to examine whether changes in the three elements of modernization have any kind of effect on the secularization process in Alevis communities. This study would have been based on the Alevis of cosmopolitan centres because of the rather vigorous social transformation among them. However, conducting interviews with migrated Alevis in cosmopolitan cities, who live a materially and spiritually hectic life with less chance to meet people with the same background (same rituals, traditions, customs), and who are deprived of a social setup where they can maintain their culture, is considered unsuitable for the purpose of this study.

Migration itself can have a very positive impact on secularization (Feijten, van Dijck & Boyle, 2010), especially if people migrate from the rural areas of Anatolia to Istanbul, Ankara or İzmir where millions of people live. Maybe not for the first generation of immigrants, but definitely for the second and third generations who were born into a different social setup than their parents, it might be said that they would be estranged from the customs of their parents since the values of their parents do not easily preserve themselves in such a new social environment (Levin, Markides & Ray, 1996; Ali, 2008). That is why this thesis has chosen Alevis' traditional strongholds as its research locales, such as the Adana, Çorum, and Tunceli regions. In these regions, the Alevis have been living in certain key areas where their daily life is shaped by Alevis beliefs and rituals for hundreds of years. Therefore, the characteristics of these areas are more appropriate than cosmopolitan areas for illustration.

The second reason is that Alevis living in these areas hail from different ethnic backgrounds: Arab Alevis, Turkish Alevis, and Kurdish Alevis are concentrated in Adana, Çorum, and Tunceli, re-

spectively. In this way, I have had the opportunity to cover more than one Alevi community. The main reason behind the selection of these three regions is related to the scope of this research in terms of sampling. Being composed of different ethnic groups, it would be more appropriate to include all three regions in this study. Still, it is important to highlight that each Alevi region will be evaluated separately. In other words, the thesis will examine the potential gap between generations of a particular region. There will be no comparison between generations from two different regions. Elderly people in the region of Adana will be compared with individuals from younger generations in the same region. In this sense, older generations living in and around Çorum and Tunceli, for example, will not be studied in terms of differences and similarities. The study also does not aim to provide an insight into the similarities and differences in terms of life styles of the younger generations in different regions. What is important for the study is to offer an insight into the differences/similarities among older and younger generations in a specific region in terms of the effect of their faith on marital issues.

Questions Related to Modernization

In semi-structured in-depth interviews, conducted with 60 Alevis in the Turkish regions of Adana, Çorum and Tunceli, respondents were asked some pre-set questions to acquire insights into the generation gap with regard to the modernization level. Questions related to the following topics were posed to the interviewees to acquire insights into the generation gap with regard to get modernization level:

- Education Level
- Line of Work
- Number of Children
- Place of Birth
- Infant Mortality

- Ownership of Durable Goods
- Supply of Daily Needs
- Heating Methods
- Hot Water Access
- Modern Medical Facilities
- Social Environment
- Independent Home Life and City Visits
- The Average Age of First Marriage
- Types of Marriage

It can be said that *education level* is one of the most influential factors accelerating the transition from a traditional way of life towards modernity in developing countries (Meleis, El-Sanabary & Beeson, 1979). Many studies suggest that an increase in society's level of modernization is directly linked to the level of education, and that people with higher education are more likely to become secular than those who have relatively little education (Becker, Nagler, Woessmann, 2014, March 10). Since the potential gap in educational levels is assumed to underpin differences in terms of modernization level, respondents' educational backgrounds were investigated.

Since one of the main aims of this study is to investigate the possible impact of urbanization on the secularization process, the new generation, unlike their parents, should be brought up in urban areas and/or their professions should be different than those of rural jobs. On the other hand, the older generation should consist of people who earned money through agriculture or animal husbandry at least before marriage.

The number of children per woman has gone down in modernizing societies (Akman, 2002). Some studies reveal that the more people have religious sensibility, the more likely they are to have more children (Blume, Ramsel & Graupner, 2006; Norris & Inglehart, 2008). Therefore, the difference in the number of children and in the

tendency towards having more children should provide clues with regard to respondents' modernization level.

Giving birth in a medical institution and receiving professional help during pregnancy would be worth considering as indices of modernization. Studies reveal that the number of births taking place in a medical institution is higher in modern countries compared to traditional societies (Gallagher, 1988).³⁹ Therefore, *birth place* is another element to be discussed in terms modernization.

Infant Mortality Rate and *Under-Five Mortality Rate* are much higher in traditional societies compared to modern societies (UN-DATA, n.d.). For example, "the risk of a child dying before completing the first year of life was highest in the WHO African region (60 per 1000 live births), about five times higher than that in the WHO European region (11 per 1000 live births)" (World Health Organization, 2013). Therefore, the statements of respondents from different generations about infant mortality (whether they were experienced personally or having become witnesses of infant losses) might well be a hint as to their modernization levels.

The usage level of durable goods and their quality are expected to be much higher in modern societies compared to traditional ones due to technological advancements and industrial development. Therefore, the generation gap with regard to ownership of durable goods might provide an important hint as to the modernization level among the various generations.

Household *heating method* is an important criterion in ascertaining the living standards of individuals. Heating systems be-

39 The Netherlands might be an exception at this point due to the fact of very high home birth rate compared to other modern countries. However, the rate of birth at home has steadily decreased also in the Netherlands since 1965. While two-thirds of all births occurred at home in 1965, the situation has changed drastically and the rate decreased from two-third to 38.2% in 25 years. But, the rate of home birth continued to decrease and just fewer than one-fourth births occurred at home by 2010 (Chervenak, McCullough, Brent, Levene & Arabin, 2013; Wiegers, Van Der Zee & Keirse; 1998).

come more effective and efficient in modern and welfare societies in comparison to traditional societies (United Nations Environment Programme, 2015, February 26). Therefore, any differences between generations with regard to heating methods might provide a hint at the modernization level of both generations.

Having instant access to *hot water* can be seen as an important indicator of the level of individual living standard. If instant hot water access becomes readily available in a cheaper and easier way due to the diffusion of technological developments, then individual living conditions may be supposed to have improved.

Improvement in *modern medicine* is one of the obvious pillars of the modernization process. Increase in average life expectancy, developing treatments for incurable diseases, decrease in the tendency to associate diseases with supranatural powers, showing less interest in alternative medicine, increase in the number of medical institutions, and improved conditions are some of the transformations experienced by modernizing societies.

A comparison of Alevi generations with regard to their *social environments* is crucial for this study. In comparison to rural areas, the structure of urban areas is more heterogeneous. Because of that, it is not abnormal for a person living in a city to encounter people from different backgrounds during daily activities like shopping, working, studies, and so forth. That is why modern urbanites are more in touch with people from different cultures. Living with different cultures, be they ethnic or religious, may even erode the decisive role of identities in daily activities. Ethnic and religious differences become less decisive for harmony in daily life (Wilson, 1976).

How and where individuals obtain their *daily needs* can provide a clue with regard to their level of modernization. In traditional societies, individuals are much more inclined to produce what they consume or use, i.e. they supply their daily needs mostly by themselves; due to the lack of industrial production they have few alternatives with regard to products. On the other hand, mechanization and

mass production, diversity in products, increase in specialization, division of labour and welfare are the primary features of modern industrial societies (Erdoğan, 2002). The more a society becomes modern, the fewer individuals become involved in the production of their own needs.

Having independent home life and being in different cities may give some impressions with regard to the respondents' modernization level. While close relatives (members of extended family) share the same living spaces and each member stays with his/her extended family until marriage in traditional agriculture-based societies, individuals would start to live apart from their families (not extended, but nuclear) even before marriage in modern urban life. Due to structural and social differentiations, individuals have become forced to lead a faster life. Unlike their traditional or rural counterparts, they have to be more mobile and need to visit or live in places other than their hometown due to various reasons such as education or business. Therefore, while individuals are more inclined to live with their parents until they get married in traditional societies, living away from family before marriage is mostly seen in modern urban life because of education, business, holidays, *etc.* So, it is not surprising to find that the number of studio apartments is increasing by the day in modern cities (Tosun & Fırat, 2012; Kaya, 2014). That is why differences with regard to generations' modes of living might also give a clue as to the level of modernization.

Transformation from traditional to modern society also raises *the average age of first marriage* (Garenne, 2004). Industrialization, increase in educational level, individualization, freer sexual relations, severe criticism of the paternalistic approach might be seen as the key reasons for the increase in the marriage age in modern societies.

Types of marriage and marriage ceremonies have changed throughout history due to various sociological reasons. For example, while arranged marriages are more common in traditional societies, autonomous marriages are considered part of more modern individ-

ualized societies (Bahramitash & Kazemipour, 2006; Zang, 2008). In this study, arranged marriages are defined as those “marriages in which the decision to marry is not made by the groom and the bride” (Nedoluzhko & Agadjanian, 2015) but by their parents. Autonomous marriages, on the contrary, are marriages in which the decision to marry is made by the partners themselves.

Questions Related to Marital Issues

In semi-structured in-depth interviews, respondents were asked a second group of questions related to their marital life. Although other sub-topics could be determined regarding marital issues to be investigated, I confined myself to the sub-topics below due to their direct connection with the respondents’ faith (Alevism):

- Premarital Dating
- The Faith of (Potential) Partner
- Divorce
- The Institution of the People’s Court
- The Institution of Spiritual Brotherhood

In all Alevi communities, *premarital datings* or premarital sexual intercourse are not condoned. Being in any kind of intimate relationship outside marriage is considered one of the biggest sins in traditional Alevi communities. Not only premarital datings or sexual intercourse/intimacy between two independent persons, but even any kind of intimacy among engaged people is forbidden. Engaged people may not stay alone in a room or go to any place on their own except with their relatives. Having been a researcher on the Alevi communities, Osman Bayatlı (1957) says that being married is one of the most vital issues for Alevis, such that anyone who does not act in the correct way in light of Alevi traditions on this subject will pay for this with her/his own life. In my own field research, I noted that many Alevis who are observant of Alevi customs expressed similar views. The reality in some settlements where traditional Alevi cus-

toms and duties are very strong is that the bride does/may not see the groom until the first night of their marriage.

Divorce among Alevis will be another crucial issue to be investigated in this thesis due to it being taboo in traditional Alevi communities. An Alevi is not considered complete if s/he is single, as full social approval for an Alevi is only possible with marriage. Parents and other elderly persons in the family have quite a significant influence on all kinds of decisions related to marriage. Generally, it is the parents who must find a suitable spouse according to their own taste, culture, and belief, and such a spouse has to be accepted by the Alevi bride/groom to live together until death. Alevi woman is supposed to stay with her husband even if she faces very harsh conditions and lives in great difficulty. In traditional Alevi communities, the right to choose is not even an option, particularly for girls (Yaman, 2007). A divorce may result in social exclusion similar to that in traditional Catholic or Calvinist faith. As one respondent said from Adana region, a divorced Alevi woman is considered a prostitute for those who are closely attached to Alevism.

The institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people's court will be a subject of this thesis too, because these two social institutions of the Alevis are closely related to marriage itself, both of which help Alevism regenerate and maintain its own customs, beliefs and rituals. Therefore, any pointed changes in these institutions may give crucial insights into secularization of Alevis.

As a concept, spiritual brotherhood might be defined as the building up of a covenant relationship between two Alevi men. These men go through a kind of social process and rituals in which they become closer than brothers. It may be depicted as a kinship that is not based on blood. Terms such as “hereafter fraternity,” “fellowship of the road,” “holding brotherhood,” *etc.* are used as synonyms of spiritual brotherhood (Yaman, 2007). In the traditional Alevi faith, each man has to have a spiritual brother after marriage. Otherwise, it would not be appropriate to participate in religious

ceremonies. People do not eat even his *lokma*, which is a highly symbolic religious food shared in religious ceremonies. Spiritual brothers are obliged to help each other throughout their lives; each one has to pay the other's debt if it is necessary; and they should handle even very private issues of other's family (Melikoff, 2012). As Demiray defines it,

it is the basic mechanism that keeps the solidarity among the members alive. In terms of religious doctrine, it constitutes the first step towards the initiation to the esoteric doctrine of the Alevi faith, i.e. without having been bound by the tie of *musahiplik* [the institution of spiritual brotherhood] no one can be initiated to the community and can participate in the collective rituals (2004: 60).

The history of spiritual brotherhood can be traced back to the age of the prophet Muhammed. The statements expressed by the respondents and information in the sources seem to support each other with regard to the origin of spiritual brotherhood. By announcing fraternity between a Muslim who migrated from Mecca to Medina and another Muslim who was from Medina, the prophet Muhammed established an institution of social solidarity (Tiryaki, 2013). Alevis believe that after everybody had found a spiritual brother except 'Alī, the prophet Muhammed declared himself the spiritual brother of 'Alī. Here is the same story vocalized by a respondent from the Çorum region:

Our lord, Hazrat 'Alī and our dignified prophet Muhammad were spiritual brothers. Why? During the migration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina, Muslims had left their properties behind. They had arrived in Medina in very poor condition. During that time, the Prophet said, "Each wealthy person of Medina will be the spiritual brother of a poor Meccanian." But after everybody had found his spiritual brother, our lord Hazrat 'Alī was left without a spiritual brother. The Prophet asked him, "What happened 'Alī, why are you sad?" Our lord ['Alī] said, "You have found spiritual brothers for everyone except me." Thereupon, the Prophet said this: "You are my spiritual brother in this world and hereafter." That is the main story behind spiritual brotherhood (Ç4C, a respondent from Çorum, September 2, 2014).

In this sense, it would not be wrong to claim that the social function of the institution of spiritual brotherhood is highly effective. These verses, which are related to the institution, belong to one of the seven holy minstrels of the Alevis, Pir Sultan Abdal (1480-1550), whose poems have been transmitted from one generation to another for hundreds of years:

If you ask what real religious duty is,
 It is being a spiritual brother.
 Is it possible for those to enter the *House of Cem*,
 If they do not have a spiritual brother.
 Is it possible for those to be forgiven,
 If they do not have a spiritual brother.⁴⁰

House of Cem is the name of places where Alevis hold their worship service called Ayin-i Cem (hereafter, *Cem*) and gather for social or religious reasons. Cem is a ritual that especially stands at the core of Turkish and Kurdish Alevi communities in Anatolia. It is generally held during the winter months in houses with wide spaces with the participation of women and men altogether. People perform traditional religious dances to the rhythm of melodies performed by the Saz, the traditional instrument, and drink beverages with alcoholic content. The traditional Alevi belief has it that those who do not have a spiritual brother, and therefore are excluded by the community, are not allowed to take part in these rituals. These rituals of Cem, where the religious guides assume the leading function, aim, through religious sermons, songs or hymns, to strengthen the loyalty in the community reinforcing the Alevi tradition by re-creating its collective history.

Another crucial institution related to marital issue is the institution of the people's court. This institution has been used to dismiss people who are considered harmful to social harmony. Particularly,

40 In Turkish: "Eğer farz içinde farzı sorarsan, yine farz içinde farzdır muhasip, Musahipsiz kişi ceme gelir mi, Ettği niyazlar kabul olur mu"

among others, having sexual relations prior to marriage or outside marriage (adultery), having relations with outsiders (non-Alevis) and divorce are among those that have been used as grounds to excommunicate people (Yıldırım, 2013) and they are considered among the biggest sins in traditional Alevi communities. In such cases, people are marginalized or excommunicated and called “*decayed*” by their religious leaders, *the dedes* (religious guides). The *dede*, “literally means Grandfather, is the practitioner of the Alevi faith. Basically the *dede* is the holy man of Alevism, which is the only person capable of conducting religious ceremonies. In this sense, the *dede* occupies the central position within the community” (Demiray, 2004: 60). The duties of the *dedes*, among others, are to teach the doctrines and creeds of Alevism to their followers, to guide them in hard times, and to conduct collective religious ceremonies (Shankland, 2009: 112). However the *dedes* do not only assume religious duties, but also have a leading position in the judicial system of the community (Erdemir, 2004: 32). The tradition in the Alevi belief has it that the decisions taken by the *dedes* during the rites of Cem have an unquestionable character. The *dedes* are entitled to provisionally or continuously discard a community member out of the community.⁴¹ David Zeidan explains the act of excommunication among Alevis as follows:

Alevis were forbidden to proselytise, and Alevism regenerated itself internally by paternal descent. To prevent penetration by hostile outsiders, the Alevis insisted on strict endogamy, which eventually made them into a quasi-ethnic group. Alevi taboos limited interaction with the dominant Sunni political-religious centre. Excommunication was the ultimate punishment threatening those who married outsiders, cooperated with outsiders economically, or ate with outsiders. It was also forbidden to use the state (Sunni) courts (1999: 76).

41 *Dedes* do not exist in the tradition of Alevis in the region of Adana. People who are considered to descend from the ancestry of Muhammed, the Prophet, and locally called *hacca* or *sheikh* assume the function the *dedes* perform elsewhere.

Decayed (excommunicated) people are not accepted in the House of Cem, and every relationship with them is terminated. No one visits them; they are not helped even in very difficult situations; and no one, even their close family members, salutes or talks to them, which amounts to being totally despised. If a spiritual brother is excommunicated, the other spiritual brother starts to live in a morally troubled situation as well (Tiryaki, 2013: 144-45).

In light of all this information, it should be stressed that marriage as a social institution occupies a very significant place in Alevism, and it is used as a kind of tool for the continuation of the community. Throughout history, Alevis have faced severe sanctions and social exclusion whenever they incurred damage on this institution. That is why this study has chosen to investigate the institution of marriage and related issues with regard to the secularization process. Therefore, during the fieldwork, the same questions in relation to marriage were posed to two generations (parents and children) in order to see in how far marriage issues have witnessed a process of secularization due to the process of modernization.

GENERATION GAP WITH REGARD TO MODERNIZATION LEVEL

We can say, speaking of Turkey specifically, that it has become a more modern country especially since the 1960s (the period where the country experienced immigration from rural areas to urban ones and developments in the capitalistic system supported by foreign resources). However it is a common impression of the people in Turkey that the poor get poorer more and more (Apak, 2012) or the poor get poorer and the rich get richer parallel to the globalization process (Kahraman & Bolşık, 2014). For this reason, in this section we will discuss in detail whether the scientific developments and modern medicine have become widespread to such an extent that they have an improving effect on the life of people with limited financial means, whether a transition is underway from an economic system basing on agriculture to an economic model based on in-

dustry and service sector, and whether, finally, the rural areas lose in power, day after day, in the face of the urbanization.

Education Level

It was noted that, compared to the older generation, the new generation have enjoyed better educational facilities, and their education level is indisputably much higher than that of the older generation in each region. During the field research, no one was found to be less educated than his/her parents.

Table B1. Educational Background of Respondents

	Illiterate	Primary School	Elementary School	High School	Graduate Studies	Total
Older Generation	6	14	2	6	2	30
New Generation	-	1	1	7	21	30

What is more, it was learnt that friends and siblings of the new generation, apparently, have also better educational levels when compared to their parents. Besides, although the older generation is poorly educated compared to their children, their educational level is still higher than that of their own parents (the previous generation). Many respondents from the older generation admitted that their own parents had no education.

The trend towards a better education among Alevi communities is similar to that in Turkey as a whole. Likewise, the level of education in Turkey has been rising, albeit gradually.

Table B2. The Enrolment Rate in Turkey (%)

Academic Year	Pre-School		Primary Education	Secondary Education	Higher Education
	Age 4-5	Age 5			
1998/'99	-	-	89,26	38,87	
2003/'04	-	-	90,21	53,37	14
2008/'09	-	-	96,49	58, 52	
2013/'14	37,46	42,54	99,57	76,65	Between 40-45

Source: National Education Statistics 2013/2014.

Line of Work

As seen in the table below, all respondents from the new generation earn their living through urban jobs, while a considerable part of the older generation had been busy with rural jobs before marriage.

Table B3. Line of Work before Marriage

	Tunceli		Çorum		Adana	
	Older Gen.	New Gen.	Older Gen.	New Gen.	Older Gen.	New Gen.
Rural Jobs	7	-	8	-	9	-
Urban Jobs	3	10	2	10	1	10

D10P: *At the present time, everybody lives in the city centre. From our family, only my brother-in-law still lives in my old village. That's it.*

Ç5C: *When I was a child, there were a lot of people busy with agricultural production, but right now since all their children had gone to schools in the city centres, they have set up their lives in the cities.*

Ç9P: *My parents were preoccupied with agricultural production. When I visited them during the summer holidays, I also did those kinds of rural works. I worked on their lands with a sickle or scythe in my hands.*

A5P: *No one was working in urban areas; they were all in the fields. Then, they started to work in factories, and that was the turning point.*

Everybody started to have a job in the city, from the textile sector to beauty salons. Right now, no one is working in agriculture anymore. No, no. Never. Because everybody now has a job in the city centres. But in the past, everybody worked on the land.

It should be stressed that the picture drawn above seems to be consistent with the reality in Turkey. After the 1950s, there was a very serious movement from rural to urban areas. In parallel, the economic structure of Turkey, once dominated by the agricultural sectors, has now been transformed into a new structure dominated by the industrial and service sectors.

Table B4. Ratio of Labour Sector in Turkey

Year	Agriculture	Industry and Service
1955	82 %	18 %
1980	61 %	39 %
2013	23,6 %	77 %

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; TSI Household Labour Force Statistics, 2014

Number of Children

As a result of the interviews, it might be said that each generation (the previous, the old, and the new) seems to have a lower fertility rate compared to the generation before it.

Table B5. Fertility Rate of Respondents

	Previous Generation	Older Generation	New Generation
Tunceli	7,9	4,6	1,1
Adana	7,8	3,7	0,8
Çorum	3,7	2, 8	1

It goes without saying that a considerable number of people from the new generation do have the possibility to bear children. Therefore, the number in Table B5 for the new generation will conceivably rise in the near future. For that reason, the question “How

many children do you want to have in the future?” was posed to respondents who were still able to have more children. In light of the interviews, it is highly likely that there will be an increase in the fertility rate of the new generation, but there seems to be no hope of reaching the level of the older generation. The number specified by respondents from the new generation does not exceed the number of children that their parents have. Economic situation was presented as one of the main - and sometimes the only - reasons for questions such as the following: *Why do you want to have fewer children compared to your parents? Why do you want to have only one child?:*

T1P: *People decide the number of children according to their economic situation. And do you know why the fertility rate was so high in the past? Because, no one was aware of the methods of birth control. Right now, having ten children means that the expenses for higher education or all other cost-items have to be multiplied by ten. Another ten plates on the dining table... How can it be possible for a man to feed all of them now?*

T2C: *We do not want to have more than one child right now. But of course no one knows what will happen in the future. Now, I and my spouse are both working.*

It could be said that the answer of Ç2C, father of one who had never ever thought of having a second child, and of Ç6C, who would like to have two children at most, might provide some kind of a framework for the notions among the new generation on the subject of fertility:

Ç2C: *I have to say that our economic situation is not good enough for another child. We live our lives in the fast lane. To raise a child or to take care of him/her is really a tough job. Now I have a 16-year-old child, a son who is totally preoccupying my life. I do not know what I can do if I would have had three of him. I guess we cannot, it would have been really difficult.*

Ç6C: *Actually I want to have only one child so as to direct all my energy towards that child, to provide the best education, and to ensure a promising future. But to be honest, I do not want to see my child alone; therefore I wish to have two children at most, so that they would complement each other.*

Respondents from Adana gave similar answers just like their counterparts in Çorum and Tunceli:

A2C: *Right now, I do not want any children. But if I can overcome my sense of uncertainty in this regard, I prefer to have only one child. I think "being married" is a very tedious and troublesome thing. Given that it is already difficult enough to maintain one's marriage with just two people, I cannot imagine adding another person to it, even a child. I am not ready to bear the responsibility of raising a child.*

A8C: *I think to ensure a good education and healthier life, the ideal number is two.*

A9C: *For the moment I want to have only one child because I do not know what to expect from the future. Our business may go bad, and then we would have hard times.*

It should be emphasized that the transformation that Alevis communities have been going through with regard to fertility rate is coherent with the overall transformation in Turkey as a whole. Since 1960, the number of children per woman in Turkish society has decreased from 6 to 2.26.

Place of Birth

In field research, this kind of modernizing process was observed and noted for Alevi communities, too. The births of the new generation mostly take place in a medical institution, while the older generation was almost all born at home/fields/caves.

In addition, when the question of "Where did/will you/your spouse give birth?" was posed to respondents from the new generation, everybody - without exception - said that they either went to the hospital or will go there. That is to say, if it is necessary to make a general overview, almost all respondents from the older generation were born at home without professional help, while almost all children of the new generation were/will be born under professional help in a health institution.

Table B6. Births in a Medical Institution (Out of 10)

	Older Generation	New Generation	Newer Generation
Tunceli	-	5	10 (Expected)
Adana	1	7	10 (Expected)
Çorum	-	7	10 (Expected)

It should be stressed that if a birth did not take place in a medical institution, this does not mean that that child was born at home. Agricultural fields (where they were working) or caves (before modern-style houses) were mentioned several times by respondents from the older generation as birth places:

T1P: *My birthplace was a cave. But my children were born at home. I have three grandchildren and they were all born in a hospital.*

T2C: *My children were born in hospital.*

T3P: *In those times, there were no doctors or someone to be responsible for them. I was born at home, so were my children. [All grandchildren of T3P were born in a hospital.]*

Ç4P: *I was born at home while my children were born in hospital.*

Ç8P: *I was born at home while my children were born in hospital.*

A1C: *If I become pregnant, I would like to give birth at a private hospital because I will get better service.*

A1P: *I was born at home with the help of a midwife (wise woman).*

A5P: *In olden times, women were giving births in the fields. My first two children were born at home while the last two births took place in a medical institution. And God knows where I was born. Because during the summer times, my families had to move somewhere to work in agricultural areas, which were everywhere.*

A5C: *I was born at home but my daughter was born in a private hospital. It was my wife's choice. She thought that it might be more hygienic.*

On the basis of answers from the respondents, it might be said that the main reason why modern-day births take place in medical institutions without any exception is because of an increase in the

number of medical institutions and healthcare professionals, in addition to the urbanization process, welfare state (related to births), and better financial situation to cover private hospital expenses.

Infant Mortality

The questions of “Have you lost any child because of disease? Or have you seen people that lost their children because of childhood diseases?” were asked to both generations in the interviews. Almost all respondents from the new generation said that either they have never run into infant deaths or the cases they have seen were not related to diseases but accidents. On the other hand, most of the respondents from the older generation said that they had often experienced infant deaths either because they had lost their own children or that relatives, neighbours and acquaintances had experienced the same thing. Some of the answers given by respondents are as follows:

Ç3P: *My brother died, too. I was twelve years old and he was 1 year old when he died. There were many neighbours whose children also died. So we ran into infant deaths often. But today, of course, that has changed. Of course, there has been an improvement. Our public health was not that good in the past. [However, Ç3C, who is the child of Ç3P, said that s/he does not remember the death of any baby.]*

T2P: *Of course. For example, my two siblings died. Rumour has it that one of them had a fever. I don't know what it was, maybe measles, I was only five or six years old at the time. Another sibling died because our mother died while giving birth. Due to want of care, after two months, he also died. A son of my uncle died, a grandson of my other uncle also died. These all happened in our village. [Nevertheless, T2C, who is the child of T2P, answered that question in this way: “No, I have never heard of the death of a baby.”]*

A2P: *Children would die if they were diagnosed with measles. Meningitis was another reason for such deaths. It was said then that the disease affected the brain. If it was the case, children became permanently disabled or died [Unlike his/her parent, A2C said that s/he does not remember any infant death case.]*

When the older generation was asked for the possible reasons behind infant mortality, many metaphysical reasons were noted:

T6P: *Since his body was bruised, people of our lands said that a bad angel called "Heleke" had hit him.*

In addition, the lack of convenient means (vehicles) to carry sick infants from rural areas to the city centres was noted as another key reason for the increase in infant deaths. A respondent from the older generation said that they had tried to carry his/her very sick sister to the hospital, but since they used a horse-drawn vehicle, they could not reach the hospital on time, so she died of a fever.

Ç4P: *My sister had not been immunized against tetanus. One day her mouth jammed, she could not say anything. It was such a very severe winter day, I remember it very well. They brought a horse-drawn carriage and then put things over the carriage. Snow was everywhere; our knees were covered in snow. Roads were closed. On one side of the carriage, my father was walking while my uncle was on the other side. But they could not continue further than the village of Ovasaray.*

Besides, measles and whooping cough, against which all children are vaccinated in our day, were noted as leading causes of infant deaths:

T4P: *Yes, I remember infant deaths because I have lost one of my siblings. Our neighbour also lost his/her two children. All of them died because of measles.*

T9P: *For example, one of my sisters, two daughters of my uncle, and one daughter of my aunt, all died of measles.*

A2P: *My sister became crippled because of measles. But unfortunately, our neighbors' child died. They were told: "Do not take your child to the doctor. It is a sin. Going to doctor at that time meant that you are committing a sinful act. "Everybody has to endure that disease; it was some kind of obligation." They sentenced their child to death.*

It was noted that some of the respondents were deprived of the facilities or possibilities to diagnose the reasons behind the infant deaths. For example, A3P and A4P used similar expressions to describe the possible cause: "They died because of temperature. That's

it.” It seems that what A4P related about his/her two dead infants might typify those experiences of the past:

V: *Have you ever lost any of your children?*

A4P: *Two of them.*

V: *Why did they die?*

A4P: *They had temperature, and died.*

V: *How old were they?*

A4P: *Each of them was one year old.*

V: *Did your acquaintances lose any of their children in those days?*

A4P: *My sister lost two of her children. A sister-in-law lost hers, too.*

A similar conversation was made with A5P:

V: *Well, do you remember anyone who lost his/her child?*

A5P: *Of course, my mother lost four of her children. She gave birth to twelve but she had to bury two of her girls and two of her boys.*

V: *Did your acquaintances lose any of their children in those times?*

A5P: *A lot of my acquaintances did. For example, my sister-in-law lost five of her children, my uncle lost six children, and another sister-in-law and my aunt both lost children. There were too many cases of infant deaths in our times. You know why? Because there were a lot of births. Each year, there were plenty of births. Each year, each year. With the dead ones, they were still able to give birth to fourteen-fifteen children. [A5C, who is the child of A5P, answered the same question as follows: “Infant deaths? No, I do not remember.”]*

I think the notions of A9P about the decreasing level of infant mortality might be the summary of this part:

A9P: *There were lots of infant deaths in the olden days. But at this moment, because of developments, hospitals, doctors, care services, education, family physicians... If something happens, we immediately take the children to the family physicians first. If it is necessary, we carry them to hospitals, which was not the case in the past.*

It should be noted that this drastic decrease in infant mortality rate among Alevi communities is in line with general developments in Turkish society.

Table B7. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-Five Mortality Rate in Turkey

Year	Infant Mortality Rate (probability of dying by age 1 per 1000 live births)	Under-Five Mortality Rate (probability of dying by age five per 1000 live births)
1960s	163	223
At the beginning of 1980s	121	152
At the beginning of 1990s	66	84
2008	17	24
2011	11,7	15
2012	11,6	No data
2013	10,8	No data

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013, February 19; 2014 April 30; World Health Organization, 2013

Ownership of Durable Goods

Based on the information given by two generations, it was noted that the new generation have had almost all necessary and primary durable goods just before marriage, while the older generation had been living in relatively empty houses or spent their first years of marriage in those empty houses. But, this contrast is a kind of mandatory diversity because even if members of the older generation could have covered the costs of durable goods, for most of them there was no chance of having a refrigerator, washing machine, dishwasher, *etc.*, because none of those goods were sold in Turkey at the time. What is more, even if all of them were on sale, there would have been no possibility to use them, because many villages in Anatolia lacked electricity and water facilities until recently.

Therefore, the answers given to the questions of “How did you keep your food cool?” and “How did you wash your clothes?” by

the older generation reflect very sharp differences between the two generations:

Washing clothes:

T3P: *We were setting up big pots to wash our clothes outside the house, along the river sides. There were no water fountains. As washing agent, we used ash.*

Ç6P: *To wash clothes, we used to make fire to get ash from oak trees. That ash was used as detergent. Sometimes, it was also used to wash the dishes.*

Keeping food cool:

A2P: *We had no refrigerators. We put our foods into a kind of small cage made of string. Let's say if there is a plate of food left, we put it into that cage up on the wall. Foods were bought daily. Tomatoes were picked up from our own garden.*

A5P: *In my time, there was no refrigerator in my mother's house. I did not have any even after marriage. I bought a wire-floored cage instead of a refrigerator. In my mother's house, we did not have any electronic devices.*

It was noted that no one from the older generation owned a motor vehicle before marriage. After hearing my question, a respondent from Tunceli astonishingly said that in the 1950s there was only one car in Tunceli. Another respondent from Adana recounted that right now, his/her neighbours are fighting for a parking lot on a street where there were no cars at all in the past:

T5C: *No, no. When I was eighteen years old, my mother got sick, she caught a terrible disease and we had to go to Elaziğ [a city next to Tunceli]. The problem was related to her gallbladder. But there was only one car in Tunceli in the 1950s, a taxi. Think about it.*

Ç2P: *How do you get the car! You couldn't find even a bike. Who could find a car at that time, not possible! When I got married 48 years ago, there were only three cars in Çorum. At the moment, even we have a car.*

Ç2C: *Obviously there are a lot of cars today. It is clear. I remember we had a very hard time finding a bridal car for our wedding ceremony. But now, when I organized a ceremony for my son's circumcision, we almost blocked the traffic in the city.*

A5P: *There was no car in the neighbourhood. Nowadays, neighbours are fighting for a parking space.*

In addition, there are considerable differences between generations in terms of household living conditions. While most of the older generation had to live in a boxy room with other relatives in the same house, those of the new generation are living in houses of their own, independent of relatives:

D10P: *I was living with three sisters-in-law, three brothers-in-law, mother-in-law, everybody. One room for us, the other rooms for them.*

A1P: *The house had four rooms, and they gave us two rooms. One room was for my sister-in-law, the other was for my mother-in-law and father-in-law.*

A2P: *In those days, we had big financial problems. My family or his family could not manage to buy or build a new house for us. My mother-in-law told me: "I will give you two small rooms, one big room, and a kitchen. There is a room outside the house, we ourselves will live there." In the end, we split their house in two.*

A3P: *I lived with my mother-in-law for nine years.*

I think the answers below of some respondents from the older generation and those of their children are the key element of this section:

T2P: *Before getting married, we had only a tiny black and white television. Except of that, we did not have any electronic devices.*

T2C: *Before getting married, I had had almost every durable goods.*

A8P: *Before getting married, I hadn't had anything at all. There was only a radio.*

A8C: *When I was single, I was living with my family. We had almost everything: refrigerator, washing machine, and later – dishwasher. So, I continued to have all of them after I got married.*

Supply of Daily Needs

The interviews indicate that Alevi communities have gone through a similar process, i.e. from being part of a traditional structure to being in a more modern structure. Having been brought up in rural

areas, most of the older generation respondents had experienced a lifestyle in which they produced what they consumed with a limited variety in food, clothes and other daily needs. For instance, many older generation respondents expressed that in their childhood they had never ever seen cheese, jam or olives, which are currently considered normal parts of an Anatolian traditional breakfast. Each family had had its own livestock, and unmechanized agricultural and animal products had been the main food sources. In contrast to the lifestyle of the older generation, the new generation had seen groceries during childhood. At present, both generations go to grocery stores, supermarkets or other shops in city centres for all their daily needs. In parallel, there is more variety in food and other daily items and needs because of industrialization. The question of “How did/ do you meet your daily needs?” was distinctively answered by the two generations:

T2P: *We did not know what cheese or jam was. One day, when I visited my uncle's house, a son of my uncle brought olives to his family. We stared at them, trying to understand what they were. After I got home I cried. I told my father, "There were black things like goat-shit. Go and ask my uncle, get their name, I want them." I was around eight/nine years old at the time. The taste was pretty different. We did not know the taste of chocolate such as Nutella or Sarelle at all. What we knew were eggs and chicken. If we had a cow or goat, then we could have produced yogurt, milk, curd, buttermilk. We also used to make lentil soup. There was nothing else.*

T4P: *We had only curds, yogurt and buttermilk. My mother used to make our breads. We ourselves used to produce them. We produced vegetables. I do not remember whether we had to buy anything because we all had our own homemade products.*

T5P: *We had never seen cheese or jam. We used to buy only products which were sold in our village such as eggs or curds.*

T6P: *Since we were living in a village, our economic situation was not good. What we had were only potatoes or wheat bread. We couldn't find even the simplest things. We used to grow our own foods.*

Ç1P: *We used to supply our own daily needs. We had livestock.*

Ç3P: *We had flocks of sheep, we had cows, chickens.*

Ç5P: *When we were living in our village, we had vineyards and orchards.*

Ç7P: *They were grown naturally.*

A5P: *There was a cow in front of each house.*

A8P: *We had a plot of land for growing plants. Our cheese was home-made, made from our own cow's milk. Today, we do not produce anything anymore.*

The answers given to the same questions by respondents from the new generation are much shorter:

T8C: *Grocery.*

A8C: *Grocery.*

A6C: *Grocery.*

Ç3C: *Grocery.*

Ç7C: *Grocery.*

It was noted that no one produces his/her own food at present time due to the modern urban life. I think what Ç6P said about being able to supply their own daily needs might well summarise this discussion:

Ç6P: *Animal husbandry was so common in our days. Therefore, we didn't know what vegetable oil was. The only thing we ate was butter. We had bees, so we had plenty of honey. We were growing our own tomatoes and cucumber in our garden. There was no grocery. Curd, honey, butter, milk, cheese were all homemade.*

Heating Methods

Although both generations have the same heating systems at the moment, the older generation used to apply very traditional and primitive systems of heating in their young days. Based on the personal narratives told by the respondents from the older generation, it was noted that wood, animal dung, coal and rubbish were used as fuel to heat up houses during their childhood. These materials had been burned in grills, *paca* (very traditional cooking place, used for

heating as well) or in quite primitive stoves. But nowadays, highly sophisticated stoves, air-conditioning technology and central heating systems have replaced those old methods:

A4P: *No heating stove, no nothing. All siblings had to sleep together side by side to warm themselves up.*

A5P: *When I was little, we used to have a kind of tool that resembles a grill. It was made of mud. We were burning coal on it to heat our rooms. And we put our quilts over us. Those were our stoves.*

A6P: *My mother used to buy some kind of coal to burn. While she was kneading them like kneading flour, we were helping her. That kneaded coals were shaped like rings and then dried. Besides, we used to burn dried dung. Our heating tool was a kind of primitive grill. Those grills were made of mud and were placed in the middle of the room with dried coal or dung in them. Every morning and evening, one coal was broken and then burned on it. That was how we heated ourselves. Now, we all have air-conditioners and electric stoves to warm ourselves.*

T1P: *With a heating stove. We called them a sheet metal stove in Erzinçan. We used to put wood on the stove. For a very long time we used this system. There was no coal, no cabin heater, up until the 70s and 80s. After that, we started getting central heating systems.*

T3P: *We used to light fire on a cooker using very thick woods. Sometimes, we used to burn rubbish. Then stoves were invented, and everybody started to use them. Now, we have central heating systems.*

T6P: *With stove.*

T8P: *Wood-burning stove.*

Ç6P: *Generally, we used wood burning stones, and sometimes we used dried dung and chaff.*

Ç7P: *In our childhood, we used to heat ourselves with wood or dried dung.*

Some of the respondents from the new generation confirmed that they were born in houses with central heating:

T6C: *I do not remember any of our houses having a stove. As far as I can remember, I have only been living in houses with a central heating system.*

T8C: *When I was little, we had central heating at home, and we still use it.*

Table B8. Changing Heating Methods and Their Fuels in Alevi Communities

Time	Heating Methods	Fuels
Long Ago	Grill, Paca, Primitive Stoves	Woods, Dried Dung, Rubbish, Coal
Before	More Sophisticated Stoves	Woods, Coal, Gas, Electricity, Propane cylinder
Now	Central Heating System, Air-Conditioner	Electricity, Oil, Water

Hot Water Access

In the field research, very striking differences between the two generations were noted on the subject of hot water accessibility. However, after conducting a number of interviews, it did not take long to realise that not only hot water but even instant accessibility to potable water was not the case for many respondents from the older generation. Although I had not thought about investigating the accessibility of instant potable water just because I had already *de facto* assumed that there would have been no differences between generations on this subject, it was noted that the two generations also have a widening gulf with regard to instant potable water. Many respondents from the older generation said that they had been obtaining water either from the fountains in the village square or from wells dug in their own gardens. But, at the present time, all respondents from both generations have access to both instant hot and potable waters. Water heaters, solar energy and central heating boilers have emerged as the most widely used methods. Some of the explanatory responses from both generations to the question of “Did you have instant access to hot water in your childhood?” might provide an overall general impression with regard to the generation gap:

T2P: *There was none. We took a bath in rivers or fountains. Our family members were all doing the same thing there. A big pot was built to boil water by riversides or fountains.*

T2C: *Currently, we are using water heaters and solar energy, we have all of them.*

T6P: *No, we didn't have any.*

T6C: *Whenever we wanted, we had access because we had water heater. Now we are also using solar energy.*

C3P: *No, we did not have any hot-water system. Actually, we did not have a tap water system either. If we needed water for drinking, taking a bath, cooking, we went to the village fountain and carried our water with buckets. The tap water system of our village was set up in 1994, which was something new. Currently, thanks to modern facilities like bath heater and water heater, we have instant access to hot water.*

C7P: *We did not have even instant cold water. We carried buckets of water from fountains.*

A2P: *We heated up water outside the house using woods during winter time. In summer, we put water outside the house under the sun, and we used those for showers. In those days, we did not have solar technology on the roof of houses.*

A4P: *There were no fountains near to us at the time; therefore, everybody dug a well right next to their houses.*

A5P: *Thanks to the wood burning stove, we had hot water in our bathroom, made of mud. The stove was set up inside but we lit it outside to heat up the bathroom. Since there was not even a fountain, we got our water from the well via a pump.*

Modern Medical Facilities

Interviews conducted with Alevis indicate that they have also experienced similar transformations in medical facilities. Generations exhibit clear-cut differences with regard to the diagnosis of diseases and treatment modalities. The new generation seems to enjoy modern medical facilities much more than the older generation and it is more inclined to talk about the causes of diseases within the framework of modern medicine. Besides, remarkable differences in the

treatment of diseases between generations were noted. For example, the thoughts and actions of the older generation (e.g. punching for headache, dying due to bad angels, using salivary juice as antibiotic, staunching blood flow via melted belt fabric, having thought that going to hospitals is a sin, going to Alevi men of religion for dental inflammation) are not familiar to the new generation. Analogously, most of the older generation respondents said that they had never ever visited a doctor or been to a medical institution in their childhoods. Not surprisingly, the following metaphysical explanations with regard to diagnosis of the diseases were stated by the older generation respondents:

T1P: *If someone was discoloured, it was said that s/he had been hit by demons. No one knew what a heart attack was. Let's say a woman died of bleeding during childbirth, but in those days it was believed that a jinni called "heleke" actually came and took her lungs. Because of that belief, people were waiting with the woman for three days after childbirth to prevent the jinn from taking her lung.*

T3P: *In those times, people could not diagnose the diseases. They did not know what they are. Heart attack was assumed as being hit by jinn. Nobody knew what the diseases were.*

A5P: *For example, at the present time, people know what blood pressure is, but not in the olden days. They kept on saying, "my brain was hit by blood."*

Ç7C: *For example, when I was little I had jaundice and my family believed that it happened because of the birth of my little brother. For them, being jealous of my brother was the reason for having jaundice.*

It was noted that having used religion-related alternative methods of treatment due to the lack then of modern medical facilities was common among the older generation respondents. Visiting men of religion, wearing an amulet, using salivary juice of men of religion were verbalized as methods of treatment for the cases of dental infections, facial paralysis, mumps, warts, psychological problems and situations of paralysis among older generation respondents:

T4P: *For example, if our teeth were infected, we visited the men of religion to ask them to say a prayer for us.*

T7P: *If the case was facial palsy, then my parents used to say, "Oh, let's go to a dede before anyone sees it."*

Ç1P: *For instance, my sibling's mouth was distorted one day, and his/her mouth was rubbed by the dede. That was our belief. If someone was paralyzed, could not walk or could not have a baby, then they were all taken to the Alevi men of religion.*

Ç2C: *If anyone had wart on his/her body, they asked my father to spit on those warts. Besides, he used a razor blade to scratch those warts. Since it was assumed that this healing power was passed on from one generation to another, I would have been supposed to have the same healing power if I happen to replace my father. I remember my father had to spit at least ten-fifteen times in a week.*

Ç5P: *I remember, since a pregnant woman had problems while giving birth, she was taken to the higher places on the back of an ox-driven cart. But it didn't work. After that, people came to my school and got permission from my teacher to take me. They took me from school because they wanted me to rub the pregnant woman's backside. They thought that, being son of a dede, if my hand would touch her, it might help her in the childbearing.*

Ç7C: *There was a shrine for people having jaundice.*

A4C: *I was taken to a man of religion after I got mumps. He scratched my cheek with a razor blade and then recited some verses.*

A2C: *As far as I remember, when my aunt became severely sick with typhoid with severe fever, she was not taken to the hospital because it was thought that going to the hospital was a sinful act.*

Some members of the older generation respondents said that although they had wanted to use more secular methods of treatment, the secular methods they managed to use were quite different from modern medicine due to the lack of doctors and medical institutions at the time. Besides, having the chance then to visit a doctor did not mean that there would be sufficient treatment. Since there was no specialized treatment as well as a general lack of doctors, the entire town would visit the same doctor for completely different diseases. Moreover, using punching as a painkiller, treating wounds with tobacco leaves, melting animal fat to prevent cold, or cutting swelling parts with a razor blade, had been considered secular alter-

native methods of treatment that had nothing to do with modern medicine:

A5P: *We did not have money to take medical treatment. We produced our own pills; it was a kind of self-medication. For example, my mother fell from a grapevine and her foot became swollen and discoloured. I swear to God if that would happen today, we have to call an ambulance. But she just held a razor blade in her hand and made a cut several times into that swollen foot.*

A6P: *There was only one doctor and all of us went to him for every disease. Dermatology, internal medicine, broken foot... since there was no specialization, we would go to him for everything. But now the situation is different.*

T1P: *Let me tell you the way to stop bleeding. First, you need to pierce a belt and take a tiny piece of cloth from it to burn. And if you put that melt cloth on the wound, then you stop the bleeding.*

T2P: *My brother always had a headache. To prevent his headache, my father used to cut the head of the witch-grass and put it into the nose of my brother. After that, he used to tap my brother's nose with his fist to make it bleed and then his headache would subside.*

T4P: *When I was little I had black spots like acne under my knees. We used dried tobacco leaves to heal them. Our neighbour used to have dry tobacco leaves on his ceiling. Then we used to put oil on those dried leaves. Those leaves were used to put on the spots under my knees. I writhed for at least a month. I still have the scars.*

T5P: *I could not go to the hospital. How can you go to a hospital if there is no such place? A woman melted the fat of fried meat and added ash to it. Then she put it on my chest. I was relieved. My fever was brought down.*

Ç4P: *Measles, mumps and malaria were the diseases we had often. For treatment, I used to take a rest, no treatment at all. We had no chance of treatment. Men of religion used to scratch our cheek. If we had measles and malaria, we just had to stay in bed without treatment. No treatment, no doctor.*

When respondents from the older generation were asked, "What would you do if the same diseases were to happen in your life?," all of them - without exception - said that they would take advantage of modern medical facilities:

T4P: *If my children would have black spots under their knees like I had when I was a child, I would take them to the hospital instead of using dried tobacco leaves.*

T7P: *Right now, a person from my family has facial paralysis but he goes to a hospital in Istanbul. Of course, we take him to the doctor.*

Ç2C: *No, no one is coming anymore to be spitted on. As far as I know, this tradition has almost disappeared.*

Ç7C: *If my child would have jaundice right now, I would not take him/her to a shrine anymore.*

A5C: *If my daughter injures her leg, she would be taken to an orthopaedic hospital immediately. Surely, an expert has to deal with it. She has to have an MRI scan or X-Ray as part of her treatment. It is not possible or wise to use the old methods anymore.*

A2C: *If I get sick now, of course I would benefit from social welfare. I can go to the hospital to be treated in the modern facilities there.*

A4C: *If my daughter would have mumps now, absolutely I would take her immediately to a hospital.*

I think reading the answers by A6P and his/her child A6C together might give an overall impression of the generation gap on the subject of modernization of health care:

A6P: *For instance, when my baby was born, s/he was crying all the time. My mom said that "you have never taken this child to the men of religion, or asked them to write verses. This is the reason behind all this crying." After that, we visited a man of religion for an amulet and my baby became better. That was common at the time. We used to go for such things.*

A6C: *I think visiting men of religion for diseases is inconceivable. And I have never ever visited a man of religion for any reason nor had anyone from my family, and I will never go.*

Like previous transformations, this transformation experienced by the Alevi communities is in line with the transformation that Turkey as a whole has experienced. For example, while measles, whooping cough and malaria had been mentioned by the older generation respondents with great sadness due to the ensuing deaths, the new generation either does not know what they are or have al-

ready been treated in modern medical facilities. The following table clearly illustrates the similar developments that Alevi communities and Turkey as a whole have both undergone.

Table B9. The Figure of Case and Deaths Related to Polio, Pertussis and Diphtheria, 1970-2003, Turkey

	Population	Number of Cases			Number of Deaths		
		Polio	Pertussis	Diphtheria	Polio	Pertussis	Diphtheria
1970	35,321,000	701	7268	1110	39	21	63
1980	44,438,000	182	1520	86	7	9	8
1990	57,582,000	24	454	20	2	2	0
1999	65,819,000	0	528	4	0	1	1
2003	71,772,711	0	255	1	0	1	0

Source: Altun, 2008

In parallel to Table B9, Ç3P said that diseases like measles, malaria or mumps are no longer seen in his/her social environment:

Ç3P: *I do not encounter those diseases any more. They have disappeared. Major transformations have taken place.*

It seems that what Alevi communities have experienced with regard to modern medicines is not independent from the rest of Turkey. What pregnant A7C said about modern medicine seems to explain quite well the transformation among Alevis as well as the rest of the country:

A7C: *At present, due to the vaccination technology, diseases can be treated even in the womb. For example, now we have the technology that whether or not a foetus has any genetic diseases, it can be diagnosed. So if s/he has diabetes and if it is necessary, they can now inject insulin to a foetus in the effort to save it.*

Those mentioned above quite clearly revealed the gap between the two generations. However, this gap does not mean that the new

generation has nothing to do with supranatural beliefs or they never ask men of religion for help. Even though it is a lot less, the new generation does visit holy places or goes to figures of religion as the last resort for incurable diseases like cancer, stroke, or warts. Firstly, they try to find solutions within the framework of modern medical facilities. If modern medicine is not sufficient to treat the disease, then they start to search for religious methods under the motto of “I have nothing to lose”.

It should be noted that with regard to usage of modern medicine there seems to be no difference between generations as of the year 2015. On the basis of interviews, it might be said that welfare state facilities, the expansion of accessibility to medical institutions, and decrease in the cost of modern medical facilities have rendered alternative methods of treatment (secular or non-secular) and supranatural powers less popular in terms of treatment of diseases for both generations.

Social Environment

From the interviews, it was reported that the new generation was more engaged in dialogue with non-Alevis. It seems that going to university and having a job in city centres are the key reasons for experiencing more diverse social environments than their parents. While 70 % of the new generation has a university diploma, this figure decreases to 6,6 % for the older generation. In addition, most of the older generation respondents had spent their time in villages or towns before marriage. Therefore, unlike the older generation, the new generation had become more open to having a non-Alevi friend, spouse or business partner. The answers that the generations had given to the question of “How was your social environment just before marriage?” are presented below, one after the other:

T6P: *Before marriage, I only lived with Alevis. My village was full of only Alevis.*

T6C: *When I went to Bolu for my university studies, my classmates' backgrounds were all different.*

T7P: *There were only Alevi in my village.*

T7C: *Before I got married, there were Sunni people all around me in İstanbul during my university studies. I have lots of Sunni friends. I accept people as they are, without any bias. Therefore, their faith is not my business. There is no such thing as Alevi being genetically good people. There are very bad people among Alevi just as they are among Sunnis. Therefore, I do not discriminate. For example, my boyfriend in İstanbul was a non-Alevi.*

T10P: *Our villages were filled with only Alevi.*

T10C: *Of course, I encountered non-Alevi people all the time because of my education and work.*

Ç1P: *There were no Sunnis in our village. Everyone was Alevi.*

Ç1C: *For example, our friends in high school were Sunnis. And we got along with them quite well.*

Ç5P: *We moved to the city centres. Then we started going to high schools where our classmates were Sunnis. While fulfilling our compulsory military service, our mates were also Sunnis. In our workplaces, we worked with Sunnis.*

Ç5C: *In high school, I enrolled in a tourism high school which was located in an area where mostly Sunni people live. In our class, there were only three or four Alevi students while the rest of them, 20-25 students, were Sunnis. But we had no trouble or discrimination. The experience at university was similar.*

Ç6C: *When I was a student in Konya, I had many non-Alevi friends. There were only two Alevi out of 42 students. When we became university students, we encountered people from different backgrounds. I lived in a dormitory where I had no Alevi friends at all as most of the people were Sunnis. Our relationship was very good.*

Ç7C: *We had more Sunni friends at university.*

A1P: *By the time I got married, we only had Alevi, as everybody was Alevi.*

A1C: *By the time of my marriage, I had worked for the Finansbank Call Centre, Elçin Catering, and Garanti Pension Directorate General. I*

mean, there were people from all backgrounds around you; I met lots of non-Alevi people.

A2P: *Because we were living in a very homogeneous environment, all our colleagues were Alevis. The only place where we used to encounter non-Alevis was Çiftehan [Çiftehan is a spa area 100 km from Adana.]. Since they were staying in rooms next to us, we came across them often. Apart from them, there were no non-Alevis in our neighbourhood.*

A2C: *By the time of my marriage, my social life was mainly to do with non-Alevi. I generally encountered non-Alevis in workplaces or at university.*

A6P: *There were only Alevis around us. Actually, we were not allowed to make friendship with Sunnis. So, marriage was also forbidden. But at present, even I myself do not prevent my grandson from making friendship with non-Alevis; no need for that kind of thing anymore.*

A6C: *Before marriage, I had been living in a heterogeneous social environment. I used to encounter Sunnis in high school since it was not possible to see them in other places. My district area was made up of just Alevis. But the school environment and school friends were mixed. There were Kurds, Sunnis, Lazs; you could find everybody at school.*

A7P: *There were no Sunnis at all around us. Everybody was Alevi.*

A7C: *Before marriage, our social environment was made of different groups. I was working and studying at the time.*

A8P: *Alevis were the main group in my environment.*

A8C: *80% or 90% of the people around me were Sunnis because my university was in Ankara.*

To finish this discussion, it is necessary to give a striking example of how people from a Sunni village had assumed that Alevis were abnormal. Ç9P said that villagers in his first work place, a small Sunni village in the district of Tirebolu/Giresun, had believed that Alevis were physiologically inhuman creatures. That was the reason why those villagers had not believed that Ç9P is an Alevi:

Ç9P: *In 1977, I was working in a Sunni village. They did not believe that I am an Alevi. They did not expect to see an Alevi who physically resembles them. For them, an Alevi should have had a tail and horn. Let me tell you an interesting story. A young guy was expected to come to the village but he had been late. When he arrived, others asked him*

for the reason why he had been so late. He said this: “We were running out of oil when we were passing Çorum. We had to wait in queue for a tanker truck. But when it arrived, an Alevi used force to take our place. He used his tail and horn to beat us. He held us with his tail, and threw us out with his horn.”

Independent Home Life and City Visits

In the field research, it was noted that the younger generation Alevis from the three regions had been more inclined to live away from their family before marriage, and the number of cities they had visited was much larger than the number of cities visited by their parents. Having a chance to get a higher education away from home and increase in the age of marriage were noted as the key reasons paving the way for parents-free home life before marriage. On the other hand, a majority of the older generation respondents had only left their parents to live elsewhere after marriage.

Table B10. The number of people who lived apart from family before marriage (Out of 10)

	Older Generation	New Generation
Tunceli	1	5
Adana	-	6
Çorum	5	10

Besides, answers given to the question of “Which cities did you visit before marriage?” are also important for indicating the striking difference between the generations. For example, while T4P had seen just one city (Elazığ) before marriage, his/her child T4C named seven cities (Trabzon, Kars, Aydın, Bingöl, Muğla, Ankara, İstanbul). Similarly, while Ç1P had not been to another city before marriage, his/her child Ç1C had been to İzmir, İstanbul, Kars, Ankara, Samsun, and Kastamonu due to his/her higher education. It may be clearly stated that these figures reflect the general pattern:

Ç3P: *Two cities*

Ç3C: *Eleven cities (at least)*

Ç7P: *None*

Ç7C: *Seven cities (at least)*

A1P: *None*

A1C: *Ten cities (at least)*

A2P: *One city*

A2C: *Five cities (at least)*

A5P: *One city*

A5C: *Five cities (at least)*

As a last remark, this subsection might be summarized by saying that the new generation respondents, in comparison to their parents, had found more opportunities to live independently before marriage and to visit other cities on account of the expansion of higher education and development in the infrastructure regarding transportation, i.e. modernization.

The Average Age of First Marriage

When it comes to the respondents of this study, it was reported that the average age of first marriage among the new generation is higher than that among the older generation.

Table B11. Average Age of First Marriage

	Older Generation	New Generation
Tunceli	19	23,4
Adana	20	28,4
Çorum	19,2 (out of 5)	23,6 (out of 5)

In light of the interviews, it can be said that the most crucial reason behind these figures is higher education (70 % of the new generation had a university degree). After enrolling at university,

young people, regardless of gender, want to get a diploma and then find a job before marriage.

Again, this transformation with regard to the age of marriage seems to be consistent with the reality in the rest of Turkey.

Table B12. Average Age on First Marriage in Turkey

Year	Woman	Man
1940s	19	23
2014	23,7	26,9

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009, TSI, 2014 March 26

Types of Marriage

Interviews reveal that most of the older generation respondents had to marry the persons that had been chosen by their parents. Otherwise, they had been forced to run away with the person they love when there was no consent from their parents. It had been very common to marry a person they had never seen or loved. 83,3 % of the new generation had an autonomous marriage while this figure drops to 13,3 % for the older generation. In parallel, while the number of the older generation's consanguineous marriages is 5 out of 30, this figure drops to 1 for the new generation.

Table B13. Types of Marriage

	Tunceli		Çorum		Adana	
	Older Gen.	New Gen.	Older Gen.	New Gen.	Older Gen.	New Gen.
Forced Marriage ⁴²	2	-	1	-	-	-
Arranged Marriage	4	3	9	1	8	1
Autonomous Marriage	2	7	-	9	2	9
Marriage without Family Consent ⁴³	2	-	-	-	-	-

To put Table B13 more explicitly, respondents' very own expressions might be helpful. As it is obvious from the older generation respondents' statements, there was no right for them to choose the person to marry, and many of them had been married to a person without seeing his/her face beforehand, even once:

T5P: *No, no, of course not. We were living in a very conservative time. Girls and boys could not see each other. It was strictly forbidden to talk to a boy even on the street. I had never seen even my fiancé. We never talked. I think I saw him from a distance once when they came to our house to ask my parents' permission for him to marry me. After one month of being engaged, we got married.*

Ç2P: *In the past, we had fear of our mother-father. Those times were different to today's. I swear to God I married my wife without seeing her face even once. My mother went and chose her for me. That's it. [However, Ç2C, who is the child of Ç2P, had lived in the same house with his/her partner before marriage.]*

A5P: *Neither I nor he was introduced to each other. We were engaged for a year but even our hands never touched. His big brother decided instead of him.*

42 Forced marriage is a marriage where duress is used as a sanction by parents upon the person who does not give his/her consent for marriage. According to Phillips and Dustin (2004), parents play a leading role in the selection of mates, and the potential spouse has no right to say no even though s/he may not want it.

43 Marriage without family consent is a marriage in which potential spouses get married in spite of their families' wishes and preference.

A4P: *My mother told me that my aunt's son wants to marry me. I swear to God I did not know. I told my mother, "Whatever you say."*

Ç4P: *She was my uncle's daughter, i.e. granddaughter of my father's uncle. We grew up in the same houses and environments. We had never talked about this subject. But my grandfather had already decided to marry us. And if he said so, it meant that we did not have any other option. When I went to the Netherlands to work, my family had me engaged. I did not know that I had been engaged to anyone.*

While forced marriages and marriages without family consent are not normally encountered among the new generation, those two types were added to the table due to certain expressions from some older generation respondents. It should be noted that while the number of forced marriages is not remarkable in Table B13, this is because in the time of the older generations, whatever the parents or elders of the large family decided, it was *de facto* accepted:

T10P: *I did not want him, so I was crying. My cousin kept saying, "he is a good boy, don't worry". But we had never seen each other before. If he entered the room, I would leave. There was no talking between us. We married without seeing each other. [Unlike T10P, T10C had opportunities of being alone with her fiancé, of going to cinemas and cafés with her fiancé, of holding hands with him, and had not been pressured by her parents.]*

To sum up, it might be said that Alevi communities have gone through a general process of modernizing societies in terms of types of marriages. That is to say, Alevis have been experiencing a transformation in consciousness from the traditional approach to marriage on the one hand (in which the person to marry is chosen by family elders and that individuals have almost no right to choose or even to express their opinion) to the more modern approach to marriage on the other (in which people are relatively freer with regard to mate selection). In light of the interviews, it would not be wrong to claim that there has been an increase in the tendency among young Alevis toward a more individualistic lifestyle.

GENERATION GAP WITH REGARD TO MARITAL ISSUES

Premarital Dating

In this study, dating is defined as a meeting between two persons beyond the level of friendship, with the aim of finding a proper mate or just for sexual reasons. Dating before marriage and all kinds of flirting between individuals out of marriage are considered some of the biggest sins in the traditional Alevi faith (Bayatlı, 1957).

On the basis of the interviews, it might be said that the frequency and intensity of datings had undergone a drastic change in three Alevi regions.

Table B14. Premarital Datings

	Tunceli		Çorum		Adana	
	Older Generation	New Generation	Older Generation	New Generation	Older Generation	New Generation
None	10	2	10	-	10	2
During Education	-	7	-	10	-	7
At Work	-	1	-	-	-	1

The reason why respondents of the older generation kept dating or that kind of relations at a distance is not because they themselves had been against premarital datings or because they had not ever desired to be in that kind of relations, but rather because it had been forbidden by their Alevi communities in rural areas. Some answers given to the question of “Had you ever dated before marriage?” by the respondents of the older generation are as follows:

A3P: *No, we couldn't. We were so afraid. We didn't want to dishonour our family.*

A5P: *Never. No one had ever dated before marriage in those times.*

A6P: *We couldn't have boyfriends because we were brought up like that. We were taught in that way. It was not possible. Neither I nor my friends could have dated. At the present time, yes it has become normal. My grandchildren have dates so do our neighbours' grandchildren.*

A7P: *No, I hadn't. Those kinds of things were forbidden in those days. Our mothers were continually warning us (girls). We were constantly warned not to dishonour our families.*

C3P: *No, I had not. Those things had not been the case for children of our age. If a guy had fallen in love with someone, then they had to marry.*

C7P: *No, I had not. "Shame" and "sin" were the two words that shaped our lives.*

C8P: *It was forbidden of course. It was not possible to go out with a guy. We had always made friends with girls. We hadn't flirted.*

T9P: *No, because in those days that kind of things could not happen. We were living in an environment in which everybody knew each other. Children had known the old people, and old people, likewise, had known the new generation. Even if a girl had been engaged to someone, she could not see her fiancé's face. We were living with all our old people, grandfathers and fathers. These old people used to decide on our behalf. They used to communicate among themselves. So, it had been very difficult to see each other as engaged people. You could not sit next to your fiancé, or talk to her/him, especially next to an old person.*

Ç3C: *There was only one café called Divan. Having had three floors, we, as high school students, used to go there. Our dating style was different to what you think. You could not go to a café with your date alone; you had to be with your friends to camouflage your date. It was a bit bizarre but there was no other option. Our girlfriends could not attempt other types. The population of Çorum in 1983-84 was about 100,000. Everybody knew each other. So there was no chance for another kind of flirting.*

While 63-year-old T5C belongs to the new generation in this study, because of her/his age he had also experienced those times in which premarital datings had been strictly forbidden (T5C's parent, T5P, is 82 years old) due to the lack of urbanization:

T5C: *You could only watch, that was flirting. No movie houses, no cafés. Those things did not happen then. People were living all together. The population was a lot less than today's. Everybody was aware of what others were doing. Those kinds of flirts were seen as sinful.*

In the Table B14., it seems that nobody had dated before marriage among the older generation respondents. Actually some older generation respondents did answer the question of "Had you ever dated before marriage?" in the affirmative. However, with the help of further in-depth questions, soon after it became clear that the words dating or flirting they referred to were completely different from their meaning in this study. Secretly exchanging letters or having a platonic love is considered dating/flirting among some of the older generation respondents:

Ç6P: *Of course, every young person had had that kind of flirting.*

V: *So how had you established contact?*

Ç6P: *You just put a letter in a matchbox and you threw it. Girls used to do the same thing. Otherwise, it was not possible...*

T10P: *Very secretly. We were using letters in those days. There was no chance to meet face-to-face. A go-between sometimes helped.*

V: *Going out?*

T10P: *No, no, absolutely not. They were so conservative; girls-boys could not see one another. Talking to a boy on the street was strictly forbidden.*

V: *Had your friends been in those kinds of relationships?*

T7P: *Of course, they had been. Every young girl and boy used to have that kind of friendship.⁴⁴*

V: *How had they met or seen each other?*

T7P: *By means of letters. Believe me, my spouse used to send letters to me before marriage.*

44 In Turkey, it is common for conservative people to use the word friendship in reference to dating.

V: *Why hadn't you met at cafés?*

T7P: *Forbidden. Our parents had never permitted us to meet.*

V: *Had people at your age the chance to date before marriage?*

A8P: *Yes, of course they had.*

V: *What were the ways to meet?*

A8P: *For example, they used to send letters, or send message via go-between people.*

It was noted that respondents' social environments as well as their living places (urban or rural) and their educational levels had played a decisive role in the tendency towards premarital datings. In addition, having lived in the same house with a date before marriage was mentioned by some respondents who studied outside of their hometown or had business far away from family which is the result of urbanization and industrialism:

A2C: *I and my date had been living together in Istanbul before marriage. We had dated for six years. Our families knew that we were living together.*

Ç2C: *I was living independently from my family throughout my university years and my girlfriend used to visit me all the time. We lived together in the last year of my study in Erzurum.*

A1C: *I used to visit my boyfriend frequently when I was living in Istanbul. He also came to my house. We spent nights together.*

Here are some answers given by respondents to the questions of "What would be the reasons behind this transformation?", "How would it become possible for the young generation to live with their dates in the same house while their parents had not even seen the face of their fiancées?". Urbanization, educational opportunities, population growth, and development in technology were the ones mentioned with a capital letter:

Ç3C: *Young people of this age are very free. They can walk hand in hand; they kiss each other at the parks. There are cafés all around us. They go to the gym together. Most of them are university students*

who came to Çorum from other cities. But I have to say that Çorumian young people are also flirting.

T6C: *We, I and my girlfriend, were using cell phones to communicate. Therefore, it was so easy to establish contact. We had never used letters or other means. We often talked on the internet via MSN.*

A5P: *I got married when I was sixteen years old. At that time, there was no television, dailies. I am a primary school graduate. No internet. No laptop. We did not know anything. We just learned how to read basic sentences.*

Ç2C: *Thinking about earlier times, there were only two main streets in Çorum. And if you would have tried to walk with your girlfriend side by side, 30 percent of the people on the street would already have known you, and all of them would have thought that there was something between you and your girlfriend even if the distance would be more than one meter. But, the city is much more crowded today. Population density is much higher now, particularly during summer time. Therefore, it is easier to have a date today. Due to the new and modern environment, they would not be spotted easily.*

To draw a clearer picture of the generation gap in terms of premarital dating, answers from both generation to the question of “Had you ever dated before marriage?” are listed one after the other. As can be seen, when it comes to premarital dating the new generation seems to have experienced a very distinctive way of going about it in comparison to their parents:

T7P: *No, I had not. It was forbidden. Our parents had never allowed us to have that kind of things.*

T7C: *Before marriage, I had had a date; I had met my date in high school. We had been going to cafés often. Sometimes movie houses... We also met privately.*

A5P: *Never. No one could have had a date.*

A5C: *Yes, I had. I had met her at preparatory school when I was seventeen or eighteen years old. We had held hands, spent time privately, kissed and hugged each other. I had had other dates also at university.*

Ç2P: *How was that possible! Not at all. In the past, we had fear of our parents. Those times were different to today's. I swear to God I*

married my wife without seeing her face even once. My mother went and chose her for me. That's it. And you are asking me whether I had a chance to date someone in that time!

Ç2C: *I had had a date in high school. There were several places to meet. We used to go to the movie houses so as not to be spotted. Or we used to sit in dark corners of the cafés. We spent time privately but of course she used to refrain from this situation. There were convenient places around school, we used to meet there, and sometimes we used to go to pinetums. The films had no importance at all in movie houses. It was dark and no one could see us. I was living independently from my family throughout my university years and my girlfriend used to visit me all the time. We lived together in the last year of my study in Erzurum.*

A1P: *My father was a very conservative person. We were not allowed to see even the sons of our uncle, i.e. our male cousins. He did not permit us to talk to anyone. After he went to work, we had to stay at home. There was no possibility to make a conversation with any person. Even a male fly could not enter our house. It was forbidden.*

A1C: *Right after graduation from high school, I started to date. I met my first date in a circle of friends. He asked my phone number, and it continued for nine months. Just before marriage, I had already a boyfriend for four years. I had met him on Facebook. I used to visit my boyfriend frequently when I was living in Istanbul. He also came to my house. We spent nights together. It wasn't a problem at all.*

A2P: *Before marriage, I had never had a boyfriend.*

A2C: *I met my boyfriends through a friend, at university, and on the internet. Some of my boyfriends were introduced to my family. But not all of them. My family did not know my short-term dates, only the long-term ones.*

A7P: *No, that was forbidden. Girls were all the time warned by their mothers not to dishonour their families. That's it. I married without having had any dates beforehand.*

A7C: *Before marriage I had had a few dates at university.*

Regarding this issue, the question of “If your children or grandchildren had / have dated before marriage, what was / would be your

reaction?" is posed to the respondents. The answers run parallel to those expressed above. Since the new generation had already premarital dates before marriage, they also did not object to their children's premarital datings. Some of the older generation respondents said that they had already started to consider datings/flirts as part of the reality of life and that they had stopped trying to lean against the wind. It seems that the answers given to the questions summarize well enough the transformation in terms of consciousness:

T4P: *I call it "age", and would say nothing more than that.*

T4C: *Of course I want them to have flirts.*

T7P: *Now, there is too much freedom. No one wonders what elder people think about their dates anymore. They are going out and meeting. The ratio of flirts has increased.*

T7C: *I think they should have some experience. It is good that I had had many flirts before my marriage and I had experienced many things before marriage. If there is no vital problem in my marriage now, I think it's related to those experiences. Your decisions and choices become much more solid. Therefore, I want my son to grow up immediately and to fall in love with a girl and to tell me, "I love a girl".*

T8C: *I approach this affirmatively. If I restrict her/him, if I cross him/her, if I say "you will not do this and this", then s/he will hide everything from me and start to tell lies. Therefore, I do not think that I will restrict my child on this subject.*

T5P: *For me it is normal. This is the new age. I go along with this.*

T9C: *There is no problem with my child flirting.*

T10C: *My daughter has already started to date.*

Ç7C: *I am not against it. I think it should be allowed.*

A2C: *Since I myself have done flirting several times, there is no problem for me. Of course they should be open to flirting.*

A3C: *Let's talk about twenty years from now. My daughter will introduce her boyfriend by saying, "he is my boyfriend." And my son will introduce her girlfriend by saying, "she is the girl I will marry". We cannot prevent this anymore because it is not an easy job to follow all their daily activities.*

A6P: *No I do not oppose this. Having a flirt before marriage is better. They should know each other, and they should be allowed to meet.*

A6C: *It is surely normal to flirt. He has to have a flirt so as to know women. He has to flirt to find the best option.*

A9P: *I want them to date before marriage.*

A9C: *I should be sympathetic towards those relations because I have experienced them before. My spouse agrees with me.*

Without any exception, all respondents from the two generations agree that the new generation is much more open to premarital relations while the older generation has already considered premarital datings a rite of passage. I think this might be considered a drastic change in the mindset of Alevis. Besides, it is highly likely that the new generation will not consider premarital datings something to escape from or a sin or shame since they are already born into it in urban areas. In this case, it would not be wrong to say that there is no sign of this secular trend being reversed towards a religious one.

The Faith of (Potential) Partner

A strict endogamy is considered an obligation among traditional Alevi communities (Çem, 2010; Yaman, 2012). Getting married to a non-Alevi would result in crisis, i.e. it might even lead to the excommunication of that “traitor” if not capital punishment, as it happened countless of times in Anatolia (Bayatlı, 1957). But there are only just a few studies that investigate the problems of interfaith marriage (Çatlı, 2008; Balkanlıoğlu, 2012).

Zeidan (1999: 76) neatly explains how getting married to a non-Alevi is a great crime in Alevism:

Alevis were forbidden to proselytise, and Alevism regenerated itself internally by paternal descent. To prevent penetration by hostile outsiders, the Alevis insisted on strict endogamy, which eventually made them into a quasi-ethnic group. Excommunication was the ultimate punishment threatening those who married outsiders, cooperated with outsiders economically, or ate with outsiders. It was also forbidden to use the state (Sunni) courts.

There is no quantitative data on Alevi/non-Alevi marriages, for the name of the sect is not asked for by registry offices. Therefore, giving nationwide data on interfaith marriages is not possible. However, in light of the interviews and several academic works (Erdemir, 2004; Çatlı, 2008; Balkanlıoğlu, 2012) it can be stated that the tendency among young Alevis to get married to a non-Alevi is higher than their parents.

Table B15. The Number of People Married to a Non-Alevi (Out of 10)

	Older Generation	New Generation
Tunceli	-	1
Çorum	-	2
Adana	-	1

Respondents from both generations clearly stressed that there had been a steady increase in the number of interfaith marriages and at the present time a non-Alevi bride or groom might be found in almost every extended family.

Tunceli Region:

T10P: *If my husband was not an Alevi, my father would not have allowed us to get married. My brother's daughter ran away with a Sunni guy from a Sunni village next to our village. No one has ever seen that girl since then. Maybe she has grandchildren now.*

What was said by the child of T10P on this issue is quite remarkable in terms of highlighting the generation gap:

T10C: *There have been mixed marriages in our family. No groom but brides. No one opposed those mixed marriages. I said there was no groom but actually back in the days my sister was engaged to a Sunni guy. Then they broke up. They were working together then in the same hospital as doctors.*

T10C thinks that the key reason behind interfaith marriages is socialization among people from different backgrounds in the work place in urban areas, i.e. urbanization and capitalism. The impres-

sions and observations of T1P and his/her child T1C show similarities to those of T10C:

T1P: *I can say that the number of mixed marriages is much higher at present. There has been an increase. Why? Because people have migrated to İstanbul and Ankara. They met new people there; each side has embraced the other.*

T1C: *An educated person might be appointed to Tunceli, then s/he might meet a person from Tunceli. Sometimes these relations may end up in a mixed marriage. Because of my job⁴⁵, I have observed an increase in the number of mixed marriages.*

Having been married to a non-Alevi and having two non-Alevi daughters-in-law, T5C seems to support what was described by T1P:

T5C: *I did not pay attention to the denomination to which my daughters-in-law belong. My children are married to Sunnis. One is living in İstanbul and the other in İzmir.*

Despite the desire of their parents, it was noted that there had been an increase in the number of new generation respondents who are religiously unmusical with regard to marriage. The answers of T7P and T7C might be given as examples:

T7P: *My spouse is an Alevi, otherwise my family would not have permitted it. For them, there was no other option except marrying an Alevi. The faith of my bride or groom is also important to me. I prefer an Alevi one. If my child would have chosen a non-Alevi, I would have talked to or explained to her since I am not eager to see violence. Whether she would listen to my words, that depends on her. If she would not care at all, I wish that my God would help her realise her desire. I cannot prevent it.*

T7C: *My spouse is an Alevi but it did not play any role in our marriage. It was a coincidence. The denomination of my child's flirt or spouse is not significant. It is his/her own choice.*

45 He is owner of a white goods and furniture shop.

Çorum Region:

Although this study does not make a comparison between regions, it should be said that the transformation in generations shares similarities across all three regions. Compared to the previous generation, the new generation respondents give also a more favourable opinion on interfaith marriage in the Çorum region:

Ç1C: *I was the first person to have gotten married to a non-Alevi in our family. After me, my cousins followed me and they also got married to non-Alevi. I and my spouse met at university. Before marriage, we had dated for approximately 5 years in İstanbul.*

However, Ç1P, the parent of Ç1C, said that it had not been possible for him/her to marry a non-Alevi:

Ç1P: *If my spouse was not an Alevi, then my parents would not have allowed me to marry him/her. Actually, I would not have married either. But today, three grandchildren of my brother-in-law have gotten married to non-Alevi.*

The expansion of higher education with urbanization process was steadily emphasized as the key reason behind the increase in the number of interfaith marriages in Çorum:

Ç5C: *The number of mixed marriages and mixed flirts/datings is much higher today. For example, my spiritual brother's date is a Sunni. And there are many people around me who are married to Sunnis. High schools and universities are the places where they meet.*

Ç6P: *The number of Alevi-Sunni marriages is higher today. The young generation go to universities and meet Sunni people there.*

Ç6C had not married a non-Alevi but dated a non-Alevi before marriage. Besides, s/he had witnessed a gradual increase in interfaith marriages in his/her family and social environment. Ç6C mentioned several friends getting married to non-Alevi despite protests from their families:

Ç6C: *I think there has been an increase in the number of mixed marriages. One of my friends met a non-Alevi in Samsun at the very beginning of his/her career. They dated for two years. His/her family was strictly against their relationship and warned them by saying, "this marriage will never happen." But now, they are married. Another*

friend of mine met a non-Alevi at university and they got married. I think families have started to say this: "There is a friendship between me and my child. At the end, s/he is a mature person. S/he can make her/his own decisions." And then they let them be. I have many relatives who have been married to non-Alevi.

Ç7C explains the transformation towards a secular way of life that s/he had undergone as follows:

Ç7C: *I had some flirts before marriage. They were all Alevis. I had never thought of flirting with a Sunni. But that was my old way of thinking, I am not thinking in that way anymore. Before anything else, I am trying to see whether s/he is a good person or not. We were influenced by our families in the olden days. There has been a drastic increase in the number of mixed marriages today. For example, if it comes to my family, I can say that mixed marriages were a matter of life or death in the past. Everybody was thinking that it was a disaster or black cloud over our family. But this perspective and understanding has recently changed. There are now non-Alevi grooms and brides in our family.*

Ç7P confirmed what his/her child Ç7C had said, and then considered the expansion of higher education the main reason for this drastic change:

Ç7P: *Mixed marriages are happening now. There are mixed marriages in my family. My sibling's bride is a non-Alevi. That kind of marriage did not happen in the past. My uncle's grandchildren have also married non-Alevi. Why is this the case? I think the new culture has changed our young generation. They moved out of Çorum, got educated. Maybe, in comparison to the new generation, having lived in a very isolated environment had made me more intolerant on this subject.*

Adana Region:

Alevis in the Adana region seem to have undergone a transformation similar to that in Tunceli and Çorum. The expressions of A4P and child A4C deserve attention as they reflect the differences between generations:

A4P: *My spouse is an Alevi. He is the son of my aunt. We could not have married if he wasn't an Alevi. But this understanding has changed; it's not like before anymore. It is even a kind of trend right now. There is no discrimination among us anymore.*

While confirming what his/her parent A4P said, A4C admitted that his/her daughter had already been dating a non Alevi and they had even gone on a holiday alone:

A4C: *If my spouse was not an Alevi, we would still have gotten married. If my daughter would like to marry a non-Alevi, his faith is not important to me. The crucial thing is his ethos and worldview. I care more for these kinds of things, not faith.*

Just as in A4P and A4C, there is also a similar gap between A5P and A5C. Having had no chance or opportunity to marry a non-Alevi due to the social structure, A5P said that his/her own child (this child does not refer to A5C, but another one) had married a non-Alevi. In addition, A5P said that the only way to get married to a non-Alevi in the olden days was to run away with that non-Alevi person. And if a family had had a non-Alevi bride or groom, it was considered that their religious ceremonies or worship would not be accepted by God anymore. However, as most of the new generation respondents had said, A5C also highlighted that the faith or denomination of his/her spouse had not played a role in his/her decision to get married. What is more, A5C said that the sect of his 18-year-old daughter's boyfriend had not been a matter of discussion at all:

A5P: *If my spouse had not been an Alevi, my father would not have given me away in marriage, not for anything in this world, because he was too conservative. He used to read the Qur'ân. Throughout Ramadan, he used to read the Qur'ân from beginning to end three times. He used to fast when he was 75 years old and never gave up even if July was the Ramadan month. However, I have a non-Alevi bride now. At present, no one cares; everyone gets married to whoever s/he wants. That's better. In the past, with the exception of people running away, getting married to a non-Alevi was not possible. Unlike the past, parents now give their children away in marriage to non-Alevis with pleasure. Why? Because children love each other and if parents do not permit their marriage, then they are highly likely to run away. If your child runs away, this is disgraceful for parents. Therefore they do whatever their children want. What is more, every young person is now likely to enrol at university. They find each other at universities. In olden times, there were no universities. Besides, if anyone would*

have decided to marry a non-Alevi, they were told that their Islamic ceremonies would not be accepted by God. Non-Alevi were strictly forbidden to know our ceremonies. Until recently, non-Alevi brides or grooms were being sent to their parents during the secret religious ceremonies of Alevi. But now, even non-Alevi spouses are taking part in religious ceremonies. The daughter-in-law of my uncle distributed bread in their ceremony. These kinds of social behaviours were considered big sins in the past. But now, non-Alevi grooms and brides are both involved in our secret ceremonies.

A5C: *If my daughter chooses a non-Alevi to marry, I have to respect her. If she is happy with him, that is the crucial thing for me. I do not care whether she is with a non-Alevi or not.*

A6P and A6C seem to have undergone similar life experiences. Although it was not possible to marry a non-Alevi for A6P, her child (this child does not refer to A6C, but another one) had gotten married to a non-Alevi. A6P thinks that the new generation is more inclined to find a non-Alevi mate and she blames herself for having been narrow-minded on the subject:

A6P: *If my spouse had not been an Alevi, my parents would not have given me away in marriage. No, no, they would not have. Surely, not. It was difficult. Giving an Alevi girl to a Sunni person, or accepting a Sunni girl as a bride was not possible in the olden days. But now, these have become a fact. I know it from my own experience. I have a Sunni bride. There has never been any discrimination. There has also been an increase in the number of Alevi-Sunni marriages. They are all around us. No one cares about these kinds of things anymore. Mixed marriages used to create lots of troubles in the past. I think we have become more open-minded. Time has extended our horizon. Older generations, our mother and fathers, were too radical. We were thinking the same way as they were, but we have changed albeit slowly.*

Supporting what her parent said, A6C expressed that if her spouse would have been a non-Alevi, it would not have created a problem for her family. She emphasized that the faith of her child's spouse or date does not have a place in her mind at all:

A6C: *If my spouse was not an Alevi, my father would still have given me away in marriage. He was a different person on this subject. If I would have loved a non-Alevi, I would have married him. Of course I*

would have. This is not a criterion for me at all. The faith of the person that my child will marry is not important to me.

On the basis of all interviews, it might be said that what A9P and A9C said about interfaith marriages can well be seen as a summary of this part:

A9P: *There is no way my mother would have given me to a non-Alevi. And that has influenced me a lot. I have never wanted to have a Sunni groom. But now, young people do not listen to anyone these days. They do not discriminate; due to their education level, they are more progressive.*

A9C: *The number of mixed marriages is much higher today. Young people like us are very self-opinionated. They do not care much about what their parents say. Maybe, having gone away from Adana for university education had affected young generation. They attach more importance to their freedom than their parents did.*

Divorce

Divorce is considered a taboo in traditional Alevi communities. As in Catholicism and the more traditional branches of Protestantism and Orthodoxy, a divorce may result in social exclusion. There is an aphorism among women in Anatolia which remains a reality even today for many elderly Alevis: "You can only return with a white shroud to your mother's home from where you left with a white wedding dress". Alevi women learn this aphorism from childhood. The word shroud represents death, and so Alevis are supposed to stay together till death. They are taught in childhood that divorced women are condemned and not allowed to enter shrines or other sacred places. In light of the interviews, it can be said that although the institution of marriage is still of vital importance to Alevis, which ought to be maintained even in hard times, divorce is no longer seen as a taboo in Alevi communities.

Table B16. The Figure of Divorced People (Out of 10)

	Older Generation	New Generation
Tunceli	-	3
Çorum	1	1
Adana	-	1

As seen in the Table B16, although divorce is not an option for the older generation, 16.6 % of the new generation had already got divorced. But it should be noted that these are couples just at the beginning of their marriage, which means that the number of divorced persons in the new generation might actually increase in the future.

All respondents, without exception, agree that the number of divorces in Alevi communities has increased in recent years. While the older generation respondents noted that there was no divorced person among their peers, respondents from the new generation emphasized that they were already aware of many divorced people among their friends and relatives. Without exception, the question “When it comes to divorce, which generation is more inclined to divorce, old or new?” is answered in the same way by respondents:

T1P: *There has been an increase in the rate of divorce.*

T1C: *Since we sell household furniture and white goods, I have observed such a transformation [increase in divorce cases] over the last twelve-thirteen years.*

T5P: *It happens more often today.*

T8P: *It happens more often today in comparison to the past. People decide to divorce after only three months of marriage. There were no such cases in the past. But I do not know what changed; youths of today get divorced without hesitation.*

T9P: *In the past, you were supposed to stay with your spouse till death.*

Ç1C: *In the past, it was not possible to encounter divorced people. But now, even my cousins have gotten a divorce.*

Ç3P: *Divorces have become much more common today.*

Ç4C: *They are increasing.*

Ç7C: *It is much more tolerable now.*

A4P: *No, there were no divorce cases in the past. But today, a lot of couples are getting divorced.*

A5P: *I swear to God I had never ever heard of any divorce case in the past. Now, each family has two divorce cases at least.*

A6P: *People are much more prone to divorce at present. It was really rare to see any divorced couple in the past.*

A6C: *They are happening more often in our time. There are examples in my own family.*

A8C: *I think it happens more often in recent years.*

A8P: *Much more often in our age.*

The question “What would have happened if an Alevi decided to divorce in the olden days?” was put to the older generation respondents. Their answers indicate that divorce was one of the biggest sins in Alevism and divorced people, particularly women, had been socially excluded:

T1P: *In the past, the act of divorce was not condoned in Alevi tradition. If an Alevi woman decided to divorce, this decision would not be taken lightly and kindly. Marriage itself was seen as a sacred thing. Although people had problems in their marriage, they were to put up with it or find solutions to them.*

T9P: *In the past, nobody had any idea what was going on inside the house. No one would publicize their family problems. If there was a very big and significant problem, then our elders or religious authorities would get involved to solve the problem.*

T10P: *There was no divorce at all in the past. Even if women were beaten and kicked out of their homes by their husbands, they had to stay there without any objection or challenge. Our elders used to tell us that only our dead body could leave our husband's house.*

Ç3P: *In a traditional Alevi community, divorce is something that was never approved by the community. The community was not cool with a divorced woman or man. Commitment in marriage looked more like a commitment in Catholic tradition.*

Ç3C: *Being divorced meant being decayed. It was that serious.*

Ç7P: *In the past, if you got married to a daughter of a divorced person, then you would be decayed.*

A1P: *In our tradition, a woman cannot return to her father's home if she gets divorced.*

A4P: *There was no one from our generation that I can remember who was divorced. Divorced people were not thought of highly. But now, people can easily get divorced. There are many divorced people around us.*

A5P: *I have never thought of divorce. Divorce was considered a very shameful act. Everyone used to condemn divorced people. People used to stop communicating with a divorced woman. She was not allowed into sacred places. She was seen as a dirty and decayed person. But now, divorced people have red-carpet treatment. Why? Because it is not considered a shameful act anymore.*

A6P: *It was even considered shameful for an engaged person to break off his/her engagement. Now, there are a lot of divorced people around us. There was no such reality in the past. Divorcing could not be an option for a woman even if she had hard times in her marriage. It was not common to see a broken family. At present, it is really so easy to break up a family. It has become so easy for the young generation, and it does not matter whether it relates to a girl or boy. Both girls and boys divorce easily nowadays.*

A8P: *Just before marriage, my parents used to warn their daughters like this: "If you marry, your husband becomes your everything. Since then, your husband becomes your father, mother, everything. And never ever try to return to this house as a divorcee. Be obedient to your husband."*

Questions like "Why has there been an increasing divorce rate among Alevis?" and "Why is divorce not seen as a taboo by the young generation?" were posed to respondents to ascertain the reasons behind the transformation in Alevis' consciousness from traditional-religious approach to a more modern secular approach regarding the issue of divorce. There are some common points in their answers that should be emphasized: individualization of women with more economic freedom in urban areas, paying more attention to the demands of children (unlike the past, new parents no lon-

ger force their daughters to put up with unhappy marriages), social breakdown regarding the concepts of sin and immorality:

T5P: *Everybody has a job now. The husband has a job, but so does his wife. Since everybody has economic freedom, they may break up even for very minor problems. I know a couple who broke up because of just one word. It is rumoured that the husband had insulted his wife by using the word "maniac". The wife broke up with him after not more than two months of marriage.*

T6C: *First, women are now involved in business more than ever. They have started to stand on their own two feet. And the idea that "this life could be managed without a husband" has become widespread. I believe that all these have led to an increase in the number of divorces.*

Ç1C: *Modern-day people think that if their marriages are unbearable, they are still able to continue as singles. They are more self-confident than their parents. Regardless of gender, they get divorced somewhat easily.*

Ç7C: *I believe that the main reason behind this transformation is economic freedom. Women stand on their own two feet. The view of life has also changed. Feudal traditions were much more taken into account in the past, but modern-day generation is busy with its own very personal issues. They seem to be much more selfish.*

A5P: *Since women have become self-supportive, they pay no attention to their marriages anymore. In addition, modern-day young people are much freer.*

A5C: *I think the first reason behind the increased rate of divorce is related to women's financial situations. They have become financially independent in the last fifteen/twenty years. They do not want to live under the control of men. They can't put up with oppression anymore. What is more, parents have started to support their children. They do not want their children to be beaten by any man.*

A6C: *Today's women have economic freedom. Our horizons have expanded. We believe that we have the right to get divorced. If my mother had the same rights as I have now, if she did not suffer oppression, if she lived in a more open-minded environment, she would have divorced my father, too. Maybe all beaten women around me would get a divorce.*

A8C: *People do not want to bear with each other. They protect their privacy better than their parents did. Their self-confidence is much*

higher, particularly among working women. If they do not want to put up with a bad situation, if they get upset, then they get a divorce. It has become very normal.

In parallel to these statements, the approach of the new generation to the possibility of divorce (divorce relating to their children or to themselves) indicates that the act of divorce itself has been normalized and internalized as part of city life:

T4C: *If my child wants to get divorced, I would approve it. The important thing is that my child is happy. If s/he is happy, then I do not care where s/he is or whom s/he lives with.*

T6C: *If two people do not get along with each other very well, then there is no reason to make life miserable. Why should people stay together and give each other a hard time? Divorce is a situation that may happen in those cases.*

T7C: *If you cannot continue in your marriage, if you and your spouse have quarrels all the time and if you are not happy with your marriage, then you should break up.*

T8C: *I think getting divorced is as normal as getting married. Especially we, the new and young generation, are very impatient, and we do not care for anything but ourselves.*

Ç1C: *I think getting divorced is understandable. Nobody belongs to anyone else.*

A2C: *There are no obstacles to divorce. It is meaningless to continue in marriage if two persons do not get along with each other. Of course my family do not force me to stay married, even though they would support my decision if I am not happy. I don't care what people say if I decide to get divorced.*

A3C: *I will definitely divorce if violence is involved.*

A4C: *If there are irreconcilable differences, or they cannot bear with each other, then it is better to divorce.*

A5C: *If my daughter decides to divorce, I will definitely question her. Actually I do not think that this might happen only in a single day, and there must be some clues about their quarrels. And if I find that she has a point, then I would support her.*

A7C: *I think if a couple does not get on well with each other, and if there is always stress at home, and children are influenced by this uneasy situation, they should divorce.*

A10C: *Certainly, I am not against the act of divorce. If it is really necessary, it should happen.*

It should be mentioned that these transformations regarding divorce in Alevi communities follow a path similar to Turkish society as a whole. The general statistics in Turkey also confirm these observations and statements of the participants. While the crude divorce rate increased 22 per mill from 2001 to 2013, a decrease in the rate of eight per mill was observed in the crude marriage rate (Ünal, 2013: 593; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014, March 26). To sum up this part in one sentence, it can be said that Alevism has been losing its cohesion as a society when it comes to the issue of divorce.

The Institution of the People's Court⁴⁶

The institution of the people's court is one of the most important social institutions in Alevi communities. This institution has been used to dismiss people who are considered harmful to social harmony. Particularly, among others, having sexual relations prior to marriage or outside marriage (adultery), having relations with outsiders (non-Alevis) and divorce are among those that have been used as grounds to excommunicate people (Yıldırım, 2013) and they are considered among the biggest sins in traditional Alevi communities. In such cases, people are marginalized, excommunicated or called *decayed* by their religious leaders, the *dedes* (religious guides). On the basis of the interviews, it might be said that the power and prestige of the institution had undergone a drastic change.

While Ç3P draws an analogy between excommunication in Catholicism and being *decayed* in Alevism, Ç5P said that being declared as a *decayed* means your right to life is taken away:

46 Alevis in the Adana region do not have the institution of the people's court.

Ç3P: *If a person is declared decayed, then s/he is excluded from our community. It looks like ostracization in Catholicism. An excommunicated person does not belong to the Church anymore. Similarly, decayed people are not allowed to enter Cem Houses. In addition, no one collaborates with them on any subject, and people do not talk to them.*

Ç5P: *For decayed people, it can be said that they have no more right to live. In the past, if there was a decayed person in our village, no one would salute him/her, or people would restrain from making any kind of contact with him/her.*

When respondents were asked about the power and prestige of the institution of the people's court, without exception they all stated that it has drastically lost any such social power and prestige. They highlighted that this institution is deprived of suitable conditions to make itself relevant in the urban life. Besides, some of the new generation respondents emphasized that they had never heard of this institution. So, it might be said that after having been the body that ensured social justice and order in society until very recently, the institution of the people's court has turned into something without voice or validity in Alevi communities. These are some of the answers given to the question: "Have you ever heard of the institution of the people's court?":

T1C: *No. Our parents know it, because it happened in their time. At present, there is no such thing as a decayed person at all.*

T2P: *If someone makes a very huge mistake, then s/he is excluded. I have never seen such a person in my entire life. I do not remember. This institution was more important in the past. But today, it has disappeared. I have not heard of such a case.*

T3C: *Long time ago, some cases related to decayed people had been mentioned.*

Ç5P: *Although people have started to behave much more wildly in comparison to the past, no one is called decayed anymore. You cannot see a decayed person anymore.*

Ç5C: *As an institution, it was powerful in the past. Nowadays, it is not, perhaps, not even as much as a tenth of its former power.*

Ç3P: *I do not think that such an institution has any influence over people anymore.*

The answers given to the question of “Why has the institution no longer been functional?” share some common points. As the main cause of the decline in the power of the institution of the people’s court, respondents particularly emphasized the immigration process from rural (in which almost all people are acquainted with each other and adverse consequences of social sanctions might be devastating) to urban (in which individuals are relatively more independent since it is no longer an easy job to know the details of individuals’ daily activities in city life). Besides, people seem to realize that being declared as a *decayed* in the city would not lead to the devastating consequences that it would have in rural areas. Therefore, individuals do not seem to care anymore about this institution particularly after they have settled in cities. I think the following statements about the institution clearly indicate structural changes that Alevi communities have gone through.

Ç5P: *No one is able to know who is decayed or not. In the past, everybody knew each other very well in the villages. But in cities, you do not know the individual’s private life. And if you announce someone as decayed, then s/he can easily find new places to socialize or go to the mosques.⁴⁷ In the past, education, law and faith were taught in our Cem Houses, but now the state is providing education, and Alevis are subject to the law of the state.*

Ç9P: *Alevi communities used to live in closed environments. They excluded themselves from the rest of the country but everybody in the community knew each other. Therefore, it was much easier to have an effective social institution in such a rural setting. But due to urbanization, no one knows who has sinned or decayed. Therefore, Cems of the olden days used to ensure social justice and order in the community, but they have lost this power in city life.*

Ç5C: *In the past, everyone regularly organized their Cems in the villages. The dedes participated regularly in all those Cems. Villagers were all acquainted with each other. Therefore, if there was a Cem, they would inform each other over who actually misbehaved or broke the*

47 Unlike Sunnis, Anatolian Alevis do not accept mosques as holy places.

unwritten rules of the community, as in “he is decayed because he eloped with a girl” or “s/he is decayed because s/he has got divorced” or “this person cheated on his/her spouse”. In the past, Alevis did not go to the state courts, but nowadays even an ordinary Alevi can bring an action against the dede. It happened to my father, I know it. Being decayed or excommunicated in the Cems was very bad in the past because everybody in the village was there and they saw you. It was humiliating. No one talked to you anymore. Decayed people had fallen behind in just about everything.

Ç3P: *The people’s court has lost its power because the population has increased drastically. The worldview of the people has also changed. People have started to live individually and no longer in a community.*

T2P: *We used to solve our problems by consulting the dedes, but now, we go to state courts to settle matters.*

Without exception, all respondents agree that the institution is on the verge of becoming totally irrelevant. I think the most caricatured form of this transformation is that some respondents from the new generation are not even aware of the existence of this institution. For example, T2C and Ç6C did not understand what I was talking about when I mentioned the institution of the people’s court and *decayed* people:

Ç6C: *I have just heard the word “decayed” for the first time in my life.*

V: *Hmm, as an adjective, “decayed” is used for people who misbehave according to Alevi traditions.*

Ç6C: *Oooh, yes I remember that. Yes, yes.*

V: *For example committing adultery and getting divorced are two reasons for being decayed. They are not allowed to enter the Cem Houses. How often do you go to the Cems?*

Ç6C: *I have never been there.*

V: *Never?*

Ç6C: *Even I am very strict on the identity of Alevism, I haven’t been there yet.*

V: *Have you ever seen a decayed person? Does the institution of the people’s court have an effect on your daily life?*

T2C: *When you say “decayed”, do you refer to old people?* [In Turkish, decayed also means old needy people semantically.]

V: *No, no, in Alevi traditions there used to be an institution called the people’s court, and this institution has the right to judge Alevis. And if necessary, the guilty person is announced as decayed.*

T2C: *I have never seen and never heard of one in Tunceli. Maybe because of my age, there has been no such case in my life.*

To sum up, in this day and age, it might surely be said that this institution is outdated at least for urban Alevis.

The Institution of Spiritual Brotherhood⁴⁸

Spiritual brotherhood is a very crucial social institution related to marriage itself, and it helps Alevis to regenerate and maintain their own customs, beliefs and rituals. As a concept, spiritual brotherhood may be depicted as a kinship between two Alevi men that is not based on blood. In the traditional Alevi faith, each Alevi man is forced to have a spiritual brother with his marriage. After they get married, these two Alevi men become closer than their own brothers or their other relatives.

In the research field, while Ç9P defines spiritual brotherhood as “banding together”, T7P explains the significance of being spiritual brother as follows: “Our forebears used to tell us ‘Do not walk on the roof of your spiritual brother so that nothing falls down from his roof’”:

Ç3C: *If someone does not have a spiritual brother, he cannot be an Alevi. Without a spiritual brother, we cannot talk about Alevism. Two families unite. This is the belief in our land.*

The history of spiritual brotherhood could be traced back to the age of the prophet Muhammed. The statements expressed by the respondents and information in the sources seem to support each other with regard to the origin of spiritual brotherhood. By announcing

⁴⁸ Alevis in the Adana region do not have the institution of Spiritual Brotherhood.

fraternity between a Muslim who migrated from Mecca to Medina and another Muslim of Medina, the prophet Muhammed established an institution of social solidarity (Tiryaki, 2013). Alevis believe that after everybody had found a spiritual brother except 'Alī, the prophet Muhammed declared himself as the spiritual brother of 'Alī.

What are the responsibilities of a spiritual brother? Respondents often stressed that a spiritual brother has to place his spiritual brother before his own brother, sister and family members. He must take care of his spiritual brother's wife and children as much as he takes care of his own wife and children:

Ç9P: *Your spiritual brother is much more important than your own brother. The wife of your spiritual brother is as important to you as your wife, and more important than your own sister.*

T1P: *There could not be marriages between the descendants of spiritual brothers up to five or six generations.*

T2C: *It is said that you can beat your sibling, or use bad language against him/her, but you cannot do that kind of things to your spiritual brother. Otherwise, you cannot see heaven.*

T4P: *Your spiritual brother is one of the most precious persons in your life. He is a part of you. You can share with him all your secrets.*

Ç2P: *If there was only one plate of food on the table, we would share it. If there was a suit bought for one of our children, then both his and my children would use that suit. All properties belonging to us were shared.*

Ç3P: *Spiritual brothers share all their tools, livestock and facilities. But their children or grandchildren are not allowed to marry. It is strictly forbidden.*

T1P: *Being parents, we have to warn our children about the rules of being spiritual brothers. We have to say, "You will see him as a real brother, his wife is your sister, you will never ever look at her. He is your friend in the hereafter."*

T8P: *Let's say you argued with your wife at home, then it is your spiritual brother who would come and smooth things between you and*

your wife. You, all the time, must consult him. He has to know your bad or good times. He is a part of you, you can tell him everything.

So, the questions “What kind of changes has this institution undergone?”, “Has it become more influential?” or “How do the young generation approach it?” are the questions that I need to find answers for. On the basis of the interviews, it seems that the institution still maintains its presence – though symbolically – in the Tunceli region but not in Çorum.

Table B17. Being in Spiritual Brotherhood

Tunceli		Çorum	
Older Generation	New Generation	Older Generation	New Generation
10	10	7	3

However, it should be noted that formally having a spiritual brother does not mean that the institution is still powerful or is able to affect people’s daily lives. Without exception, all respondents agreed that the institution was much more powerful in the past. The new generation respondents from Tunceli said that although they have spiritual brothers, they do not observe the tradition anymore. It has been reduced to a symbol, i.e. individuals choose to be involved in spiritual brotherhood but they do not fulfil its obligations as their parents did in the past. While having been seen as a means of family unity in the past, the institution itself had turned into a concept that close friends use as an adjective when they get married but without any further obligation. It had transformed from a socially dissuasive institution into a non-functional social symbol in the Tunceli region:

T1P: *There has been a decrease in the number of spiritual brothers due to the way society is nowadays. Today, it is not easy to see the level of faith and commitment in the past. Now, if you have a good friend you call yourselves as spiritual brothers but no one knows anymore how sacred it once was.*

T1C: *My spiritual brother lives in Istanbul; we see each other once every two months. If he lives in Tunceli, maybe we might see each other every day.*

T2P: *It was much more powerful and common in the past. Faith was powerful then. Spiritual brotherhood has turned out to be something like a good friendship. But it was not something like that in the olden days. If your spiritual brother had visited you, the height of your sitting place couldn't be higher than your spiritual brother's sitting place in the room. In the same way, you used to get the same attention and treatment during your visit. But you cannot run into this kind of feudal connection or faith among young people today.*

T4C: *In our tradition, being spiritual brother is very important. People in the past honoured the concept of spiritual brotherhood much more than today's generation. You cannot see such an attachment in our generation.*

T5P: *It's over now. Maybe there are still some people who attach importance to it, but it is completely over for many.*

T5C: *It was much more powerful in the past.*

T6P: *It was forceful in the past. Being spiritual brothers was a heavy duty for people. But no one has continued to carry that tradition anymore.*

T6C: *I think it was more powerful in the life of our parents.*

T7P: *There is an expression that was used by old people in relation to spiritual brotherhood. They used to say, "Do not walk on the roof of your spiritual brother so that nothing falls down from his roof". But I do not see such a tradition anymore. I do not know how this transformation has happened, but it is obvious that spiritual brotherhood is not as important as it was in the past. It is terrible, particularly for our young generation.*

T8P: *In the past, your spiritual brother had to be with you in good times and in bad times, through thick and thin. He should be more than a brother. But I have never seen my spiritual brother since I got married.*

T8C: *We do not see each other very often due to the workload.*

T9P: *Spiritual brotherhood was powerful in the past.*

As T2C and T4P said, the new generation has chosen their spiritual brothers among their close friends without consulting their families which had been an obligation in the past:

T2C: *In the past, without consent of your parents, you could not be involved in spiritual brotherhood. However, today, the children themselves decide who will be their spiritual brother.*

T4P: *The youths of today suppose that the spiritual brother is someone like a close friend or a person that you get along with fairly well. They get their own way. It was not like that in the past.*

When it comes to the Çorum region, it might be said that the new generation had already become indifferent to the institution, and a majority of the young generation had not even chosen a spiritual brother. As is the case in Tunceli, all respondents agree that the institution was much more powerful and influential in the past.

Ç3P: *I am not talking of a decline but rather the disappearance of a tradition.*

Ç2C: *I do not see any spiritual brotherhood in the new generation. Maybe it is just me, but there isn't any case that I have come across. In the past, almost everybody had a spiritual brother.*

Ç2P: *It was much more common in the past. People do not trust each other anymore. They cannot maintain such an institution; they do not trust, they do not believe, and they do not rely on each other.*

Ç4C: *It was common in the past, but not today.*

Ç5P: *There are not many if there are any at the present time. Our fathers were resplendently enjoying this spiritual brotherhood. However, when you talk to people of today about spiritual brothers, it's almost impossible because they do not see their spiritual brothers or they do not come together.*

Ç6P: *It was experienced much more by the older generation. Nowadays, you cannot see it.*

Ç7C: *I hope the young generation find the right thing by understanding the value of this institution. We do not see this institution anymore.*

Alevis from Çorum and Tunceli agree on the point that this institution has lost its significance and it is no longer able to affect the

daily activities of individuals. The answers given to the question of “what would be the main causes that led to a decrease in the social power of the institution” share some common points: urbanization, decrease in the number of people who visit Houses of Cem, attending religious services less often, increase in the development of technology, the hustle and bustle of daily life, etc.

T5C: *Development of technology, changes in the worldview of people, bad reputation of the dedes, and so forth... I think if spiritual brotherhood is not as popular as it once was, it is a kind of reaction to the Alevi men of religion.*

T6P: *I believe that we should blame ourselves, i.e. older generation. If spiritual brotherhood does not appeal to young people, then it means that we have not explained it clearly to our children.*

T6C: *Because developments in technology have rendered people estranged from each other. Back in the day, people used to come together to talk to each other. But today, mobile phones and the internet are deemed enough for communication. People used to make home visits, not only to their spiritual brother but also to all their acquaintances. But for the new generation, a phone call seems enough for communication. People used to know the value of being a spiritual brother, but unfortunately people have started to move away from these institutions.*

T8P: *The dignity of the spiritual brotherhood has been disappearing, and urbanization and technology might be the reasons behind this transformation.*

Ç2C: *Why do people keep spiritual brotherhood at a distance? I think they do not want to give meaning to their friendship, good fellowship or relationships through this institution. It does not make sense to them.*

Ç7C: *For example, I am not living where I was born. I am in Konya. Therefore, there has to be a distance between me and my spiritual brother. What we share becomes superficial due to the distance. Urbanization is another factor; in villages, people were much more intimate.*

Ç3P: *There is no need for spiritual brotherhood. There are now NGOs to take the place of that institution. Political or semi-political communities are coming together. There are no people protecting, applying or*

checking whether this institution works properly. It is over. This institution belongs to the past.

Ç3C: *Spiritual brotherhood is such a rigid institution. That's the reason why it has not been able to continue. Actually, these kinds of institutions are the institutions of feudality. It strengthens the kinship, and adds more people to your family. You become stronger against your enemies. Because of the feudal culture, kinship was very effective and rigid. But today, it has turned out to be only a symbol. Can you ask for your spiritual brother's car, house, or his wife's jewellery? Being a spiritual brother directly influences your own future.*

Ç4C: *Young people do not go to the Cems anymore. We don't go. We are supposed to learn it from the dedes in Cems. But we do not. If our community had gone to the Cems, we would have had a more effective spiritual brotherhood.*

Ç5C: *My brother does not have a spiritual brother, and as far as I can say, there is no such person near me. I would not use the word distance but unfamiliarity. They do not know this institution. Or maybe they know, but they consider it unnecessary.*

Based on all these stories and statements, it can be concluded that the institution has been losing its power and prestige by the day, and there is no clue as to whether it could be part of Alevi life once again. While being a spiritual brother was a kind of *raison d'être* for the older generation, the new generation seems not to want to live their marriages under the roof of such an institution. And I think it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that as is the case for the people's court, the institution of spiritual brotherhood is also slowly but surely disappearing into oblivion.

PART C

DISCUSSION

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

TOWARDS MODERNIZATION ALMOST IN EVERY WAY

The extended secularization paradigm is grounded on the notion that there is a non-accidental direct correlation between modernization and secularization. The paradigm asserts that scientific developments, industrial capitalism, and urbanization process create problems for religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms, and superstitious beliefs at the social level. In order to illustrate the extended paradigm, I have researched the case of Alevi revival, aiming to find out if this case fits the paradigm. Therefore, in semi-structured in-depth interviews, respondents, firstly, were asked some pre-set questions to gain insights into the generation gap with regard to the level of modernization. In light of those interviews, it can surely be said that compared to the older generation, the new generation has experienced a more modern life.

1. The new generation has much better educational facilities, and their level of education is undeniably higher than that of their parents. In my research, no parent was found to be more educated than his/her child.

2. It was found that all respondents from the new generation work in urban areas throughout their working life while a substantial part of the older generation had worked only in rural areas.

3. When it comes to fertility rate and infant mortality rate, it was noted that each generation (the previous, the older, and the newer) has a lower fertility and infant mortality rate compared to the generation before it. Respondents from the new generation said that they had never run into infant deaths or the cases they had seen were not related to diseases, but to accidents. On the other hand, many respondents from the older generation were noted as having lost their own children. Does this say something? As Table C1 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 232) indicates, infant mortality rate and fertility rate are much higher in religious societies.

Table C1. Demographic Indicators by Type of Society

Type of Society	Fertility (Rate)		Infant Mortality (Rate)		Nations
	1970-75	2000-05	1970-75	2000-05	
Most Secular	2.8	1.8	35.4	12.4	25
Moderate	3.3	1.7	43.5	15.7	24
Most Religious	5.4	2.8	94.5	39.1	24
All Nations	3.8	2.1	56.8	22.4	73

NOTES: Type of society: Based on macro-level mean religious values measured on the 10-point "importance of God" scale. Fertility: Total fertility rate per woman. Infant mortality: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births). Nations: Number of societies.

Source: World Bank 2003 World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank, available online at: www.worldbank.org

4. Instead of the homes, fields or sometimes caves which were the standard birthplace for the older generation, for the new generation medical institutions are the new birthplace. Going to medical institutions to give birth or get professional help during pregnancy

is now the norm in modern countries and it seems that Alevis have also caught up with this transition.

5. Due to technological advancements and industrial development, the new generation has acquired almost all necessary durable goods before marriage while their parents had been deprived of even the most basic durable goods. In addition, when it comes to daily needs, while most respondents from the older generation used to produce themselves what they consume or use, and with less variety in terms of food, clothes and other daily needs, the new generation seems to be less involved in the production of their own needs due to the modernization process. Grocery stores, supermarkets or malls in city centres were mentioned as the places wherefrom all their daily needs are being supplied.

6. Transition in usage of durable goods is also observable for household heating systems and instant hot water access. While the older generation could only apply very primitive ways to heat their houses and were not able to instantly access hot water, the new generation, thanks to the diffusion of technological developments, can access hot water in a cheaper and easier way, and can now use technologically more advanced and efficient methods to heat their houses.

7. The new generation also enjoys improvement in modern health care. I noted very remarkable differences in terms of the diagnosis of diseases and treatment modalities among generations.

8. The interviews indicate that the new generation is more in touch and more engaged in dialogue with people from different cultures because of higher education and/or getting a job in city centres.

9. The new generation does not share the same living spaces with members of their extended family as their parents did. While the older generation used to stay with their large family until marriage, respondents from the new generation emphasized that they prefer to live apart from their families even before marriage.

10. From the interviews, it can be concluded that the average age of first marriage among the new generation is higher than that among the older generation. While the average age of first marriage for new generation is 25,44, this figure decreases to 19,04 for the older generation. In addition, the fertility rate of the generations (the previous, older and new generations) has sharply decreased from 6,4 to 0,9,⁴⁹ which indicates that the new generation is more inclined to have smaller families. Like other modernizing societies, the new generation is waiting to marry a lot later, modern couples are not inclined to have more children than their parents, and modern women are spending more time outside the home.

11. The types of marriage and marriage ceremonies for Alevis have changed throughout history due to various socio-economic reasons. For example, while arranged marriages are more common among the older generation, autonomous marriages are mostly preferred by the new generation.

All these transitions tell us that Alevis have become much more modern compared to past in almost every way.⁵⁰ In this situation, we

49 Since new generations currently have the physiological conditions to have children, an increase in birth rates is possible in the near future. However, it has to be said that from the interviews and observations done, there is no probability of approaching the birth rates in earlier generations.

50 It should be stressed that, the transition of Alevi communities of Turkey run parallel to the transition of Turkey as a whole. Should it be deemed necessary to indicate the socio-economic transformation of Turkey with figures, it may surely be stated that while average life expectancy at birth, literacy rate, secondary school attendance, the number of universities and university students, the rate of employees in the industrial and service sector, privatization implementations, the number of household durable, the average age at first marriage, the number of women who receive prenatal care and the number of births births happened in a health institution have increased in Turkey. On the other hand the population growth rate, the rate of agricultural workers, fertility rate (Total Births per Woman), the figure of case and death connected to the polio, whooping cough and diphtheria, the rate of infant mortality and under-five mortality rate have decreased. In addition, food poverty, complete poverty and maternal mortality ratio have been reduced in 40 years. All these statistics can be seen in Appendix A.

are faced with a conclusion as such. On the one side, there is a period of revival where Alevis expressed their identities more openly compared to the past, when they fought for their rights and identity by getting themselves organized, when they attained enough power to conduct lobbying efforts domestically and also in Europe in order to be recognized at the state level, when they established their own television and radio channels, and overall when they experienced a period during which they were modernized in every facet of life. In this situation, the claim of this thesis that societies which modernize become secular and the revival of Alevism taking place at the same time may seem contradictory at first glance. Consequently, an explanation has to be provided primarily regarding the relationship between the secularization process among Alevis and the Alevi revival.

SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS OR REVIVAL OF ALEVISM

With regard to all the subheadings that this thesis is interested in researching, it is observed that the new generation of Alevis, in contrast to the previous generation, has led a more secular lifestyle on the subjects of premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, the institution of spiritual brotherhood, and the people's court.

The frequency and intensity of datings before marriage among young Alevis tend to increase. Although strict endogamy had been accepted as an obligation by the older generation, the new generation seems to accept getting married to a non-Alevi. "(...) in practice increasing numbers of Alevi women [and men] do marry Sunnis" (Erdemir, 2004: 257). Having conducted an ethnographic study of the Alevis in southern Turkey, Muharrem Erdem (2010) also found that exogamy has become more widespread among Alevis. When it comes to divorce, Alevis follow the paths of other modernizing societies. While divorce might mean social exclusion for the older generation, in light of interviews, it may be claimed that

divorce is no longer seen as a taboo for the new generation and the number of divorced Alevis has been increasing. Since religious sub-groups are not recognized by the state in Turkey, accessing statistical information for Alevis only in case of the mentioned marriage and divorce is not possible. However, it has been observed in both the fieldwork done for this thesis and some qualitative studies on Alevis (Balkanlıoğlu, 2012; Çatlı, 2008) that divorce is no longer a taboo for Alevi communities. What is more, making the claim that Alevis, who are part of Turkish society, also share the same divorce rate which has increased by 43% in Turkey (Turkish Statistical Institute, n.d.) during the last fifteen years would not be far-fetched.

In our field research, it was found that the institution of the people's court is not responsible anymore for ensuring justice and order as it once did. The new generation does not pay attention anymore to this institution for their daily activities and particularly marital issues. The *dedes* (religious guides) have lost their spiritual and politico-judicial power and prestige among young Alevis. The institution of the people's court, which has played an important role for centuries in the protection of the disciplined structure of traditional Alevi society, seems to have lost such a key role at the present time. It was a very powerful control mechanism in rural areas and used to alienate people who were supposed to threaten the harmony of the community. However, it has become a non-applicable institution within the complex structure of the cities. Therefore "the endogamous justice system of Alevis was not able to compete with the modern judiciary system and gradually faded away" (Demiray, 2004: 76).

In light of the interviews, it can be concluded that besides the institution of the people's court, the social power of the institution of spiritual brotherhood has also eroded. Demiray (2004: 76) states that the institution of spiritual brotherhood that was a part of the feudal order could not be continued by the persons who struggle within urban life and compete with each other in capitalist eco-

nomic system. That institution was used by Alevis to reinvent and maintain their own customs, beliefs and rituals throughout their history. Today, the institution of spiritual brotherhood has also lost its previous role and importance, much like other institutions of Alevism, due to modernization. It is also possible to say that the former spiritual brotherhood tradition is not relevant anymore for the young generation.

Although these two institutions are considered part of a faith system, by their very nature, I think it would be more convenient to see them as the institutions of traditional society. These institutions have for centuries helped Alevis extend their family and protect themselves against enemies. Through them, Alevis become more powerful and secure in the face of non-Alevis in an agricultural culture. Kinship culture is much stricter in traditional societies than in modern ones, and new modern-life structures have been undermining those traditional institutions. Industrial capitalism, urban life style, and technological advancements have encouraged Alevis to move away from traditional institutions. There still are Alevis who try to keep those institutions alive, but their endeavours may not be enough to stop the erosion of the power and prestige of those institutions or to prevent them from becoming mere symbols.

Although this thesis only focuses on the institutions of the people's court and spiritual brotherhood, there are other studies suggesting that other institutions in Alevism have also lost social power and prestige, such as the institutions of *kivrelilik* (Yaman, 2007) or *unclehood* (Erdem, 2010). *Kivrelilik* is an institution takes place between two families who love each other and are confident that they will continue to do so. That happens with hearts and consent of the parties. In addition, to put an end to the hostilities between families or tribes, and in order to sustain peace and friendship, the institution of *Kivrelilik* is established among parties. Blood feuds or hostility end after the parties reconciled and interconnected by the bonds of the institution of *Kivrelilik* (Yaman, 2007). The institution of *Unclehood*,

on the otherhand, is an institution by which Alevi males in Adana region learn their religion and be a member of the community. They have to pass secret initiation rituals which are very crucial in terms of social, religious and cultural life. They spend a particular time in another house under a religious guide's care and that guide is called as "uncle" (Erdem, 2010). Compared to the older generation, the new generation is less interested in rituals and other religious duties. They are not eager to participate in public worship or religious meetings (Erdem, 2010: 166).

It is still possible to argue against the result of this thesis by claiming that people see themselves still as Alevis and they do not deny that they are Alevi. In addition, it might be asserted that the changes in their daily lives are still within the boundaries of a new Alevi form. The second possible objection might be this: If there have been changes in the prestige and power of folk beliefs, this does not relate to Alevism. Therefore, it is not meaningful to assert that they have been secularized.

These two objections may be responded as follows: It is true that they would still call themselves as Alevis and it would be possible that they may not conceive their new life styles outside of Alevism. However, this perception does not change the fact that Alevism touches daily life practices less than in the past. Certainly new forms of Alevism may have emerged, but whether or not individuals call themselves Alevi, or whether or not there are new forms of Alevism is not the crucial point for secularization debates. What should be highlighted at this point is whether Alevism or metaphysical realm is reflected less or more in daily social life. This thesis defends the idea that the concept of secularization does not equal becoming irreligious. Therefore, emergence of new forms of any belief systems should not be used to disproof secularization paradigm unless those new forms touch daily life activities more than in the past.

The second objection was that Alevis cannot be assumed to have been secularized because only folk beliefs have lost their power and

prestige, not Alevism itself. The concern with this point of view is that it, again, oversimplifies secularization by equating it with disbelief. The issue being researched in the present dissertation is the question of which generation is most affected by the metaphysical realm (sometimes in the name of Alevism and sometimes in the name of folk beliefs). From this point of view, if a new Alevi generation does not adopt the old tradition of “watching over pregnant women to prevent evil spirits from taking their lungs,” then this is considered secularization since such a belief also belongs to metaphysical realm.

It should be noted that, secularization does not posit the behaviors/beliefs of Alevis (about Alevism) at the center. There are still many towns and villages in Anatolia where non-Alevi traditional beliefs dominate daily life, and it is possible that Alevis have been affected by these beliefs throughout their history. What is important for the secularization discussion is not to completely abandon Alevism as defined by certain specialists or theologians. The crucial point is how metaphysics is reflected in the daily lives of two different Alevi generations (parents/children). Whether such metaphysics is considered to belong to Alevism or not is an issue for Alevi specialists or theologians and is well beyond the scope of this thesis.

Another example of this issue is whether to consider the increasing number of marriages between Alevis and Sunnis as secularization. This thesis asserts that today's increasing number of marriages between Alevis and Sunnis compared to the past are indeed examples of secularization. In the past, religious attachments were so strong that it was almost impossible to marry someone with a different belief/religion. Today, the number of such marriages has increased hand-in-hand with the process of urbanization. New generations consider these details with much less import than former generations. Those who do not call this change part of secularization claim that these marriages do not contradict real Alevism and thus do not relate to secularization. It should be emphasized that it

is not the duty of a sociologist to determine if a certain social behavior belongs to Alevism or not. In the past, the reason for people not recognizing these marriages was their faith. Today, increasing marriages or partnerships between people of different beliefs point to a diminished impact of religion on daily life. The fact that certain behaviors, which were once impossible for religious reasons, can now be openly exhibited, is indicative of secularization. What is considered part of Alevism tends to be construed differently by different sources and people. For a sociologist then, claiming to provide the most accurate definition of Alevism is not very meaningful. Rather, it is the transformation of behaviors as allowed or restricted by religious beliefs that matters more.

At the beginning of the thesis, I stressed that Bruce's secularization paradigm may be valid not only for West European countries and their offshoots, but also in terms of providing valuable insights into the secularization process in other non-Protestant societies. In light of the interviews, it seems that the transformation among Alevis in Turkey may also be explained by the secularization paradigm. Alevis in Turkey have become much more modern compared to bygone days, and at the same time a rather pervasive secularization process touches upon all marital issues due to the very structure of modern life.

Due to the scientific advances, capitalism and urbanization processes, information is disseminated no longer in a top-down process but in lateral fashion. The new Alevis can access information more easily and speedier than their elders. While the former generation experienced communal socialization in their families, the new generation is learning the good, the bad, and their morals from people or groups (universities, social media) that cannot be controlled by their families. According to the Young Turkey Research of Intel (Demirok, 2012, October 9), 13% of the young generation in Turkey go on the internet before they visit the toilet when they get up in the morning, and 28% have already been online

before they leave home. That study was conducted in 2012; therefore, as the smartphone market expands, this rate will continue to increase accordingly.

Parallel to all these transitions, the concept of authority is also being transformed. The social moral codes (transferred to new generations by the old) are first of all filtered and assessed parallel to the general trend in the social environment that have been established outside the family as a result of the advances in communication technology and educational institution.

During the olden days when faith was dominant, marriage was accepted as a way towards integration and strengthening of ties between families. As Tayfun Amman (2010: 45) has explained, the family has been removed from its holiness, has lost the integrating and strengthening power of community, and is now reduced to the individual happiness of the (Alevi) couples.

Bruce (2002) tries to relativize the issue when defining the age we live in. In a traditional community, some privileged people (*dedes* and other leading figures of the community) had determined what is the best and the most accurate for social life. However, at present, it would not be easy to mandate “the accurate” to the new generation with respect to particular belief or moral systems, as it was in former days. As Ural Manço of Aksaray University (2014: 298) has stated, while ancient collective identities are on the wane, social institutions are losing their legitimacy:

Official institutions, mandated absolute belongings, structured religions or traditional religious conceptions, inarguable ideologies, official history conceptions, international institutions, justice, schools and even social institutions like families can be questioned and not accepted as much as they were. Representatives of these corporate structures experience loss of reputation and authority (like politicians, public administrators or teachers).

Unlike their own parents, the new generation tends to accept or reject the identities or lifestyles that are mandated to them after they have questioned them. If somehow they are forced to accept

former lifestyles, they are inclined to create new forms of those lifestyles by adding their own interpretation. This is sometimes reflected in their religious clothing and sometimes in their attitudes towards faith or religious symbols. They are more inclined to select the group or belief system that they are willing to accept after they research, question, and discuss. Young Alevis, as a part of Turkey, are now part of a very different social setting in comparison to their parents (Akşit, Şentürk, Küçükkural and Cengiz, 2012). That means they interiorise different values, norms and attitudes: "(...) as a result of the global communication technologies, the public sphere is released from the control of the nation-state and is transformed into a transnational communication flow sphere which enables different cultures and civilizations to have close communication contact" (Göle, 2012: 24).

Therefore, it is not a mere coincidence that Y and Z generations are both more suspicious and more tolerant than their parents. Today, there are Alevi families wherein children have a more horizontal relationship with their father despite coming from families with seven/eight members, where children used to see their fathers as if they were gods. Starting from this point of view, of course it is not possible to assert that all individuals from this new generation are in this category. To define a trans-generational change does not mean that all individuals of a particular generation become part of that change without exception. However, interviews and some other studies (Erdemir, 2004; Çatlı, 2008; Erdem, 2010) on Alevis indicate that when we look to the near future, there is no impression that this process is about to change anytime soon.

Based on these findings, it would not be an overstatement to say that Alevis have become more secular compared to times past. However, unlike those referred to above, academics both at home and abroad share the same opinion that there has been an ongoing revival of Alevism since the 1980s. Alevi revival, which started in the 1980s, has made Alevis part of Turkey's agenda. The new gener-

ations have begun not to feel the need to keep their identities secret. Alevi belief and rituals have reached wide audiences through both social media and traditional media. With the Alevi Initiative of the AKP, the Alevis now have the chance to communicate their rights and freedoms at the highest levels of the state. So, how do secularization of Alevis and revival of Alevism take place at the same time?

To give plausible answers to these questions, it is crucial to understand that there is a democratization process going on in Turkey since the 1980s, albeit at a snail's pace. This comes to the fore sometimes due to political reasons (EU membership process) and sometimes particularly as a result of the effects of urbanization and capitalist articulation process: "There is a growing constituency in contemporary Turkish politics that is more responsive to identity claims, the political recognition of social differences and enhancement of liberties" (Soner and Toktaş, 2011: 431). Just as homosexuals, feminists, Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and Orthodox Christians became more visible after the 1980s and their rights came to the front in the country's agenda, Alevis likewise took their share during this democratization process. With the spread of social media in the 2000s, Alevis, who had used to hide and keep their identity confidential for centuries, started to reveal their faiths and rituals (Erdemir, 2010). However, the secularization process among Alevis accompanied this Alevi revival. Although this study tried to determine the impact of the secularization process based on marriages, it would seem that the secularization of Alevis has not been realized only in marriages.

Adaptation to urban conditions unavoidably has undermined the traditional Alevi lifestyle, rituals, and hierarchic order. The *dedes*, who were believed to be the representatives of 'Alî and were the sole authority in rural life with respect to beliefs, rituals, social life and judiciary issues in Alevis' lives, no longer possess their prestige and power particularly in urban settings: "Today, especially in urban environments, the mediating functions of the *dede* seem to be gone;

they had been tied into the socio-economic fabric of traditional Alevism, which largely eroded due to urbanization and secularization” (Dressler, 2008: 295). The *dedes*, whose authority is decreasing by the day, could not adapt to the new environment and thus started to focus more on various professions within the rush of metropolitan life and losing their traditional charisma in the process. While they could assert their authority in rural life, it would seem that the young educated Alevis are no longer interested in the ancient myths and tales of the Alevi *dedes*. These dramatic transformations in relation to the *dedes* are mentioned by scholars who are convinced that there is an Alevi revival (Bozkurt, 2003: 86; Demiray, 2004: 76; Shah, 2013: 263). The *dedes*, who once played a critical role on almost all issues such as social, economic, and judicial ones, are now almost reduced to a mere symbol.

The most caricatural case of this transformation (losing power and prestige in an urban setting) was that of a lawsuit filed against a *dede* by his follower: “An Alevi from the city of Burdur brought a libel suit against the *dede* who denounced him as ‘*decayed*’ due to adultery. The Court ruled that the citizen was right” (www.haberturk.com, 2010, July 7). Besides, as Fuat Bozkurt stated (2003: 86), new *dedes* are not so keen to substitute the old *dedes*, and in place of being a *dede* they prefer to find jobs that may provide them with a better and attractive living standard. Cems also seem to have lost their power together with that of *dedes*. As Shah (2013: 267) argues about the Cem, “the meetings and gatherings that used to occupy the long winter nights have now been replaced by weekend meetings. However, they have not gained any cultural level capable of satisfying the needs of urban life.”

In line with all of the aforementioned issues, it should be stated that Alevi revival and Alevi secularization continue to survive together without alienating each other. Alevis still wish to be legally recognized at state level, and struggle to have an independent authority for themselves either within the DRA or at state level. They

try to mold public opinion in order not to participate in mandatory religion classes, make Cem Houses gain legal status, and have *dedes* put on salary by the state. However, the new generations are moving more and more away from traditional Alevi beliefs, precepts and rituals due to urbanization, capitalism, and scientific developments. The following statement below by David Shankland provides a fitting summary to this section:

It appears to me that over perhaps the past four or five decades, the efficacy of Alevi religion as an instrument of social control has declined, but "Aleviness" as a culture, as a collection of interlocking ideals and symbols which people may use to assert their identity has strongly emerged (2003: 134).

As Shankland states, actual experienced reality is not an Alevi religious revival but an Alevi identity revival. Therefore, if the term revival is used to mean religious revival by any scholar, it should be pointed out that this is not consistent with the revival experienced by the new generation of Alevis. The faith system of Alevism affects fewer aspects of life and never before in their history have Alevis openly demonstrated and promoted their identity. Therefore, we should emphasize that it is not an Alevi religious revival but Alevi identity revival that coexists with the secularization process in Alevi society.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The objectives of this thesis are to revise and extend Steve Bruce's secularization paradigm and to illustrate the extended paradigm by means of a case study in a non-Protestant and non-European society, i.e. Alevis in Turkey. The ten questions presented in the introductory part underpin this study, throughout which answers to those questions have been ascertained. Therefore, it is worth introducing here, albeit briefly, those questions and the answers found in this study.

1) What does the concept of secularization mean?

From the outset, scholars who write on secularization try to clarify their definition of secularization and emphasize the dynamics prioritized when it comes to measuring secularization. The concept of secularization used in this thesis, unlike its widespread use in other academic works and even daily life, is not just based on religion or religious affiliation. Secularization is here defined as the relative decrease in the social prestige and social influence of the metaphysical realm, i.e. religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms, and superstitious beliefs, within a defined period of time and in a particular society.

The reason for extending the scope of the concept is that discussions solely based on religion but not on the metaphysical realm do not offer a satisfactory context for secularization. Due to the definition suggested in this study, excluding other belief systems such as folk and superstitious beliefs which are independent of orthodox religions but have power to influence the daily lives of individuals, may not lead to a comprehensive discussion of secularization. In addition, sacralizing or deifying worldly leaders, places, nations, *etc.*, is also part of the secularization debates. In line with this, it has also been stated that secularization should not be confused with laicization, the separation of state and religion by law, or with becoming irreligious.

2) Is it possible to explain the secularization process among modern or modernizing societies in light of an extended paradigm?

As a result of being defined as above, and in order to understand the secularization process among Alevis in Turkish society, Bruce's paradigm which is based on the classical secularization theory, i.e. that modernization and secularization have gone hand in hand, was used as the basis. Hence, the answer to the second research question is precisely the extended version of Bruce's paradigm.

There are two fundamental reasons for which Bruce's secularization paradigm has been adopted as the foundation of this dissertation. At the very beginning of this study, it was stated that the concept of secularization is related to changes in the effect of religious belief on daily practices, not whether one has faith in the supernatural or not. Although Bruce conducted studies which put forward religious affiliation and being a believer as vital criteria, generally this is not what dominates Bruce's studies. Bruce's paradigm and studies, based on his paradigm and samples, are all grounded on a system that accorded privilege to this point of view. Secondly, apart from experiencing the Protestant Reformation, which is at the top

of Bruce's paradigm, it is highly likely that the transformation of modern or modernizing societies on account of the secularization processes may be explained through Bruce's paradigm. Although scientific developments, industrial capitalism and urbanization are the dynamics triggered by the Protestant Reformation in Western Europe, such dynamics may be the results of different undercurrents in various places. Such innovations are not always triggered by the same reasons, especially if those social innovations will improve societies' standards of living.

Therefore, it is asserted that Bruce's paradigm, which explains the secularization process in West European countries and their modern offshoots with fairly consistent and empirical data, can be applied to other modern or modernizing societies which have not experienced the Protestant Reformation. To extend the scope of the paradigm, parts strictly related to the Protestant Reformation have been blurred if not removed. Moreover, other dynamics, free from the dominant religious culture, which can be realized within any society are brought to the fore. For this reason, a paradigm which is based on Bruce's theory and at the same time purports to explain the social transformations of other non-Protestant countries is presented. The main pillars of this extended version of Bruce's paradigm consist of scientific advances, industrial capitalism, and urbanization.

3) Why is the Protestant Reformation vital for Bruce's paradigm?

For Bruce, if the main reason for European countries being secularized is modernization, then the initiator of modernization is the Protestant Reformation. Bruce, basing his argument on Weber, stresses that the Protestant Reformation changed the ethic of working and this led to the accumulation of capital. Bruce states that after the Protestant Reformation, other-worldly asceticism was abandoned and the idea that one does not have to desert worldly

affairs to be blessed by god became widespread. According to Bruce, the Protestant ethic, which stresses the importance of success in this world in order to win the approval of god, becomes the trigger of economic development. Bruce also emphasizes that social and functional differentiations, which are the initiators of the secularization process, are the results of economic developments coupled with industrialization. Bruce argues that the domination of religious authorities in the fields of education, social aid and morals declined due to the secular experts, new perceptions, and the new classes which emerged through the economic developments triggered by the Reformation. For Bruce, behind the developments that caused disintegration of traditional religious communities was the Protestant Reformation.

In addition to this, according to Bruce, the Reformation led to an increase in individualization. To him, that Protestantism is highly open to fragmentation in comparison with Catholicism, that various perceptions and religious organizations for salvation arose, that individuals became more equal in the eyes of God in comparison with Catholicism caused the rise of individualism. In parallel, the rise in religious diversity led to constructions that were once unique and unquestionable becoming “one of the alternatives”. Bruce asserts that the cogency of belief decreases if that belief is not accepted collectively by all individuals; and for that reason, Bruce emphasizes that the Protestant Reformation has knocked down a heap for European societies who had had “unique and unquestionable truth” for centuries. Bruce claims that the trend in mass literacy increased along with the Reformation. He claims that through the proliferation of a new current of thought such as “answering to God individually”, the Bible was translated into local languages, and read by large masses.

It is not that easy to assert that Bruce’s reading of the Protestant Reformation and its effect on Western Europe is wrong. However, when it comes to the secularization process of Western Europe, it is

necessary to stress that Bruce underestimates the Renaissance that began well before the Reformation. It is required to emphasize on the new way of thinking, new methods for science, a new approach to the nature of human, a new architectural view together and the fact that Ancient Greece and Roman Empire were inspirational for education and cultural revival.

Even if any of the details asserted by Bruce regarding European history is valid, it is possible that the same processes may not bring the same results in other parts of the world. For example, as frictions among various groups of believers weaken the power of a certain belief in European history, conflicts among different communions in Muslim communities may have led to the rise of an intolerant religious culture. It seems that similar social upheavals may have led to diverse results in various geo-political settings.

4) Why not use other models as a starting point (i.e. Religious Market Model, Secure Secularization Theory, or Religious Individualization Theory) rather than Bruce's paradigm?

But why not use other models as a starting point rather than Bruce's paradigm based on CST? Because either the assumptions put forward by the other theories or the claims they have raised concerning the definition and measurement of secularization were not sufficiently persuasive.

For example, the Religious Market Model (RRM) has two fundamental claims. The first is that in case of the existence of monopoly in the religious sense, where there is domination by any given belief system and additionally if it is supported by the state, it precludes vitalization in the religious sense. According to the second claim, every human being is born with the need to believe as part of one's nature, and this need has to be met. On the other hand, the Secure Secularization Theory (SST) claims that social disturbances, anxieties, worries and risks push people towards religion. The proponents of this theory defend the notion that uncertain-

ties and insecurity concerning the future make people turn towards the metaphysical realm. And finally, the Religious Individualization Theory (RIT) claims that the modernization process has modified the social form of religion but this change does not mean a decrease in religion's power or prestige. According to the defenders of RIT, a drop in church attendance in conjunction with modernization does not mean a corresponding drop in piety. On the contrary, in conjunction with the rise in individual piety, the loss of power among traditional religious institutions occurred in the same period.

It should be emphasized that academic research have not verified the assumptions and hypotheses of RRM and RIT. We do not have hard evidence at hand to support the conclusions of these studies. Nevertheless, a sufficient number of studies that verify SST's claims have been published but it is not clear whether SST deviates from the classical secularization theory.

It has to be stated additionally that while these three theories constitute important cornerstones of the secularization discussions, there are some important differences between the definition and measurement methods of secularization in these theories and the definition and measurement methods used in this thesis. Church attendance rates and changes in the number of pious people have been used as the most important and sometimes the only criteria for secularization in these theories, but this is not consistent with the secularization concept as used in this thesis. Being defined as such, instead of focusing on the frequency of worship or the number of believers, the increase or decrease in the influence of the metaphysical realm on daily life was reviewed during the measurement phase of secularization in this thesis. However, what is emphasized is not that the frequency of worship, rate of going to church, and changes in the number of believers are unimportant. What needs to be expressed is that insistence on the frequency of worship in order to determine if the metaphysical realm is included in daily life practices could prevent the attainment of sufficient results in particular soci-

eties. What is important is not whether one is a believer or not, but how frequently belief touches the daily life of believers. Therefore, the secularization paradigm proposed by Steve Bruce constitutes the baseline of the extended secularization paradigm presented in this study.

5) What are the pillars of such an extended secularization paradigm?

To apply Bruce's paradigm to a non-Christian community or a community that has not been affected by the Protestant Reformation in its history, parts of the paradigm that are specific to Europe or Christianity were blurred while parts that are applicable on a more general basis were emphasized. That is the way in which Bruce's paradigm is extended. For that reason, the three dynamics borrowed from the old paradigm, i.e. scientific developments, industrial capitalism, and urbanization, are claimed to have caused secularization.

There were two important reasons for focusing on these three dynamics. First, these three pillars are common to modern societies which can be observed independently of those societies' religious, historical and political culture. The emergence of these three dynamics may take different paths in different countries. At times they may emerge as a result of socio-economic reasons that develop by themselves, and at other times as a result of support by the state. Technological developments, industrial capitalism and urbanization do not have to be the product of a single historical process. They are the reality faced by different societies that have experienced diverse modernization processes.

Another reason for which these three dynamics are adopted is that social, structural and cultural differentiation, economic development, egalitarianism, religious diversity, technology and technological consciousness and other such sub-dynamics in Bruce's paradigm are without exception the results of these three main dynamics.

In short, this dissertation argues that secularization tends to accelerate in societies where scientific developments have become widespread and affecting daily practices, industrial capitalism is dominant, and where urbanization is increasing when compared to the past. That is to say, based on these three dynamics, it is argued that the social prestige and power of the metaphysical realm will decrease.

6) Why does the secularization process accelerate with the diffusion of scientific knowledge and advancements in daily life?

The contribution of scientific development to secularization is not a direct but an indirect one. In other words, the reason why scientific developments accelerate secularization is not because scientific knowledge refutes the arguments asserted by religion. At least, that is not a result claimed by this study. According to the paradigm, there are two reasons why scientific developments have led to secularization.

The first reason is the increasing *rational consciousness* in light of scientific developments. Rational consciousness, in this study, refers to perceiving the natural events in a cause-effect relation, and purgation of supernaturalism which dominates the social behaviours of individuals. Scientific developments have broken the spell of the known universe as they find explanations for mysterious natural events. In times when scientific developments had no radical effects on life, natural events such as the eclipse of the sun and natural disasters (floods and earthquakes), as well as wars wreaking great destructions were all taken as messages from the supernatural realm. Since the causes and treatments of many illnesses were not known, they were believed to be the anger of the gods. However, new data and improvements in modern medicine, brought forth by scientific developments, have brought about an increase in the level of rational consciousness let alone a more mechanical world view.

The second reason for which scientific developments accelerate secularization is that issues in need of the metaphysical realm have either completely dissipated or their frequency has decreased as new technology becomes a part of daily life. The increase in technical data, great developments in calculation, and improvement in the tools that enable to see far and nearby distances have allowed people to have more control of nature, thereby rendering the mystery of nature less intimidating than it once was. The “darkness/obscurity” of nature leaves one with problems that cannot be solved by possibilities on earth, and so it forces people to turn towards the supernatural realm. With improvements in technology, some natural disasters have become predictable or preventable or at least the ability to take precautions beforehand is now possible. All such improvements have led people to depend less on the metaphysical realm in case of disasters.

Parallel to these improvements, developments in medicine have also led to a decrease in the need for god. As diseases become controllable and treatment centres have increased in number, all these have made treatment processes faster and cheaper compared to the past. That process has contributed to less dependency on other alternatives (supernaturalism, alternative medicine, places and people associated with holiness, etc.) as people rely more on medicine. Therefore, religious people, who once helped people with their illness, are not being asked for counselling anymore.

In short, scientific developments have given rise to secularization not because they refute religious arguments but because they have reduced the need for religion.

7) Why does the secularization process seem to be accelerating in capitalist countries?

Capitalism, in which production tools are subject to private ownership and where free market mechanism works while voluntary ex-

change of goods and services is vital, limits the power of the metaphysical realm at the social level in at least four different aspects.

Firstly, the rules upon which capitalism is built in order to reproduce itself prevent any religious discipline from intervening with the economy. In capitalism, the commercial success of man – religious or not – is not related to his relation to other-worldly power but related to making the right decisions at the right place and at the right time. As they search for ways of presenting high quality goods at cheaper prices than their competitors, religious teachings and practices are mandated to stay away from economic life. Things that are religiously improper (such as interest in Islam) have been normalised and become an essential part of economic life because of capitalism.

Secondly, the new working conditions have led to the disintegration of the traditional family structure. A cultural shift in the way women are perceived is taking place in religiously-dominated agricultural societies that now transform into a modern society in which secular-rational values are dominant. Together with economic gains and increasing education level, women become relatively free from the domination of traditions shaped by religion. Such a change has led to a fall in birth-rates and an increase in divorce, leading to a fall in the average age of extramarital sex and an extramarital baby boom.

Thirdly, the wealth and prosperity caused by capitalism tends to reduce loyalty to absolute authorities, religious or otherwise. In countries where the free market has become widespread, it is not a coincidence that income per capita increases, rate of literacy increases, housing becomes more hygienic and comfortable, average life expectancy increases, baby death rate decreases, communication becomes easier, and a more democratic way of life takes hold. The increasing level of welfare leads to a decrease in dependency on supernatural powers among individuals.

Finally, as a result of state being pulled back from the economy, its domination in the political sphere also regresses and its imposition of a certain value on society becomes more difficult. Since qualification becomes prominent in the capitalist system, individuals are hired or fired depending on their success. When the government has the means of productions, individuals need to share the same mentality as the government's or act in accordance with government leaders' political views. The reason is that the government who is powerful economically can become totalitarian in the political sphere. It can be seen that countries with a protective economy throughout the 20th century have dictated certain collective values to their communities or have attributed holiness to a certain ideology or founder of such ideology. However, the capitalist system both forestalls monopolization and makes disposing individuals difficult for those in political power. If individuals do not need the support of the government in order to earn money, then they can also be free from the government on other aspects of life. As the government shrinks and loses its position as the power that be, it also loses its dictating power on matters that its people can believe in.

8) Why does urbanization lead to an increase in the level of secularization?

Because of the urbanization process, people have begun to live in a mobile way and have more alternatives compared to those in rural life. In addition, private spaces which are relatively free from pressure from neighbour, religious sanctions, customs and traditions are created. Such changes in people's lives restrict the social power of the metaphysical realm.

Mobilization: the mobilization process in the city, interurban and from rural to urban, gives rise to coming into contact with various cultures for the individuals. The individual who comes across different cultures becomes less conservative with respect to cultural differences compared to the one who has been in touch with only

one culture throughout his/her life. In the city, pluralism and tolerance become structural factors, while groups such as homosexuals that are excluded by religion become more prominent. The process of mobilization also leads to encountering new power groups and their followers. Finding out that values considered unquestionable for the individual are in fact meaningless for another can lead to psychological effects that accelerate the secularization process. Another reason that mobilization accelerates secularization is that as people move away, religion also moves away from its holy places. In rural areas, people move away from the sacred spaces they have used for worship for centuries, and for other social reasons. New job opportunities in urban areas, long working hours because of aggravated competition circumstances, socializing possibilities, parents care more about their children, going on vacation more often, *etc.* all mean less spare time for religious activities. Such a new way of life makes way for focusing more on “this world” rather than “the other world”.

Access to Different Alternatives: the second reason for supposing that urbanization leads to the acceleration of secularization is that the individual has begun to live in a structure that provides him/her with various alternatives on any matter. When compared to people in rural areas, those living in urban areas have the opportunity to choose from among diversified (even religious) alternatives. The freedom of choosing in the urban setting leads to the construction of a new way of awareness. A belief that people in rural areas tend to accept religion without question ends up becoming only one of many alternatives for those in urban areas to choose from. Because of the alternatives available to those in the urban setting, not only proselytizing but also moving away from religion – not possible for those in a rural setting – is highly probable. It can be asserted that since one still believes in a religion, proselytizing is not related to secularization. However, secularization does not mean being a nonbeliever. What is crucial for the arguments in favour of

secularization is that religious identity, which is held from birth to death and not open to question in the rural area, is loosened because of other alternatives in the urban setting. Proselytizing in rural areas can end up in death, whereas choosing any of the alternatives in the urban setting would not disturb the social roles of the individuals, and thus would create less problem for an individual if not at all.

Privatization of Personal Life: the third reason that causes the acceleration of secularization is the appearance of private spaces that are void of traditions justified by religion with less social pressure. Traditions are decision mechanisms for deciding how, where and when one can socialize with others in the rural area, but in the urban setting individuals decide relatively freely where, how and with whom to socialize. In contrast to the rural setting, in the urban area coming together depends on common interests and enjoyments. While people in rural areas need to communicate with their neighbours much, that is not the case for the ones in the urban area because of different life-standards. For that reason, individuals living in the same neighbourhood or even in the same apartment block do not know each other. With new possibilities, people do not need neighbours as much as they did in a rural setting; therefore, interference by the neighbours in one's private space is kept to a minimum or none at all. Urban life indirectly makes people interfere less in other's life space on matters of friendship, dress, and belief.

9) What does the extended secularization paradigm *not* assert?

However, revealing the meaning of the paradigm may not always have been enough as an explanation. For that reason, putting forward what the paradigm did not defend was necessary in order to avoid possible misunderstandings.

Firstly, the extended paradigm, contrary to Bruce's paradigm, is not restricted to a certain time and place. Although the extended secularization paradigm is not a steady law of nature, its claim covers a wider range of settings when compared to Bruce's paradigm.

For sure, to understand the secularization process in a society, it seems preferable to explain it through the inner dynamics of that society rather than through a universal paradigm. As the question involves the ups and downs between religions and society, then various dynamics may change the course of that relation at different times. Yet still, if the question is scientific developments, capitalism and urbanization, it is expected that societies, irrespective of dominant metaphysical realm, would become more secular.

Secondly, the extended paradigm does not itself disapprove or favor secularization, meaning that it is not a progressive or secularist ideology but one that tries to give a plausible explanation for the social transformation. For that reason, the paradigm does not seek answers to these questions: Are secularized societies happier? Does secularization, as compared to the past, mean having better living conditions? Do individuals become part of a high-quality life in secularized societies? Arguments within these questions as well as their answers can neither verify nor falsify what the paradigm asserts.

Thirdly, becoming non-religious or atheist does not suggest that the last stage has been reached by the paradigm. Since the paradigm does not question the subjective belief of the individual, it does not claim or foresee that religion will disappear due to modernization. However, it questions the apparent effects of order, prohibition and advice of the individual's belief on his/her life experiences. The secularization process is not a process about the disappearance of religion. Decrease in the social power and prestige of any religion may lead to a decrease in the number of people believing in that religion. Yet, the secularization paradigm does not refer to a final point. Those who are secularized may still believe in a religion.

Fourthly, the paradigm does not claim that all modernizing societies are secularized in the same way, in the same direction, within the same time period, and with the same circumstances. The secularization paradigm does not assert that each and every society secularizes in the same way as water ballet athletes do. To assert that

secularization actualizes in a synchronized way, or any individual living in a modern society becomes part of the secular culture or that no one will be devout in such a society is simply unreasonable. In the course of social changes, various social components may tend towards a more diversified way of life. What is meant by social transformation is the new social structure that emerges in the course of such tendencies.

Fifthly, frequency of worship is not placed at the heart of the paradigm. The literature on secularization with focus on Christianity uses the rate of going to church or increase in the number of believers or nonbelievers as almost the only parameter. Within the secularization discussions, all parameters that are thought to offer an impression on the matter of social transformations should be taken into consideration. However, using the same method for other religious groups, i.e. placing emphasis on just the frequency of church attendance, frequency of praying or the number of believers, might not give a comprehensive picture of the secularization process. It cannot be asserted that the rate of praying is not a parameter worth considering. Yet, when it comes to a country with a Muslim majority, it would be difficult to get healthy results if the rate of praying or the rate of going to the mosque is taken as determining factors of the secularization process. Being different from modern-day Christianity, modern-day Islam still wants to have the right to comment on individuals' selection of partner, job, city, dress, food and beverage, sexuality, *etc.*.

Finally, the paradigm takes into consideration the deification or transcendence of worldly "things" besides celestial belief systems. Secularization does not only mean the loss of power for monotheistic religions. Apart from the monotheistic religions, polytheistic folk beliefs with multi-symbols that are in touch with daily life or superstitious beliefs are also part of secularization discussions. Moreover, since some leaders are deified, and divinity is attributed to them, the social prestige and power of such sacralised leaders or

another worldly structure are regarded as the field study of the secularization paradigm, too.

10) Can the extended secularization paradigm provide a plausible explanation for Alevi communities in Turkey even if there has been a revival of Alevism?

This thesis claims that an extended version of Bruce's contradictory secularization paradigm may provide valuable insights into the secularization process, not only in Western Europe and its offshoots, but also in other non-Christian communities, as well as Christian communities that did not experience the Protestant Reformation. For that reason, the Alevis living in the Adana, Çorum and Tunceli regions of Turkey have been chosen as the primary focus of this thesis. There were two crucial reasons behind this choice: firstly, to focus on a non-Christian religious subgroup in Turkey which is not part of Europe or one of its offshoots, and which has not experienced the Protestant Reformation in its history. The second reason is the claim of an Alevi revival to have taken place in the 1980s despite being part of a modernizing society. Alevis, who were assumed to be non-existent at the state level and social arena, became Turkey's most important agenda item after the 1980s. The start of Alevis' struggles for their rights when they arrived in cities, the establishment of Alevi associations, the opening of Cem houses of worship in central parts of large metropolitan areas, sharing of their worship rituals and rites at these Cem houses with millions watching via state televisions, having their own radio and television stations, and the fact that the new generation of Alevis do not hide their Alevi identity in contrast to the previous generations – these are examples put forward by researchers in favour of the existence of such an Alevi revival. These two reasons, i.e. being part of a non-Protestant society and having experienced such a revival, have made the social transformation experienced by Alevis in terms of the secularization discussion quite interesting.

The results of the field study demonstrate that the extended version of Bruce's paradigm is applicable not only to West European societies but to Alevi society as well. The Alevis have increasingly been part of a more modernized and secularized society with regard to the issues of premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorcement, the institutions of spiritual brotherhood and people's court.

It can be observed from the issues which this thesis aims to investigate that the new generation of Alevis has been experiencing a more secularized lifestyle compared to the previous generation. The intensity and frequency of flirting/dating have increased among the new generation of Alevis. Divorce, which previously resulted in having been completely excluded from society, has ceased to be a taboo subject and become something normal in their lives. The institution of the people's court, which is responsible for social justice and order, no longer has any say on the issue of wedding. New generations do not anymore refer to this institution for daily or marital advice. "*Dedes*", who traditionally are the religious leaders among Alevis, have lost their spiritual and political power to guide the new generation of Alevis. Besides, the social prestige and power of the institution of spiritual brotherhood have also waned. This institution, which survived for centuries and ensured the existence of Alevi society, has lost its power due to the experienced rapid modernization process.

It is also found that the Alevi identity revival and secularization do not alienate each other. Alevis have campaigned to be legally recognized at the state level and be allowed to have an independent form of governance. For the foreseeable future, it would not be surprising if mandatory religion classes are abolished, Cem Houses have gained legal status, and *dedes* are recognized and paid for by the state. However, these indicators of Alevi identity revival do not mean that the new generations are becoming more and more Alevi. On the contrary, because of the three pillars of the extended secular-

ization paradigm, it actually seems that they are far-removed from traditional Alevi beliefs, precepts, and rituals compared to previous generations.

Last Words

It should be stressed that this thesis can be further expanded by future studies of other regions and religions, both in and outside Europe, i.e. Christian, but not having experienced the Protestant Reformation or non-Christian societies. The result of this thesis should be corroborated by other works so as to allow for generalization. I have conducted fieldwork research using a qualitative approach. Due to the nature of the snowball sampling method, control over sampling was somewhat restricted. In fact, in order to test a theory in social sciences whether it is secularization or any other thing, it is clear that it is required longitudinal studies, sufficiently large numbers of samples and quantitative studies as well as qualitative ones. A sample group consisting only 30 pair, and qualitative study may not be enough to test a theory. Hence, the empirical study of this thesis was not carried out to test the extended version of secularization theory, but an illustration of it.

Therefore, I am confident that any research with a qualitative approach or an ethnographic study within a large scale will substantially contribute to this discussion. In addition, a comparative study on Alevis and Sunnis would also be very beneficial. Such a study might be helpful in strengthening or revising this study's extended paradigm. My study also does not include Alevis who have migrated to cosmopolitan cities such as İstanbul; therefore, the impact of migration on the secularization process among Alevis also remains to be sorted out. It would be very exciting and informative to acquire insights into the situations of Alevis living in cosmopolitan areas. This study selected a faith group in Turkey as its field of study due to time and financial restrictions of a doctoral thesis. In the future, studies based on different faith groups in Turkey or studies

to be made in another country not dominated by Protestantism will expand the discussions in this respect.

At the very beginning of the theoretical part, it was stressed that the secularization process of non-Protestant societies may also be conceived in light of Bruce's secularization paradigm, if it can be extended. In light of interviews, this thesis supports the idea that in societies where dynamics such as scientific developments, capitalism and urbanization arise, the social prestige and power of the dominant metaphysical realm diminishes. The findings of the thesis support the idea that Bruce's paradigm is valid not only for Western-Europe, but it also offers insights into the secularization process happening in other modern or modernizing societies outside Western Europe. The extended secularization paradigm provides a reasonable explanation for the secularization process happening in Alevi communities. Alevis in Turkey have become much more modern compared to bygone days, while at the same time a rather pervasive secularization process is impacting even marital issues due to the very structure of modern life itself.

REFERENCES

- Akmam, W. (2002). Women's Education and Fertility Rates in Developing Countries, With Special Reference to Bangladesh. *Journal of Asian and International Bioethics*, 12, 138-143.
- Akşit, B. (2005). Laikleşme Tipolojisi ve Türkiye'de Laiklik Deneyimi. In A. Öncü & O. Tekelioğlu (Eds.), *Şerif Mardin'e Armağan* (pp. 65-103). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Akşit, B., Şentürk, R., Küçükkural, Ö. & Cengiz, K. (2012). *Türkiye'de Dindarlık. Sosyal Gerilimler Ekseninde İnanç ve Yaşam Biçimleri*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Aktaş, A. (1999). Kent Ortamında Alevilerin Kendilerinin Tanımlama Biçimleri ve İnanç Ritüellerini Uygulama Sıklıklarının Sosyolojik Açından Değerlendirilmesi. In *www.alevibektasi.eu*. Retrieved from http://www.alevibektasi.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=675:kent-ortamında-alevilerin-kendilerini-tanmlama-bicimleri-ve-nanc-ritueellerini-uygulama-sklklarnn-sosyolojik-acdan-deerlendirilmesi&catid=38:2014-11-29-00-06-44&Itemid=54%3E [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Akyüz, N. & Çapcıoğlu, İ. (2011). Modernleşme, Toplumsal Değişme ve Din. In İ. Çapcıoğlu (Ed.), *Modernleşen Türkiye'de Din ve Toplum* (pp. 27-43). Ankara: Otto.
- Ali, S. (2008). Second and Third Generation Muslim in Britain: A Socially Excluded Group. In *www.portmir.org.uk*. Retrieved from <http://www.portmir.org.uk/assets/pdfs/second-and-third-generation-muslims-in-britain-a-socially-excluded-group.pdf> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Allen, R. M. (2010). *Reformed Theology (Doing Theology)*. New York, NY: T&T Clark International.
- Altun, Ş. (2008). *6-14 Yaş Arası Çocuklarda Aşılama Oranı ve Ailelerin Özel Aşılarda İlgili Bilgi Düzeyi*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bakırköy Dr. Sadi Konuk Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi, İstanbul, Turkey. Retrieved from http://www.istanbulsaglik.gov.tr/w/tez/pdf/aile_hekimligi/dr_senol_altun.pdf [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Amman, T. (2010). Ailenin Açık ve Örtük Sekülerleşmesinin Sosyolojik Analizi. In M. F. Bayraktar (Ed.), *Aile ve Eğitim* (pp. 41-70). İstanbul: Ensar Neşr.
- Aquaviva, S. S. (1960). The Psychology of Dechristianisation in the Dynamics of the Industrial Society. *Social Compass*, 7(3), 209-225.

- Apak, S. (2012). *Avrupa Birliği, IMF, Balkan Ülkeleri ve Türkiye Bankacılık Sektörü*. Discussion Paper, Turkish Economic Association, No: 2012/11. Retrieved from <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81730/1/715317814.pdf> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Arieli, Y. (1994). Modern History as Reinstatement of the Saeculum: A Study in the Semantics of History. *Jewish History*, 8(1/2) (The Robert Cohen Memorial Volume), 205-228.
- Armağan, M. (1997, September 26). Sekülerizasyon (Laikleşme) Efsanesi. In *Zaman*. Retrieved from http://www.zaman.com.tr/mustafa-armagan/sekularizasyon-laiklesme-efsanesi_477406.html [Last visited 12/03/2016]
- Arman, A. (2009, July 12). İsmail Ağa Caddesi'nde mini etekli Nişantaşı'nda Türbanlı. In *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ismail-aga-caddesi-nde-mini-etekli-nisantasi-nda-turbanli-12053542> [last visited 28/08/2016] .
- Arnold, M. (2012). How Does Religion Matter Today in Poland? Secularization in Europe and the "Causa Polonia Semper Fidelis". In A. Maik & L. Przemyslaw (Eds.), *Europe and America in the Mirror: Culture, Economy, and History* (pp. 199-238). Krakau: Nomos.
- Ashford, N. (2003). *Principles for a Free Society*. (2nd Ed.). Bromma: Blomberg & Janson.
- Atay, T. (2012). *Din Hayattan Çıkar*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Atkinson, P. & Hammersley, M. (2007). *Etnography: Principles in Practice*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Bahramitash, R. & Kazemipour, S. (2006). Myths and Realities of the Impact of Islam on Women: Changing Marital Status in Iran. *Middle East Critique*, 15(2), 111-128.
- Bagnall, N. (2002). *The Punic Wars, 264-146 BC*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Balkanlıoğlu, M. A. (2012). *Ve Aşk Kazandı. Alevi Sünni Evlilikleri*. İstanbul: Şahı Merdan Yayınları.
- Balzac, H. de (2013). [1830]. *Gobseck*. (E. Marriage, Trans.). In [www.gutenberg.org](http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1389?msg=welcome_stranger). Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1389?msg=welcome_stranger [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Bardakçı, C. (2012). [1940]. *Alevilik Ahilik Bektaşilik*. İstanbul: Postiga.
- BARNA Research Studies. (2001, December 17). The Year's Most Intriguing Findings. In www.barna.org. Retrieved from [http://](http://www.barna.org)

- www.barna.com/research/the-years-most-intriguing-findings-from-barna-research-studies/[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Barry, N. (2002). Kapitalizm (A. Yayla, Trans.). *Piyasa*, 1(Winter), 33-38.
- Başdemir, H. Y. (2011). Optimum Değerler Olarak Laiklik ve Din Özgürlüğü. In H. Y. Başdemir (Ed.), *Türkiye’de Din Özgürlüğü ve Laiklik* (pp. 147-172). Ankara: Liberte.
- Bayatlı, O. (1957). *Bergama’da Alevi Gelini ve İnançları*. İzmir: Teknik Kitan ve Mecmua.
- BBC. (2013, March 15). A Point of View: Crowd-sourcing comets. In *www.bbc.com*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21802843>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Becker, S.O., Nagler, M. & Woessmann, L. (2014, March 10). *Education promoted secularization*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8016. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409538 [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Belkin, L. (2013, August 2). Huffpost Poll: What Would You Do With An Extra Hour Every Day?. In *www.huffingtonpost.com*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/extra-hour-a-day_n_3697387.html[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Berger, P. L. (1967a). *The Sacred Canopy*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
- Berger, P. L. (1967b). A Sociological View of the Secularization of Theology. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 6(1): 3-16.
- Berger, P. L. (1997). Epistemological modesty: An Interview with Peter Berger. *Christian Century* 114, 972-75. Retrieved from <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=240> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Berger, P., Davie, G. & Fokas, E. (2008). *Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Berkes, N. (2006). *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*. İstanbul: YapıKredi Yayınları.
- Berlin, I. (2000, October 19).[1945]. The Arts in Russia Under Stalin. In *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2000/10/19/the-arts-in-russia-under-stalin/?pagination=false>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Berlin, I. (2004).[1949]. *The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture Under Communism*. Virginia, VA: The Brookings Institution.
- Bernard, L. L. (1938). The Sociological Interpretation of Religion. *The Journal of Religion*, 18(1): 1-18.

- Blackburn, S. (2005). Anthropocentric. In *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (2nd Ed., pp.18). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Blume, M., Ramsel, C. & Graupner, S. (2006). Religiosity as a Demographic Factor – an underestimated connection. *Marburg Journal of Religion*, 11(1), Retrieved from <http://web.archive.org/web/20120425090544/http://www.blume-religionswissenschaft.de/pdf/blume2006.pdf> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Bozkurt, F. (2000). *Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinde Alevilik*. Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık.
- Bozkurt, F. (2003). State-Community Relations in the Restructuring of Alevism. In T. Olson, E. Özdalga & C. Raudvere (Eds.), *Alevi Identity* (pp. 85-96). Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute
- Bremmer, J. (2008). Secularization: Notes Toward a Genealogy. In H. de Vries (Ed.), *Religion: Beyond a Concept* (pp. 432-437 / 900-903). New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
- Bruce, S. (1993). Religion and Rational Choice: A Critique of Economic Explanations of Religious Behavior. *Sociology of Religion*, 54(2): 193-205.
- Bruce, S. (1995). A Novel Reading of Nineteenth-Century Wales: A Reply to Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 34(4): 520-522.
- Bruce, S. (1996). *Religion in the Modern World, From Cathedrals to Cults*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bruce, S. (1997). The Pervasive World-View: Religion in Pre-Modern Britain. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 48(4): 667-680.
- Bruce, S. (1998). The Charismatic Movement and the Secularization. *Religion*, 28(3), 223-232.
- Bruce, S. (1999a). Modernisation, Religious Diversity and Rational Choice in Eastern Europe. *Religion, State and Society*, 27(3-4), 265-275.
- Bruce, S. (1999b). *Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Bruce, S. (2000). The Supply-Side Model of Religion: The Nordic and Baltic States. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 39(1): 32-46.
- Bruce, S. (2001). Christianity in Britain, R.I.P. *Sociology of Religion*, 62(2):191-203.
- Bruce, S. (2002). *God is Dead*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Bruce, S. (2003). The Social Proces of Secularization. In (R. Fenn, Ed.). *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion* (pp. 249-263). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- Bruce, S. (2006). Secularization and the Impotence of Individualized Religion. *Hedgebog Review*, 8, 35-45.
- Bruce, S. (2011a). *Secularization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bruce, S. (2011b). Secularisation, Church and Popular Religion. *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 62(3): 543-561.
- Bruce, S. (2014). Late Secularization and Religion as Alien. *Open Theology*, 1(1), 13-23.
- Brunner, J. (1991). From Rousseau to Totalitarian Democracy: The French Revolution in J. L. Talmon's Historiography. *History and Memory*, 3(1), 60-85.
- Burnett, G. (1807). *Specimens of English Prose Writers: From the Earliest Times to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orma and Paternoster Row.
- Casanova, J. (1994). *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Casanova J. (2003) Beyond European and American Exceptionalism: Towards a Global Perspective. In G. Davie, P. Heelas & L. Woodhead (Eds.), *Predicting Religion, Christian, Secular and Alternative Futures* (pp. 17-29). Aldershot: ASHGATE
- Casanova, J. (2007). Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A European Union / United States Comparison. In T. Banchoff (Ed.), *Democracy and The New Religious Pluralism* (pp. 59-83). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Ceylan, Y. (2004). The Conflict Between State and Religion in Turkey. In G. Steunebrink & E. Van Der Zweerde (Eds.), *Civil Society, Religion, and the Nation* (pp.175-190). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- ChartsBin Statistics Collector Team. (2009). Average Age at First Sex by Country. In www.chartsbin.com. Retrieved from <http://chartsbin.com/view/xxj> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Chaves, M. (1994). Secularization as Declining Religious Authority. *Social Forces*, 72(3), 749-774.
- Chervenak, F.A., McCullough, L.B., Brent, R.L., Levene, M.I. & Arabin, B. (2013). Planned Home Birth: the Professional Responsibility Response. *American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology*, 208(1), 31-38.

- Coates, W. H., White, H. V. & Schapiro, J. S. (1966). *The Emergence of Liberal Humanism*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book.
- Comte, A. (1998). *Early Political Writings*. (H. S. Jones, Trans. & Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooke, P. (1990). Modern Urban Theory in Question. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 15(3), 331-343.
- Cowen, T. (2008). Arts. In *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*. (2nd Ed.). www.econlib.org/index.html. Retrieved from <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Arts.html> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Cox, H. (1965). *The Secular City*. London: Pelican Books.
- Cox, H. & Swyngedouw, J. (2000). The Myth of the Twentieth Century: The Rise and Fall of Secularization. *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 27(1/2), 1-13.
- Crippen, T. (1988). Old and New Gods in the Modern World: Toward a Theory of Religious Transformation. *Social Forces*, 67(2), 316-336.
- Crocker, L. G. (Ed.). (1969). *The Age of Enlightenment*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Çaha, Ö. (2004). The Role of the Media in the Revival of Alevi Identity in Turkey. *Social Identities*, 10(3), 325-338.
- Çamuroğlu, R. (2003). Alevi Revivalism in Turkey. In T. Olson, E. Özdalga & C. Raudvere (Eds.), *Alevi Identity* (pp. 79-84). Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute
- Çatlı, G. (2008). İstanbul ve Nevşehir'de Alevi-Sünni evliliğinin antropolojik açıdan incelenmesi. Unpublished master thesis, The University of Yeditepe, İstanbul, Turkey.
- Çem, M. (2010). *Dersim Merkezli Kürt Aleviliği*. İstanbul: Vate.
- Çetinsaya, G. (2014). *Büyüme, Kalite, Uluslararasılaşma: Türkiye Yükseköğretimi için Bir Yol Haritası*. Ankara: Yükseköğretim Kurulu, Publish no: 2014/2.
- Çilingiroğlu, N. (2009). Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu'nun 2002-2009 Yılları Arası Yoksulluk Bulguları. *Toplum Hekimliği Bülteni*, 28(3), 24-32.
- Dal Lago, F. (1999). Personal Mao: Reshaping an Icon in Contemporary Chinese Art. *Art Journal*, 58(2), 46-59.
- Dante, A. (2005). [1555]. *The Divine Comedy*. (H. W. Longfellow, Trans.). Hazleton, PA: The Pennsylvania State University. Retrieved from <http://swcta.net/moore/files/2013/10/dante-longfellow.pdf> [last visited 28/08/2016]

- Davie, G. (1990). Believing without Belonging: Is this the Future of Religion in Britain?. *Social Compass*, 37(4), 455-469.
- Davie, G. (1994). *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Davie, G. (2002). *Europe: The Exceptional Case*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.
- Davis, K. & Casis, A. (1946). Urbanization in Latin America. *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 24(2), 186-207.
- Demiray, M. (2004). *Understanding the Alevi Revival: A Transnational Perspective*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.
- Demircan, A. (2013). Hz. Ali ve Halifelik Dönemi. In E. Baş(Ed.), *İslam Tarihi* (2nd ed., pp 285-301). Ankara: Grafik Yayınları.
- Demirok, G. (2012, October 9). Türk Gençlerinin 3'te 2'si Bilgisayarların Kendilerini Sosyalleştirdiğini Düşünüyor. *www.sosyalmedya.co*. Retrieved from <http://sosyalmedya.co/intel-genc-turkiye-arastirmasi/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Dillon, M. & Garland, L. (2005). *Ancient Rome*. New York, NY: Routledge
- Dinçer, Ö. (2007). *Namus ve Bekaret: Kuşaklar Arasında Değişen Ne? İki Kuşaktan Kadınların Cinsellik Algıları*. Unpublished master thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara. Retrieved from <https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/r?key=7d53ed97e31a8bd32ee4d7d6ed88a294ea600057d1efd87bfc549cddb467fc14953a3a08fddfd43515d60d46ddd7bf97> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Dobbelaere, K. (1985). Secularization Theories and Sociological Paradigms: A Reformulation of the Private-Public Dichotomy and the Problem of Societal Integration. *Sociological Analysis*, 46(4), 377-387.
- Dobbelaere, K. (1999). Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization. *Sociology of Religion*, 60(3), 229-247.
- Doğan, N. (2012). *Rakamlarla Özelleştirme. Türkiye'de ve Dünya'da Özelleştirme Uygulamaları ve Özelleştirme Fonu'nun Kaynak ve Kullanımları*. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı.
- Donne, J. (1840). [1640]. *Selections from the Works of John Donne*, D. D.. Oxford: D. A. Talboys.

- Dressler, M. (2008). Religio-Secular Metamorphoses: Re-Making of Turkish Alevism. *Journal of American Academy of Religion*, 76(2), 280-311.
- Duran, B. (1995). Sekülerleşme-Laikleşme Süreci ve Gezegen Ölçeğinde Sonuçları. *Köprü Dergisi*, (51). Retrieved from <http://www.koprudergisi.com/index.asp?Bolum=EskiSayilar&Goster=Yazi&YaziNo=215> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Duran, B. (1997). *Sekülerleşme Krizi ve Bir Çıkış Yolu Arayışı*. İstanbul: TİMAŞ.
- Durkheim, É. (2008).[1912] *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Durkheim, É. (2014).[1893]. *The Division of Labour*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Dynes, R.R. (2000). The Dialogue Between Voltaire and Rousseau on the Lisbon Earthquake: The Emergence of a Social Science View. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 18 (1), 97-115. Retrieved from <http://www.ijmed.org/articles/166/download/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Easlea, B. (1980). *Witch Hunting, Magic and the New Philosophy: An Introduction to Debates of the Scientific Revolution 1450-1750*. Sussex: The Harvester Press.
- East-West Center (2013, April 10). Declining Birth Rates Raising Concerns in Asia. In www.eastwestcenter.org. Retrieved from <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/declining-birth-rates> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Erdem, M. (2010). *Secrets and Revelations: An Ethnographic Study of the Nusayr community in the Karaduvar District of Mersin*. Unpublished master thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.
- Erdemir, A. (2004). *Incorporating Alevis: The Transformation of Governance and Faith Based Collective Action in Turkey*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, the USA
- Erdoğan, M. (2002). İyi Niyet, Yoksulluk ve Piyasa. *Piyasa*, 3(Yaz), 93-98.
- Erman, T. & Göker, E. (2000). Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36(4), 99-118.
- Eurostat. (2015, June). A Rise in Births Outside Marriage. In [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics#A_rise_in_births_outside_marriage [last visited 28/08/2016]

- Evans, G. & Northmore-Ball, K. (2012). The Limits of Secularization? The Resurgence of Orthodoxy in Post-Soviet Russia. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 51(4), 795-808.
- Eze, E. C. (2002). Answering the Question, 'What Remains of Enlightenment'. *Human Studies*, 25(3): 281-288.
- Farid, M. (2013). Mahtap Farid to Alan Eyre: What part of Public Diplomacy don't you understand? [Web log post] Retrieved from <http://uspublicdiplomacy.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-part-of-public-diplomacy-dont-you.html> [last visited 19/05/2013]
- Feijten, P., van Dijck & Boyle, P. (2010, September 1-4). *Secularization and Migration in Scotland: A Test of the Modernization Hypothesis*. Paper presented at European Population Conference, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from <http://epc2010.princeton.edu/papers/100655> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Fenn, R. K. (1969). The Secularization of Values: An Analytical Framework for the Study of Secularization. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 8(1), 112-124.
- Fetzer, J. S. & Soper, J. C. (2005). *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fırat, G. (2003, June 23). Ordunun Müdahalesi Kaçınılmaz Hale Gelmiştir. *Türk Solu*, 33. Retrieved from <http://www.turksolu.com.tr/33/basyazi33.htm> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Fırat, K. (2005). Ankara'da Bir Alan Araştırması: Aleviliğin ve Dinsel Kimliğin Alevilerce Algılanması. *Kırkbudak*, 1(1), 50-69.
- Finer, L.B. (2007). Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954-2003. *Public Health Reports*, 122(1), 73-78.
- Finke, R. & Stark, R. (1988). Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities, 1906. *American Sociological Review*, 53(1), 41-49.
- Frejka, T. and Westoff, C. F. (2008). Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the US and in Europe. *European Journal of Population*, 24(1). 5-31.
- Friedman, M. (1982). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Froese, P. (2004). Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic Monopoly Failed. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 43(1), 35-50.

- Froese, P. (2005). Secular Czechs and Devot Slovaks: Explaining Religious Differences. *Review of Religious Research*, 46(3), 269-283.
- Gallagher, E. B. (1988). Modernization and Medical Care. *Sociological Perspectives*, 31(1). 59-87.
- Garenne, M. (2004). Age at Marriage and Modernisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Southern African Journal of Demography*, 9(2), 59-79.
- Gaskill, N. J. (1997). Rethinking Protestantism and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America. *Sociology of Religion*, 58(1), 69-91.
- Giddens, A. (2006). *Sociology*. (5th. ed). Cambridge: Polity.
- Gill, A. (1999). Government Regulation, Social Anomie and Protestant Growth in Latin America. *Rationality and Society*, 11(3), 287-316.
- Goldmann, L. (1968). *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, The Christian Burgers and the Enlightenment*. (H. Maas, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Gorman, L. (1993). Discrimination. In *Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics*. (D. R. Henderson, Ed.). New York, NY: Warner Books.
- Gorski, P. S. (2000). Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1), 138-167.
- Gorski, P. S. (2003). Historicizing the Secularization Debate: An Agenda for Research. In M. Dillon (Ed), *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 110-122), New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Göle, N. (1997). Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter -Elites. *Middle East Journal*, 51(1), 46-58.
- Göle, N. (2012). *Seküler ve Dinsel: Aşınan Sınırlar*. (E. Ünal, Trans.). İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık.
- Göner, Ö. (2005). The Transformation of the Alevi Collective Identity. *Cultural Dynamics*, 17(2): 107-134.
- Greenberg, U. (2014). *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War*. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.
- Griswold, D. T. (2002, May 1). Seven Moral Arguments for Free Trade. In www.cato.org. Retrieved from <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/seven-moral-arguments-free-trade> [last visited 28/08/2016]

- Gürpınar, D. & Kenar, C. (2016). The Nation and its Sermons: Islam, Kemalism and the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 52(1), 60-78.
- Gwartney, J., Robert Lawson & Joshua Hall. (2013). *Economic Freedom of the World: 2013 Annual Report*. Vancouver: Fraser Institute.
- Haber Turk. (2010, July 7). Alevi Hukuku Yargıdan Döndü. In www.haberturk.com. Retrieved from <http://www.haberturk.com/yasam/haber/530031-alevi-hukuku-yargidan-dondu> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. (1999). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 1998. Ankara.
- Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. (2004). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2003. Ankara.
- Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. (2009). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008. Ankara.
- Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. (2014). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2013. Ankara.
- Hadden, J. K. (1987). Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory. *Social Forces*, 65(3), 587-611.
- Hadden, J. K. (1995). Religion and the Quest for Meaning and Order: Old Paradigms, New Realities. *Sociological Focus*, 28(1), 83-100.
- Hamilton, B. (2003). *The Christian World of The Middle Ages*. Gloucestershire: Sutton.
- Harman, P. M. (1983). *The Scientific Revolution*. London: Mathuen.
- Harry, J. (1974). Urbanization and the Gay Life. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 10(3), 238-247.
- Hartwell, R. M. (1965). The Causes of the Industrial Revolution: An Essay in Methodology. *The Economic History Review*, 18(1), 164-182.
- Hay, D. A. (2014). An Investigation into the Swiftness and Intensity of Recent Secularization in Canada: Was Berger Right?. *Sociology of Religion*, 75(1), 136-162.
- Hayes, C. J. H. (1919). *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*. New York: The MacMillan.
- Hazlitt, H. (2012). *The Foundations of Morality*. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
- Heintz, P., Held, T. and Levy, R. (1975). Family Structure and Society. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 37(4), 861-870.

- Hood, J. (1998, August 1). Capitalism: Discrimination's Implacable Enemy. In *www.fee.org*. Retrieved from <https://fee.org/articles/capitalism-discriminations-implacable-enemy/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Hughes, J., Sharrock, W., & Martin, P. J. (1995). *Understanding Classical Sociology: Marx, Weber, Durkheim*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Hürriyet (2003, December 20). Mini Etekli Kızı Yaktılar. In *www.hurriyet.com*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/mini-etekli-kizi-yaktilar-190914> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Joukhador, J., Blaszczynski, A. & Maccallum, F. (2004). Superstitious beliefs in gambling among problem and non-problem gamblers: preliminary data. *Journal of Gambling Studies*, 20(2), 171-80.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1991). The Consequences of Religious Market Structure. *Rationality and Society*, 3(2), 156-177.
- İmga, O. (2010). *Amerika'da Din ve Devlet*. Ankara: Liberte.
- İnce, Ö. (2012, March 4). Laikleşme Süreci Dindarlaşma Süreci. In *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/laiklesme-sureci-dindarlasma-sureci-20051654> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Jones, C. (2009). Enlightenment. In B. Kümin (Ed.), *The European World 1500-1800, An Introduction to Early Modern History* (pp. 225-235). London: Routledge.
- Kahraman, A. & Bolşık, B. (2014). Küreselleşmenin Çocuk Sağlığına Etkileri. *The Journal of Pediatric Research*, 1(3), 108-12.
- Kaplan, D. (2014). Alevilere Atılan "Mum Söndü" İftirasının Tarihsel Kökenleri Üzerine. *Hünkar Alevilik Bektaşilik Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 1(2), 41-53.
- Kasper, W. (2002). *Economic Freedom and Development*. New Delhi: Centre for Civil Society. Retrieved from http://ccs.in/sites/all/books/com_books/book_economic-freedom-development.pdf [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Kaya, G. (2014). Adıyaman Üniversitesi'nin Kentsel Mekan ve Sosyal Çevre Üzerindeki Etkisi (Altınşehir Mahallesi'ndeki Haneler ve İşletmeler Üzerine Bir İnceleme). *Adıyaman Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, No:16, 231-260.
- Kazemipur, A. & Rezaei, A. (2003). Religious Life under Theocracy: The Case of Iran. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 42(3), 347-361.
- Kehl-Bodrogi, K. (2012). *Kızılbaşlar – Aleviler*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı.
- Kennedy, J. F. (1962, September 12). Speech in The University of Rice. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

- Retrieved from <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/MkATdOcdU06X5uNHbmqm1Q.aspx> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Keser, İ. (2013). *Nusayri Alevilik*. Adana: Karahan Kitapevi.
- Kilp, A. (2009). Secularization of society after Communism: Ten Catholic Protestant Societies. *ENDC Proceedings*, 12, 194–231.
- King James Bible, Retrieved from <http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/>
- Kirman, A. (2005a). Din Ve Eğlence Kültürü. KSÜ İlahiyat Fakültesi Öğrencilerinin Mezuniyet Gecesi Hakkında Sosyolojik Bir Değerlendirme. *KSÜ İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 6, 17-42.
- Kirman, M.A. (2005b). *Din ve Sekülerleşme*. Üniversite Gençliği Üzerine Sosyolojik Bir Araştırma. Adana: Karahan Kitapevi.
- Koç, İ., Eryurt, M. A., Adalı, T., Seçkiner, P. (2009). *Türkiye'nin Demografik Dönüşümü, Doğurganlık, Anne-Çocuk Sağlığı ve Beş Yal Altı Ölümlerdeki Değişimler:1968-2008*. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. Retrieved from http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/TurkiyeninDemografikDonusumu_220410.pdf [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Koestler, A. (1990). *The Sleepwalkers, A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe*. London: Penguin Books.
- Köse, A. (2002). *Sekülerizm Sorgulanıyor*. İstanbul: Ufuk Kitapları.
- Köse, A. (2006). Sekülerleşme teorileri bağlamında Türkiye'de Din ve Modernleşme. In A. Köse (Ed.), *Laik ama Kutsal* (pp. 11-18). İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları.
- Köse, T. (2013). Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of 'Alevi Identities'. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 49(4), 590-607.
- Kramer, T. & Block, L. (2008). Conscious and Nonconscious Components of Superstitious Beliefs in Judgment and Decision Making. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 34(6), 783-793.
- Kulkova, A. Y. (2014). Religiosity and Political Participation in Contemporary Russia: A Quantitative Analysis. *Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 20/PS/2014*. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533473 [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Kuru, A. (2007). Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion. *World Politics*, 59(4), 568-594.

- Küçük, A. (2011). Laikliğe İlişkin Tartışmalar ve İki Laiklik Modeli. In H. Y. Başdemir (Ed.), *Türkiye’de Din Özgürlüğü ve Laiklik* (pp. 39-95). Ankara: Liberte.
- Küçükcan, T. (2005). Modernleşme ve Sekülerleşme Kuramları Bağlamında Din-Toplumsal Değişme ve İslam Dünyası. *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, (13), 109-128.
- Landes, D. S. (2003). *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lechner, F. (1991). The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal. *Social Forces*, 69(4), 1103-1119.
- Leick, G. (2010). *Historical Dictionary of Mesopotamia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Levin, J.S., Markides, K.S. & Ray, L.A. (1996). Religious attendance and psychological well being in Mexican Americans: a panel analysis of three-generation data. *Gerontologist*, 36(4), 454-63.
- Lorenz, R. et al. (2011). Meteorological Conditions at Racetrack Playa, Death Valley National Park: Implications for Rock Production and Transport. *Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology*, 50(12), 2362-75.
- Lotfi, A., Kabiri, S. and Ghasemlou, H. (2013). Değerler Değişimi ve Kuşaklararası Çatışma: İran Khoy Kenti Örneği. *Eskişehir Osmangazi University Journal of Social Sciences*, 14(2), 93-113.
- Luckmann, T. (1967). *The Invisible Religion: the problem of religion in modern society*. New York, NY: Macmillan
- Luckmann, T. (1979). The Structural Conditions of Religious Consciousness in Modern Societies. *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 6(1/2), 121-137.
- Machan, T. R. (1993, June 1). In Defense of Property Rights and Capitalism. In www.fee.org. Retrieved from <https://fee.org/articles/in-defense-of-property-rights-and-capitalism/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Maland, D. (1986). *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*. Hong Kong: Macmillan
- Manço, U. (2014). *Küreselleşme Bağlamında Gençlik ve Kimlik*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Gençlik ve Kültürel Mirasımız, Samsun, Turkey. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/16580707/K%C3%BCreselle%C5%9Fme_Ba%C4%9Flam%C4%B1nda_Gen%C3%A7lik_ve_Kimlik [last visited 28/08/2016]

- Mann, N. (1996). The Origins of Humanism. In J. Kraye (Ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism* (pp. 1-19). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, D. (1965). Towards eliminating the concept of secularization. In J. Gould (Ed), *Penguin Survey of the Social Sciences 1965* (pp. 169-182). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Martin, D. (1978). *General Theory of Secularization*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Martin, D. (1991). The Secularization Issue: Prospect and Retrospect. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 42(3), 465-474.
- Malkara Latest News (2013, May 26). Malkara'da 24 Köy Yağmur Dusasına Çıktı. In *Malkara Latest News*. Retrieved from <http://www.malkarasonhaber.com/malkarada-24-koy-yagmur-duasina-cikti/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Mason, M. (2002, October 31-November 3). *New Turns in the Secularization Debate*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Salt Lake City, UT.
- Maxfux (2013, April 2). Iran Which We don't Know. [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://maxfux.livejournal.com/265190.html> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- McCabe, J. (1916). *Crises in The History of the Papacy, A study of twenty famous Popes whose careers and whose influence were Important in the development of the Church and in the history of the World*. New York, NY: The Knickerbocker.
- McElroy, W. (1998, June 1). The Origin of Religious Tolerance. In *www.independent.org*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=153> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- McIntosh, E. (2015). Belonging without Believing: Church as Community in an Age of Digital Media. *International Journal of Public Theology*, 9(2), 131-155.
- McKim, D. K. (2001). *Introducing the Reformed Faith: Biblical Revelation, Christian Tradition, Contemporary Significance*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press
- Medya Radar. (2009, December 2). Habertürk TV'de şok sözler! Profesör darbeyi savundu!. In *www.medyaradar.com* Retrieved from <http://www.medyaradar.com/haberturk-tvde-sok-sozler-darbeyi-profesordarbeyi-nasil-savundu-haberi-40747> [last visited 28/08/2016]

- Meleis, A. I., El-Sanabary, N. & Beeson, D. (1979). Women, Modernization, and Education in Kuwait. *Comparative Education Review*, 23(1), 115-124.
- Melikoff, I. (2012). *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*. İstanbul: Demos Yayınları.
- Mert, N. (2009, March 23). Zenginleştikçe Laikleşiyorlar mı? In *Hurriyet*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/zenginlestikce-laikleliyorlar-mi-11266801>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Milliyet(2004,February17).ReformTalepleriDevletinProjesi.In *www.miliet.com*. Retrieved from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/reform-talepleri-devletin-projesi/guncel/haberdetayarsiv/17.02.2004/265311/default.htm>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Mises, L. V. (1972). *The Anticapitalistic Mentality*. Grove City, PA: Libertarian Press.
- Mises, L. V. (1981). *Socialism, An Economic and Sociological Analysis*. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
- Mitchell, C., Fu, X., Heaton, T.B. & Jacobson, C. K. (2010). Urbanization, Education and Racial Inter-marriage in Brazil. *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology*, 47(2), 273-294.
- Mohanty, M. (1989). Secularism: Hegemonic and Democratic. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24(22), 1219-1220.
- Monter, W. (2002). The Fate of the English and French Reformations, 1554-1563. *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 64(1), 7-19.
- Moosa, M. (2009). Alevi. In J. Esposito (Ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* (p. 107). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Morris, J. (2006, September 7). The Role of Market Institutions in Enabling Adaptation to Climate Change. Reason Foundation. Retrieved from <http://reason.org/news/show/the-role-of-market-institution>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Morrison, K. (1995). *Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Mountford, B. (2011). *Christian Atheist: Belonging without Believing*. Hants: O-Books.
- Mutisya, J. & Mutisya, V. (2015). *For Better, For Worse or Too Naive to Care*. USA: Xlibris.
- NASA. (n.d.). What Are Astreoids and Comets. In *nasa.gov/index.html*. Retrieved from <http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/faq/#ast>[last visited 28/08/2016]

- Nedoluzhko, L. & Agadjanian, V. (2015). Between Tradition and Modernity: Marriage Dynamics in Kyrgyzstan. *Demography*, 52(3), 861-82.
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2007). Uneven Secularization in the United States and Western Europe. In T. Banchoff (Ed.), *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism* (pp. 31-58). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2008). *Sacred and Secular, Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, R. D., Norris, J. M., Lorenz, R. D., Ray, J. and Jackson, B. (2014). Sliding Rocks on Racetrack Playa, Death Valley National Park: First Observation of Rocks in Motion. *PLoS ONE*, 9(8): e105948. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105948
- Noy, C. (2008). Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in Qualitative Research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 11(4), 327-44.
- Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (2001). *Trends in International Migration (Report 2001)*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/2508596.pdf> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Önen, S. (2011). *Citizenship Rights of Gypsies in Turkey: Cases of Roma and Dom Communities*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.
- Perry, M., Chase, M., Jacob, J., Jacob, M. & Von Laue, T. H. (1989). *Western Civilization*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Pew Research Center. (2014, November 13). Religion in Latin America. Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region. Retrieved from <http://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Phillips, A. & Dustin, M. (2004). UK Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Dialogue and Exit. *Political Studies*, 52(3), 531-51.
- Pollack, D. & Pickel, G. (2007). Religious Individualization or Secularization? Testing Hypotheses of Religious Change – the Case of Eastern and Western Germany. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 58(4), 603-632.
- Privatization Administration of Turkey (2015). *Privatization Implementations Between 1985-2015*. In www.oib.gov.tr. Retrieved from <http://www.oib.gov.tr/program/implementations.htm>. [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Rand, A. (1986). *Capitalism: An Unknown Ideal?*. New York, NY: Signet.

- Raw, L. (2011). *Exploring Turkish Cultures: Essays, Interviews and Reviews*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Redwood, J. (1976). *Reason, Ridicule and Religion, The Age of Enlightenment in England 1660-1750*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Robert, K. & Yamane, D. (2012). *Religion in Sociological Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
- Rowen, H. H. (1960). *A History of Early Modern Europe 1500-1815*. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Salisbury, W. S. (1958). Religion and Secularization. *Social Forces*, 36(3), 197-205.
- Salsman, R. M. (2000, January 2). What does Competition Mean under Capitalism?. In *www.capitalismmagazine.com*. Retrieved from <http://capitalismmagazine.com/2000/01/what-does-competition-mean-under-capitalism/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Scheckel, L. (2013). *Ask a Science Teacher*. New York, NY: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
- Schram, R. H. (2013). *Mixed Marriage... Interreligious, Interracial, Interethnic*. USA: Xlibris
- Sci-News.com (2014, September 14). Death Valley Sailing Stones Caught in Action for the First Time. In *www.sci-news.com*. Retrieved from <http://www.sci-news.com/physics/science-death-valley-sailing-stones-02148.html> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Schevill, F. (1930). *A History of Europe, From the Reformation to the Present Day*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Shah, J. (2013). Evaluating Alevism in Turkey. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3(2), 263-275.
- Shankland, D. (2003). *The Alevis in Turkey: The emergence of a secular Islamic Tradition*. London & New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Shapin, S. (1996). *The Scientific Revolution*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Sharkey, N. (1950). *Saint Gregory the Great's Concept of Papal Power*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Catholic University of America. Washington, DC, the USA.
- Shiner, L. (1967). The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 6(2), 207-220.
- Simon, W. M. (1956). History for Utopia: Saint-Simon and the Idea of Progress. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 17(3): 311-331.

- Skousen, M. (1994, June 30). Sorry, Charley, But That's Not Capitalism. In *www.mskousen.com*. Retrieved from <http://mskousen.com/1994/06/sorry-charley-but-thats-not-capitalism/> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Soner, B. A. & Toktaş, Ş. (2011). Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Party's Alevi Opening. *Turkish Studies*, 12(3), 419-434.
- Souvay, C. L. (1923). The French Papal States during the Revolution. *The Catholic Historical Review*, 8(4), 485-496.
- Stark, R. (1999). Secularization, R.I.P. *Sociology of Religion*, 60(3): 249-273.
- Stark, R. & Bainbridge, W. S. (1985). *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Stark, R. & Finke, R. (2000). *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Stark, R. & Iannaccone, L. R. (1994). A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the 'Secularization' of Europe. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 33(3), 230-252.
- Statistics New Zealand (2014, April 15). 2013 Census QuickStats about culture and identity. In <http://www.stats.govt.nz/>. Retrieved from: <http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats-culture-identity/religion.aspx> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Steup, M. (2011). Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism. *Synthese*, 178(1), 19-26.
- Stirling, P. (1958). Religious Change in Republican Turkey. *Middle East Journal*, 12(4), 395-408.
- Strange Sounds (2012, December 4). Unexplained Earth Phenomenon: The Moving Rocks in Death Valley National Park. *Strangesounds.org*. In *www.strangesounds.org*. Retrieved from <http://strangesounds.org/2012/12/unexplained-earth-phenomenon-the-moving-rocks-in-death-valley-national-park-usa.html> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Sturm, L. (2004). Church-State Relations and the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Slovenia. *Brigham Young University Law Review*, 3, 607-650.
- Sururi, G. (2013, February 19). Gülriz Sururi: Türbanlı Kadınlara Nişantaşı Kafelerinde Oturmaları Emredildi. In *T 24*. Retrieved from <http://t24.com.tr/haber/gulriz-sururi-tesetturlu-kadinlara->

- nisantasi-kafelerinde-oturmaları-emredildi,224024[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Swanepoel, M. (1992). *Common Sense of Wealth Creation*. Saxonwold: The Freemarket Foundation.
- Swinford, S. (2013, July 10). Most children will be born out of wedlock by 2016. In *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10172627/Most-children-will-be-born-out-of-wedlock-by-2016.html> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Şahin, Ş. (2005). The Rise of Alevisim in Public Spheres. *Current Sociology*, 53(3), 465-485.
- Tierney, B., Kagan, D. & Williams, L. P. (1992). *Great Issues in Western Civilization, Since 1500 From Renaissance Civilization through the Cold War*. (2nd Ed.). New York, NY: McGraw Hill.
- Tiryaki, R. (2013). *Sorularla Alevilik Bektaşilik*. İstanbul: Şahı Merdan Yayınları.
- The New York Times. (1993, July 3). 40 Killed in a Turkish Hotel Set Afire by Muslim Militants. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/03/world/40-killed-in-a-turkish-hotel-set-afire-by-muslim-militants.html> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Tobin, A. & Dusheck, J. (2005). *Asking About Life* (3rd Ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson.
- Toprak, B., Bozan, İ., Morgül, T. and Şener, N. (2010). *Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak*. (3rd Ed.). İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Tosun, E. K. & Fırat, Z. (2012). Kentsel Mekândaki Değişimler ve Kişilerin Konut Tercihleri: Bursa Örneği. *Business and Economics Research Journal*, 3(1), 173-195.
- Treasure, G. (1993). *The Making of Modern Europe 1648-1780*. London: Routledge.
- Tschannen, O. (1991). The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 30(4), 395-415.
- Turkish Statistical Institute. (2013, February 19). Ölüm İstatistikleri, 2011. In www.tuik.gov.tr. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13440> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Turkish Statistical Institute. (2014, March 6). Hanehalkı İşgücü İstatistikleri. In www.tuik.gov.tr. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16015> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- Turkish Statistical Institute. (2014, March 26). Evlenme ve Boşanma İstatistikleri. In www.tuik.gov.tr. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16051> [last visited 28/08/2016]

- Turkish Statistical Institute. (2014, April 30). Ölüm İstatistikleri, 2013. In *www.tuik.gov.tr*. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16050>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Turkish Statistical Institute. (2014, September 22). Gelir ve Yaşam Koşulları Araştırması, 2013. In *www.tuik.gov.tr*. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16083>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Turkish Statistical Institute. (2015, April 2). Evlenme ve Boşanma İstatistikleri, 2014. In *www.tuik.gov.tr*. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=18628>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Turkish Statistical Institute (n.d.). Evlenme ve Boşanma İstatistikleri. In *www.tuik.gov.tr*. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Turner, F. M. (1978). The Victorian Conflict between Science and Religion: A Professional Dimension. *Isis*, 69(3): 356-376.
- UNDATA (n.d.). Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births. In <http://data.un.org/Default.aspx>. Retrieved from <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=MDG&cf=seriesRowID%3A562> [last visited 28/08/2016]
- United Nations. (2011) *Levels & Trends in Child Mortality*. (Report 2011). New York, NY: United Nations Children's Fund. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/documents/childmortality_booklet_2011.pdf[last visited 28/08/2016]
- United Nations Environment Programme. (2015, February 26). Modernizing District Energy systems Could Reduce Heating and Cooling Primary Energy consumption by up to 50% finds New Report. In *www.unep.org*. Retrieved from <http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2818&ArticleID=11153>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Ünal, V. (2013). Geleneksel Geniş Aileden Çekirdek Aileye Geçiş Sürecinde Boşanma Sorunu ve Din. *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 6(26), 588-602.
- Üzüm, İ. (2000). *Günümüz Aleviliği*. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları.
- Üzüm, İ. (2009). *Tarihsel ve Kültürel Boyutlarıyla Alevilik*. İstanbul: İslam Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları.
- Ventura, S.J. (2009, May). Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States. *NCHS Data Brief*, No 18. Retrieved from

- http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Van Bruinessen, M. (1996). Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey. *Middle East Report*, No:200, Minorities in the Middle East: Power and the Politics of Difference (Jul.-Sep.), 7-10.
- Van der Zweerde, E. (2014). Confronting the Confrontation: Europe beyond Secularism?. In B. Black, G. Hyman and G. M. Smith (Eds.), *Confronting Secularism in Europe and India* (pp. 131-148). New York, NY: Bloomsbury.
- Von Hayek, F. A. (1944). *Road to Serfdom*. (T. Feyzioğlu, Trans.) Ankara: Liberte
- Voas, D. & Crockett, A. (2005). Religion in Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging. *Sociology*, 39(1), 11-28.
- Voltaire. (1980). [1733]. *Letters on England*. London: Penguin.
- Warner, R. (2010). *Secularization and Its Discontents*. London: Continuum.
- Weber, M. (2005).[1930]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (T. Parsons, Trans.). London: Routledge.
- Weber, M. (2009). *Max Weber, A Biography*. (H. Zohn, Trans. and Ed.). New Jersey, NY: Transaction.
- Weigert, A. J. & Thomas, D. L. (1970). Secularization: A Cross-National Study of Catholic Male Adolescents. *Social Forces*, 49(1), 28-36.
- Wiegers, T. A., Van Der Zee, J. & Keirse, M. J. N. C. (1998). Maternity Care in The Netherlands: The Changing Home Birth Rate. *Birth*, 25(3), 190-97.
- Wilson, B. R. (1966). *Religion in Secular Society*. London: C.A. Watts.
- Wilson, B. R. (1976). Aspects of Secularization in the West. *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 3(4), 259-276.
- Wilson, B. R. (1979). The Return of the Sacred. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 18(3), 268-280.
- Wilson, B. R. (2000). Salvation, secularization and de-moralization. In R. Fenn (Ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 39-51). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, W. J. & Chaddha, A. (2010). The Role of Theory in Ethnographic Research. *Ethnography*, 10(4), 549-564.
- Wirth, L. (1938). Urbanism as a Way of Life. *American Journal of Sociology*, 44(1), 1-24.

- World Health Organization (2013). *World Health Statistics 2013*. In www.who.int. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS2013_Full.pdf
- Worthen, T. (1997, May). Herodots's Report on Thales' Eclipse. *Electronic AntiQuity: Communication the Classics*, 3(7). Retrieved from <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/EIAnt/V3N7/worthen.html>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Wright, C. T. (1934). Some Conventions regarding the Usurer in Elizabethan Literature. *Studies in Philology*, 31(2), 176-197.
- Wright, C. T. (1938). The Usurer's Sin in Elizabethan Literature. *Studies in Philology*, 35(2), 178-194.
- Yaman, A. (2007). *Alevilik & Kızılbaşlık Tarihi*. İstanbul: Nokta Kitap.
- Yaman, A. (2012). *Alevilik & Kızılbaşlık Tarihi*. İstanbul: Kalipso Lüks Yayınları.
- Yaman, A. & Erdemir, A. (2006). *Alevisim-Bektashism: a brief introduction*. İstanbul: England Alevi Cultural Centre.
- Yamane, D. (1997). Secularization on Trial: In defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 36(1), 109-122.
- Yapıcı, A. (2012). Modernleşme-Sekülerleşme Sürecinde Türk Gençliğinde Dini Hayat: Meta-Analitik Bir Değerlendirme. *Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 12(2), 1-40.
- Yew, L. K. (2012, October 16). Warning Bell for Developed Countries: Declining Birth Rates. In *Forbes*. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=http://www.forbes.com/sites/currentevents/2012/10/16/warning-bell-for-developed-countries-declining-birth-rates/>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Yıldırım, A. (2013). *Alevi Hukuku*. İstanbul: İtalik Yayınları.
- Yılmaz, A. (Director) (1978). *Kibar Feyzo* [Movie]. Turkey: Arzu Film.
- Yılmaz, H. (2012, October). *Türkiye'de Muhafazakârlık*. In www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr. Retrieved from <http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/muhafazakarlik/04.pdf>[last visited 28/08/2016]
- Yılmaz, N. (2005). *Kentin Alevileri*. İstanbul: Kitapevi Yayınları.
- Yılmaz, S. (2012). *Türkiye'de Ailenin Dönüşümü*. Ankara: Divan Kitap.
- Yoder, D. (1974). Toward a Definition of Folk Religion. *Western Folklore*, 33(1), 2-15.

Zang, X. (2008). Gender and Ethnic Variation in Arranged Marriages in a Chinese City. *Journal of Family Issues*, 29(5), 615-638.

Zeidan, D. (1999). The Alevi of Anatolia. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 3(4), 74-89.

APPENDIX A

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY

Table AA1. Level of Population Growth Rate

Year	1970	1980	2000	2023
Population Growth Rate	2,5 %	2 %	1,5 %	0,9 % (Expected)

Source: Koç, Eryurt, Adalı & Seçkiner, 2009.

Table AA2. Average Life Expectancy at Birth

Year	Woman	Man
1940	33 Year	30 Year
2008	79 Year	73 Year
2014	79 Year	75 Year

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2013.

Table AA3. Literacy Rate

Year	Woman	Man
1935	10 %	29 %
1980	55 %	80 %
2012	92,2 %	98 %

Source: Koç, *et al.*, 2009; Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), 2015, March 5.

Table AA4. Secondary School Attendance Ratio

Year	Girls	Boys
Beginning of 1990s	21 %	32 %
2008	56 %	61 %
2012	66,1 %	68,5 %

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; TSI, 2015, March 5.

Table AA5. The Number of University⁵¹

Year	The Number of University
1967	9
2013	175

Source: Çetinsaya, 2014.

Table AA6. Ratio of Labour Sector

Year	Agriculture	Industry and Service
1955	82 %	18 %
1980	61 %	39 %
2013	23,6 %	76,4 %

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; TSI, 2014 March 6.

Table AA7. Privatization Implementations

Year	Amount (\$)
1923-1983	0 \$
1983-2003	8 Billion \$
2003-2015	55 Billion \$

Source: Doğan 2012; Privatization Administration of Turkey, 2015.

Table AA8. Food Poverty & Complete Poverty

Year	Food Poverty (Hunger)	Complete Poverty (Food+Nonfood)
2002	1,35 %	26,96 %
2009	0,48 %	18,08 %

Source: Çilingiroğlu, 2009.

⁵¹ While only 41,574 students out of 466,963 were enrolled at a university in 1980, this figure has risen to 877,784 out of 1,923,033 in 2013 (Çetinsaya, 2014).

Table AA9. Share of Total Income of the Top 20 %

Year	Total Share of the Top 20 %
1960	57 %
2008	47 %
2013	46,6 %

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; TSI, 2014 September 22.

Table AA10. Households Durables (%)

	1998	2003	2008	2014
Refrigerator	93,2	94,3	97,6	98,6
Oven	67,6	71,3	77,0	78,5
Washer	63,6	78,3	91,8	95,9
Iron	No Data	85,1	87,7	89,3
Vacuum Cleaner	65,1	75,6	85,1	89,0
TV	91,4	94,7	95,9	97,9
Cell Phone	13,3	67,2	91,8	95,6
Microwave Oven	No Data	7,2	12,4	19,9
Food Processor	No Data	39,2	50,3	No Data
Dishwasher	16,4	22,1	35,2	57,2
Notebook/Desktop Computers	4,2	11,6	40,2	58,1
Transportation Vehicles				
Private Car	No Data	25,8	32,3	37,6
Number of Household	8,059	10,836	10,525	11,794

Source: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 1999; 2004; 2009; 2014

Table AA11. The Average Age at First Marriage

Year	Woman	Man
1940s	19	23
2014	23,7	26,9

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; TSI, 2014 March 26

Table AA12. Fertility Rate (Total Births per Woman)

Year	Number of Children
1960s	6
1970s	5
End of 1980s	3
2013	2,26

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2014.

Table AA13. The Rate of Birth Control Methods for Married Women

1963	22 %
2008	73 %
2013	93 %

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2014.

Table AA14. The Rate of Prenatal Care

Year	Figure out of 100 Mothers
At the beginning of 1980s	38
At the end of 1990s	68
2008	92
2013	97

Source: Koç, *et al.*, 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2014.

Table AA15. The Rate of Births Happened in a Health Institution

Year	Figure out of 100 Mothers
1980s	42
2008	90
2013	97

Source: Koç, *et al.*, 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2014.

Table AA16. The Figure of Case and Death Connected to the Polio, Whooping Cough and Diphtheria in Turkey between 1970-2003

	Population	The Figure of Case			The Figure of Death		
		Polio	Whooping Cough	Diphtheria	Polio	Whooping Cough	Diphtheria
1970	35.321.000	701	7268	1110	39	21	63
1980	44.438.000	182	1520	86	7	9	8
1990	57.582.000	24	454	20	2	2	0
1999	65.819.000	0	528	4	0	1	1
2003	71.772.711	0	255	1	0	1	0

Source: Altun, 2008.

Table AA17. Maternal Mortality Ratio

Year	Maternal deaths per 100.000 live births
1975	208
1995s	56
At the beginning of 2000s	49
2005	29
2011	14,8

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; Directorate General for Health Research, 2013.

Table AA18. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-five Mortality Rate

Year	Infant Mortality Rate (Probability of dying by age 1 per 1000 live births)	Under-five Mortality Rate (Probability of dying by age 5 per 1000 live births)
1960s	163	223
At the beginning of 1980s	121	152
At the beginning of 1990s	66	84
2008	17	24
2011	11,7	15
2012	11,6	
2013	10,8	

Source: Koç *et al.*, 2009; TSI, 2013 February 19; 2014, April 30; World Health Organization, 2013.

APPENDIX B

THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SAMPLE WITH A PARENT

The interview conducted with A2P on 05.08.2014 in Adana

She was born in 1957. Having completed primary school, she then worked in the agricultural and textile sectors.

V: How many children do you have?

A2P: Two.

V: How many siblings do you have?

A2P: I have five, but two of them have died. One of them died from meningitis, while the other died due to a wrong injection when he was only eighteen months old.

V: Where were you born?

A2P: At home. There was a midwife in our district.

V: How about your children?

A2P: One was born in hospital, the other at home. My second child was born at home.

V: Why were they born in different places?

A2P: It was my own choice at the time. I think doctors and nurses were not usually consulted at the time. Someone suggested a very qualified midwife to me, and so I had a private midwife present. She was very good at her job.

V: If you would give birth to a baby today, would you prefer to go to the hospital or stay at home?

A2P: The conditions are very different today compared to the olden days. In the past maybe there was a lack of opportunities and facilities. But right now, we have better conditions and private hospitals.

V: How did you heat up your home when you were child?

A2P: My mother used coal, we all used coal.

V: What were the methods of treatment when you were sick?

A2P: My family were not making conscious choices when we were children. They took us to the doctor if we were seriously ill. In those days, there were only general practitioners. I mean, if we were really sick, then we could see the doctors. Having a fever was not a good enough reason to be taken to the doctor.

V: Did you ever work before your marriage?

A2P: Yes, in agriculture.

V: What was your job there?

A2P: I was moving earth. There were wealthy landowners, and we moved earth for cotton seeds, and during the cotton seasons we picked them up. Our neighbors were also fellow workers.

V: Were there people whose religious identities were different from yours among your workfellows?

A2P: No, everybody belonged to the same religious group.

V: How about your working conditions?

A2P: Our working conditions were better than those of the workers before us. Previous workers did not have the facility to heat up their foods, but we did. We lit fires using stalks. Even we had forks. If we wanted to have Kebab, sometimes the foreman would bring us Kebab. We had days off as well. We went to the cinemas or restaurants.

V: Before marriage, what kind of durable consumer goods did you have?

A2P: Till I was thirteen/fifteen years of age, we did not have many house goods. For example, we had no refrigerator. We put our foods into a kind of small cage made of string. Let's say if there is a plate of food left, we put it into that cage up on the wall. Foods were bought daily. Tomatoes were picked up from our own garden.

V: Where do people (around you) work, in the agricultural sector or other sectors?

A2P: In agriculture.

V: Have you lost any child because of diseases? Or do you know people who have lost their children because of childhood diseases?

A2P: Children would die if they were diagnosed with measles. Meningitis was another reason for such deaths. It was said then that the disease affected the brain. If it was the case, children became permanently disabled or died. My sister became disabled because of that. But unfortunately, our neighbors' child died. They were told: "Do not take your child to the doctor. It is a sin. Going to doctor at that time meant that you are committing a sinful act. Everybody has to endure that disease; it was some kind of obligation." They sentenced their child to death.

V: Have you seen anyone whose child has been diagnosed with measles these days?

A2P: Yes, my nephews. They were taken immediately to the doctors.

V: Did you have access to hot water?

A2P: We heated up water outside the house using woods during winter time. In summer, we put water outside the house under the sun, and we used those for showers. In those days, we did not have solar technology on the roof of houses.

V: Which cities have you visited up till now? Why?

A2P: Hatay and Çiftehan. There are religious places in Hatay. My aunt, Sabiha, was a very religious woman. She took us to Hatay. We visited shrines or tribes there. Apart from Hatay and Çiftehan, I visited the pool of Abraham in Urfa, too.

V: Have you ever spent time with non-Alevis before marriage?

A2P: Some friends of mine in Adana were non-Alevis. We met them in the thermal spring of Çiftehan. Sometimes we organized meetings just for women who were invited. We went to them. Being non-Alevis was not a problem for us. We did not bring up that kind of subject. They were happy to be with us, and it was the same for us, too. We did not want that kind of subjects to ruin our friendship.

V: Were there non-Alevis people apart from those you met in Çiftehan?

A2P: No, because we were living in a very homogeneous environment, all our colleagues were Alevis. The only place where we used to encounter non-Alevis was Çiftehan⁵². Since they were staying in rooms next to us, we came across them often. Apart from them, there were no non-Alevis in our neighbourhood.

V: Have you ever lived alone (free from your family) before marriage?

A2P: No.

V: Were there any non-Alevis among your neighbors?

A2P: No.

V: Did you ever have a boyfriend before marriage?

A2P: No.

V: May I kindly ask how you met your husband?

A2P: I knew him from our district. He knew me, too. He already had a girlfriend, and they loved each other. They even got engaged but his family did not want him to marry her since she was not Alevi. And they stood by their decision. Recai (husband), firstly, did not care about his family's attitude but soon after he did not want to marry as well. Then, his ex-fiancée started to discredit him due to his belief. They met while working in a factory and dated for two-three years. After that girl, he then found another girl. But before he could decide on this girl, he wanted to marry me. I refused him, and so he found another girl from another district. I think she was Sunni, I am not sure exactly. It was an arranged marriage. But, it did not go well and they broke up. Afterwards, my mother-in-law and his sister suggested me to him once again. He said ok. They came to our house, and insisted on marrying me. Although I was not so eager to marry him, since my heart was empty at the time I accepted

52 Çiftehan is a spa area 100 km from Adana.

his proposal. If I loved someone – and I was very finicky – it could not have happened. Although he was not handsome, Recai was a good person and a poet. That's the story.

V: How did his family come to ask for your hand in marriage?

A2P: My mother-in-law came and said to my father: "We want your daughter, what do you say?" We were also distant relatives. My father gave his consent. He asked me whether I was in love with anybody at the time. I said "no". Then he said, "Recai is a good person, do you want him?" At first, I did not like him much but then love eventually happened between us.

V: Was "being Alevi" important in your decision?

A2P: Maybe my family would not have accepted such a case, but it was no problem for me. To be honest, it did not even enter my mind at the time. If he would have been Sunni, maybe my family would have gone against him. My mother would have been sad. But we never talked about it because we never encountered such a case. The people asking for my hand for their sons were all Alevis.

V: So, what would be your reaction if one of your children would like to marry a non-Alevi?

A2P: If my son Serhat marries a Christian, I will not argue against it. I do not object to my daughter's decisions as well. If that what she wants, I will say nothing. She once dated a Kurdish Alevi and I liked him very much. Then she dated a Sunni guy for a short time and we said nothing.

V: Do your children listen to your wishes in terms of their mate choice?

A2P: No. Since their mother and father do not discriminate, they need not worry about such things.

V: Could you give some details of the ceremonies before your marriage like the engagement process, *etc.*?

A2P: First, they came to ask for my hand. We said 'yes'. After that, dessert was shared among family members and we began wearing rings. After a while, we got engaged.

V: Did any religious man/woman interfere in these ceremonies?

A2P: At our wedding.

V: We will talk about it later, but how about your engagement?

A2P: No.

V: Could you elaborate a little more?

A2P: It happened at home. Like the wedding, the engagement rings were worn then. There was nothing related to religion. After four months, our wedding took place.

V: What kind of religious rituals were performed?

A2P: Not much. A Hocca was visited. One person from my family, and another from his family visited a hocca. From my family, it was my father; from his family, Cevdet, the brother of Recai, went to the hocca. In there, they told the hocca, "We are here to formalize an agreement. They will marry in the presence of Allah." After that, a holy agreement was sealed. Since this is a secret act, I didn't know that it was done.

V: Did you do this religious act for your children?

A2P: My mother-in-law asked whether we did such an act or not. She thought that if we did not do it, my daughter could not be "halal" to her husband. I said to her, "Yes, we did." But actually we did not.

V: How about your son-in-law's family?

A2P: Yes, the mother of the groom wanted to have a hocca act. I said to her, "Yes, we did, we solved it." My son-in-law did not let her talk much about this subject.

V: Was there any religious ceremony that the groom's family would have liked to do but you did not?

A2P: No. My daughter and her husband did not want us to interfere in their wedding process.

V: Where did you start living after marriage?

A2P: In those days, we had big financial problems. My family or his family could not manage to buy or build a new house for us. My mother-in-law told me: "I will give you two small rooms, one big room, and a kitchen. There is a room outside the house, we ourselves will live there." In the end, we split their house in two. By the way, when we were engaged, they had told me that Recai had already initiated the process of buying a house. And it was true, for he was working in SASA (biggest factory in Adana), but the building contractor did not keep his promise. Because of that, Recai withdrew his money and said, "I will not continue to pay you from now on." After that decision, we could not buy a house anymore and "under obligation" we lived with his family. After that, he went to Saudi Arabia. He quitted his job and received material compensation for political reasons. With the sum of money from his material compensation, we bought a piece of land on Kenan Evren boulevard. I moved in with my family after he went to Saudi Arabia and gave back our rooms to my mother-in-law. They were already living one on top of the other. I was going back and forth between my family and his family for seven years until we built our own house.

V: How about sharing work at home?

A2P: It is me who does everything. He knows only how to make a cup of tea.

V: You have two children. Is there any reason behind this decision?

A2P: I was against too many children in those days. I just wanted one child. The second one was an unintended pregnancy. My mother and mother-in-law expressed their hope for a second one. And people around me were not thinking like me. Many of them have more than three children.

V: How about your mother and father? Do you know how many brothers/sisters they had?

A2P: My mother had seven siblings, my father three. The reason why my father had only three siblings had nothing to do with his parents being against many children. Health problems prevented it.

V: What was the reaction towards having a “girl” or “boy”?

A2P: Boys were more valuable. If a newborn was a boy, people celebrated it like a festival because boys were thought important for maintaining the ancestral line. For me and my husband, such ideas were meaningless.

V: How do you solve problems related to your marriage?

A2P: We solved it together. Apart from us, no one can interfere in our family problems. Even I do not tell my own family members. Since Recai and I get on quite well, I am not eager to tell people of our own family issues.

V: Have you ever been divorced?

A2P: No.

V: Have you ever come to that point of wanting to seek a divorce?

A2P: No, never. I have been the person who is dominant in our marriage. What would I do after divorce? I have a house. I have children. Even though I may have problems with my partner, we can solve it together. This talk of divorce is therefore meaningless. I have never thought of divorce or the possibility of going back to my mother's house. Even though love between us is no longer how it used to be, I have a house, home, and children. Hence, there is no need for divorce whatsoever.

V: What are the names of your children? Why did you name your children like that?

A2P: Senem and Serhat. I chose their names. I took my spouse's advice too, but I did not fancy the names he suggested. Both our

mothers' name was Sabriye. That is why he offered the name Sabriye for our daughter. I said, "No way". They did not want it as well. For the name Serhat, I do not remember, I think I heard it somewhere.

V: Did you give any religious education to your children? If yes, how?

A2P: We did not want to give any. But since other children were receiving religious education, my son wanted to have one. We said 'ok', and sent him to an *amca* (a person who teaches religion to Alevi children in the Adana region). He was not taught one hundred percent but for the sake of formality we sent him. We never encouraged him to pray, but sometimes he wanted to go. Apart from that, no one prays in our family.

Turkish version of the interview with A2P:

1957 doğumlu, ilkokul mezunu, Önce tarım sektöründe ardından 20 sene tekstil işinde çalıştı.

V: Kaç çocuk sahibisiniz.

A2P: 2.

V: Kaç çocuklu aileden geliyorsunuz.

A2P: 6 kardeş. 2 tane de ölen çocuk var. 1 menenjit hastalığı diğeri de iğneden öldü. İkisi de 18er aylıktı.

V: Nerede doğdunuz

A2P: Evde doğdum. Mahalledeki ebe aracılığı ile.

V: Sizin çocuklarınız?

A2P: Biri hastanede, diğeri evde. 2. Çocuğum evde doğdu. Ben öyle istedim. Hastane çok fazla ilgilenmediklerini düşündüm. Eve özel ebe getirttim. Bu konularda uzmanlaşmış bir kişi getirttim. Biri tavsiye etti.

V: Şu anda bir çocuk yapma durumunda olsaydınız hastane mi yoksa yine ebeyi mi getirdiniz?

A2P: O zamanın şartları ile şimdinin şartları değişik. O zaman öyle imkânlar vardı ama şimdi daha özel hastaneler daha iyi koşullar vardır.

V: Küçükken nasıl ısınırdınız?

A2P: Annem kömür yakardı, kömürle ısınırdık.

V: Hastalandığınızda çözüm olarak ne yapardınız?

A2P: Küçükken ailelerimiz çok fazla bilinçli değildi. Ancak çok ağırlaştığımız zaman doktora götürürlerdi. O zamanlar pratisyen doktoralar vardı. Yani böyle tam ölümcül olduğumuzda götürürlerdi. Bir ateş için falan götürmezlerdi.

V: Evlenmeden önce çalışmış mıydınız?

A2P: Evet tarlada çalışırdık.

V: Neydi göreviniz tarlada?

A2P: Kazma kazardık. Büyük ağaların tarlalarında pamuk zamanı kazma kazardık, pamuk toplardık. Çalışma arkadaşlarımız mahalledeki arkadaşlarımızdı.

V: Beraber çalıştığınız kişiler arasında sizden farklı dini kimliğe sahip olan kimseler var mıydı?

A2P: Yok, herkes aynı dini kökenden geliyordu.

V: Çalışma koşullarınız?

V: Bizden öncekilere nazaran daha iyi çalışma koşullarına sahiptik. Bizden öncekiler örneğin yemeklerini ısıtmadan yerlerdi, biz ısıtıyorduk. Ateş yakardık kazma sapını koyardık, ısıtırdık. Çatal dahi götürürdük. Eğer canımız kebab isterse ırgat basını gönderir kebab isterdik. Tatil günlerimiz vardı, sinemaya giderdik, lokantaya gider kebabımızı yerdik.

V: Dayanaklı tüketim mallarına sahip miydiniz evlenmeden önce?

A2P: Ben 13-15 yasına kadar yoktu. Sonra hepsi oldu. Buzdolabımız yoktu, kafes koyardık telli kafes. Bir tabak yemek art-

tı diyelim, onun içine koyardık. Gıdalar günlük alınırdı. Domatesler bizim bağdan gelirdi.

V: Etrafınızda tarımla mı yoksa sanayi ile mi uğraşan insan sayısı daha fazla idi.

A2P: Tarımla.

V: Etrafınızda ufak çocuklar ölür müydü?

A2P: Kızamık olduğunda ölürlerdi. Ya menenjit hastalığı diyorlar ona, beyne vururdu o. Ya sakat kalırlardı, ya da ölürlerdi. Benim kız kardeşim sakat kaldı. Ama komşumuzun çocuğu öldü. Dediler ki doktora götürmeyin, günahıdır. Doktora götürmek günah demektir. Herkes bunu geçirecek, geçirmese olmaz. Ölüme mahkûm ettiler.

V: Şu anda çocuğu kızamık olan biri ile karşılaşılıyor musunuz?

A2P: Evet, yeğenlerim vardı örneğin, onlar doktora gittiler.

V: Sıcak su erişiminiz var mıydı?

A2P: Biz kendimiz dışarıda ısıtıyorduk ya da yazın güneşte bekletiyorduk. Onlarla duş yapardık. Kışın ateşte ısıtırdık odun ateşinin üstünde. Güneş enerjisi yoktu.

V: Evlenene kadar hangi şehirleri gördünüz?

A2P: Antakya ve Çiftehan. Antakya'da ziyaretler vardı. Sabiha halam vardı, dine düşküncü, bizi götürürdü oraya. Orada türbeye geçerdik tabii. Antakya ve Çiftehan harici Urfa'ya balıklı gölü görmeye gittik.

V: Evlenmeden önce Arap-Alevi olmayanlar var mıydı, nasıl tanışmıştınız?

A2P: Adana'daki kimi arkadaşlarımız öyleydi. Onlarla Çiftehan'daki kaplıcalarda tanışmıştık. Gün yapardık, kendiler gelirdi. Biz giderdik. Alevi olmamaları sorun teşkil etmezdi. Böyle konulara girmezdik. Kendiler bizi seviyordu, biz onları seviyorduk, hiç aramıza girmesini istemiyorduk arkadaşlığımız iyi idi.

V: BU kız arkadaşlarınız haricinde etrafınızda Sünni kimse yok muydu?

A2P: Yoktu. Çünkü dar bir çerçevede idik, çalışma arkadaşlarımız, ırgatlar falan hep buralardan idi. Alevi olmayanlar ile karşılaşılın tek mekan Çiftelandı, çünkü yan odada idiler, tanışıyorlardık.

V: Evlenmeden önce ailenizden bağımsız ev hayatınız oldu mu?

A2P: Yok.

V: Komşularınız arasında Arap Alevisi olmayan kimse var mıydı?

A2P: Yok.

V: Evlenmeden önce erkek arkadaşınız hiç oldu mu?

A2P: Yok olmadı.

V: Eşinizle nasıl tanıştığınızı anlatabilir misiniz?

A2P: Ben onu tanıyordum mahalleden. O da beni tanıyordu. Kendinin kız arkadaşı vardı, seviyorlardı birbirlerini, hatta nişanlandılar, ama aile karşı çıktı. Kız Türk olduğu hatta Kürt olduğu için. İstemediler. Diretiler. Recai önce ailesine uymadı, ama sonra kendisi istemedi. Sonra kız da ırk ayrımı yapmaya başladı, sonra Recai istemedi. Fabrikada tanışmışlardı. 2-3 sene sürmüştü. Sonra başka bir kız ile nişanlandı. Ama bu ikinci kızıdan önce benimle nişanlanmak istedi, ben istemedim. Ben istemeyince gitti başka bir mahalleden kız ile nişanlandı. Sünni biri ile, ama tam emin değilim. Görücü usulü ile tanıştı o kişi ile. Ama anlaşılmadılar, ayrıldılar. Daha sonra kayıinvalidem ve kız kardeşi demişler ki Miyesseri tekrar isteyelim. O da tamam demiş. Geldiler, bastırdılar, benim çok niyetim yoktu, ama bastırınca benim de sevdiğim yoktu, hani birini sevmiş olsam, zaten çok fazla birilerini de beğenmiyordum, o zaman dedim ki boş ver, olsun dedim. Recai iyi bir insan, şairdi, ama görüntü olarak çok beğenmiyordum. Öyle bir evlilik yaptım.

V: İsteme bölümünü biraz anlatır mısınız?

A2P: Kayıinvalidem geldi, babama kızını istiyorum dedi, ne diyorsun? Akralalık da var arada. Babam uygun gördü. Sevdğin var mı, yok dedim, Recai iyi efendi bir insan olsun mu? Önce çok sevmemedim, ama sonra sevgi oluştu aramızda.

V: Mezhebi önemli miydi eşinizin?

A2P: Belki ailem çok kabul etmezdi ama benim için çok önemli değildi. Aslında hiç aklıma bile gelmiyordu. Sünni olsaydı belki ailem karşı çıkardı, annem de üzülürdü. Ama bunu hiç konuşmadık. Çünkü böyle bir şey ile karşılaşmadık. Beni isteyen herkes Arap idi.

V: Peki sizin çocuklarınızın başka bir dini kimlikten biri ile beraber olmasına nasıl bakıyorsunuz?

A2P: Eğer serhat şimdi bir Hristiyan ile evlenirse kesinlikle karşı çıkmam. Kızıma da karışmazdım, karşı çıkmam eğer kendisi isterse. Daha önce Kürt alevisin ile çıkıyordu, çok da sevmiştim onu, ama hiç karşılaşmadım ama. Sünni biri ile kısa süreli bir ilişkisi oldu, ama hiç karışmadık.

V: Çocuklarınız eş seçiminde kendi anne babalarından bir talep ile karşılaştılar mı?

A2P: Yok, çünkü anne baba çok ayırım yapmadığımız için çok fazla şey yapmıyorlar.

V: Kısaca söz ve nişan nasıl oldu anlatır mısınız?

A2P: Önce geldiler istediler. Anne baba evet dedi, ben de evet dedim. Aile içi akrabalar ile tatlı yendi, yüzük takıldı. Daha sonra nişan oldu.

V: Bu sürede herhangi bir dini şahıs dahil oldu mu?

A2P: Nikahta oldu.

V: oraya geleceğiz, söz ya da nişanda oldu mu?

A2P: Yok.

V: Nişanı anlatır mısınız?

A2P: Nişan salonda oldu. Düğün gibi. Orada nişan yüzükleri takıldı. Nişanda da dini motifi herhangi bir şey olmadı. 4 ay sonra düğün oldu. Söz kesiminden 1 ay sonra nişan, 3 ay sonra da düğün oldu.

V: Düğün zamanı dini motifi bir şey oldu mu?

A2P: Olmadı. Sadece hocanın yanına gidildi, bizden bir kişi onlardan bir kişi. Bizden benim babam, onlardan Recai'nin abisi Cevdet abi hocanın yanına gittiler. Diyorlar ki hocaya akit yapacağız. Bunlar Allah huzurunda evlenecek. Ondan sonra yapılıyor akit. Ben bunu duymuyorum bile. Kendi aralarında yapmışlar ben sonra duyuyorum.

V: Kendi çocuklarınıza yaptınız mı?

A2P: Kayınvalidem sordu yaptınız mı diye, helal olsun diye. Evet yaptık dedim ama yapmadık.

V: Karşı taraf istemedi mi?

A2P: Karşı taraf istedi. Damadın annesi. Ona da yaptık hallettik dedim. Dediler ki bizden de gitmesi gerekir. Damadım annesine söyledi biz hallettik diye, çok konuşturmadılar.

V: Peki onların istediği ama sizin yapmak istemediğiniz bir şey oldu mu dini motifli?

A2P: Yok olmadı, gençler çok karıştırmadı.

V: Ev eşyaları nasıl alındı ve nerede yaşadınız?

A2P: Benim eşim fabrikada çalışıyordu. Çalıştığı için gittik bütün eşyaları taksitle aldık. O zaman kredi kartı yoktu. Mobilyayı beyaz eşyaları. Bana düşenleri ben almıştım zaten. Annemler aldı bana.

V: Size düşen bir şey mi vardı?

A2P: Öyle bir ayırım vardı. İlk nişanlandığında soruyorlar. Siz bunu alacaksınız, biz bunu alacağız diye. Mesela bize düşen ney, koltuk takımını aldık biz mesela, iki halı, bütün halılar. Herkes öyleydi. İki kanepa, koltuklar kız tarafı alırdı. Örtüler, yataklar, yastıklar ile ilgili şeyler kız tarafı alırdı. Erkek tarafı buzdolabı, fırın, çamaşır, televizyon, yatak odası, perdeler erkek tarafı alırdı.

V: Bunlar alınmadığı takdirde sorunlar yaşanır mıydı?

A2P: Bir eşya alınmadığı takdirde ciddi sorunlar yaşanırdı. Diy-
orlar ki bu eşyayı ben almam, siz alacaksınız. En ufak bir tüpün bile
lafı olurdu.

V: Kuşak merasimi yapıldı mı?

A2P: Yapıldı. Benim 3 erkek kardeşim de yaptı. 3 de kuşak
bağladı.

V: Anlamı nedir?

A2P: Bilmiyorum ama kuşak muhakkak bağlanır geline.

V: Düğün sonrası dönemde nerede oturma kararı aldınız bu
kararın sebebi neydi?

A2P: O zamanlar maddi imkanlar tabii. Tek basıma bana ev
yaptıramazlardı. Kayınvalidem dedi ki biz size iki oda bir salon
ve mutfak size vereceğiz. Bizde ayrı oturacağız. Dışarıda ayrı oda
vardı. bizim evden ayrı bir oda verdik kendilerine. Dışarıdan kapısı.
Onarın yaşadığı eve böldük, bir bölümünü biz bir bölümünü on-
lar kullandı. Ama ben nişanlandığımda bana dediler ki Recai kata
yazılmış o zamandan. Ve doğru yazılmıştı. Sasa da çalışıyordu,
ama o zaman müteahhit oyun oynadı. Oyun oynadığı için Recai
çekilmek zorunda kaldı. Parasını çekti, dedi ben yatırmayacağım,
gitti parasını geri aldı. Geri aldığı için dairemiz olmadı, mecburen
kayınvalide ile oturduk. Daha sonra Arabistan'a gitti. Sasadan çıktı
siyasi olaylardan dolayı. Tazminatını aldı. O paranın bir bölümü ile
gittik arsa aldık Kenan Evren'den. Kayınvalidemgile evi verdim o
gidince. Ben de aileme geldim. Zaten onlar üst üste yaşıyorlardı. Bir
orada kalırdım bir burada kalırdım. 7 yıl beraber yaşadım bir orada
bir burada. Sonra evimizi yaptırdık.

V: evdeki iş bölümü?

A2P: Hepsini ben yapıyorum. Sadece çay demler.

V: İki çocuk yapmanızın sebebi karar mıydı, yoksa olmadı mı?

A2P: Ben fazla çocuğa karşıydım o zamanlar. Bir tane istiyordum
2.si kaza oldu. Kayınvalidem ve annem olsun istediler. Ben iste-
memiştim. Tabii benim çevrem öyle değildi, çoğu 3-4 çocuk yaptı.

V: Anneniz ve babanız

A2P: Annemler 7 kardeşti, babamlar 3 kardeşti. Ama isteyerek değil, isterlerdi daha fazla olsun.

V: Kız ve erkek çocuklar arasında fark var mıydı?

A2P: Erkek daha değerli idi, erkek doğduğunda bayram yaparlardı soyun devamını getireceği için. Bizim için değil ama benim ya da eşim için bunun bir önemi yoktu.

V: Evlilik ile ilgili sorunların çözümünde neler yapmaktasınız?

A2P: Eşimle çözerdim, dışarıya taşımazdım. Kendi aileme bile anlatmazdım. Gerek kalmazdı çünkü. Recai uyumlu idi, ben de çok fazla anlatmak istemezdim. Aramızda çözerdik.

V: Hiç boşanma yaşadınız mı?

A2P: yok.

V: Boşanma noktasına hiç geldiniz mi?

A2P: Yok, hiç o noktaya gelmedik. Ben daha hakimdim. Boşanıp da ne yapacağım diyordum. Benim bir evim var. Çocuklarım var. Eşimle sorunum olsa dahi çözeceğimi düşünüyordum. Onun için hiç yani. Boşanıp aileme gideyim diye hiç düşünmüyordum. Çünkü evim var, yuvam var, çocuklarım var, bu hayatı benimsiyordum her ne kadar çok büyük bir ask olmasa da arada. Gerek yok diye düşünüyordum.

V: Çocuklarınızın isimleri nelerdir, neden o isimleri koydunuz?

A2P: Senem ve serhat. İki ismi de ben koydum. Eşıme danıştım, eşimin söylediği isimleri beğenmedim. Benim ve onun annesinin ismi Sabriye idi, Sabriye koymak istedi. Ben mümkün değil dedim, benim annemle kayınvalidem de istemedi. Serhat'ı da bilmiyorum, duymuştum bir yerlerden. Senemi de duymuştum bir yerlerden.

V: Çocuklarınıza din eğitimi verdiniz mi, verdiyseniz kim verdi?

A2P: Din eğitimi biz vermek istemedik. Benim oğlum herkes namaz öğreniyor diye ben de öğreneyim dedi. Tamam dedik. Öyle gönderdik kendini, gitti, tam öğrenmedi ama adet yerini bulsun diye

gönderdik. Namazlara gitmesi için teşvik etmedik, kendisi gitmek istedi. Onun haricinde dini ibadet edilmiyor.

V: Hangi hallerde boşanırdınız?

A2P: Beni ezse idi boşanırdım. Ama hep mülaim olduğu için hiç düşünmedim.

APPENDIX C

THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SAMPLE WITH A CHILD

The interview conducted with A2C on 05.08.2014 in Adana

V: How many siblings do you have?

A2C I have a brother who is younger than me.

V: Do you know how many siblings your parents have?

A2C: My father has 9, my mother has 6.

V: Do you know where your mother/father was born?

A2C: My mother was born at home with the help of a midwife.
No idea where my father was born but most likely at home, too.

V: How many children do you want to have?

A2C: Right now, I do not want any children. But if I can overcome my sense of uncertainty in this regard, I prefer to have only one child.

V: Is there any special reason behind your decision?

A2C: Firstly, I think “being married” is a very tedious and troublesome thing. Given that it is already difficult enough to maintain one’s marriage with just two people, I cannot imagine adding another person to it, even a child. I am not ready to bear the responsibility of raising a child with my husband. I do not agree with my husband on different subjects. And so it is not easy for us to decide together on anything. I am a kind of person who is more organized. In contrast, my husband is a person who takes each day as it comes. I always have to restrain or check him which makes me exhausted. If a child comes to our life, s/he will only bring more responsibilities. Because of that, I am not that much eager to have a baby right now. If my husband’s disposition is like mine even just a little, I might have been more willing to have a child.

V: Do other people around you force you and your husband to have a child?

A2C: I do not care about that kind of pressure. I really do not care. There are people who remind us of this all the time but this does not influence me at all.

V: If you give birth in the future, where will your child be born, home or hospital?

A2C: I prefer to give birth to a child in a hospital. It is more dependable and safer.

V: Do you have any idea how your mother/father were living - their house conditions - at your age?

A2C: Generally, they used a wood heater. The conditions at my father's were much worse than at my mother's. My father's family was poorer and impoverished. This was the case because his family was larger than my mother's. I think that my mother's family used a wood heater as well. After electric heaters became widespread, they started to use it.

V: Have you any idea of their housing conditions?

A2C: My mother's family had a wood heater, even in their bath. After that, they used a bath stove, and later water heater with gas. I do not remember the conditions at my father's, for I was so little at the time.

V: What differences/similarities can you tell between their houses and the house where you spent your childhood?

A2C: Before my time, everyone used the same parlour. In order to sleep, many small beds were placed together and all members of the family, apart from father and mother, slept together on the floor. When I look back at my childhood, there were three rooms and one big parlour. Each family member had one room for him/herself since there were only two children in the family.

V: Do you have any idea what kind of methods they used to seek healing?

A2C: They used folk remedies. As far as I remember, when my aunt became severely sick with typhoid with severe fever, she was

not taken to the hospital because it was thought that going to the hospital was a sinful act. She used medicine at home, and she was cured at home. On the other hand, my other aunt fell into hot oil and got burnt but she was not taken to the hospital immediately. She died. If they had lived in better conditions, she might still be living today.

V: What's your methods of healing when you are diagnosed with a disease?

A2C: If I get sick now, of course I would benefit from social welfare. I can go to the hospital to be treated in the modern facilities there.

V: Did you ever work before marriage?

A2C: Yes, at a bank.

V: Where was the bank located?

A2C: At the city center.

V: With whom were you in communication?

A2C: Mostly businessmen, but actually people from all social classes. Let's say they were mixed.

V: Do you have any idea which religious denominations the people you were in contact with at the bank belonged to?

A2C: There were from different religious backgrounds. There were Armenians who were one hundred percent Muslim. I was in communication with Sunnis and there was no problem at all.

V: Before marriage, what kind of durable consumer goods did you possess?

A2C: I owned quite a lot before marriage. Actually, I had some of them in my mother's house and some in my own home after marriage.

V: Where do people (around you) work, in the agricultural sector or in others?

A2C: They are working at the city center. My mother and father worked in the agricultural sector, but later became urbanized.

V: Have you lost any child because of disease? Or do you know people who have lost their children because of childhood diseases?

A2C: Hmm, I think, it happened once. But it was not in my social environment; rather, it happened to one of my husband's relatives. His sister's children died when she was pregnant for eight months. The reason was legal cruelty. In addition, one of my acquaintances' child died because of a wrapped cord.

V: Have you ever encountered any death because of disease or infection after birth?

A2C: Most probably, but I do not remember anymore.

V: Did you have access to hot water?

A2C: Yes, we had solar energy technology.

V: Which cities have you visited before marriage? And why?

A2C: I went to İstanbul to work there for one year. I was also in Ankara just for a visit. And I stayed one year in Mersin while preparing for my university entrance exam. Hmm, I have also been in İzmir.

V: Have you ever spent time with non-Alevis before marriage?

A2C: Most of them were already non-Alevis.

V: Where or how did you communicate with them?

A2C: Generally at work or university.

V: Have you ever lived alone (free from your family) before marriage?

A2C: Yes. When I was working in İstanbul and living in Mersin, I was free then from my family. And when I went to university, I and my brother rented a house in Adana but lived apart from our family.

V: Do you remember the neighborly relations in those buildings?

A2C: In those buildings, our neighborly relations were not warm. One of my neighbors in Mersin was a police officer. The other was a housewife. One of my other neighbors was accidentally my mother's distant relative. In Istanbul, there was a student couple, and so I did not experience problems there with my neighbors.

V: Why did you not experience problems with them?

A2C: Because I had many visitors (women and men), and my neighbors did not bother me. Nobody was disturbing me.

V: Do you have any connection with those neighbors still?

A2C: No. Just with my mother's cousin. Apart from her, I do not see any of them anymore.

V: Did you have boyfriends – except your husband - before marriage?

A2C: Yes, I did.

V: How did you meet them?

A2C: Through a friend, at university, and on the internet.

V: Did your family members know your boyfriends?

A2C: Yes, of course. Some of my boyfriends were introduced to my family. But not all of them. My family did not know my short-term dates, only the long-term ones. Yes, of course. But not all of them. If it was only a fling, they did not know.

V: Have you ever dated non-Alevis?

A2C: All of them were non-Alevis. One of them was Kurdish-Alevi, and all the others were Sunni.

V: What were the reactions of your family in terms of their religious identity?

A2C: My family is very open-minded on this subject. There was no polemic on this subject between us. Since their approach is very humanistic, they do not care about the denominations of my boyfriends. I was free to do it my way. Even once, my father told me that people from other denominations make our family colorful.

V: Did your husband's religious identity influence your decision in terms of marriage?

A2C: My husband is Alevi as well. But it did not affect my decision. Being Alevi does not bring any advantage to my family. The important thing for my family was whether my husband makes me happy or not. My decision was not influenced by his religious identity. It took me one month to learn that he was an Alevi.

V: Could you say something about how you got married? How did your families meet?

A2C: We flirted for six years, from our university years to the time we got our jobs. We were engaged in a very simple way while flirting. At the engagement ceremony, our two families met. I had never met them before that engagement ceremony. They had not come to our house to ask for my hand before the engagement. But my family had met my spouse beforehand. Our engagement came into being in this way: we were working outside of Adana and were living together.

V: Did your families know that you were living together before marriage?

A2C: Yes, they did. In addition, they were supporting us materially and spiritually. So, we came to Adana just for one day to engage. After that, he went to do his military service. Wedding ceremony was done after he finished his military service. His family did not support us materially but my family did because they were closer to us and knew us better.

V: Who was responsible for the marriage contract?

A2C: The registrar general of marriage.

V: Was there a religious person in charge of your wedding/engagement ceremonies?

A2C: We were absolutely against it.

V: Why did you not permit religious ceremonies?

A2C: We are not believers when it comes to these subjects. People around us did not force us to do that kind of things as well. Maybe we did not allow them to force us.

V: Did not anyone suggest such a ceremony?

A2C: My husband's family has a way with religious people but since we were not on good terms with them, they could not force us.

V: Could you tell me briefly about your wedding ceremony?

A2C: It was very unpretentious and modest. Not very long. After that, we put on entertainment with people we like. It was not a wedding which was organized in light of traditions or customs.

V: Did your relatives tie a red band over your belly?

A2C: No, it did not happen. I did not want it. I think we should get rid of traditionalism.

V: Do you have any idea why red bands are tied onto the brides' belly? Why were you against it?

A2C: Actually I do not know exactly why there is such a tradition. I think it is a kind of custom or a habit.

V: Where did you begin to live after marriage? What was the reason behind your decision?

A2C: We decided to live at the city center. We preferred a district where we can find peace when we get home from work.

V: Did you ever think of staying with your family or your husband's family?

A2C: Never. But, right now we are living with my family because of our financial situation.

V: How about sharing chores at home?

A2C: My husband irons his own clothes. Sometimes, he hangs out the laundry. But everything else is done by me.

V: Why do you think your husband only does very few chores around the house?

A2C: I do not think it has anything to do with my husband having certain prejudices. If I want anything done, most likely he will do it. But I do not want him to do it. I do not give him that chance. Because right now, I am not working but he goes to work every day and is exhausted at the end of the day. However, to be honest, when we were working together, I was the person who does all the housework. Unfortunately, whenever he cleans somewhere, I have to clean that part again after he does it.

V: If you decide to have a baby, what would be your preference, boy or girl?

A2C: I do not have that kind of preferences but I think my husband wants to be the father of a girl. He thinks that he can get along better with a girl than with a boy.

V: How do you solve problems related to your marriage?

A2C: Firstly, we prefer to fight. My husband does not want a third person to interfere in our marriage. But sometimes we share our problems with some of our friends.

V: Have you decided on the names of your children yet?

A2C: I do not remember exactly what we chose but we decide together on this subject. Dora, Armin - that kind of names I remember. My husband prefers Ege or Deniz. I like names which mirror me better. For example, Arya (Aria) since I am interested in music. Or maybe we can choose a name which matches our names well such as Arif - Arya - Alya.

V: How did you become interested in music?

A2C: Not right now, but at one time I was playing the guitar.

V: If you have a child in the future, are you going to give him/her a religious education? If yes, what kind of education would it be?

A2C: I think religious education is not necessary. Knowledge is something that you can attain easily nowadays. Therefore I do not think that they need to have an education on religion. But my husband thinks the other way around. For example, he wants to send

our child to do a course on the Qur'ān. And he thinks that if our child internalizes what the Qur'ān says, then s/he would be a very religious person. But if s/he does not agree with what the Qur'ān teaches, then s/he is free to be an atheist. It depends on what s/he wants. We haven't decided yet, but since religious education might affect my child's psychology, I might take a stand against it. It might be a very good reason to have a fight.

V: Have you ever divorced?

A2C: No. Neither of us nor my parents have experienced such a case.

V: Are there any obstacles if you want to divorce?

A2C: There are no obstacles to divorce. It is meaningless to continue in marriage if two persons do not get along with each other. Of course my family do not force me to stay married, even though they would support my decision if I am not happy. I don't care what people say if I decide to get divorced.

V: If you want to divorce, don't you care about what other people think?

A2C: Of course we do care about their reactions. But if there is no happy marriage, what people think becomes secondary.

V: What would you say if you are asked to compare potential reactions to your divorce and that of your mother?

A2C: Because I have economic freedom, I think I now have the possibility to change my social circle. Or, even if I could not change my social environment, I can shut my ears to all gossips or social pressure. During my mother's divorce, unfortunately there was no economic freedom then for women as the social environment was so oppressive. Compared to their time, our age is more free, our lifestyle easier, and people have gotten used to these kinds of things. My mother's time was not open to welcoming different lifestyles. To be honest, I can say that I am luckier than my mother when it comes to divorce.

V: So, in which situations would you prefer to divorce?

A2C: If I am cheated on. Or, if my husband loses money because of some secret initiatives of his. I can give him a second chance but if it happens again, then I would divorce him of course. Material discrepancy is crucial to me. For example, if he sells our real estate without asking me, that would be reason enough to divorce.

V: If you have a child in the future, are you disturbed if s/he flirts before marriage?

A2C: Since I myself have done flirting several times, there is no problem for me. However, I wish s/he will not make the same mistakes I did. I might warn her/him. Of course they should be open to flirting. But, sometimes ladies might be more sensitive and might be deceived by a man's romantic innuendos. I can warn her against some potential disappointment.

V: If your child follows a different faith to yours, what would be your reaction?

A2C: We have to respect it since it is her/his own choice. If you react to it angrily, you won't be able to change it, and you might even make it worse.

Turkish version of the interview with A2C:

V: Çocukluğunuz hakkında kısaca konuşabilir miyiz? Kaç çocuklu bir ailede büyüdünüz? Anne babanız nasıl evlendi?

A2C: Annem babam görücü usulü ile evlendiler. Bir kardeşim var. 4 kişilik bir aileyiz.

V: Anne babanız kaç kardeşliydi.

A2C: Babam 9 kardeş. Annem 6.

V: Anne babanız nerede doğdular.

A2C: Annem evde doğdu babamdan emin değilim ama sanırım o da evde doğmuştur.

V: Siz kaç çocuk sahibi olmak istersiniz?

A2C: Şu an için hiç çocuk sahibi olmak istemiyorum. Ama eğer kararsızlığımı yenebilirsem belki bir tane olabilir.

V: Bu kararınızda ya da kararsızlığınızda etkili olan özel bir sebep var mı?

A2C: 1. Evliliği çok meşakkatli bir şey olarak görüyorum. 2 kişi ile dahi evliliği sürdürmek zor iken 3 kişi bana fazla yorucu geliyor. O yüzden hani bazı endişelerim var bir çocuğun sorumluluğu konusunda, eşimle olan çatışmalarda. Evlilikte çok çatışmalar yaşıyoruz her konuda. Karar verirken, karar alırken büyük sıkıntılar yaşıyoruz. Ben biraz daha planlı giden, eşim ise biraz daha günü anı yaşayan biri. Sürekli frene basma durumunda kalıyorum bu da beni yoruyor. Çocuk işin içine girince daha ağır sorumluluklar getirecektir, o yüzden çocuk beni bayağı düşündüren bir şey şu anda. Kocamın karakteri biraz daha benzer olsa idi bana, çocuk konusunda biraz daha hevesli olabilirdim.

V: Etraftan baskı görüyor musunuz çocuk konusunda?

A2C: Etraftaki baskı çok önemsiz benim için, hiç önemsemiyorum. Sürekli söyleyenler oluyor ama bu beni hiç etkilemiyor.

V: Eğer çocuk sahibi olursanız nerede doğurmayı düşünüyorsunuz? Evde mi yoksa başka bir yerde mi?

A2C: Hastanede doğurmayı tercih ederim. Daha güvenli ve steril olması açısından.

V: Annenizin ve babanızın sizlerin yaşında iken yaşadıkları ev koşullarına dair bir fikriniz var mı?

A2C: Odunlu soba ile genelde ısınırlarmış. Babamların şartları annemlerin şartlarına göre daha ağırmış. Muhtemelen çok daha fazla çocuğa sahip olduklarından dolayı daha fakir ve yoksullardı. Annemler de odunlu soba ile ısınıyorlardı diye biliyorum. Elektrikli soba çıktıktan sonra ona geçmişlerdir.

V: Ev koşullarını hatırlıyor musunuz?

A2C: Banyoda odunlu sobaları olduğunu hatırlıyorum, sonra termosifonlar çıktı ama şofben yoktu. Babamları tam hatırlamıyorum çok küçüktüm onlarla yaşarken, anneannemleri hatırlıyorum.

V: Sizin çocukluğunuzun geçtiği ev ile onların çocukluklarının geçtiği ev arasında ne gibi farklılıklar ve benzerlikler var?

A2C: Anne-babamın evlerinde bir salonu herkes kullanıyordu yer yatağı seriliyor ve herkes bir arada yaşıyordu. Benim çocukluğum ise 3 oda bir salonlu, banyosu ayrı, bir ev idi. 2 çocuktuk zaten.

V: Onlar hastalandığında çözüm olarak nereye başvurusunlardı?

A2C: Kendi ürettikleri şeyler oluyordu. Hatırladığım kadarı ile teyzem rahatsızlandığı zaman, tifo geçirdi örneğin, hastaneye götürmediler günahıdır diye. Hala ilaçlar alır bu yüzden. Evde tedavi ettiler. Ayrıca diğer teyzem yağın içine düşmüş, yetiştirememişler ve ölmüş. Eğer imkânlar sağlanabilseydi hayatta olacaktı belki de.

V: Siz hastalandığınızda ne yapıyorsunuz?

A2C: Şu an hastalandığımda tabii ki sosyal imkânlarımdan faydalaniyorum. Hastaneye gidip modern tıp olanaklarını kullanabiliyorum.

V: Evlenmeden önce çalıştınız mı?

A2C: Evet, bankada çalıştım.

V: Nerede çalışıyordunuz?

A2C: Şehir içinde çalışırdım.

V: Kimler ile diyalog kurardınız?

A2C: Genelde iş adamları vardı, ya aslında her kesimden kişi vardı, karışık diyelim.

V: Diyalog halinde olduğunuz kişilerin dini aidiyetleri sizinki ile farklılık taşıyor muydu?

A2C: Farklı dini gruplardandı. Ermeni de vardı, tamamı ile Müslüman da vardı. Sünnilerle de diyalog halinde idim, aram da iyiydi.

V: Evlenmeden önce dayanaklı tüketim eşyalarından hangisine sahiptiniz?

A2C: Evlenmeden önce birçoğuna sahiptim. Hem annemlerin evinde iken sahiptim hem de evlenmeden önce yaşadığım evde de vardı.

V: Sosyalleştiğiniz insanlar tarımla mı ilgilenirlerdi yoksa şehirdeki iş kollarında mı çalışıyorlardı.

A2C: Şehirdeki iş kolları. Annemle babamlar tarımla ilgilenirlerdi ama sonra yavaş yavaş şehirleştiler.

V: Yakın çevrenizde ya da etrafınızda çocuk ölümleri yaşandı mı?

A2C: Oldu diye hatırlıyorum, benim çevremde değil de eşimin çevresinde. Ablasının çocukları öldü. Hamile iken ablası koca şiddetinden dolayı 8 aylıkken bebekler karında öldüler. 1 tanıdığımın da çocuğu kordon dolanmasından dolayı öldü.

V: Doğduktan sonra yaşadığı hastalık ya da enfeksiyondan dolayı ölen bir çocukla karşılaştınız mı?

A2C: Muhakkak vardır ama hatırlamıyorum.

V: Sıcak suya erişiminiz var mıydı?

A2C: Evet, güneş enerjimiz vardı.

V: Evlenmeden önce Adana dışına çıktınız mı? Evet ise hangi şehirlere neden gittiniz?

A2C: İstanbul'a gittim 1 sene çalışmak için. Ankara'ya gittim gezme amaçlı. Ayrıca Mersinde 1 sene kalmıştım üniversite sınavına hazırlanmak için. İzmir'de de bulunmuştum.

V: Evlenene kadar bulduğunuz ortamlarda alevi olmayan insanlar var mıydı?

A2C: Zaten çoğunluğu alevi değildi.

V: Nereelerde karşılaşıyordunuz?

A2C: Genelde iş ortamı veya okul ortamlarında oluyordu.

V: Evlenmeden önce ailenizden bağımsız ev hayatınız oldu mu?

A2C: Oldu. İstanbul'da çalışırken oldu, Mersinde olmuştu. Adana'da üniversite okurken de kardeşim ev tutmuştu, onunla kalmıştık.

V: Bu evlerdeki komşularınızla ilişkileriniz nasıldı?

A2C: Genelde seçtiğim apartmanlar böyle çok fazla komşuluk ilişkileri yakın olmayan yerlerdi. Mersindeki bir komşumuz polisti. Diğer komşumuz ev hanımı idi. Bir komşum da tesadüf annemin kuzeni idi. İstanbul'da bir öğrenci çift vardı. O nedenle sorun çıkmıyordu?

V: Neden sorun çıkmıyordu dediniz?

A2C: Çünkü benim de evime giden gelenler oluyordu. Kimse rahatsızlık vermiyordu erkek olsun kız olsun.

V: O dönemden kalan komşularınızla hala diyalogunuz var mı?

A2C: Yok hayır. Bir tek annemin o kuzeni var, onun haricinde herhangi bir diyalogum yok.

V: Evlenmeden önce erkek arkadaşınız olmuş muydu şu andaki eşiniz haricinde?

A2C: Evet olmuştu.

V: Nasıl tanışmıştınız?

A2C: Biri ile arkadaş vasıtası ile, diğeri ile üniversiteden, diğeri ile internet üstünden.

V: erkek arkadaşlarınızı aileniz biliyorlar mıydı?

A2C: Tabii biliyorlardı ama hepsini değil. Kısa süreli olanları bilmiyorlardı ama uzun süreli olunca tanışıyorlardı.

V: Bu ilişkileriniz içinde sizinle aynı dini kökenden olmayanlar var mıydı?

A2C: Hepsini farklı mezheptendi zaten. Bir tanesi Kürt Alevisi idi, ben Arap Alevisiyim, diğerleri Sünni idi.

V: Aileniz onların dini kökenleri hakkında olumlu ya da olumsuz bir geri bildirimde bulundular mı?

A2C: Bu konuda ailem çok esnek, hiç zıtlasma olmadı. Daha hümanist yaklaştıkları için olaylara mezhepsel bakmıyorlardı. Bana bırakmışlardı kararı. Babamın dediğine göre farklı bir renkti onlar için farklı mezhepten olan biri.

V: Eşinizin dini kimliği evlilik kararınızda etkili oldu mu?

A2C: Eşim de Arap Alevisidir, ancak bir etkisi olmadı. Onun Arap olması ailem için bir avantaj değildi. Onlar için o insanın beni mutlu etmesi önemliydi. Beni de hiç etkilemedi zaten ben bir ay sonra öğrendim onun Arap Alevisi olduğunu.

V: Kız isteme olayı yaşandı mı, yaşandı ise nasıl oldu?

A2C: Eşimle biz 6 yıl flört ettik. Üniversite sürecinden iş bulana kadar. O flört içerisinde kısa bir nişan yaptık. O nişan zamanı tanıştık ailesi ile. Daha önce tanışmışlığım olmadı. Bir isteme falan olmadı, aileler de o zaman tanıştılar. Ama eşim ile ailem tanışıyorlardı. Nişan şu şekil oldu, biz çalışıyorduk şehir dışında, beraber yaşıyorduk.

V: Beraber yaşadığınızdan ailelerinizin haberi var mıydı?

A2C: Evet vardı. Ayrıca destek oluyorlardı zaten maddi manevi. İşte bir günlüğüne adanaya gelip nişan yaptık. Sonra eşim askere gitti döndü sonra düğün yaptık. Onun ailesi maddi anlamda çok destek olmadı ama benim ailem çok destek oldu maddi oldu. Çünkü benim ailem bizimle daha sıkı fıkı idi, ilişkimizin boyutunu onlar biliyordu.

V: Ev eşyalarını nasıl aldınız?

A2C: Maddi olarak ikimiz de çalışıyordunuz ayrıca benim ailemin desteği çok oldu. Ev eşyalarına ben ve eşim karar verdik, kimse müdahale etmedi. Erkek tarafı kız tarafı olmadı, ortaya bir para kondu ve onunla alındı. Ailesi ile problemler yaşadığımız için biz ikimiz ortadaki parayı kullandık benim ailemden gelen.

V: Nikâhınızı kim kıydı?

A2C: Nikâh memuru.

V: Nikahınızın öncesinde ya da sonrasında herhangi bir dini şahıs gelip dahil oldu mu, dini tören düzenlendi mi?

A2C: Buna kesinlikle izin vermedik.

V: Neden izin vermediniz?

A2C: Bu konularda çok inançlı olmadığımız için yapmadık. Etraftan da baskı görmedik, izin vermedik böyle bir baskı yapımlarına.

V: Hiç kimse telkin etmedi mi?

A2C: Eşim ailesinin biraz hacı hocalarla işleri vardır ancak onlarla aramız çok iyi olmadığından onlar da karışamadılar.

V: Düğün töreninizi kısaca anlatabilir misiniz?

A2C: Sakin bir tören, çok uzun sürmeyen, ardından da sevdiğimiz insanlar ile bir eğlence düzenledik. Çok gelenek göreneklere bağlı bir düğün değildi.

V: Kuşak merasimi yapıldı mı?

A2C: Olmadı, ben istemedim. Gelenekçilikten vazgeçilmesi gerekiyor bence.

V: Kuşak merasimi neden yapılmaktadır, ve siz neden karşı çıkıyorsunuz?

A2C: Kuşak merasiminin tam olarak ne olduğunu da bilmiyorum. Bana gelenek gibi geliyor. Bağımlılık gibi geliyor.

V: Düğün sonrası nerede oturma kararı aldınız? Ve bu kararı almanızın sebebi nelerdir?

A2C: Merkezde oturma kararı aldık. İşten geldiğimde huzur bulacağımız bir yer tercih ettik.

V: Aile ile oturmayı düşünmediniz mi?

A2C: Hiçbir zaman düşünmedik. Şu anda aile ile beraberiz ama maddi durumlardan dolayı.

V: İş bölümünü nasıl gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?

A2C: Eşim kendi ütüsünü yapar, bazen çamaşırları serer, evin geri kalan bütün işlerini ben yaparım.

V: Eşinizin yapmamasının sebebi nedir diğer işleri?

A2C: Eşimin belli kalıpları olduğu için değil de, istesem yapardı hani, ona bu fırsatı vermiyorum. Çünkü ben su an çalışmıyorum ve o yorulduğu için ona yaptırmak istemiyorum. Ancak ikimizin çalıştığı dönemde de ben yapıyordum ancak hep onun üzerinden gidiyorum o yapsa da o nedenle yapmasını istemiyorum.

V: Kız ya da erkek çocuk yapma tercihiniz var mı?

A2C: Benim yok ama eşim sanırım kız çocuk istiyordu kız çocukları ile daha iyi anlaşacağını düşündüğünden dolayı.

V: Evlilik ile ilgili bir sorunuzun çözümünde hangi yöntemlere başvuruyorsunuz?

A2C: Öncelikle kavga etmeyi tercih ediyoruz. Eşim 3. Kişileri tartışmaya dahil etmeyi kabul etmiyor. Ama arkadaşlarımıza bazen danışıyoruz.

V: Çocuklarına vermek istediğiniz isimlere karar verdiniz mi?

A2C: Tam hatırlamıyorum ama isimlere ortak karar veriyoruz. Dora vardı, Armin vardı. O tarz isimler vardı. Eşim Ege Deniz gibi isimleri tercih ediyor. Ben daha çok beni yansıtan isimleri tercih ediyorum. Arya gibi, müzikle ilgiliyim diye. Ya da ismimizle alakalı olsun diye, Arif Arya Alya gibi.

V: Müzikle nasıl ilgileniyorsunuz?

A2C: Şu anda çok değil ama zamanında gitar çalıyordum.

V: Çocuğunuz olunca din eğitimi verecek misiniz, verirseniz nasıl bir eğitim düşünüyorsunuz?

A2C: Bence din eğitimi verilmemeli. Zaten bilgiye kolayca ulaşabiliyor, ayrıca eğitime gerek olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Ama eşim tam tersini düşünüyor. Örneğin o çocuğumuzun kuran kursuna gitmesini istiyor. Zamanla bunu benimserse o yöne gitsin, istemiyorsa diğer yöne gitsin diyor. Henüz buna karar vermedik ama

eğer açıkçası çocuğun psikolojisi açısından istemediğim için onun karşısında dururum. Bu iyi bir kavga nedeni olabilir.

V: Hiç boşanma yaşadınız mı? Anne babanız ?

A2C: Yok. Bizde de onlarda da böyle bir şey yaşanmadı.

V: Sizin boşanma konusunda önünüzde engeller var mı?

A2C: Boşanmaya hiçbir engel yok. İki insan anlaşıyorlarsa bunu sürdürmeleri saçma tabii ki. Ailemde tabii ki bu konularda boşanma konusunda baskı yapmazlar ve destek bile olurlar eğer sonuç alınmıyorA2C:

V: Boşanma kararı alırken çevreyi çok umursamayacak mısınız?

A2C: Tabii ki çevreyi umursayacağız. Ama mutlu bir evlilik yoksa bu ikinci plana giriyor.

V: Annenizin boşanmak istememesinin sebepleri ile sizinkiler paralel miydi?

A2C: Annemlerin boşanmama sebebi çevre değildi.

V: Sizin boşanmanız durumunda karşılaşacağınız olumlu ve olumsuz tepkiler ile annenizin boşanması durumunda karşılaşacağı tepkileri kıyaslamanız istense ne söylerdiniz?

A2C: Benim ekonomik özgürlüğümünden dolayı benim çevre değiştirme şansım olabilir. Ayrıca çevre değiştirmesem bile çevreye kulağımı kapatabilirim. Annemin dönemindeki zamanda ise hem ekonomik özgürlük kısıtlı hem de çevre kabuğundan çıkmamış. Şu anda benim çevrem biraz daha o döneme göre yaşayış tarzları girmiş oldukları ortamlar alışlagelmiş şeyler var artık. O dönemler yoktu o kadar. Şu anda daha şanslı hissedebilirim kendimi anneme göre söz konusu boşanma olduğunda.

V: Hangi hallerde boşanırsınız?

A2C: Aldatma söz konusu ise, eşimin benden habersiz ciddi anlamada maddi kayıpları varsa o anlamada 2. Şansı verip aynı kayıpları veriyorsa bu nedendir. Maddi tutarsızlıklar yani. Örneğin bir gayrimenkulün satışı benden habersiz yapılıyorsa gibi.

V: Çocuğunuz olursa, evlilik öncesi flörtü sizi rahatsız eder mi?

A2C: Ben flörtler yaşadığım için benim açımdan hiçbir sakıncası yok. Ama benim yaptığım kimi yanlışları yapmasını istemem tabii ki, uyarılarda bulunabilirim. Tabii ki flörte açık olmalı gençler. Bazen bayanlar daha duygusal olabiliyor, erkelerin duygusal olduğuna kanabiliyorlar. O yönde uyarabilirim hayal kırıklığı oluyor diye.

V: Çocuğunuz farklı bir inanışa sahip olursa tepkiniz ne olurdu?

A2C: Onun seçimidir diye saygı duymamız gerekiyor zaten. Ona tepki verdiğinizde zaten değiştirmeyeceksiniz, hatta onu daha katı hale getirebilirsiniz.

APPENDIX D

Interview Form

Research Object: Examination of the effects of religious beliefs/identities to individual/social field in the marriage process.

Date: ??/??/2016 **Time:** (Start/End)_____/_____

Intro

Hello, my name is Volkan Ertit. I am a research associate in Aksaray University Sociology Department and a doctoral student in Radboud University, the Netherlands. I'm doing a research about the effect of religious beliefs on marriage rituals. I'm having this interview for my doctoral thesis.

Before our interview, I do want to point out that our interview is confidential and what talked about in this interview will be known only by me. Your daughter (son) / mother (father) will never heard and read what you tell. Additionally, the research report will certainly not include your names, instead of this, pseudonyms will be used or your names will be encrypted.

Do you have any questions or any opinion you want to ask or state before our interview?

What do you think about our conversation to be saved? We may remove information, which you don't want, at the end of the interview.

I guess our interview will take about 45 minutes. If you excuse me, I want to start with questions.

QUESTIONS

Age:

Gender:

Education:

Job:

Marital Status:

First Group Questions

1. How were you earning your living before marriage/after marriage?

1.1. Where?

1.2. Working Conditions?

1.3. With whom?

2. How many children / (brothers/sisters)/ do you have? How many children do you want to have?

3. How many brothers /sisters does your mother/father have?

4. Where were you/your children/ your parents born? (House or a medical centre)

5. Have you lost any child because of disease? Or have you seen anybody that they lost their children because of childhood diseases?

6. Before and after marriage, what kind of durable goods (washing machine, television, dishwasher *etc.*) did you have?

7. What kind of heating systems do you use/ did your parents use?

8. Did you have access to hot water in your childhood?

9. What kind of illnesses did you catch when you were child? What kinds of ways were used to heal you? Did any religious man/woman help you? Or have you tried any metaphysical ways to improve your situation? (How about your child or your parents?)

10. Have you ever spent time with non-Alevi before marriage? Where do you meet or come across with non-Alevi? (Social Environment)

11. How do you obtain your daily needs before/after marriage (bread, cheese, clothes, fruits, vegetables, jam, paying bills, *etc.*)?

12. Have you ever lived alone (free from your family) before marriage?

12.1. If yes, what was the religious origin of your neighbours?

13. Which cities have you visited until now? Why?

14. At what age did you get married?

15. What was the type of your marriage?

Second Group Questions

1. Have you ever had a boy/girl friend?

If yes,

1.1. How did you meet?

1.2. Did your parents or your close relatives know that you had a boy/girl friend?

1.3. What was the denomination of your partner?

1.4. If s/he would have been a non-Alevi, what would have been the reaction of your parents? Or if s/he was a non-Alevi, what was the reaction of your parents?

2. How did you propose or get proposal?

3. Did religion play any role in the rituals of marriage from beginning to the end?

4. Was it a religious or a civil marriage? Why?

5. How did you prepare yourself for the wedding ceremonies?

6. Where did you start to live after marriage? (What was the reason behind this decision?)

7. If you have problems related to your marriage, whom do you prefer to consult?

8. What is/are name(s) of your child(ren)? And why did you choose that/those name(s)?

9. If your children or grandchildren would date before marriage, what would be your reaction?

10. Have you ever been divorced? What kind of reasons would cause you to divorce?

10.1. Which generation is more inclined to divorce, old or new?

11. Have you ever had a spiritual brother? / Has your husband ever had a spiritual brother?

11.1. Have you observed any change in the social power and prestige of the institution of spiritual brotherhood?

12. Have you ever seen a case held in the people's court?

12.1. Does the existence of the institution of the people's court influence your decision in terms of mate choice?

12.2. Have you observed any change in the social power and prestige of the institution of the people's court?

13. What would you say if your opinion is sought about the differences between the past and now in terms of marital issues in general?

APPENDIX E
RESEARCH FIELDS

